Category Archives: EU

The wages of Scottish independence – infrastructure

Geographically Scotland is very isolated. It is a stranded at the top of mainland Britain with a single land border with England. Any goods or people coming and going to Scotland have a choice of independent access by air and sea or dependent entry and exit via rail and road through England.

Why does this matter? Two reasons: Scotland cannot assume free passage for goods and people through England in perpetuity. They might not have it immediately after independence if Scotland is unable to gain EU membership, either because the reduced UK (henceforth the UK) opposed it or the other EU members did. Alternatively the UK (or England on its own) might leave the EU. It would also be in the UK Government’s hands
to impose its own restrictions on the free movement of Scottish imports and exports.

In any of these eventualities Scotland would be severely hampered in its importing and exporting. EU law would prevent the free export of Scottish goods to and through the rest of the UK if Scotland was not part of the EU and to the EU through the UK if the UK did not remain in the EU. If the UK did not remain in the EU, exports to Scotland from the UK would also be subject to EU protectionism and even goods from the EU could become subject to tariffs and quotas if they passed through the UK. As for the UK Government taking steps off their own bat to impose restrictions, that could be a real possibility if the UK left the EU, either in retaliation for EU imposed restrictions on UK trade with the
EU or EU restrictions on the movement of goods to and from the non-EU nations of Europe to the UK . There might also be disputes between the UK and Scotland which could result in restrictions, for example, Scotland failing to pay the interest on their share of the UK National debt at the time of independence or Scotland operating too lax an
immigration policy resulting in immigrants coming into Scotland with the intention of moving across the border to England.

The precarious geographical situation of Scotland shows the importance of it remaining on good terms with the UK in the event of independence. But it also means that the UK would have no incentive in improving railways and roads right up to the Scottish/English border. In the UK it may make sense for political reasons to build a high speed rail line from London to Glasgow and Edinburgh as is presently under discussion (http://news.scotsman.com/edinburgh/Scotland-must-be-on-new.6606935.jp),
although the proposed HS2 route is being fiercely resisted by those parts of England through which it will wend on its way to Scotland (http://www.rail.co/2011/01/31/why-britain-needs-hs2/). But if Scotland were independent , at best it would make no political sense for the UK to extend such as line further than Carlisle, a city ten miles short
of the Scottish border and 70 odd miles from Glasgow. More likely than extending the high-speed line to Carlisle would be a decision to extend it no further than Manchester, a city 170 miles from Glasgow. The same reasoning would be likely to apply to all rail and road access between England and Scotland, because there would be little benefit to the UK in improving the links right up to or anywhere near the Scottish border.

But even if the UK was willing to improve railways and roads up to the Scottish border, it is doubtful whether an independent Scotland could afford to extend the links to Glasgow and Edinburgh. HS2 if it ever gets built will cost tens of billions of pounds (http://stophs2.org/news/2368-hs2-bill-1000-family). A substantial part of the line, around a fifth of its length, would be in Scotland if it runs to Glasgow and/or Edinburgh. Bearing mind that Scotland’s GDP at present is less than £140 billion (in 2009 it was
officially estimated at £131 billion – http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/06/21144516/5), it is difficult to see how Scotland would fund the construction, maintenance and running of the HSE on their side of the border.

Poor communications, external and internal, would not hinder only Scottish exports and imports of goods . It would also adversely affect large sections of the private enterprise part of the Scottish economy such as tourism and dissuade talented individuals from coming to work in Scotland or businessmen to invest there. Poor infrastructure generally would be a disincentive to individuals and businesses. Existing well qualified individuals and companies located in Scotland might well decide to move elsewhere.

But infrastructure is about much more than main roads and rail links to major cities. An independent Scotland would have to fully fund all new capital projects in Scotland including the rail and road network over the sparsely populated highlands and islands, and maintain the existing networks. This would not be easy to do even under the present devolution arrangements because Network Rail (which has responsibility for the
railway in Scotland) is projecting considerable cuts in funding (http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/may/31/rail-industry-prepares-for-public-funding-cuts)

Amongst other things, an independent Scotland would also have to build new schools, universities, prisons, law courts and hospitals and maintain the old ones; prevent coastal erosion (a considerable task with such an extensive coastline for such a small population); fund most the local council’s infrastructure spending and maintain state-owned Scottish Water infrastructure . Of course much of this is already done via the UK Treasury block grant Scotland receives each year, but thereby hangs a tale: in the first ten years of devolution public spending in Scotland increased dramatically. Now it is due to fall, viz: “In the last decade, Scottish Government departmental expenditure has grown by over 5% a year on average in real terms. It is projected that between 2011/12 and 2014/15 it could fall by an average of 2.9% in real terms per annum and be £3.5 to £4bn lower.” (http://www.scdi.org.uk/downloads/SCDIBlueprintforScotland.pdf). That is the official estimate in the event of Scotland remaining within the UK with all the benefits that provides, such as assurance for business investors that Scotland is effectively underwritten by England and a massive annual subsidy from England. (Shortly before Labour left office in 2010, the monetary benefits to Scotland since devolution in 2000 were calculated by the Scottish Secretary Jim Murphy’s office at £76 billion, that is the difference between tax raised in Scotland and public expenditure in Scotland since 2002 – http://www.scotsman.com/news/Scotland39s-76-billion-39devolution-dividend39.6009619.jp).

In short, infrastructure spending in the ten years since devolution has taken place in the most benign economic and fiscal circumstances. Those circumstances would not exist come independence. Indeed, they would probably be far worse by the time independence was reached because according to the Murphy report the tax deficit is already at dangerous levels : ‘… an examination of “real money” government expenditure that excludes capital spending, Scotland Office economists found total expenditure in Scotland currently amounts to 145 per cent of all Scottish tax receipts.”

An independent Scotland would find itself immediately saddled with a massive national debt as the result of taking on a proportionate share of the financial obligations of the UK at the time of independence (this would be in excess of £200 billion – https://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2011/06/02/the-wages-of-scottish-independence-public-debt/), further debt in the shape of PFI contracts for work undertaken in Scotland
and local authority debt. On the other side of the fiscal ledger, the tax base in an independent Scotland would shrink because of the unhealthy proportion of its GDP which is dependent on public spending (https://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2011/05/19/the-wages-of-scottish-independence-public-sector-employment/) and the receipts from oil in Scottish waters would not compensate for the £8 billion pa Scotland receives in extra funding from the UK Treasury because the per capita funding is around £1,500 per head higher in Scotland than it is in England. The oil is also a rapidly declining asset. (https://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2011/05/14/the-truth-about-uk-oil-and-gas/).
It is also a fact that Scotland has a dangerously narrow private sector being far too dependent on oil, Scotch whisky, material and tourism. This means it could easily be blown off course by a sudden change of fortune in one of the main revenue earners .

With additional costs and tax revenue falling, it is improbable in the extreme that Scotland’s infrastructure could be maintained at its present level let alone substantially improved. Nor is there any reason to believe that an independent Scotland would be wise in its use of money for infrastructure investment. The Scottish parliament was estimated to cost £40 million and cost £414 million (http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-03357.pdf) and a tram scheme in Edinburgh which bids fair to waste £750 million with
precious little to show for it (http://scotlandonsunday.scotsman.com/comment/Edinburgh39s-disgrace-II-Tram-fiasco.6783582.jp). Those are serious amounts of money for an economy the size of Scotland. A massive like England could shake them off, but a few fiascos of this magnitude could seriously damage Scotland.

The likely outcome for infrastructure in an independent Scotland is more ridiculously expensive projects, less of it and worse maintained.

The wages of Scottish independence – immigration

The Scots Numpty Party (SNP) fondly imagines that an independent Scotland would continue to have free access to England. They recklessly assume Scotland’s position would be akin to that of the Republic of Ireland. However, that assumption rests on a number of dubious presumptions: (1) that an independent Scotland would be in the EU; (2) that the remainder of the UK (henceforth the UK) will remain in the EU; (3) that the EU will survive in its present form ; (4) that the UK will continue to have such generous welfare provision and (5) that the UK will play by the formal EU rules.

If either Scotland or the remainder of the UK was outside the EU, the rules relating to free movement of peoples across EU borders would not apply and the UK could restrict movement from Scotland to England at will. If Scotland was not in the EU (and the EU
might not welcome the idea of another potential Greece or Republic of Ireland or the Westminster government might veto their application to join ) but the UK remained in the EU, the Scots would be at a disadvantage in comparison with the continental EU states, because the remainder of the UK would be required to accept labour from other EU countries but not from Scotland. But what if both Scotland and the UK remained within the EU? That would mean there would be free movement between the countries. However, that presumes the EU will remain as it is. This is very uncertain. Should the Euro collapse that might cause such financial distress that the EU ceased to exist as each of the member states looked in desperation for their own salvation. That could leave an independent Scotland out on a limb, bankrupt and unable to export its unemployed.

Even if the EU did not break up, a the collapse of the Euro would could produce a lasting depression along the lines of that of the 1930s. This would reduce both the opportunities for employment within the EU and the ability of member states to meet their welfare obligations, which would dissuade people from moving to countries where the welfare benefits are highest.

As all EU law requires is that the same benefits that are offered to the citizens of an EU member are offered to any other EU members’ citizens, this produces widely varying provision in the various EU states with corresponding differences in their attraction to immigrants.

Welfare is particularly significant in the UK’s case because when everything is taken into account – unemployment pay, sick pay, working tax credits, housing benefit, council tax
benefit, free school education and (still) subsidised university education and the NHS (which is by far the most generous healthcare system in the EU – the UK has arguably the most attractive welfare package in the EU and one moreover which is very readily accessed.

If UK benefits were considerably reduced there would be far less incentive for foreigners to come. That would apply to an independent Scotland. In fact, Scotland could find itself in a situation where the welfare benefits they offered were more substantial than those of the UK and produced migration from the UK to Scotland to claim the higher benefits. As things stand with EU law, they would have to pay the higher benefits to all EU citizens who claimed them. The only way the Scots could prevent paying higher benefits would be to
reduce the provision s to their own people.

There is also the possibility that the UK could reduce their level of welfare provision even without a further great economic disaster. This is certainly the intent of the Tory Party and if they achieve a strong majority at the next general election this may well happen.

Another possibility is that the EU could re-invent itself in a number of ways. It could reduce its members to a core of stable, productive members. That would not include Scotland. A multiple layered EU with members having a different status is another with differing rules relating to free movement, the right to work and access to welfare. In reality this already exists with countries in the European Economic Area (EEA) such as Norway and Switzerland having free trade and free movement of peoples but not obligations such as welfare provision for EU state citizens (http://livinginamadhouse.wordpress.com/2011/05/01/if-we-leave-the-eu-we-mustnt-be-another-norway/). It is improbable that an independent Scotland and the UK would be in the same layer because of the great difference in size and wealth between the two.

As for free movement within the EU itself, it is noticeable how readily the Schengen Agreement was overthrown in May 2011 by subscribing states declaring they were suspending free movement because of the pressure of refugees from North Africa caused by the so-called “Arab Spring”. (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/12/europe-to-end-passport-free-travel). The Schengen Agreement provides for the twenty five signatories (all EU members except for the UK and the Republic of Ireland) to operate a no borders regime for the subscribing members. This covers approximately 400 million people. Not only is free movement within the EU one of the four EU “freedoms”, but the Schengen Treaty conditions and the law evolving from them are now part of the EU’s acquis communautaire (literally that which has been acquired by the community) . This means that jurisdiction over the Schengen Area and any amendment to the Treaty provisions is now subject to the legislative process of the EU (the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament) rather than a negotiating free-for-all by the political heads of
each member state. Yet the decision of EU countries large and small – Italy, France, Denmark – to act unilaterally passed without any real opposition or action. The lesson here is that when shove comes to push national interests will predominate. Other examples are the flouting of EU rules on such things as competition and state subsidies. Often no action is taken and even where it is, the larger countries such as France simply ignore any fines or judgements from the European Court of Justice with impunity. Even if Scotland and the UK remained within the EU, the UK as one of the larger EU states could impose border controls against Scotland without anything dramatic happening. The same would apply with greater force if an independent Scotland became a member of the EEA or the UK left the EU and signed up to the EEA.

Scotland could in principle join the Schengen Area, although its fragility has been clearly demonstrated this year. But that would do them little good because neither the UK nor the Republic of Ireland are members. Thus Scotland would have no shared border with the treaty members.

If the UK left the EU, an independent Scotland would be utterly in the hands of the UK, which could not only stop human traffic over the border but legally prevent any goods traffic between the UK and Scotland. The same would apply if Scotland was not in the EU and the UK was.

Why would the UK not want to have an open border with Scotland? The Westminster government might wish to prevent free Scottish immigration for a number of reasons. The most obvious would be if Scotland was used as a conduit for immigrants from outside the British Isles to enter England in large numbers. (I say England not the UK because experience shows that immigrants to the UK overwhelming head for England).

Then there would be the risk that the resident population of Scotland would want to come to England in large numbers if the Scottish economy turned turtle. That could have considerable costs for England both in terms of competition for jobs, housing, public services and benefits paid to the unemployed.

There is also the strong risk for Scotland that a future Westminster government could be faced by an electorate, especially of those in England, which was hostile to Scotland because of their decision to leave the union and wished them to be denied any suggestion of special treatment such as continued free movement across borders.

If Scotland became independent that England’s already great predominance within the UK would become even greater with over 90% of the UK’s population and much more of its wealth. That would make the UK government give more attention to English interests. This natural tendency would be enhanced by the loss of the 59 House of Commons seats which are returned by Scotland. That would make a future Labour or even a Labour/LibDem government improbable because Labour and the LibDems hold all but one of the 59 seats. The likelihood would be a Tory Government at Westminster for the quite some time after Scottish independence.

There would also be the question of nationality at the time of Scottish independence. Alex
Salmond has the quaint idea that the Scots would have both Scots and British nationality. This is a very rash assumption. British nationality might not continue once Scotland was gone. The UK might opt for a confederal system with different nationalities for England,
Wales and Northern Ireland. England might decide to go for independence herself. More broadly, a Westminster Parliament dominated by English MPs and concentrated on English interests might refuse to share a nationality with an independent Scotland. An independent Scotland which did not have free movement between herself and the UK would be in a very perilous position, because she would be a small country on the very
periphery of Europe with no border with any country other than England. Scots should reflect on that inescapable fact.

English Speaking Union debate: ‘This house believes that an English Parliament is the last hope for a United Kingdom’

Report and commentary on the Campaign for an English Parliament English Speaking Union debate 24 November 2010

Proposition: ‘This house believes that an English Parliament is the last hope for a United Kingdom’

Chair: Louisa Preston (BBC Presenter)

For: Scilla Cullen (CEP), David Wildgoose ( (English Democrats)

Against: Prof. Hugo de Burgh (Ex-journalist and now a Director, China Media Studies at Westminster U, Eddie Bone (CEP)

NB Eddie Bone was playing devil’s advocate (see below) as he is a supporter of an English Parliament

The proposition for debate was lightly worn as both the platform speakers and comments and questions from the floor tended to circle around the questions of a federal UK and the practicality of an English parliament. Nonetheless, it was an interesting evening with a healthy turnout.

Scilla Cullen

Mrs Cullen’s main thrust was directed at what she claimed were breaches of the 1707 Act of Union. She illustrated this by pointing to the fact that we now have at two Parliaments – at Westminster and Edinburgh – in the UK ( four if the Welsh and Northern Irish Assemblies are treated as parliaments) whereas the Act says there will be but one Parliament for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and different tax and regulatory regimes for trade between the four home countries, something which she claimed was forbidden by the Act.

There are two objections to Mrs Cullen’s argument. The Act of Union is simply an ordinary Act of Parliament. It has no superior status as constitutional law. This means that it can be amended or repealed overtly by an Act of Parliament or by the application of the English legal doctrine of implied repeal, viz:

“As a general rule, if an Act is partially or wholly inconsistent with a previous Act, then the previous Act is repealed to the extent of the inconsistency. It does not matter that the later Act contains no express words to affect the repeal or alteration. This is known as the doctrine of implied repeal. (page 3 – http://cseng.aw.com/catalog/uploads/Carroll_C05.pdf – there is a good presentation of the history and development of the doctrine at this url )”

There have been attempts since Britain’s entry into the EU (EEC at the time of entry) – most notably in the ‘Metric Martyrs’ case – to establish that some statutes have a de facto constitutional status and should not be subject to implied repeal – but no higher court has sustained the claim. (This failure to create a superior constitutional law status underpins David Cameron’s recent claim that Parliament is supreme and consequently Britain could leave the EU simply by an Act of Parliament. Cameron is incorrect because of the Lisbon Treaty – see below under Wildgoose). It is worth adding, that even if some ordinary Acts of Parliament were retrospectively given a superior constitutional law status and were not subject to implied repeal, the constitutional position would remain unclear because the Acts with constitutional law status would contradict one another.

The existence of implied repeal means that any complaint that the original Act of Union has been breached by later law has no legal force.

As for the claim that the original Act required equality of tax and trade regulations throughout Great Britain, this is simply wrong because there are exceptions such those in clause VI (the full text of the Act can be found at http://englandcalling.wordpress.com/the-act-of-union-1707/ ). Most notable is clause IX, viz:

“THAT whenever the sum of One million nine hundred ninety seven thousand seven hundred and sixty three pounds eight shillings and four pence half penny, shall be enacted by the Parliament of Great Britain to be raised in that part of the United Kingdom now called England, on Land and other Things usually charged in Acts of Parliament there, for granting an Aid to the Crown by a Land Tax; that part of the United Kingdom now called Scotland, shall be charged by the same Act, with a further Sum of forty-eight thousand Pounds, free of all Charges, as the Quota of Scotland, to such Tax, and to proportionably for any greater or lesser Sum raised in England by any Tax on Land, and other Things usually charged together with the Land; and that such Quota for Scotland, in the Cases aforesaid, be raised and collected in the same Manner as the Cess now is in Scotland, but subject to such Regulations in the manner of collecting, as shall be made by the Parliament of Great Britain.”

At the time of Union England had a population in the region of 5 million and Scotland a population of approximately 1 million. If Scotland had been taxed at the same rate as England under that clause they would have been paying not £48,000 but nearer to £400,000. Hence, from the very beginning Scotland was treated much more favourably than England when it came to taxation.

Mrs Cullen was on firmer ground when she pressed the fact that we had a de facto federal system which could only be equitable by the creation of an English Parliament . She illustrated the point by mentioning that we currently have the absurdity of the SNP’s Richard Lochhead, a domestic Scottish politician without any electoral base in UK politics, negotiating on behalf of the UK with the EU over fishing policy.

David Wildgoose

Mr Wildgoose wanted a federal UK but it would not have been one which I think most English men and women would welcome. His idea of a federal government was one in which 55 seats at Westminster were taken from the Celts and given to the English, with “English votes for English laws” and the federal issues decided by the entire Parliament. The problem was he was not envisaging a situation in which the English subsidy to the Celts ended, for example, he assumed welfare benefits would continue to be funded from Westminster . This sat uncomfortably with his claim that he wanted “The English to be equal citizens with equal rights”.

During the Q and A session afterwards I detailed what a stable and long lasting federal UK should involve – four national parliaments with home rule including fiscal responsibility and one assembly to deal with federal matters such as foreign affairs, defence and the servicing of the national debt. Oddly, Mr Wildgoose claimed this was not a federation but a confederation. I pointed out, sadly without success, that a confederation is a loose league of states without any overarching government, for example, the confederation which arose immediately after the end of the American War of Independence , while a federation has an overarching government such as that which was formed when the United States was established. Clearly what I was proposing was a federal system while Mr Wildgoose was suggesting no more than a procedurally amended House of Commons.

Mr Wildgoose also recited the oft made claim that because Parliament is supreme Britain can leave the EU simply by passing an Act of Parliament repealing all the Treaties which enshrine our EU membership in law. This is no longer true. The Lisbon Treaty contains for the first time a mechanism for any EU state wishing to withdraw from the Union, viz:

“Article 50 of the Treaty runs:

“1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.

2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.

3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.

4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it. A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.”

Apart from requiring a qualified majority of the other EU states (QMV means in practice the support of most of the large EU nations), the state which wishes to withdraw would be excluded from any discussions on the conditions for withdrawal. Then there is the delay before withdrawal can be effected. It is probable that the minimum period of waiting before secession would be two years, because it would be extraordinary if the EU did not try to make withdrawal as difficult as possible, while the provision in paragraph 2 that departure must be by negotiation “setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union” means that it will necessarily be a protracted process.

During the time before Britain left she would be bound by EU laws and the EU could adopt directives which could do Britain a good deal of damage, for example, directives which severely interfered with the City. These would not even have to be directives deliberately designed to harm Britain, but simply decisions advantageous to the remaining members which would take no account of any damage that might be done to Britain. Britain would take no part in discussions or votes on EU legislation introduced during the period between asking to withdraw and actually withdrawing. There would almost certainly be significant conditions for withdrawal which impinged upon British sovereignty including agreement to ‘voluntarily’ adopt much EU legislation, both existing and future. With the Treaty unsigned Britain could have simply stated that it was withdrawing. Such a declaration would raise the question of whether Article 56(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties, to which our political elite have also promiscuously bound Britain, would sanction withdrawal. The Article runs:

“1. A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless:

a) it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or

b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.”

Whether the various treaties which encumber the EU before the Lisbon Treaty is in force could be said to imply a right of withdrawal is a matter of legal debate, although the fact that the Lisbon Treaty itself makes provision for withdrawal is a tacit admission that withdrawal was always implied. But legal or not, a situation where the right of withdrawal was claimed where no treaty sanctioned, forbade or laid down conditions for withdrawal would be a vastly more fluid and, consequently, Britain would be in a much stronger bargaining situation than that which would exist after the Lisbon Treaty becomes law. After implementation of the Treaty, Article 54 of the Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties would apply to the EU. That Article runs:

“The termination of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party may

take place:

(a) in conformity with the provisions of the treaty; or

(b) at any time by consent of all the parties after consultation with the other contracting States.”

This is in conformity with the withdrawal Article in the Lisbon Treaty and the EU’s legal position would be greatly strengthened by the Treaty‘s implementation. That is one of the reasons why the EU is so desperate to get the Treaty ratified before the next British general election.

But legality in international matters is not the same as legality within a nation state. This is both because there is no democratic legitimacy for international law and for the entirely practical reason that there is no means of enforcing such law, short of blockade or war. Hence, international law is all too often observed in its breach by powerful nations and enforced by the powerful on the weak. Its unreality is shown in Article 42 of the Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties:

“Validity and continuance in force of treaties

1. The validity of a treaty or of the consent of a State or an international organization to be bound by a treaty may be impeached only through the application of the present Convention.

2. The termination of a treaty, its denunciation or the withdrawal of a party, may take place only as a result of the application of the provisions of the treaty or of the present Convention. The same rule applies to suspension of the operation of a treaty.”

This means that for Britain to legally withdraw from the Vienna Convention all Britain’s co-signatories would have to agree to the withdrawal, a truly fantastic hope.” (Extract from my recent Quarterly Review article Life after Lisbon: freedom or servitude?)

Hugo de Burgh

Prof de Burgh served up a very rum political dish. On the one hand he was wont to make comments such as the EU is “Germany’s Fourth Reich” and a claim that the best governments in the world were all to be found in the Anglosphere as well as constantly extolling the culture and traditions of England. He was also roundly contemptuous of modern politicians, whom he sees as largely corrupt and self serving, and the centralising tendencies of recent British governments. On the other hand he was adamant that that there should be no English Parliament.

There are two contradictions here. First, if English culture and traditions are so valuable, it follows that they are worth preserving and like everything else worth preserving this is best done by those with the most direct interest, in this instance the England. Second, if Prof de Burgh wants less centralisation, what could be a better place to start than by removing English spending from the bonds of UK policy? It was noticeable that while advocating a devolution of powers generally to the local levels, the Professor did not feel it necessary to suggest that the Celtic Fringe assemblies be abolished. Astute readers will see that Prof de Burgh’s ideal UK is not a million miles from that of the Blair government with England balkanised and the Celts left politically intact.

How did Prof de Burgh justify his opposition to an English parliament? Apart from his localism argument, he conjured up a vision of a new world dominated by China with the Anglosphere replaced as top political world dog by the Asiansphere and argued from this that it made no sense for England to assert her nationhood because England would be too small and insignificant to have a significant voice. Why this would be a significantly smaller or significant voice than that of the UK – England having five sixths of UK population – he did not attempt to explain.

The Professor eventually let the cat out of the bag by saying that England (and the rest of the Anglosphere) should exercise its influence by simply continuing as before which would set an example to nations without a tradition of the type of values he most admired in the Anglosphere such as representative democracy (note: England invented representative government not democracy) and equality before the law. This is the modern liberal internationalist version of the late imperial ideal of bringing civilisation to “lesser breeds without the law”.

Prof de Burgh told a fascinating story about a recent encounter he had with a rising member of the Chinese elite who was already an important administrator. Most Chinese the professor meets love to show off their English. Not this one. In fact, he did not speak at all and was proud of the fact. The Chinese official explained that he had made a conscious decision not to learn English because he wanted to remain untouched by foreign culture as this would allow him to fully understand and appreciate the people he would be effectively governing. That is precisely the mentality which Lord Macartney encountered on the first official British embassy to China in 1794 (His journal is available from the Folio Society in their publication An Embassy to China. ) The liberal idea that China will become a model of Liberal democracy rigid with political correctness is so far removed from the Chinese mentality as to be comical were it not for the threat China potentially pose to the West. (Those who wish to understand the immense ambition of the Chinese should read Parag Khanna’s “The second world”.)

Prof de Burgh disavowed this mentality but clearly admired it. In fact, it is a classic expression of the natural human desire to guard the security of the tribe. I applaud that, but seek the same privilege for the English and any other nation.

Eddie Bone

Mr Bone’s contribution I found unreservedly fascinating. He has amassed a positive treasury of quotes of Anglophobic politicians from all the major parties and used these to put the anti-English Parliament government case. There was Jack Straw claiming the English were dangerous because they were violent, David Cameron recoiling with horror at the idea of being Prime Minister of merely England , George Robertson rubbing his hands at the idea of regional governments in England, John Prescott bizarrely claiming he is a “proud Welshman” and William Hague insisting he is a Briton first and foremost.

Mr Bone has promised to send me a copy of his quotes which I shall post on the England calling blog (he has agreed to this).

Questions and comments from the floor

There was a good array of questions including important issues which had gone largely or wholly unmentioned by the speakers such as the complication of the EU and the dire economic situation of the Celtic Fringe.

The mood of the meeting was overwhelmingly one of anger at the way England was being treated.

The vote on the proposition was carried overwhelmingly.

My general observations

Those who want an English Parliament must ensure they:

1. understand the legal position before making claims. It is not enough to think that something is so or to rely on a quote. It is imperative to go and look at the full Act or Treaty to properly understand the situation and quite probably to read an expert commentary on the Act or Treaty.

2. realise the importance of economics to this debate because the Celtic Fringe countries are all economic basket cases, for example, the public service proportion of their GDP is approximately 70% Northern Ireland, 65% Wales and 58% Scotland. They survive at their present level of expenditure simply because of the English subsidy which is probably in the region of £25 billion a year once the higher per capita Treasury funding to the Celtic Fringe (£15 billion), the lower tax take in the Celtic Fringe than in England and the higher per capita benefits bill (which is paid by Westminster) in the Celtic Fringe than England . None of the speakers raised the issue and I was the only one to do so in the Q and A.

3. understand that unless each home nation has full autonomy for domestic issues and has to raise all the tax they use to fund domestic and their share of federal funding, the odds are that England would still end up subsidizing the Celts.

What if there is no English Parliament?

English resentment will inevitably grow and have nowhere to go within the political system. The danger will be that people will turn to violence because they have no democratic means of gaining national representation. Suppose no mainstream party takes up the cause. Suppose that English majorities committed to an English parliament were elected to Westminster, yet were never able to form a government because an English minority allied to the Celts formed a Commons majority. Suppose that Proportional Representation was introduced and practically removed forever the opportunity for a single party to form a government. All this and a media dedicated to preventing honest public discussion of the subject. Some would think that no meaningful constitutional or nonviolent opportunity was left?

The most obviously inflammatory constitutional position would be where an English party advocating an English parliament gains a majority of English seats in the Commons but did not gain an overall Commons majority. Using parliamentary procedures and keeping their behaviour within customary bounds, they could inconvenience the business of government but little more. They might boycott Parliament but that would be an impotent ruse unless linked to massive demonstrations. They might set up a self-declared English parliament but it would have no power. The best tactics in such a situation would be for the party with the English majority to take the lead in organising civil disobedience and to announce before the election that they would do so if an English parliament was denied.

Then there is Europe. Our enmeshment in the EU may become so advanced that we could not legally set up an English parliament. Fanciful? Suppose that the EU at some future date insists on Regional Assemblies throughout the EU and this is accepted by a British government. Such Assemblies might then be set up in England without referenda. Suppose further that the EU insists that the only representation for domestic matters rests with the Regional Assemblies. Add to that entry into EMU the ever diminishing control over policy in foreign relations and plans for an EU defence force and tax harmonisation, and it would be constitutionally impossible for England to set up a meaningful parliament for it could decide nothing. The only nonviolent answer to such a situation would be to elect a UK or an English parliament to declare independence from the EU.

The English should not be afraid of national feeling. Let them ask themselves why should all peoples except the English be encouraged to celebrate and defend their ethnicity? The oft cited dichotomy between patriotism and nationalism is contrived. Both words have at their core a pride of nation and a desire to protect and celebrate the nation and culture. Nationalism is a synonym for patriotism. The true difference is between non-aggressive and aggressive patriotism; between those who wish to celebrate and protect their nation within their existing territory and those who wish to invade and compromise the culture and territories of others. The modern English of all peoples can be trusted to remain within the limits of non-aggressive nationalism.

Devolution and our membership of the EU raise the most profound of political questions: who governs? Those who would deny England a parliament do so because for one reason or another they wish to destroy England as a nation. The English must work unceasingly for an parliament both for their self-respect and to prevent the political murder of Albion.