Category Archives: Politics

Patriotism is not an optional extra

Robert Henderson

Contents

1. What is patriotism?

2. The roots of patriotism

3. Nations are tribes writ large

4. The importance of a national territory

5. The democratic value of nations

6. What the individual owes to the nation

7.  The liberal internationalist

8. How to move from multiculturalism to patriotism

9 No patriotism, no enduring society

1. What is  patriotism?

By patriotism I mean the sense of belonging to a people, of  owning a land, having a group identity,  of feeling  at ease with those belonging to the group  in a way which meeting  those  outside the group never engenders, of naturally  favouring your  people above foreigners, of knowing that the  interests of the “tribe” must come before that of any outsider. By this  definition patriotism is something which the vast majority of human beings can  understand because it is not an ideology but an innate human quality whose origins lie buried deep within the evolution of social animals.

The only people who may genuinely be unable to understand  patriotism are the severely mentally retarded or those with a personality disorder such as autism which reduces their ability to understand social contexts.  Despite their incessant repudiation of patriotism even latterday liberals understand the pull of patriotic inclinations, although of course they would never recognise the nature of their inclinations.    These drive  them to live in a manner which is directly at odds with their professed ideology. Look at the life of a white liberal and you will find that they overwhelmingly arrange their lives so that they live in
very white, and in England, very English worlds. They do this in two ways. They either live in an area which is overwhelmingly white – the “rightest of right-on”  British folk singers Billy Bragg chooses to live in the “hideously white”  and English county of Dorset – or  reside in a gentrified white enclave created  on the outskirts of an area such as Islington in London  which has a significant ethnic content to its population– the Blairs lived there before moving to Downing Street. The latter tactic allows the white liberal to luxuriate in the faux belief that they are “living the diversity dream”,  whilst in reality encountering little if any  of the “joy of diversity” they are so vocally enthusiastic about.  A splendid example of  white liberal ghettoization is the drippingly  pc TV presenter Adrian Chiles who  described in a BBC programme  The  Colour of Friendship (18 August 2003) how he looked at his wedding photographs which were taken only a few years before and saw to his dismay and  astonishment that it was in the words of the one-time BBC director-general  Greg Dyke “hideously white”.  With a guest list of several hundred he was unable to find a single non-white face staring out at him. The only ethnic  minorities he had equal or extended contact with were those he met at work, who  were of course middleclass and westernised.

The ease and near universality of understanding of  patriotism sets it apart from ideologies such  as Marxism and liberal internationalism.  The majority of the followers of any ideology with a large number of adherents  will have little understanding  of it, either because they are intellectually lazy or because they lack the  intellectual wherewithal to master the creed. Few Marxists have ever had  a grasp of such ideological niceties as the
laws of dialectics and even fewer modern  liberal internationalists understand  the relationship of  laissez faire economic theory  to historical economic  reality.   The tendency for those who ostensibly support  an ideology to be ignorant of it beyond the grasping of a few ideas which can be reduced to slogans is greatly inflated where, as has happened with political correctness, it becomes the  ideology of  the ruling elite.  In such circumstances people  give lip service to an ideology ,  even  if they neither understand its theoretical basis or even agree with it out of  expediency, whether that be driven by fear or ambition.

The majority of believers in any ideology  are in the position of the laity in Western Europe  before the Reformation when the universal use of the Latin Bible and Latin in church rites meant that the vast majority of the population were left at the mercy of a clerical elite who simply told them what to believe, whether or not it was  sanctioned by the Scriptures. Such people will chant the slogans and support  the intellectual leadership of their movements not because they understand and  are convinced by the ideology, but because  they have  nailed their emotional  colours to  a group.  Ironically, they are tapping into the same  innate traits which create tribes and nations.  The problem is they are creating something which is evolutionarily destructive because it drives them to attempt to destroy the natural formation of human groups through bonds of cultural and racial similarity.

Compare the  situation of the follower of an ideology with that of those who respond to the all of patriotism as defined above. They cannot be so easily or routinely hoodwinked and manipulated by the few, because almost everyone instinctively understands what it is to be patriotic. It does not need to be explained to them.  Whatever the behaviour arising from appeals to patriotism it is not undertaken out of ignorance. Of course, the  ways in which people respond to  their innate feelings  need not be either pretty or moral,  for at its extreme appeals to the emotions and thoughts which come with patriotism may lead to attempts at genocide.  However, even in such extreme circumstances,  the tribe or nation attempting genocide is at  least behaving in a way which is congruent with human biology  and the survival of the group, although an  attempt at conquest or genocide which goes wrong may severely damage or destroy the aggressor.

2. The roots of  patriotism

The sense of being separate, of belonging to a discrete group with identifiable characteristics is a necessary part of being human because Man is a social animal. Social animals have two universal features: they form discrete groups and within the group produce hierarchies – although both the group and the hierarchy vary considerably in form and intensity. Human beings are no exception; whether they are hunter-gatherers or people populating a great modern city they all have a need to form groups in which they feel naturally comfortable.

Why do social animals form discrete groups rather than treat all the animals of their species which they encounter as being part of the group? Part of the answer surely lies in competition for territory, food and mates and the  limits placed on any species by their environment.  For example, it would be impossible for lions to exist in much larger groups than they do because of their heavy food demands. Moreover, once the group size is established it is not possible for a species to suddenly change its size because the behavioural template will have been set to accommodate the size which exists.  Man is possibly the exception to this rule, but  it could be argued that humans only learned
how to form larger groups very slowly and that where larger groups form today, for example, villagers moving off the land to the cities in developing countries,  this is simply  the extended consequences of the long, painful steps towards extending the human group size.

Some animals, most notably insects, fish and birds, successfully form very large groups. However, the  form of their association  or their degree of social integration  differs from  that of primates  (and arguably mammals generally). Social insects rely for their organisation on what are in effect  simple  automated responses through such triggers as
chemical releases. Fish and birds may form large groups, most probably because it affords them evolutionary  goods such  as greater protection from predators or easier access to mates,  without  engaging in much social support for one another beyond being together. Birds  may assemble in large groups only when they migrate.

The most highly developed social animals amongst mammals such as primates and wolves do far more than simply congregate.  They develop patterns of behaviour which require active and complex  cooperation between members of the group.  Such behaviour may of itself place limits on the size of a group by the behaviour being dependent  upon the mental capacity of the animal.   For example, it could be that a pack of  wolves can only be the size it is because anything substantially larger would  be impossible for the mind of the animal to comprehend or for behaviours which are essentially automatic to operate within.

There is also the question of mating strategies and the  raising of offspring. Sexually reproducing social animals have to evolve strategies to maximise reproduction for the individual whilst preventing competition for mates amongst males becoming so intense it threatens the viability of the group.  Probably the most common method of achieving this amongst social mammals is to have a dominant male; frequently  a sexually mature male who occupies the position of the oriental despot with his harem, for example,  the gorilla.
This of itself means that that the group must be clearly defined with males from outside excluded. But even where there is a looser social arrangement which permits different males within the group to not only co-exist but share the females , as is the case with the chimpanzee,  there is still a sense of possession amongst the males at least and hence the need for a defined group.When a species has moved to social animal status,  behaviours that intensify group behaviour such as the recognition of members of the group by scent will make the exclusion of outsiders  ever more rigid. It is also probable that amongst the most advanced social  mammals that the individual animals have sufficient mental awareness to become, just as humans do, accustomed to the behaviour of the members of their particular group and that becomes a  major part of maintaining the group identity.
Animals generally hate novelty so it would make evolutionary sense for them to prefer those individuals with whom they have grown up to strangers.

Man is the exception to the rule of group size in as much as over the past 10,000 years or so humans have shown themselves capable of  creating groups of vast size . This is plausibly attributable to the mental capacity of humans being sufficient to overcome the organisational  which thwart the increase in group size of other social mammals.  But this ability to increase group size massively has only occurred in recent human existence. Human settlements where people are counted in thousands rather than dozens or hundreds have a history of less than 10,000 years and even today most human beings live in small communities.   From paleontological and archaeological evidence, historical accounts of how people lived  and  the example of  tribal peoples living today, we can reasonably deduce that the natural size of human groups living  without the ability to generate their own food supply through farming is a few hundred at most.   Importantly, although  Man can now live in larger communities,  he is still in evolutionary terms equipped to live in small groups. This means that the innate tendencies which lead social
animals to set limits to the group  are alive and well.

That leaves the formation of hierarchies to be explained. For animals other than Man the answer is I think simple enough, only by forming hierarchies can social groups cohere. Animals vary considerably in their physical and mental qualities. Observe any animal, even the simplest single cell organism, and differences between individuals within the species will become apparent. Some are more vigorous than others, some unusually large, some abnormally small, some more adventurous and so on. Individuals will also vary in physical capacity and behaviour by age and, in sexually reproducing species, sex.

Solitary animals compete for existential goods through direct competition with other members of their species, something they do through methods such as such as scent marking of territorial boundaries and serious fighting . When an animal is social, differences in individual quality and the urge of each individual to survive have to be resolved by something other than the methods used by solitary animals because the animals live in close proximity. Competition for desirable goods still occurs, most notably
competition for food and mates, but normally within behaviours which are not fatal to other members of the group or behaviours which are so disruptive as to threaten the survival of the group. Moreover, the development of such behavioural restraint  provides the possibility for  behaviours to develop  which  make the individuals of the group dependent  upon one another, for example, the hunting strategies of  the wolf which
requires the adult members of the pack to display a very considerable degree of cooperation.  The development of  such behaviours probably reinforces the tendency
towards hierarchy. The upshot of these various social accommodations  is the formation of different social niches into which individuals with different qualities ad histories fit.

Consider what would happen if hierarchies did not exist. There would be constant conflict within the group because no individual would have cause to defer to another except from fear of physical harm.  Fear is a blunt and very limited instrument of social control, whether it be of humans or animals. It is a strategy more suited to the solitary animal than the social one. Group behaviour is a compromise between the immediate advantage of the individual and the diffuse advantages derived from group activity. The compromise is given structure by hierarchies, whether that be a fixed biological distinction by sex or caste (for example, social bees) or a transient one due to the age of an animal. Hierarchies are
built on the differences between individuals and the more rigid the hierarchical structure the greater will be the selective pressures to produce individuals in the right proportions to fill the various social niches within the group.

Hierarchies also make sense in terms of the development of social animals. Social animals are descended from asocial animals. The movement from asocial to social animal is presumably akin to the evolutionary process whereby a parasite is converted to a symbiotic partner. It is a process of gradual behavioural accommodation.

Social animals on the bottom rung of the social animal ladder may do little more than associate together at certain times. The next rung up and the animal frequently associates with others of its kind. One more step and the animal forms more or less permanent groupings. And so on until we reach the ultimate social animal, Man.

The gradual evolution of social behaviour of itself points to the need for hierarchy, because at each stage of the evolution the natural overtly selfish behaviour of the original solitary animal has to be modified. That modification will only come through natural selection working on behavioural traits which favour more complete socialisation.

What about human beings? Are they not capable of breaking the biological bounds which capture animals? Does not their immense intelligence and possession of language place them in another category of being? Could Man not simply decide not to behave in a non-hierarchical manner? The fact that human beings have never done so is of itself sufficient evidence for all but the most ideologically committed nurturist to decide that human
beings cannot do it in practice and to conclude that the forming of hierarchies is part of the human template. However, to that fact can be added another, the dominance-submission behaviour which every person witnesses daily not merely in positions of formal dominance and subordination such as the workplace, but in every aspect of social life.

Societies which consist of various human groups that  see themselves as separate  from each other disrupt the creation of a healthy hierarchy. Instead of there being a single hierarchy within an homogenous group (defining homogenous as a population in a discrete territory  which sees itself as a group), there are  hierarchies formed within each group and a further overarching hierarchy formed from the various groups themselves
with  each group hierarchy competing within the population as a whole.

The nature of the competition between the groups will depend on the relative  proportions each forms  of a population and the history of each group.  The subordinate groups within the society will feel that they are there on sufferance and  be suspicious and fearful of the dominant  group and constantly  worried that any  other minority group is outcompeting them.  A majority population which has been  dominant  in all respects within the territory will take some shifting from its position of supremacy,  but the influx of substantial numbers of outsiders will nonetheless create insecurity and  resentment amongst the dominant population. In such circumstances no individual , whether of the dominant or subordinate group(s), feels entirely  secure because there is constant tension between groups. Most importantly for the wellbeing of the society, there is no common bond of trust between people sharing the same territorial house.

3. Nations are tribes writ large

Nations are tribes writ large. They are remarkably durable. Empires invariably fall but a nation is timeless and can be only be utterly destroyed only through an act of genocide. Even the loss of a homeland – the most traumatic loss any nation can sustain – does not destroy a people as the Jews have emphatically shown for nearly two thousand years.

A shared faith or political ideology does not make a nation.  Muslims may claim to be one people, but the reality is very different as the continual strife between Muslims bears witness. Not only is there the major division between Shias and Sunnis, Muslim dominated states of the same ostensible branch of Islam are often hostile to each other, while Muslim terrorists/freedom fighters (take your pick) willingly kill fellow Muslims – women and children included – in large numbers.

Similarly, Marxist Leninists in the Soviet Union and Red China may have maintained the fiction to the bitter end of the Soviet Bloc that the international proletariat was as one, but the substantial deviations between their ideologies and the viciously repressive measures they used to deny their own proles contact with outside world (and hence with the rest of
the proletariat) told another tale.

Today, the doctrine of liberal internationalism pretends to a universality of human experience and commonality which is refuted every day by the manifold social, ethnic and racial strife throughout the world. It is an ideology which wishes the world would be as it says rather than asserts that this is the world as it is or would be under given conditions.

Nations are organic growths. They cannot be constructed consciously as the “nation-builders” of the period of European de-colonisation fondly imagined and their liberal internationalist successors today continue to at least pretend to believe. Nations are developed through the sociological process of establishing trust within the group. This only happens when others are recognised as belonging naturally to the group. That does not mean that every member of the nation is seen as equal as an individual, whether for
reasons of personality, ability or social status, but it does mean they are accepted automatically as being part of the nation. An English duke may have little if any social contact with the English working man, but each would instinctively recognise the other as English because despite their social distance they fall within the recognised template of what it is to be English.

Nor is the sense of group solidarity and empathy  restricted to nations. As David Hume noted  over two centuries ago when he reflected on how we respond to people in different circumstances: “An Englishman [met] in Italy is a friend:  A European in China [is a friend] ; and perhaps a man [of any origin] wou’d be belov’d as such, were we to meet him in the moon.” ( A Treatise of Human Nature Book II section 2 (A Treatise of Human
Nature).  The same forces which create tribes and nations are at work here as the individual seeks, in the absence of members of his tribe or nation,  those who are closest to his tribe or nation.

Just as a nation cannot be consciously created the individual cannot decide in anything other than the legal sense that they are this or that nationality. A man may decide to become a British citizen through an act of will but he cannot decide to be English. That is because being English is the consequence of parentage and upbringing, something over which the child has no control. It is the unconscious imbibing of a culture something
visceral.

Most vitally, to be part of the tribe or nation a person has to be accepted without thinking by other members of the nation as a member of the nation to be of that nation. That is why the claims of English men and women to be Irish, Welsh or Scots are both forlorn and ridiculous. As the English film director Stephen Frears wittily remarked of the very English actor Daniel Day-Lewis “I knew Daniel before he was Irish”.

Like it or not, the upbringing of these wannabe Celts has made them English. Not only do they think like the English, understand English mores without thinking and are armed with a library of English cultural references, they have a personality which falls within the English spectrum. Put them in a room with foreigners or the Celts they wish to be and they will be taken for English. Such people cannot be anything but English, because only by being raised in a society where you are accepted without question as being part of the nation can the person become part of a nation. An Englishman who wishes to claim that he is a Scot cannot realistically  do so because he lacks the cultural imprinting of a Scot. It is not something which can be faked.

4. The importance of a national territory

A national territory is essential to the well-being of the nation. The fate of the Jews after they lost theirs is a cautionary tale for anyone who believes otherwise. The ideal is a territory which is controlled entirely by the nation, a population which is overwhelmingly comprised of people who are authentic members of the national “tribe” through their parentage and upbringing. The prime example of such a state is the pre-union England, which was the first true nation state.

The next best choice is for a nation state containing different peoples who each have de facto their own national territory. Britain is a first rate example of such a state, with the four home nations – England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – each having their own territory.  Simply having a land in which you form the majority on the ground is a great consolation and benefit . That applies even to a people such as the Kurds whose land is  divided between Turkey, Iraq and Iran. Being the dominant population they have both the reassurance of their demographic  control of the territory – boots on the ground – and the consoling possibility of converting that demographic dominance into political control in the future.

The Jews are an oddity. Until the modern state of Israel was founded in 1948 they had been without a homeland for nearly two millennia. They neither controlled a territory in their own right nor were the dominant people in a land. Because of that they were able to convert their religion into a cultural suit to be worn by all adherents in a way that Islam and Christianity or any political ideology never could. Denuded of their own land, they could neither be oppressed by an invader nor oppress others by invasion. They could
not exercise state power. All they had left was cultural power, whether that be intellectual or economic. The consequence was that Jewish culture rather than the possession of a homeland became the primary or even sole psychological focus of  Jews.

As a consequence of the history and  evolution of Jewish society, there been a strain within Jewry since the foundation of a modern state Jewish state was first seriously mooted  in the 19th century that has been hostile to the formation of such a state,  because the Jewish culture which they valued was the product of not having a country to call their own and consequently would become tainted if Jews had a homeland, that Jews would become like other peoples.

Although this mentality has a certain intellectual attraction, it condemns Jews to perpetual insecurity. Although Jews have successfully developed a culture built upon the need to accommodate themselves as a minority within majority non-Jewish populations whilst maintaining a strong ethnic identity, the absence of a territory which they control has meant that their history for the past twenty centuries has been an unhappy one, punctuated regularly by abuse from the majority populations with whom they co-existed,
abuse which ranges  from everyday discrimination to attempts at genocide. This abuse is the consequence of the disordering of the hierarchy humans need, the consequences being what at bottom is a battle for territory.

5. The democratic value of nations

Politically, nations are immensely valuable because the nation state is the largest political unit which allows any meaningful democratic control. Indeed, it is arguable that representative government at the national level is the only real opportunity for serious democratic control, because representative bodies below the national level are always subject to a national government. Supra-national authority signals the end of democratic control. More of that later.

Only in a country where there is a sense of shared history, culture and communal interest can representative government function, even in principle, as a conduit for the interests of the entire population. In a country which is riven by ethnic and racial difference representative democracy invariably deteriorates into a mass of competing groups all struggling for their own advantage. Policy making and its execution becomes fragmentary and it is impossible to construct a coherent approach to promoting the common good. In a nation state with a large degree of homogeneity the political process is concentrated instead upon policies which affect all, or at least the overwhelming majority, of the people. For example, before post-war mass immigration fractured Britain, the great political questions were ones related to class. Policies were put forward  which either were intended to better the situation of the working class or to resist change.  Whichever side a person
was on in that debate, they had no illusions that political policy was designed to meet the situation of the British people as a whole. Today political policy in Britain  is at best a juggling act between the competing ethnic and racial groups and at worst  a deliberately  conspiracy amongst the political elite to suppress the interests of the native population to accommodate those of  minority groups formed over the past 60 years  by incontinent mass immigration.

Once a country’s sovereignty is breached through treaties which commit countries to bow to the will of supra-national bodies , as has happened with the constituent countries of the EU, democratic control withers on the vine because mainstream politicians of all stamps begin to formulate their policies within the context of what the supra-national body allows not in the interests of the country. Eventually, a situation is reached, as has been reached in the case of the EU, where all parties with an opportunity for power sing from the same policy hymn sheet. At that point representative government becomes a shell and democratic control is gone because there is no opportunity to vote for any party which will change matters. That is so because the grip of the existing elite is so tight on all the levers of power, most importantly the mass media, that no new party can even get a serious hearing.

Where the form of government is parliamentary, the difficulty is enhanced by the fact that very large numbers of candidates must stand to both be taken seriously and have any chance of forming a majority. This imposes an immense organisational and economic burden on the new party, not least because the party will lack experienced politicians as candidates and party bureaucrats. Add in things such as first-past-the-post voting in
individual constituencies and the deposit of £500 for each candidate which is at risk of being lost in the vote does not reach 8% of the total, and the British system is just about the best armoured against new parties gaining a foothold in government as any in the world.

Democratic control is vitally important to maintaining the integrity of the nation. There is only one general political question of importance in any society, namely, how far can the masses control the abusive tendencies of the elite? Elites as a class are naturally abusive because it is in the nature of human beings to be selfish and to look for their own advantage and that of those closest to them. That does not mean that no member of an
elite will break ranks and go against their class interest. What it does mean is that an elite as a whole will not change its spots , not least because the sociological shackles are too strong for most of those members of the elite who might be tempted to go against their class interest will be dissuaded from doing so because of the group pressures within the elite, for the elite will develop a “tribal” sense of their own, with those outside the elite seen as a separate social entity.

The less democratic control there is over the elite , the more the elite will engage in behaviours which are detrimental to the coherence of the “tribe” as a whole because the elite will seek their own advantage rather than that of the nation.  Before the rise of the nation state, the abuse was generally much in evidence because elites commonly took the form of monarchies and subordinate rulers in the forms of territorially based aristocracies presiding over territories which contained various national/ethnic groups, the members of which were seen as subjects not part of a national whole. The common and deliberate policy of such elites was to “divide and rule”. Territories were also frequently subject to changes of ruler through conquest, a change of royal favour (in the case of subordinate rulers), inheritance or marriage contracts. In such circumstances there was little
opportunity for the masses to exercise any form of control over their rulers because there was no unity of feeling or sense of commonality amongst the peoples they ruled and the sense of “tribe“ was localised.  It is noteworthy that arguably the most dramatic popular rising in Europe during the mediaeval period took place in England (the Peasants’ Revolt of 1381), the one large kingdom in Europe at that time with a broadly homogenous population and a territory which enjoyed meaningful central Royal control.

With the creation of the nation state there arose the possibility of democratic control. The creation of a sense of nation within a single territory responsible to a single ruler in itself provides the circumstances whereby dissent can be focused and power and influence removed from the monarch and diffused to an ever larger part of the population. That is
precisely what happened in England , with first the gradual accretion of powers by Parliament , especially over taxation, then with the development of Parliamentary government after 1689 and finally with the extension of the franchise from 1832 onwards. By the beginning of the 20th century a large degree of democratic control had been established because the elite were working within the nation state, were dependent on a mass electorate and were having to produce policies within a national context. That control lasted until the early 1970s when the elite found another way of breaking it by moving politics from the national state to a supra-national power, the EU. Once that
was done, the abusive tendencies of the elite could re-assert themselves, as they have done in spades.

6. What the individual owes to the nation

Membership of a nation places a natural duty on the individual to support the nation. Patriotism should be viewed as a matter of utility, an absolutely necessity for the maintenance and coherence of a society. The idea that a society can survive which is merely a collection of deracinated individuals has no basis in history or observed human behaviour today.

It is a very great privilege to be unambiguously part of a nation, for it is the place where you automatically belong. Just as a family is the place where most people can find automatic support so is the nation. In fact, the nation is even more reliable than a family because no one can remove the nationality which has been imprinted into a person while a family can reject a member. In an advanced country such as Britain membership of the nation state is valuable indeed, for materially at least it is still (just) a fully-fledged
life support system.

That which is valuable needs to be defended, because what is valuable is always envied by others and will be stolen if possible and destroyed if not. The state recognises this by expecting its nationals to fight to protect the national territory against an overt invader. The principle can be extended to other things such as opposing mass immigration (a surreptitious form of conquest) and defending the nation’s vital industries.

Patriotism becomes less intense as the size of the group   increases, a fact noted by David Hume: “But when society has become more numerous, and has encrease’d to a tribe or nation, the interest is more remote; nor do men so readily perceive , that order an
confusion follow upon every breach of these rules , as in a more narrow and contracted society.”  (Book II section 2 A Treatise of Human Nature).  But that does not mean it becomes diluted to the point of having no utility. It simply means that patriotic feelings are not as immediately strong as those which attach to family and friends.  Perhaps more exactly, patriotism is not called upon with the same frequency  as the emotions which attach to those whom we regard with personal affection.  The latter feelings are constantly with us,  constantly being called upon. Patriotism on the other hand, is intermittently required to preserve the integrity of the tribe or nation. But it is always there in the
background guiding our  behaviour from thinking it natural that immigrants are excluded from our territory to supporting a national sporting team.

Being patriotic by my definition does not mean constantly and stridently asserting a nation’s achievements and superiority to other nations. It simply   means looking after
the national interest in the same way that an individual looks to their own interest.

7. The liberal internationalist

Liberal internationalist ideology is diametrically opposed to what Nature has decreed. It states that homo sapiens is a single species whose atoms, the individual human being, are interchangeable. For the liberal internationalist discrimination is the dirtiest of words and a word which he interprets to the point of reductio ad absurdum.

That is the theory. In practice, the liberal internationalist complains of discrimination only when it effects those whom it includes within the protective embrace of political correctness. Those outside that embrace may be abused and vilified. Most perversely this attitude frequently results in members of a majority actively discriminating against their
own people. Nowhere is this behaviour seen more sharply than in the attitude of the British elite towards the English to whom they deny any political voice – a privilege granted to the other parts of the UK – and actively abuse them by representing English national feeling as a dangerous thing.

The liberal left internationalists may have made truly immense efforts to portray nations as outmoded relics at best and barbarous survivals from a less enlightened past at worst, but despite their best (or worst) efforts they have not changed the natural feelings of people because these feelings derive from the general biological imperative common to all
social animals: the need to develop behaviours which enhance the utility of the
group.

But if an elite cannot destroy the naturally patriotic feelings the people they rule, they can severely taint and shackle  them by suppressing their public expression through the use of the criminal law, for example, laws against the incitement to racial hatred which are interpreted  as applying to any dissent from the politically correct position on race and immigration  and civil law penalties such as   extortionate payments for unfair dismissal
through racial discrimination which, curiously, only ever seem to apply to members of  ethnic minorities. To this they add the ruthless enforcement of their liberal-left ideology throughout politics, public service, academia, the schools, major private corporations and the mainstream media.

So successful have liberals in Britain been in their censorship and propaganda  that rarely
does any native dissent about immigration and its consequences enter the public realm, while it is now impossible for anyone to occupy  a senior position in any public organisation or private organisation with a quasi-public quality, for examples, charities
and large companies, without religiously observing the elite ideology which has solidified into what is now called political correctness. The consequence is that people have developed the mentality common in totalitarian regimes that certain feelings, however natural, are somehow now out of bounds and dangerous and consequently should be the subject of self-censorship. People still have the feelings but they are withdrawn from public conversation and increasing from private discourse.

It is important to understand that even the most vociferous liberal does not believe in his or her heart of hearts that humanity is a single indivisible entity whose atoms (the individual) are in practice interchangeable. They wish it was so but know it is not so. However, the ideologically committed continue to live in hope that minds and behaviours can be changed by what they are wont to call “education”, for which read indoctrination. The rest go along with the idea because it has been built into the structure of the elite and the doubters prize ambition and their membership of the elite above honesty.

It is of course impossible to consciously force someone to be patriotic,  but there is no need to because the natural instinct of human beings is to be patriotic. All that needs to be done is to remove the constraints placed on national expression by the liberal internationalists and these natural instincts will re-assert themselves . That can be done by the political elite changing their tune towards a defence of the nation and the nation state. Let the political rhetoric alter and the public mood will swing towards the patriotic. The underlying strength of patriotism can be seen in the case of England. Despite being denied any national political voice and incontinently abused by the British elite,   whenever a national sporting  team representing England takes the field the support is immense.  Come the football World Cup and vast numbers of the flag of St George appear on everything from flagpoles to cars. Let England win the Rugby World Cup or cricket’s Ashes and great crowds fill the streets of London as they teams go on a celebratory parade.  Whenever an England side plays abroad they are joined by astonishing numbers of  English men and women.

8. How to move from multiculturalism to patriotism

All treaties which restrict the power of a government to act in the national context must be thrown away. In the case of Britain that means leaving the EU and repudiating treaties such as the UN Convention on Refugees and the European Convention on Human Rights.

The institutionalisation of political correctness within public service must be destroyed, both by dismissing all those employed explicitly to enforce such views (who are de facto political commissars) and by repealing all laws which both provide powers for officials and those which restrict free expression. I say political correctness in its entirety because the various strands of political correctness support each other, most notably in the general attack on “discrimination”. Leave anything of the “discrimination” culture intact and it will be used to bring in multiculturalism by the back door. It would also require many of the de facto political commissars to be left in office.

Public office, both that held by politicians and officials, should be restricted to those with four grandparents and two parents as nationals born and bred. This should be done to prevent any lack of focus because of the danger of divided national loyalties.

Mass immigration must be ended. Immigrants in a country illegally should be removed in short order where that can be done. Where possible, those legally in a country who cannot or will not assimilate fully, should be re-settled in their countries of their national origin or the national origin of their ancestors or in other countries where they will be in the racial/ethnic majority. Those who are in a country legally but who do not have essential scarce skills which cannot be supplied by the native population, should be sent back to their countries of origin – there would be few from countries who could not be returned because they would be definitely identifiable as coming from a country and few countries will refuse to receive one of their nationals even if they do not have a passport.

A written constitution is a must because otherwise any change to remedy matters will be vulnerable to easy reversal. Such a reversal could be thwarted, as far as these things can ever be thwarted, by placing a bar on what a government may do. That should include prohibitions on the signing of treaties which restrict national sovereignty and mass immigration, provisions for the protection of strategic industries and the restriction of
public office to born and bred nationals and a clear statement that the nation state exists to privilege its members over those of foreigners. Most importantly, there should be an absolute right to free expression for that is the greatest dissolver of elite abuse and general chicanery. Milton understood this perfectly: ‘

And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose upon the   earth, so truth be in the field [and] we do injuriously  by  licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength.  Let  her
and falsehood grapple;  who ever knew truth put to the worse,  in a free and open encounter…’ [Milton – Areogapitica].

9. No patriotism, no enduring society

The value of patriotism is its ability to produce social coherence and an enduring and discrete population . Without patriotism a country becomes no more than a geographical expression and is ready prey for colonisation by overt conquest through force or covert conquest through mass immigration.

Liberal internationalists have ends which are directly in conflict with patriotism. They seek the destruction of nation states and the subordination of nations to a world order ommanding a single human society .  A particularly crass example comes from the TV
broadcaster I mentioned earlier, Adrian Chiles:

“I want all the species to marry each other so that in 300 years’ time we are all the same colour.

“White people can’t talk about whiteness without sounding racist. I would love my daughter to marry an Asian or black man. “http://icbirmingham.icnetwork.co.uk/0100news/0100localnews/content_objectid=13305960_method=full_siteid=50002_headline=-Asian-for-Aide-s-girl-name_page.html#story_continue

The  ends  of liberal internationalism are predicated on the demonstrably false premise that diverse populations will live not merely as peacefully and productively as homogeneous ones , but produce stronger and, by implication, more enduring societies . The internationalists have no rational grounds for believing this , for the whole experience of human history and the world as it is today is that diversity of race and ethnicity in the same territory equates to violence and social incoherence. There is literally no example of a diverse society which has not suffered serious ethnic strife, whether that be outright racial war or chronic social disruption such as riots and the production of ethnic ghettos which become de facto no go areas.

Ironically, the invariable consequence of mixed populations is not as liberals would like to believe, a diminishing of aggressive national/tribal sentiment but an inflation of it. A people secure in its own territory does not need to engage in constant national expression because nothing threatens it: a people in a mixed society must constantly do so because
all the ethnic/racial groups are necessarily in conflict because of the need for each to compete for power and resources for their own group.

Because Man is differentiated profoundly by culture, the widely accepted definition of a species – a population of freely interbreeding organisms sharing a common gene pool – is unsatisfactory. Clearly Man is more than an animal responding to simple biological triggers. When behavioural differences are perceived as belonging to a particular group by that group as differentiating members of the group from other humans  they perform the same role as organic differences for they divide Man into cultural species. That is how homo sapiens should be viewed, as an amalgam of species and subspecies who require their own territories to maximise peace . In addition such societal differentiation probably  drives  the evolution of Man . A good example of  the latter would be 18th century England and the Industrial Revolution. Would that revolution have occurred if England had not been a very homogeneous society which suffered very little immigration from the 14th century onwards?  Probably not, because large-scale immigration or conquest by a foreign power would have radically changed the nature of England.

The Liberal internationalists’ belief  that human beings are interchangeable social atoms who may live as readily in one society as another is a recipe for national suicide. Patriotism is not an optional extra.

The Spring Edition of the Quarterly Review is out

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Quarterly Review  Vol 5 . No 1 . Spring 2011

CONTENTS

Editorial Derek Turner Click here

Who owns the food chain? Julian Rose Click here

Lukács and Gramsci – curiously conservative radicals Geoffrey Partington

The promised planet

Frank Ellis on Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth? by Eric Kaufmann

Libya: a war of the womb Ilana Mercer

The disuniting States of America

Mark G. Brennan on Age of Fracture by Daniel Rodgers

Home schooling – an idea whose time has come? S. Jay Porter

The West in history

Michael H. Hart on Why the West Rules – For Now by Ian Morris

Jerusalem – the heavenly and profane city

Peter Stark on Jerusalem – The Biography by Simon Sebag Montefiore’s

Revolution, freeze-framed

Leslie Jones on Photography and Memory in Mexico: Icons of Revolution

by Andrea Noble

Replay: Ordet Luise Hemmer Pihl

Replay: The Man Who Knew Too Much Johanna Rhiannon Johnson

Second Reading: Hakluyt’s Voyages Derek Turner

Uncollected Folk Roy Kerridge on playing the blues

Taki Taki on men (and women)

Eggs Catharine Savage Brosman (poem)

On the terrace Niels Hav (poem)

The complete “Wages of Scottish independence”

I have now completed the series on the implications of Scottish independence on the Calling England blog. They cover all the important ground relating to the question:

The wages of Scottish independence – England, Wales and Northern Ireland must be heard

In the matter of Scottish independence, the British political elite and the Scottish Numpty Party (SNP) are flatly ignoring the interests of the English, Welsh and Northern Irish. This is unreasonable for two reasons: firstly, the granting of independence to … Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – If Parliament says NO

Whether or not Scotland would vote for independence is debatable. Polls consistently show a majority against, although there are always a substantial number of “don’t knows”. In a referendum held only in Scotland with the YES campaign headed by the … Continue reading →

Geographically Scotland is very isolated. It is a stranded at the top of mainland Britain with a single land border with England. Any goods or people coming and going to Scotland have a choice of independent access by air and … Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – a divided country

The divided country is not the UK but Scotland. Its divisions are cultural, geographical, religious, demographic and racial. Demographically Scotland is a most peculiar place. It has a population estimated at 5.2 million in 2010 (http://www.scotland.org/facts/population/) set in an area … Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – membership of the EU

The Scottish Numpty Party (SNP) leader Alex Salmond has a dream; well, more of an adolescent fantasy really. He imagines that an independent Scotland would immediately be embraced enthusiastically by the EU. In the more heroically bonkers versions of the fantasy, … Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – The monarchy

The Scottish Numpty Party (SNP) has committed itself to the Queen being Scotland’s head of state should independence occur. http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/wintour-and-watt/2011/may/25/alexsalmond-queen). As with so much of the SNP policy towards independence this presumes something which is far from self-evident, namely, that …Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – immigration

The Scots Numpty Party (SNP) fondly imagines that an independent Scotland would continue to have free access to England. They recklessly assume Scotland’s position would be akin to that of the Republic of Ireland. However, that assumption rests on a …Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – Public Debt

One thing is certain about an independent Scotland: it would begin life with a massive national debt. Exactly how much is problematic because the Scottish referendum on independence will probably not be held until 2015. The Scots Numpty Party (SNP) …Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – the currency problem

The most problematic decision for an independent Scotland is the currency. There are three choices: to keep using the pound, join the Euro or create their own currency. If they choose the pound or Euro they will not be truly … Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – the loss of the military

 

One of the most complex aspects of disentangling Scotland from the rest of the UK should Scotland become independent is defence. It is complex because of (1) the siting of the Trident submarines and other major ships at Faslane; (2) … Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – public sector employment

One of the many major issues which an independent Scotland would have to address is the extent to which the Scottish economy is dependent on public spending and in particular the number of public sector jobs which would be moved … Continue reading →

These posts also address the same subject:

The truth about UK oil and gas

 

The Scots Numpty Party (SNP) bases its case for the viability of Scotland’s independence on the idea that wicked England has been “stealin’ ouir oil” and that if only they had control of the tax revenues from UK oil and gas … Continue reading →

Make sure the costs of Scottish independence get into the media

The letter below was published in the Times 10 May 2011. It is extremely important that the debate on independence for Scotland is conducted on the basis that Scotland will not be allowed to walk away from the financial obligations … Continue reading →

Scottish independence? Yes, but only on these terms

The Scots Numpty Party (SNP) has managed to defeat the attempts of the unionists who deliberately devised the electoral system to thwart single party government (and hence leave independence off the practical political agenda) and get a majority in Scotland. The …Continue reading →


The wages of Scottish independence – England, Wales and Northern Ireland must be heard

In the matter of Scottish independence, the British political elite and the Scottish Numpty Party (SNP) are flatly  ignoring the interests of the English, Welsh and Northern Irish.  This is unreasonable for two reasons: firstly, the granting of independence to Scotland has considerable political, economic and security implications for the remainder of the UK and, secondly, the conditions on which Scotland might be allowed to leave the Union are of direct interest to the rest of the UK, because if they are too generous to Scotland they will disadvantage England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

The granting of over-generous conditions to the Scots  is probable with the present Coalition Government, which has done nothing to abate the appeasement of the Scots so assiduously practised by New Labour since 1997  by continuing the Barnett Formula and tossing juicy bones to Edinburgh such as increasing the number of armed forces personnel in Scotland at a time of massive reductions in Britain’s defence forces (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/8646134/Liam-Fox-Scottish-defence-footprint-to-increase-despite-RAF-Leuchars-closure.html).  There is also the strong possibility that the present Government would attempt to placate Scots by going for devolution max or independence lite, either of which would shift major powers to Scotland such as fiscal independence and the revenues from the oil and gas in Scottish waters without the Scots taking on a share proportionate to their population of the UK’s financial obligations.

It is also true that even if the cutting adrift of Scotland was entirely equitable in terms of the division of debts and assets, the rest of the UK (and especially England) would have a serious interest in blocking the divorce. To begin with, an independent Scotland would not be able to guard its own borders or patrol the oil and gas fields in its waters because of its small population, the large territory in relation to the population and the sheer cost of doing so. The rest of the UK (in reality England because Wales and Northern  Ireland receive far more from the UK Treasury tax pot than they put in)  would in practice be providing Scotland’s defence,  because no country could imagine that an attack on Scotland would not bring in England.

There would also be the threat of immigration from an independent Scotland to England. Scotland could operate an open door policy in the sure knowledge that immigrants entering Scotland would overwhelmingly head for England. Scotland might even act as a national people trafficker by selling entry to Scotland and/or Scottish citizenship. If both Scotland and England remain within the EU, the Westminster Government would be unable to do anything about the immigration to England via Scotland  of any number of people from both within and without the EU.

Lastly, there would be the question of what would  happen if  an independent Scotland ran into the sort of economic trouble experienced currently by the Republic of Ireland and Greece. As sure as eggs are eggs, England would be called upon to bail her out.  Even if that did not happen it is probable that an independent Scotland would not be able or willing to finance her share of the accrued financial obligations of the UK. There would be no way of guaranteeing that an independent Scotland could service even her 9 per cent share of the UK national debt (which is officially projected to be  at least £1.3 trillion at
the proposed referendum date of 2015) let alone her PFI and other public service debt (http://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2011/06/02/the-wages-of-scottish-independence-public-debt/). The reality  is that if Scotland had a nominal independence England would be the guarantor of last resort, underwriting Scotland’s obligations accrued both before and after independence.

The rest of the UK, and especially England, clearly have a pressing interest in the question of  Scottish independence. How should that interest be given a  political voice? This can be done either with a referendum on Scottish independence in which they (but not the Scots) vote on a simple question such as “Should Scotland be allowed to vote on whether they want independence” or by a referendum held in England, Wales and Northern Ireland on any conditions for independence which have been agreed between the UK and Scottish Governments and accepted by the two parliaments. It is important to understand that UK Government cannot simply decide to grant Scotland independence, because the 1707  Act of Union would have to be repealed by the Westminster Parliament  and the Scottish Parliament would have to accept the conditions for independence and pass legislation preparing Scotland for independence if a YES vote was obtained. (The later Acts bringing  Ireland into the Union and then adjusting the Union to include Northern Ireland rather than Ireland,  would be amended by the doctrine of implied repeal. However, a new Act might be passed clarifying the new situation).

A  vote on the simple question of independence should be held in England, Wales and Northern Ireland  and a YES vote obtained  before a Scottish referendum is  held.  If a NO vote resulted then Scottish independence would be off the agenda.   Similarly, if the conditions are voted upon, this should be done before the vote is put to the Scots.  A NO vote would mean that either Scottish independence was off the agenda or that the conditions had to be changed and put to the English, Welsh and Northern Irish electorates again.  Nothing short of Westminster abolishing the Scottish parliament and government by repealing the devolution settlement as it applied to Scotland could prevent a referendum, being organised by the Scottish government and sanctioned by the Scottish parliament, but such a referendum would have no legal or constitutional status.

If Scotland declared UDI they would legally  be in rebellion. That would not only lay Scotland open to catastrophic sanctions by Westminster but also put them at odds with the EU because  an independent Scotland created illegally would not automatically  have EU status. It would also be a very dangerous thing for the EU to offer any support on encouragement to part of an established EU member seceding from the member because there are so many parts of the EU which might do the same. In theory this might play into the hands of Eurocrats because it undermines the powerful  national state, but in practice it would simply strengthen nationalism and in the most messy and chaotic manner with
micro-states popping up all over the EU.  This consideration would also prevent the EU
pushing for Scotland to be made  independent in the case of Scotland voting YES in a referendum which had no legal status.  However, the EU might well push for greater
devolved powers short of independence for Scotland in  such circumstances. That needs watching.

There is also the ticklish question of what the franchise should be for the Scottish referendum on independence. Like the rest of the UK, Scotland is far from being ethnically monolithic. The 2001 census showed 88 per cent of the population being White Scottish, 9 per cent White non-Scottish  and 2 per cent black or Asian. (http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2004/02/18876/32939).
There are also different electoral qualifications for voting in Scotland and the rest of the UK, these varying between UK national elections, elections to the devolved assemblies, EU elections and local elections. Elections to the Scottish parliament include Scottish residents from other EU countries in the electorate, while elections to the Commons do not. Conversely, ex-patriot Britons are allowed to vote for Westminster MPs while they are not allowed the privilege in the election of MSPs to the Scottish parliament even if they are on Scottish electoral registers. As there are large numbers of Scots living outside
Scotland,  this is no small difference.

The Scottish government Draft Referendum (Scotland) Bill Consultation Paper  states “Eligibility to vote will follow the precedent of the 1997 referendum in being based on who
can vote at Scottish Parliament and Scottish local government elections. However, the draft Bill provides that those aged 16 or 17 on the electoral register on the date of the referendum will also be entitled to”.   (http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2010/02/22120157/7)

That is all very well on paper, but there is no guarantee that the Commons would accept such a franchise because that would mean a large proportion of voters could be either without British citizenship or possessed of dual citizenship. It would in principle be possible to identify people from outside Scotland who would be willing to vote for independence, ship large numbers of them into the country shortly before a referendum, get them registered as resident in Scotland and effectively fix a YES vote.

There is also the strong possibility that there would judicial challenges from those excluded particularly ex-patriot Scots. In a country such as modern Britain they might well succeed, so hemmed about with laws and treaties obligations restricting what parliaments and governments may do. Most particularly Article 3 of the first Protocol to the Human Rights Act runs “The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.”  It is all too easy to foresee the type of legal wrangles over who comes within the definition of “the people”, especially in the case of ex-patriot Scots.  Would a Scot have to live outside Scotland for six months, a year, five years or what to count as not being part of the people?

If the Scottish parliament could not simply lay down who should vote in the referendum large numbers of possibilities arise. Here are a few. Should every adult living in Scotland get the vote? Should it be every adult who is qualified to vote for the Scottish Parliament? Should it be only British citizens living in Scotland?  Should it be only Scots living in Scotland? Should it be Scots living throughout the UK? What about Scots living abroad? Should they be allowed to vote as ex-pat Britons are allowed to vote in Westminster elections? Should it be any adult in Scotland entitled to vote in EU elections? Should it be every adult in Scotland entitled to vote in local elections?

The above facts speak for themselves: there is considerable doubt about when and in what form a referendum on Scottish independence might be held. It is vital that the many unresolved questions are answered before any referendums are held and that the political elite in the UK does not simply railroad an independence referendum through without giving the people of  England, Wales and Northern Ireland a say in that which so directly concerns them.

The wages of Scottish independence – If Parliament says NO

Whether or not Scotland would vote for independence is debatable.  Polls consistently show a majority against, although there are always a substantial number of “don’t
knows”.  In a  referendum held only in Scotland with the YES campaign headed by the Scottish Numpty Party  (SNP) leader Alex  Salmond and the  NO campaign led by Scottish
non-entities or people from outside of Scotland such as Cameron, it is possible  that a YES result might be obtained, especially if there is a low turnout and there is no minimum turnout required for the referendum to have force.  If  the referendum is held before  the conditions for independence are decided, as Salmond wants,  the chances of a YES vote would be considerably increased because voters would be buying into the idea of independence based on the wildly irresponsible SNP fantasy of a Scotland made rich by oil revenues rather than the reality.

From his public comments David Cameron appears to accept that the results of a referendum held in Scotland  would  be binding because he stated in June 2011 that
if a referendum is  held he will  campaign as vigorously as possible  for a NO. But it is not in Cameron’s gift to  say that a referendum will be binding,  because the Act of Union of 1707 would require repeal. Before any referendum is held Cameron  would  have to persuade the Westminster Parliament to pass a Bill which granted Scotland independence in the event of  a YES vote, with the YES  triggering a repeal of the  Act of Union. As a matter of practicality it would also have to contain the conditions under which Scotland would be granted independence, because it is improbable in the extreme  that the House of Commons would give an absolute promise  of independence, that is, allow the Scots to vote  for independence without the conditions being agreed in advance of the referendum. (If  the Commons did perpetrate such an act of folly it would create untold strife between the Westminster and the SNP because it is a fair bet that Salmond would ask for impossible terms). What could happen is that there are either two referenda, one on an undefined independence with a second after conditions have been agreed between Westminster and Edinburgh, or a single referendum on an undefined independence with a vote in the Commons on conditions for independence after these have been agreed between Westminster and Edinburgh.   This would be the disadvantage of the rest of the UK because the SNP would be arguing for favourable conditions with the propaganda tool of a YES vote behind them.

It is unclear where Cameron stands on the agreeing of conditions for independence, viz: “ He [Cameron] has made it clear that the referendum question would have to be  straightforward rather than the multiple-choice version favoured by the SNP: Cameron wants the voters to be asked a simple question, along the following lines “Do you wish Scotland to remain part of the United Kingdom?” Last night a Westminster source with inside knowledge of the new hard – line stance being adopted by Mr Cameron commented: “Mr Salmond must be honest and straightforward with the Scottish people in his phrasing of the question for the referendum. If he isn’t we will conduct the referendum.” ‘(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/8565826/David-Cameron-might-take-Scottiish-independence-referendum-off-Alex-Salmond.html).
This  does not  indicate whether the conditions would  be decided before or after  the referendum, but,  as mentioned previously, it is  unlikely that the Commons would accept a binding commitment without knowing the conditions. Again, the Commons would have control of what happened because if Cameron wished for the Coalition to run a referendum new legislation by Westminster would be needed. If Cameron takes charge of the referendum it would provide the SNP with a recruiting sergeant for independence because they could march under their favourite banner of “the English are oppressing us”.

Bt whatever the result of  a referendum,  there would still be the need for legislation to dissolve the Union and it is by no means certain that the Coalition Government or any other would be able to force such a Bill through the House of Commons. There are three reasons for this. The first is the self-interest of  the Labour and LibDem parties, both of which rely disproportionately on Scottish seats in their representation in the  Commons. At the 2010 General election  41 out of 257 Labour seats were  in Scotland, as were  11 of the Libdems total  of 57.
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/election_2010/scotland/8663161.stm).  If the 59 Scottish seats were removed from the House of Commons,  it would be very  difficult for Labour ever to form a government by themselves.  A coalition of   Labour and the LIbDems  would perhaps stand a better chance of forming a government in a rump UK, but it would not be that much better , especially in the disillusionment of LibDem voters in the aftermath of the formation of the Coalition which has seen them both break election promises, most notably their written pledge on university tuition fees, and attach their
name to many unpopular policies such as the rapid reduction of public debt and  further
privatisation of the NHS. There are also sincere unionists in both the Labour and the LibDem parties who would vote against on principle.

But it is not  only Labour and the LibDems who might vote against a Bill to dissolve the  union.  It would be in the interest of the Tory party to see an independent Scotland because it would greatly increase the likelihood a Tory Government in the rump UK. But the Tory Party is by history and inclination a unionist party.  Some Tory MPs might feel strongly enough to vote against the Bill on principle.  The fact that Cameron is firmly in the unionist camp would give individual Tories, especially the backbenchers, encouragement to vote independence down.

The Bill could also be rejected  by the Commons  if were unduly generous to Scotland, for example,  it did not require Scotland to take a share proportionate to their population of UK National debt at the time of  independence.

It is also a moot point whether MPs for Scottish seats would be allowed to vote on the repeal of the Act of Union. If they argue to be allowed to vote it could be argued that if the whole of the UK, as represented by the Commons, is voting on the matter, the referendum should include the whole of the UK.   There is also the possibility that before the conditions for independence as  agreed between the Government and the SNP (or
any other Scottish government)  are accepted as binding, they should be put to a referendum in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.  This would be both reasonable and  emasculate any Commons objection to conditions.

There is also a potential delay of several years lying in wait in the Lords.  If the Lords rejected either a Bill enacting Scottish independence or a Bill laying down conditions thought to be unacceptable, the Parliament Act would have to be used which entails both a statutory delay of one year  and possibly (although this would be highly unusual) further substantial delay when the Bill returned to the Commons for re-presenting to the Lords.   It is also worth remembering that when any Bill goes to the Lords initially there are plenty of opportunities delay matters.

What would happen if the Commons rejected Scottish independence after a Yes vote?  It would depend to a substantial degree on the turnout and the size of the Yes majority. If the
turnout and majority were small, say 35 per cent voting and a majority of a five per cent or less, it would be uncomfortable for the Government and would provide a very strong propaganda tool for the SNP and any other party supporting independence to either  raise the number in Scotland wanting independence at any price or to extract serious concessions from  the Government which could be anything from the continuance of the Barnett Formula and  massive funds for infrastructure projects in Scotland to arrangements leading to an independence lite or devolution max settlement.  The latter course would be much more likely  because the Alex Salmond has been pushing independence lite or devolution max very heavily since the SNP won a majority in the Scottish parliament  in May 2011.

If  a referendum resulted in a  low turnout but a large majority voting for independence, it would become more difficult for the Commons to vote against independence. It would also give the SNP more bargaining power to reach independence lite or devolution max.  A high turnout with a narrow majority would probably give Salmond less bargaining power because the Government and the Commons would be able to point to the large minority of the electorate voting against and claim  that such a serious step as independence needed a solid majority of the people behind it.

The most problematic situation would  be a high turnout with a substantial majority for independence. That would cause problems for both the Government and the SNP. The Government and  the Commons  would not be able to argue that the vote was not conclusive because either only a small proportion of the population had voted for independence in the case of a low turnout or that almost as many had voted NO as had voted Yes in a high turnout. The difficulty for the SNP would be that with a clear mandate the pro-independence Scots  would not accept anything less than full and unambiguous independence. The other great unknowable is what the political situation at Westminster will be in 2015 or whenever a referendum is held. The Coalition Government may say that  they will not go to the  country until 2015, but there is no certainty about that. Even if the Bill stipulating that Parliaments must run their full term is passed, it will still have a mechanism for going early, for example, sixty per cent of the Commons voting for  dissolution.   The relationship between the Coalition  partners is looking increasingly fractious and the News Corp phone hacking scandal bids fair to both make that worse,
strengthen Labour and conceivably force Cameron from the Premiership as more and  scandalous associations between Cameron and News Corp power players and journalists comes out.

If  the Parliament is dissolved before any referendum is held,  that will potentially scupper any agreement which Cameron (or any successor) may have made with Salmond. Any new Government would not be bound to honour such an agreement and even if an Act is on the Statute Book  which provides for a referendum and has a clause which  repeals the Act of Union, a new Government would still be under no obligation to honour it – a simple Bill repealing it would be all that is needed to prevent a referendum.

To add to the Westminster confusion, Lords Reform is still on the cards.   This will  not be
reform but in effect the abolition of the Lords and its replacement with a new House.  No one knows what the relationship will be between that House and the Commons. If it is elected in whole or part it would be difficult to deny it great powers than the Lords has. Those might be greater powers of veto, amendment of Commons legislation or delay of
Commons legislation.

An elected second chamber or one based on appointments to represent a greater range of British society than the Lords presently does would have a very different make-up from the Lords.  This could mean a second chamber much less responsive to the prevailing British political elite culture and mores. Such a chamber might well be hostile to the idea of placating Scotland, as Cameron seems to be determined to do, because growing English resentment of the privileges given to the Celtic Fringe and the subordination of English interests would be likely to be expressed more strongly in a reformed second chamber, especially a an elected one under proportional; representation, than  in the Lords which is overwhelmingly the creature of the mainstream political parties.

Speaking of English interests and resentment, there is the undelivered to date promise of “English votes on English laws” which Cameron made before the 2010 election.  If that promise is honoured  before a  referendum on Scottish independence, especially if an English Grand Committee is formed,  that would provide a focus and vehicle to either oppose such a referendum or influence the conditions for independence or the nature of the referendum to be held.

There is also the possibility that the SNP may cease to have a majority in the Scottish Parliament or even to be part of a Scottish Government before any referendum is held or conditions are decided. This is not that improbable because the SNP has the referendum on independence pencilled in for 2015, the very end of the present Parliament even if it runs its full term.

If the referendum has not been held by then there will be another set of elections to the Scottish parliament. The SNP could easily lose their majority because the economic realities are beginning to strike home in Scotland. The Brown Government agreed to delay cuts to Scotland’s block grant for a year and the Coalition  honoured this when they formed a Government in May 2010 (http://scotlandonsunday.scotsman.com/scotland/Tories-to-delay-cuts-for.6168741.jp).
This means that it is only in this financial year (2011/12) that cuts are occurring. But because the 2010/11 cuts were delayed, the cuts this financial year  includes those plus any others made since the Coalition gained office.   All the Scottish government did was put off
the pain.

If a situation is reached where a referendum has been held and a YES vote achieved but the House of Commons refuses to pass the necessary legislation  or a referendum is held  without conditions being agreed in advance and the Westminster Government is unable to agree  terms with Holyrood, what would be the position?  The Westminster Parliament and Government would hold all the aces if they  chose to play them because the Scottish government is dependent on Westminster raising the money to fund them. Even if  Scotland declared UDI (wildly improbable)  they would not be able to raise anything like the money they would need to fund everything in Scotland that is now funded by the taxpayer. To take one example, the Centre for Economic and Business Research  predicted in 2009 that by 2013 67 per cent of Scottish GDP would come from public spending (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article5489654.ece).
Anything short of UDI and Westminster could simply strangle Scotland by, for example, reducing the Treasury block grant to Scotland to the per capita level of England. That would remove around £8 billion pa from the Scottish government’s revenue.  The only question at issue is whether the Westminster Government would have the will to take such action.

The wages of Scottish independence – infrastructure

Geographically Scotland is very isolated. It is a stranded at the top of mainland Britain with a single land border with England.  Any goods or people coming and going to Scotland have a choice of independent access by air and  sea  or dependent  entry and exit via rail and road through England.

Why does this matter?  Two reasons: Scotland cannot assume free passage for goods and  people through England in perpetuity. They might not have it immediately after independence if  Scotland  is  unable to gain EU membership,   either because the  reduced UK (henceforth the UK) opposed it or the other EU members did.  Alternatively the UK (or England on its own) might leave the EU.  It would also be in the UK Government’s hands
to impose its own restrictions on the free movement of Scottish imports and exports.

In any of these eventualities Scotland would be severely hampered in its importing and exporting.  EU law would prevent the free export of Scottish goods to and through the rest of the UK  if Scotland was not part of the EU and to the EU through the UK if the  UK  did not remain in the EU.  If the UK did not remain in the EU, exports to Scotland  from the UK would also be subject to EU protectionism and even goods from the EU could become subject to tariffs and quotas if they passed through the UK.  As for the UK Government taking steps off their own bat to impose restrictions, that could be a real possibility if the UK left the EU,  either in retaliation for EU imposed restrictions on UK trade with the
EU or EU restrictions on the movement of goods to and from the non-EU nations of Europe  to the UK . There might also be disputes between the UK and Scotland which could result in restrictions, for example, Scotland failing to pay the interest on their share of the UK National debt at the time of independence or Scotland operating too lax  an
immigration policy resulting in immigrants coming into Scotland with the intention of moving across the border to England.

The precarious geographical situation of Scotland shows the importance of it remaining on good terms with the UK  in the event of independence.  But it also means that  the UK  would have no incentive in improving railways and roads right up to the Scottish/English border.  In the UK  it may make sense for political  reasons to build a high speed rail line from London to Glasgow and Edinburgh as is presently under discussion (http://news.scotsman.com/edinburgh/Scotland-must-be-on-new.6606935.jp),
although the proposed HS2 route is being fiercely resisted by those parts of England through which it will wend on its way to Scotland (http://www.rail.co/2011/01/31/why-britain-needs-hs2/).  But if Scotland were independent , at best it would make no  political sense for the UK to extend such as line further than Carlisle, a city ten miles short
of the Scottish border and  70 odd miles from Glasgow.  More likely than extending  the high-speed line to Carlisle  would be a decision to extend it no further than Manchester, a city 170 miles from Glasgow. The same reasoning would be likely to apply to all rail and road access between England and Scotland,  because there would be little benefit  to the UK in improving  the links right up to or anywhere near the Scottish border.

But even if the UK was willing to improve railways  and roads up to the Scottish border, it is doubtful whether an independent Scotland could afford to extend the links to Glasgow and Edinburgh. HS2 if it ever gets built will cost tens of billions of pounds  (http://stophs2.org/news/2368-hs2-bill-1000-family).  A substantial part of the line, around a fifth of its length, would be in Scotland if it runs  to Glasgow and/or Edinburgh.  Bearing  mind that Scotland’s GDP at present is  less than £140 billion (in 2009 it was
officially estimated at £131 billion – http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/06/21144516/5), it is difficult to see how Scotland would fund the construction, maintenance and running of the HSE on their side of the border.

Poor communications,  external and internal,  would  not hinder only Scottish exports and imports of goods . It would  also adversely affect large sections of the private enterprise part of the Scottish economy  such as tourism and dissuade talented  individuals from coming to work in Scotland or businessmen to invest there. Poor infrastructure generally would be a disincentive to individuals and businesses.  Existing well qualified individuals and companies located in Scotland might well decide to move elsewhere.

But infrastructure is about much more than main roads and rail links to major cities. An independent Scotland would have to fully fund all new capital projects in  Scotland including the rail and road network over the sparsely populated highlands and islands, and maintain the existing networks.  This would not be easy to do even under the present devolution arrangements because  Network Rail (which has responsibility for the
railway in Scotland)   is projecting  considerable cuts in funding (http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/may/31/rail-industry-prepares-for-public-funding-cuts)

Amongst other things, an independent Scotland would also have to build new schools, universities, prisons, law courts   and hospitals and maintain the old ones;  prevent coastal erosion (a considerable task with such an extensive coastline for such a small population);  fund most the local council’s infrastructure spending and maintain state-owned Scottish Water  infrastructure . Of course much of this is already done via the UK Treasury block grant Scotland receives each year, but  thereby hangs a tale: in the first ten years of devolution public spending in Scotland increased dramatically. Now it is due to fall, viz:  “In the last decade, Scottish Government departmental expenditure has grown by over 5% a year on average in real terms. It is projected that between 2011/12 and  2014/15 it could fall by an average of 2.9% in real terms per annum and be £3.5 to £4bn lower.” (http://www.scdi.org.uk/downloads/SCDIBlueprintforScotland.pdf).  That  is the official estimate in the event of Scotland remaining within the UK  with  all the benefits that provides, such as assurance for business investors that Scotland is effectively  underwritten by England  and   a massive annual subsidy from England. (Shortly before Labour left office in 2010, the monetary benefits to Scotland since devolution in 2000 were calculated by  the Scottish Secretary Jim Murphy’s office at £76 billion, that is the difference between tax raised in Scotland and public expenditure in Scotland since 2002 – http://www.scotsman.com/news/Scotland39s-76-billion-39devolution-dividend39.6009619.jp).

In short, infrastructure spending in the ten years since devolution has taken place in the most benign economic and fiscal circumstances. Those circumstances would not exist come independence. Indeed, they would probably be far  worse by the time independence was reached because  according to the Murphy report the tax deficit is already at  dangerous levels : ‘… an examination of “real money” government expenditure that excludes capital spending, Scotland Office economists found total expenditure in Scotland currently amounts to 145 per cent of all Scottish tax receipts.”

An independent Scotland would find itself immediately saddled with a massive national debt as the result of taking on a proportionate share of the financial obligations of the UK at the time of independence (this would be in excess of £200 billion – https://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2011/06/02/the-wages-of-scottish-independence-public-debt/), further debt in the shape of PFI contracts for work undertaken in Scotland
and local authority debt. On the other side of the fiscal ledger, the tax base in an independent Scotland would shrink because of the unhealthy  proportion of its GDP which is  dependent  on public spending (https://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2011/05/19/the-wages-of-scottish-independence-public-sector-employment/) and the receipts from oil in Scottish waters would not compensate for the £8 billion pa Scotland receives in extra funding from the UK Treasury because the per capita funding is around £1,500 per head higher in Scotland than it is in England.  The oil is also a rapidly declining asset. (https://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2011/05/14/the-truth-about-uk-oil-and-gas/).
It is also a fact that Scotland has a dangerously narrow private sector being far too dependent on oil, Scotch whisky, material and tourism.  This means it could easily be blown off course by a sudden change of fortune in one of the main revenue earners .

With additional costs and tax revenue falling, it is improbable in the extreme that Scotland’s infrastructure could be maintained at its present level let alone substantially improved.  Nor  is there any reason to believe that  an independent Scotland would be wise in its use of money for infrastructure investment.  The Scottish parliament was estimated to cost £40 million and cost  £414 million (http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-03357.pdf) and a tram scheme in Edinburgh which bids fair to waste £750 million with
precious little to show for it (http://scotlandonsunday.scotsman.com/comment/Edinburgh39s-disgrace-II-Tram-fiasco.6783582.jp).  Those are serious amounts of money for an economy the size of Scotland. A massive like England could shake them off, but a few fiascos of this magnitude could seriously damage Scotland.

The likely outcome for infrastructure in an independent Scotland is more ridiculously expensive projects, less of it and worse maintained.

The wages of Scottish independence – The monarchy

The Scottish Numpty Party (SNP) has committed itself to the Queen being Scotland’s head of state should independence occur.  http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/wintour-and-watt/2011/may/25/alexsalmond-queen). As with so much of the SNP policy towards independence this presumes something which is far from self-evident, namely, that
this would be acceptable to the Queen, practical or agreeable to the remainder of  the UK.

It  might seem a simple thing for the Queen to be Scotland’s  head of state for many of Britain’s ex-colonies and dominions, including substantial states such as Australia and
Canada, retain such a link with the old colonial power.   If she can act as head of state for them why not for an independent Scotland, a much smaller and more insignificant entity?   The answer is simple; all the Commonwealth  countries of which she is queen  are not intimately connected with Britain  geographically, administratively or economically.   Scotland is. In addition, if Scotland retained the pound she would have something no other Commonwealth country has, her fiscal policy substantially decided by Westminster.

To understand the potential dangers of the Queen as head of state of an independent Scotland a familiarity with the nature of the monarchy as it is today.  Britain’s monarchy
evolved from an executive to a constitutional one largely through convention rather than law.  For example, the  monarch stopped vetoing Acts of Parliament after the advent of the Hanoverians in 1714 not because the power was removed by Parliament,  but because the monarch did not use the power. In time this became a convention.  The consequence is that there are few constitutional bars placed on the Crown’s powers and the Royal prerogative is essentially what it was after the Bill of Rights was passed in 1690 in the aftermath of the overthrow of James II. (An up to date description of the Royal Prerogative can be found at (http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-03861.pdf).  However, all of the important  powers  which remain bar two  are exercised today by the Prime Minister.  The important exceptions  are (1) where the appointment of a prime minister  is to be made when there is no party with a clear majority in the Commons and the monarch has to decide whether a government can be formed and if so who is best able to do so and (2) the monarch’s decision whether to grant  a dissolution of  Parliament is not straightforward.  For example, suppose a coalition government breaks up and there is the possibility of forming a different coalition with a working majority, the monarch might  decide that the denial of a dissolution and the acceptance of a different coalition might be preferable to another General Election. That could be the case where there have been two General Elections in a short period which have failed to return a House of Commons with a workable  majority for a single party.  If the present Coalition pushes through the promised Bill to make future Parliaments go the full five years unless a strong majority in the Commons votes for a dissolution, this objection would  be much weakened. If the present arrangements for   general elections  in Scotland continue, namely that they be called only every four years , (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/46/part/I/crossheading/general-elections)
the difficulty will not arise.  However, in the case of an independent Scotland there would be more opportunity  for the monarch to be called upon to appoint a new government during the course of a parliament because  the electoral system is likely to produce coalitions and often coalitions of more than two parties.   At present the formation of the Scottish devolved Parliament and government does not involve the monarch. If Scotland became independent she would have to do one of three things: have a Governor-General as the Queen’s representative ;  have a  relationship in which the Queen performs  the same duties in Scotland as she does in the UK as it is presently constituted or some entirely new relationship which reduces the monarch to nothing more than a figurehead with no prerogative power or influence, for example, no Royal warrants, no part in hung parliaments and so on.  This strikes me as unlikely because it would offer  an example to  other Commonwealth states which persuade them to  lobby top change their relationship
with the Crown.

In the case of the appointment of a Governor-General,  that in itself would be a difficult political decision because the Scots would doubtless call for a Scot. The appointment of a Scot could produce a person  with divided loyalties or even worse one wholeheartedly biased towards Scotland’s interests.  Conversely, the failure to appoint a Scot could result in a continuous running political sore. But appointing a Scot as  Governor-General  would be no guarantee of compliance to Edinburgh’s wishes.  The Governor-General of Australia who dismissed Gough Whitlam as Australian Prime Minister in 1975, Sir John Robert Kerr, was Australian.

Any relationship other than one which was new  would produce constitutional difficulty, because the major element of the prerogative which the monarch still exercises which would be applicable to Scotland –  the decision of who should form a government where there is no clear cut electoral decision –  would force the monarch into politics, either
directly or through a High Commissioner.  This might not matter if coalitions were a
rarity in an independent  Scotland. But they would probably be the norm rather than a rarity.  If Scotland retains the  electoral system used for her devolved parliament, the monarch (or Governor-General)  would have to make such a decision  after most  Scottish general elections . Coalitions being fragile, there would also be multiple opportunities for more than one such decision to be made in any parliament.   If that were the case, the monarch (or Governor-General)  would constantly be brought into active politics. Should the monarch (or Governor-General ) make a decision which  was questionable, for example, accepting a coalition which excluded the party with the most seats, the monarch could be subject to personal political attacks. That could undermine the position of the
monarchy in the rest of the UK as well as Scotland.

Scotland could adopt a first-past-the-post electoral system, but that is most unlikely because of the vested interest all parties in  Scotland have in retaining the present system,
that is, all know they will have a chance of at least some seats, something which would not be the case under first-past-the-post.  But  even if a first-past-the-post system was adopted there would still be occasions when a   coalition was needed. This would be much
more likely in a small assembly such as the devolved parliament than in the House of Commons , which has more than  five times the members of the  Scottish parliament.

A small number of elected representatives means that any overall majority is going to be small whatever the electoral system.  That is simply a matter of arithmetic.  In a House with 646 members such as the House of Commons, a party winning 55% of the seats  has 355 members  which gives a majority of  64.  60% of the seats in the Scottish parliament (129 members)  is 71 seats and a majority of 13.  Managing a parliament for four or five years on a majority that small would be difficult. Every death or retirement of a member would take on considerable importance.  The opposition would be constantly on the alert to embarrass the government with “ambush” voting and refusals to pair.  This would make coalitions even where an overall majority likely within their potential for politically embarrassing the monarch.

That is not the only chance of political embarrassment or worse for the monarch. The Queen acts a conduit for  the UK Government’s legislative programme through the Queen’s speech. She does not do the same for the devolved government in Edinburgh.   If  an independent Scotland wished the Queen to give a Queen’s speech in an independent Scottish parliament , she could easily find herself proclaiming contradictory policies in Westminster and Edinburgh, for example,  Westminster might decide to raise duty on Scotch whiskey while Edinburgh opposed such a move. More dramatically, if Scotland continued to use the pound the Scottish government might, for example,  argue for lower
interest rates and Westminster to raise them.

The monarch might also find herself having to speak words written for her by either government which would insult or enrage either Westminster or Edinburgh. It is easy to imagine Alex Salmond putting anti-English rhetoric into a Scottish Queen’s speech.

Embarrassment could also arise if those who were persona non grata to either  Westminster and Edinburgh were entertained by the other and monarch had to meet them. Or the monarch might be called upon to undertake a public duty which was unpalatable to one of the governments, for example opening a nuclear power station in England and praising it as the best way of ensuring future energy supplies while Scotland continued with a no nuclear policy.    The same problems would arise with any lesser royal, in whom they me, the speeches they might give and the places they might visit.

If an independent Scotland decided to use the Royal Prerogative powers which the Westminster Government  uses,  they would be much more potent in Scotland than they are at Westminster. The small size of the  Scottish Parliament would lend itself much more easily to corruption and intimidation because there would be few people who would need to be corrupted or intimidated. That would, for example,  make the use of existing prerogative powers which allow ministers to produce law without having to put legislation through Parliament a potentially dangerous weapon  in the hands of a Scottish Prime Minister inclined  to govern autocratically. In the latter days of the last Labour Government  The Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill 2008-0 (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/46/part/I/crossheading/general-elections)
was passed. This did put some restrictions on the Royal Prerogative such as giving Parliament  a say in the  waging of war and the agreement to Treaties . But that Act only applies to the Westminster Parliament and UK Government. An independent Scottish Parliament could use the Prerogative in its form prior to that Act.  They could, amongst other things,  make treaties or declare war without  Parliamentary approval.  The Queen could end up supporting a treaty  or war in one country and opposing it in another.

A particularly fraught  problem  is the position of the armed forces. The UK armed forces owe their loyalty to the monarch not Parliament or Government.  Imagine the situation after Scottish independence if both Scotland and the UK had their separate armed forces who were yet all subject to the authority of the monarch.   The opportunities for disagreement would be immense, as indeed they were before the Union when the English and Scottish crowns were united.  In the 1690s Scotland  developed a madcap scheme to establish a colony on the Isthmus of Panama  http://www.rogermoorhouse.com/article2.html).  Its promoters knew nothing about the reality of the site, which was inhospitable. It also fell within the Spanish  ambit.  The promoters of the scheme  called on William III  as King of Scotland to use English colonial power,  English troops and the Royal Navy to support the colony and to generally aid them to the disadvantage of English interests.   William refused because he did not wish to give Spain grounds for war  or create opposition in England.  It is conceivable that similar clashed of interest could arise again, for example, if an independent Scotland could not defend  its territorial waters and called on  the Royal Navy to do so.

That would be an awkward enough marriage of dissonant interests, but the SNP leader is hoping for an independent Scotland and the remainder of the UK to share a common defence force (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/8515034/Sir-Mike-Jackson-tells-Alex-Salmond-British-soldiers-have-only-one-master.html).
That would create an impossible situation whereby Scotland might wish to  withhold  troops and equipment  from Westminster  if there was disagreement about how they might
be deployed.  Servicemen cannot  have two political masters.

Those are some of the problems which would come with an independent Scotland with the Queen as head of state. There are others, for example, the funding of the monarchy. What would Scotland pay?  Or the diplomatic service; how would UK and Scottish ambassadors in the same country, both appointed by the monarch, reconcile different views on the
same diplomatic matters?   What is clear is that a return to the 1707 situation of one crown but two countries would be immensely messy and not in England’s interest.  If Scotland becomes independent it should be without  the Queen as head of state.   The Queen (or her successor) could not veto this,  because the Parliamentary settlement of 1689 with William III puts the ascension of a monarch to the throne of England  in the gift of Parliament.

The wages of Scottish independence – immigration

The Scots Numpty Party (SNP) fondly  imagines that  an independent Scotland would continue to have free access to England. They recklessly  assume Scotland’s position would be akin to that of the Republic of Ireland. However, that assumption rests on   a number of dubious presumptions: (1) that an independent Scotland would be in the EU; (2) that  the remainder  of the UK (henceforth the UK) will remain in the EU; (3) that the EU will survive in its present form ;  (4) that the  UK will continue to have such generous welfare provision and (5) that the UK will  play by the formal EU rules.

If either Scotland or the remainder of the UK  was outside the  EU,   the rules relating to free movement of peoples across EU borders would not apply and the UK could restrict movement from Scotland to England at will.    If Scotland was not in the EU (and the EU
might not welcome  the idea of another potential  Greece or Republic of Ireland or the Westminster government might veto their application to join ) but the  UK remained in the EU, the Scots would be at a disadvantage in comparison with the  continental EU states,  because the remainder of the UK would be required to accept labour from other EU countries but not from Scotland.   But what if both Scotland and the UK remained within the EU? That would mean there would be free movement between the countries. However, that presumes the EU will remain as it is. This is very uncertain.  Should the Euro collapse that might cause such financial distress that the EU ceased to exist as each of  the member states looked in desperation for their own salvation.  That could leave an independent Scotland out on a limb, bankrupt and unable to export its unemployed.

Even if the EU did not break up, a  the collapse of the Euro would could  produce a  lasting depression along the lines of that of the 1930s. This would reduce both the opportunities for employment within the EU and the ability of member states to meet their welfare obligations, which would dissuade people from moving  to countries where the welfare benefits are highest.

As all EU law requires is that the same benefits that are offered to the citizens of an EU member are offered to any other EU members’ citizens, this produces widely varying provision in the various  EU states with corresponding differences in their attraction to immigrants.

Welfare is particularly significant in the UK’s case because when everything is taken into account – unemployment pay, sick pay, working tax credits,  housing benefit, council tax
benefit, free school education and (still) subsidised  university education and the NHS (which is by far the most generous healthcare system in the EU –  the UK has arguably the most attractive welfare package in the EU and one moreover which is   very readily accessed.

If UK benefits were considerably reduced there would be far less incentive for foreigners to come. That would apply to an independent Scotland. In fact,  Scotland could find itself in a situation where the welfare benefits they offered were more substantial  than those of the UK and produced migration from the UK to Scotland to  claim the higher benefits.  As things stand with EU law, they would have to pay the higher benefits to all EU citizens who claimed them. The only way the Scots could prevent paying higher benefits would be to
reduce the provision s to their own people.

There is also the possibility that the UK could reduce their level of welfare provision even without a further great economic disaster. This is certainly the intent of the Tory Party and if they achieve a strong majority at the next general election this may well happen.

Another possibility is that the EU could re-invent itself in a number of ways. It could reduce its members to a core of stable, productive members. That would not include Scotland. A multiple layered EU with members having a different status is another with differing rules relating to free movement, the right to work and access to welfare. In reality this already exists with countries in the European Economic Area (EEA) such as Norway  and Switzerland having free trade and free movement of peoples but not obligations such as welfare provision for EU state citizens (http://livinginamadhouse.wordpress.com/2011/05/01/if-we-leave-the-eu-we-mustnt-be-another-norway/).   It is improbable that an independent Scotland and the UK would be in the same layer because of the great difference in size and wealth between the two.

As for free movement within the EU itself, it is noticeable how readily the Schengen Agreement  was overthrown in May 2011  by subscribing  states declaring they were suspending free movement because of the pressure of refugees from North Africa caused by the so-called “Arab Spring”. (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/12/europe-to-end-passport-free-travel).  The Schengen Agreement provides for the twenty five signatories (all EU members except for the UK and the Republic of Ireland) to operate a  no borders regime for the subscribing members. This covers approximately 400 million people.  Not  only is free movement within the EU one of the four EU “freedoms”, but the Schengen Treaty conditions and the  law evolving from them are now  part of the EU’s  acquis communautaire (literally that which has been acquired by the community) . This means that jurisdiction over the Schengen Area  and any amendment to the Treaty provisions is now subject  to the legislative process of the EU (the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament) rather than a negotiating free-for-all by the political heads of
each member state.  Yet the decision of EU countries large and small –  Italy, France, Denmark – to act unilaterally passed without any real opposition or action. The lesson here is that when shove comes to push national interests will predominate.  Other  examples are the flouting of EU rules on such things as competition and state subsidies. Often no action is taken and even where it is, the larger countries such as France simply ignore any fines or judgements from the European Court of Justice  with impunity.  Even if Scotland and the UK remained within the EU,  the UK as one of the larger EU states could impose border controls against Scotland without anything dramatic happening. The same would apply  with greater force if an independent Scotland became a member of the EEA or the UK left the EU and signed up to the EEA.

Scotland could in principle join the Schengen Area, although its fragility has been clearly demonstrated this year.  But that would do them little good because neither the UK nor the Republic of Ireland are members. Thus Scotland would have no shared border with the treaty members.

If the UK left the EU, an independent Scotland would be utterly in the hands of the UK,  which could not only stop human traffic over the border but legally prevent any goods traffic between the UK and Scotland.  The same would apply if Scotland was not in the EU and the UK was.

Why would  the UK not want to have an open border with Scotland? The Westminster government might wish to prevent  free Scottish immigration for a number of reasons. The most obvious would be if Scotland was used as a conduit for  immigrants from outside the British Isles to enter England in large numbers. (I say England not the UK because experience shows that immigrants to the UK overwhelming head for England).

Then there would be the risk that the resident population of Scotland would  want to come to England in large numbers if the Scottish economy turned turtle.  That could have considerable costs for England both in terms of competition for jobs, housing, public services  and benefits paid to the unemployed.

There is also the strong  risk for Scotland that a future Westminster government could be faced by an electorate, especially of those in England,  which was hostile to Scotland because of their decision to leave the union and wished them to be denied any suggestion of special treatment such as continued  free movement across borders.

If Scotland  became independent that  England’s already great predominance within  the UK would become even greater with over 90% of the UK’s population and much more of its wealth.  That would make the  UK government  give more attention to English interests.  This natural tendency would be enhanced by the loss of the 59 House of Commons seats which are returned by Scotland. That would make a future Labour or even a Labour/LibDem government  improbable because  Labour and the LibDems hold all but one of the 59 seats. The  likelihood would be  a Tory Government at Westminster for the quite some time after Scottish independence.

There would also be the question of nationality at the time of Scottish independence.  Alex
Salmond  has the quaint idea that the Scots would have both Scots and British nationality. This is a very rash assumption.  British nationality might not continue once Scotland was gone. The UK might opt for a confederal system  with different nationalities for England,
Wales and Northern Ireland.  England might decide to go for independence herself. More broadly, a Westminster Parliament dominated by English MPs and concentrated on English interests might refuse to share a nationality with an independent Scotland. An independent  Scotland which did not have free movement between herself and the UK would be in a very perilous position,  because she would be a small country on the very
periphery of Europe with no border with any country other than England.  Scots should reflect on that inescapable fact.

How English football became foreign football played in England

Robert Henderson

English football has “enjoyed” the benefits of more or less unrestricted market forces
and the globalist ideology for twenty years. The result is instructive: a combination
of huge amounts of new money (primarily from television, sponsorship, inflated ticket
prices, the cynical merchandising of club strips and money introduced by immensely rich foreign owners) and greatly increased freedom of movement for footballers has gone a long way to destroying the character of English professional football and the nature of its support.

Before all this happened English league football had existed very successfully for more than a hundred years – the Football League was formed in 1888, the first in the world. With 92 clubs, England has supported (and still supports) the largest full-time professional football league in the world (since 1992 the Football League has been divided into the Premier League – the old First Division – and the Football League which contains the other three divisions. As there is relegation and promotion between the Premier league and the rump of the Football League, the position structurally is essentially the same as the old 4 division Football League).

Despite many alarms about clubs going bust, very few went out of business in those one
hundred odd years. Their teams were overwhelmingly staffed by Englishmen and the minority who were not English were almost always drawn from the rest of the British Isles. Players frequently stayed with one club for much of their career and many came up through the youth and reserve teams of the clubs for which they played. Frequently the players were also supporters from childhood of their clubs. Ticket prices were cheap and even the poor could regularly watch their teams. It was truly a game for all.

The poorer clubs made ends meet by selling players to the richer clubs. Even if a player was out of contract, a club could demand a transfer fee or insist on a player continuing to
play for them, provided they had offered the player another contract not inferior to the one he had previously had with them. Until the early 1960s, players were subject to a maximum wage and could not move at all if a club refused to release their league registration.

Very much a controlled market. The point is it worked. English club football was stable. After the reforms of the 1960s players had reasonable freedom of movement and decent wages. The Football League was also strong in footballing terms. Until they were banned from European competition in 1985 after the Heysel stadium disaster, English clubs  dominated European club competition, winning the European Cup every year between 1977 and 1984. Although such extravagant success was not matched at national level, the England side had a record which was more than respectable – in the 1990 World Cup, despite having been kept out of European club competition for five years, the England side reached the  semi-finals.

In twenty years the leading English clubs have gone from being staffed overwhelmingly by English players to a position whereby most Premiership clubs regularly put out sides with
fewer than half the side made up from English players. In some cases, such as Fulham and Chelsea, teams frequently take the field with two or fewer English players. In 2009/10 the average number of foreign players in the first team squads of Premier League clubs was 13. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/football/eng_prem/8182090.stm.) Moreover, the more prominent the club, the less likely English players were to play English. Arsenal illustrates the change dramatically: 1989-90 season: 19 players were born in UK, two born abroad; in 2009-10 four players were born in the UK, 23 were born abroad. The Premier League inquiry into the “tapping-up” of the then Arsenal and England left back Ashley Cole by Chelsea (http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/football/eng_prem/4596209.stm)n quotes Peter Kenyon of Chelsea as claiming that ‘Cole told him at the meeting that there were a series of cliques at Arsenal, that the “team was primarily run by the French boys” and that he was concerned with a lack of team spirit at Highbury. (http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/premier-league/french-clique-runs-arsenal-coles-revelation-to-chelsea-492976).
That epitomises what is wrong with the current English elite mentality. Arsenal
are a team run by a French manager who has systematically excluded English
players from the team whilst ensuring that his own countrymen are dominant in
the imports.

Why do foreign managers favour their own? It is partly because those are the players they
know. They come to England knowing next to nothing about English players other than those in the top clubs or England side. Football below the Premier League is unknown to them. But there is also the ethnic factor. When a foreign manager comes into a country the thing he is most fearful of is a homogeneous phalanx of native players. He fears this because they people he doesn’t understand and because they are representatives of the dominant culture. The manager’s response is (1) to divide and rule by bringing in many foreigners and (2) to bring in many of his own countrymen to act as a cultural guard for him.

But it is not only foreign managers who have gorged on foreign players. British managers,
including English ones, have done so albeit to a lesser degree. One of the drivers of this behaviour is driven by the demands of owners for instant success. It is obviously easier to buy an established player from abroad than taking a chance on young English players untried at first team level. Even if the foreign players do not bring success the manager can say well I tried and the board can point to foreign purchases as evidence that they are “willing to invest”. However, there are other incentives, legal and illegal, for English managers to buy foreign. Managers’ contracts can contain clauses which give them a percentage of any fee if a player is subsequently sold on. That’s the legal way. The illegal way is to take “bungs”, that is, payments made to a manager by the selling club as a reward for selling a player they would not otherwise have sold or persuading the board of the buying club to pay far more than a player is worth. Deals for foreign players make it much easier to hide bungs because the buying and selling clubs are in different legal jurisdictions.

The destruction of the old ties between players and their clubs has other pernicious effects.
Foreign players are mercenaries and move very frequently chasing higher wages. The wages of players have become so astronomical that the future of many clubs has been placed at risk. The fans have been milked by ticket prices which have gone through the roof. Many of the poorer followers who had watched their clubs man and boy have found themselves unable to continue going regularly to games. What has happened in the Premiership is mirrored in varying degrees by the clubs in the Football League.

If other circumstances had remained the same, things might not have changed radically. But of course circumstances did change and, indeed, the Premier League would almost certainly not have been formed when it was formed if new media opportunities had not arrived. Satellite television was in its infancy, but provided a dynamic competitor for the  terrestial channels. The only British satellite broadcaster BskyB was in severe difficulties in its early years. The company decided to try to save itself by concentrating on high class sport. It began paying massive amounts for sporting events which had previously been seen only on terrestial TV. No sport was more handsomely rewarded than Premiership football. The formation of the Premier League resulted in a five year contract with BskyB worth £304 million, riches which utterly dwarfed anything which had gone before. Not only that, but the amount of televised football was massively increased. That in turn increased media exposure generally which inflated revenue greatly as international interest grew. The Premiership TV deal in 2010 was worth £1.4 billion (http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/premier-league/premier-league-nets-16314bn-tv-rights-bonanza-1925462.html)

To the new TV money was added much increased sponsorship deals, itself driven by the additional media exposure football was getting. Merchandising became a racket with the larger clubs changing their strips every five minutes. Clubs also found they could put their ticket prices up substantially and still fill their stadia. This was not surprising because Margaret Thatcher had insisted after the Hillsborough disaster in 1989 that clubs in the higher divisions become all-seater. That commonly reduced the capacity of stadia by 50%. By the early 1990s that policy was taking effect.

So much money came into Premiership football that it changed utterly the way the top clubs were run. Many floated on the stock market and became responsible first and foremost to their shareholders. They could also afford to pay wages which matched those of the more extravagant clubs on the continent such as Real Madrid and Inter Milan. If nothing else had  changed, it is a fair bet that the likes of Manchester  United would still have employed some of the great foreign players of the world. However, the numbers would have been few and the quality high. Unfortunately, in the decade in which the new money became available, two events greatly increased the mobility of players both
domestically and internationally.  These led to a massive influx of foreign players, managers, coaches and eventually owners into England.

The first event was ever increasing scope of the EU’s single market regulations followed by the “Bosman ruling”. Together they allow free movement within the EU of players with
citizenship of an EU country, provided the player is out of contract. (Bosman is an obscure Belgian footballer who in the mid 1990s successfully challenged the right of his  club to prevent him playing at the end of his contract by refusing to transfer him by holding onto
his registration).

The position was worsened by the pusillanimous behaviour of successive British Governments when dealing with players from outside the EU. In theory any non-EU player can be banned from playing in Britain. However, the Major government introduced a system of work permits for such players whereby any player playing more than 75% of his country’s international matches in the previous year could play in Britain (the rules
were somewhat tighter for the weaker FIFA ranked nations). Not content with this concession, clubs began pleading special circumstances, to which the Government almost invariably acceded if the appeal was from a leading  club. The result was that for the Premiership at least, any player from anywhere could in practice be employed.

Without the Bosman ruling allied to the Single Market regulations and government weakness over non-EU  players, the basic form of British football would have remained. Players would not have been able to move very freely between countries or even within clubs in England. Football wages would still have risen, but by nothing like the as much as they have because the bargaining position of players would have been much less.

Perhaps most importantly, teams in the higher divisions, including the Premiership would
have spent the money they have allowed to go out of English football through foreign transfer fees and wages (very few English players have gone to foreign clubs) on English players and with English clubs. A good deal of the transfer money would have gone to  clubs in the lower divisions, strengthening their position and English football generally. As things stand, Premiership clubs have virtually ceased buying players from the divisions
below the Premier League.

The effect of the ever growing reliance on foreign players is the exclusion of not merely established English players from the leading sides but also the denial of opportunity to the coming generation of England players. Talented English youngsters are being denied regular opportunities or any opportunities at all. It was not from a lack of talent. Take the case of Liverpool. In the 1990s their academy produced McManaman, Gerrard, Fowler, Owen, Carragher. That was under British managers. From 2000 to 2010 Liverpool had foreign managers, Houllier and Benitez. Not a single Academy player gained a regular place in the first team. This was all the more surprising because Liverpool won the FA Youth Cup in successive years (2006,2007). To add insult to injury, Benitez not only refused to use any the Academy players from these years, he instigated a “reform” of the Academy which prompted the departure of successful Academy director, the old Liverpool
player Steve Heighway.

Opportunity is the key. This has always been a problem. To take a few examples from the 1980s Peter Beardsley nearly slipped through the net before making it in the big time, John Aldridge was in his late twenties before being given a chance in the old First Division and Gary Lineker was a comparatively late developer who did not play for England until he was twenty-three. If this occurred when most places in the top division of English football were available to Englishmen, it is one greatly magnified today when most positions are not available to Englishmen.

All the major English clubs have academies with age group teams running Ajax-style from
primary school age upwards. In the first half of the nineties, Man United’s youth football produced Beckham, Scholes, Butt and the Neville Brothers for England. Ominously in the last five years, no  other English youth player has come through to be a first team regular. In the past fifteen years, Arsenal have produced only three players from their own resources (Parlour,Ashley Cole and Jack Wilshire) to command a regular place in the first team. Chelsea have produced one – John Terry.

The denial of opportunity to English players inevitably damages the English national side. There are 20 teams in the Premiership which gives 220 starting places. Less than half of those places go to English players. Does anyone doubt that if another 120-150 or so English players were given the opportunity to play in the Premiership, a dozen or so would not show themselves to be of international quality?

All in all, a very dismal story for anyone who cares about the long-term health of English football, which is looking less than rosy. Players’ wages have become so grossly inflated – they have risen fantastically since 1990 with players being paid £200,000+ a week at the top of the scale – that they threaten the viability of many clubs, A few clubs, such as Blackburn Rovers when they won the Premiership, have managed to arrive at the absurd situation of playing more in wages than their total income.

The heavy dependence on TV money is potentially dangerous. In 2000 the English Football League (then known as the Nationwide Football League) discovered the worth of a private contract. They signed an agreement with ITV digital for a three year contract worth around £300 million to show Nationwide games. A year into the contract, ITV Digital  found that they grossly overpaid for the contract and presented the Nationwide with a take it or leave offer of £50 million instead of the contracted £189 million which was still to be paid. This was refused and ITV Digital placed in administration.
(http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/football-league-sues-itv-digital-for-acircpound178m-651218.html).
The result was many clubs below the Premier League being severely embarrassed as they had budgeted on the assumption that the ITV Digital money would be paid.  The same scenario could conceivably hit the Premier League.  BskyB no longer have a monopoly of Premier League TV rights because of the intervention of the European Competition ommission. Setanta obtained some of the rights when the last TV contracts were signed. They rapidly failed  (http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2009/jun/22/setanta-espn-premier-league-tv).
It is conceivable that the at some time in the future either BskyB will run into trouble or the Premier League will cease to have its international appeal and bids for Premiership matches plummet.  That would place most Premiership clubs and all Football League clubs
(they receive a share of the Premier League money) in serious difficulties because many of their players are on long contracts (as a result of Bosman) with grossly inflated wages. Clubs such as Manchester United and Chelsea would doubtless be able to become very rich by marketing their own TV but most clubs would be much poorer.

The other  financial dangers to football in England arise from foreign owners. Some, such as the Glazers at Manchester United, take a great deal of money out of the club to both finance the massive borrowings they made to purchase the club and in profits. That means fans are paying more and more for tickets and merchandise and there is less money to spend on players.  The situation is also only sustainable if United continue to have the same sort of success and world-wide appeal. Others are immensely rich men or consortia such as the owner of Manchester City and Chelsea. The danger here is that the owners may lose interest and sells the club on to someone without such deep pockets who cannot bear the cost of the existing players’ contracts. The other danger is that an individual such as Roman Abramovich runs into the same sort of trouble that his fellow Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky who now languishes in a Russian jail or simply goes bust. That would leave the club high and dry unable to meet running costs. As more than half of current Premier League clubs are foreign owned this is a real source of danger.

What the present plight of English football shows is that the market is inappropriate in some spheres of economic activity. Football is not the same as selling baked beans (as the erstwhile MD of Birmingham City, Karen Brady, once said). Football is about sport. It is
about trib al loyalty. The emotional relationship between the fan and the club is intense. It is formed most commonly in youth and remains until the fan’s dying day. It is only incidentally about money and business.

A combination of excessive money and the free movement of people has turned a social institution, English professional football, on its head. It has gone from being a sport available to all even at its highest level to one affordable only to the better off. The national character of the game has been tossed aside in the pursuit of money. The long term interests of the English game have been ignored. And for what? The satisfaction of businessmen who have no concern for anything other than the balance sheet.

The ill effect of market forces and free trade on football illustrate the shortcomings of the
market. When selling bake beans it may be the most efficient and desirable method of meeting the customers needs. When more than mere material need or profit are involved, the market is not merely  inefficient in producing the desired ends but is positively destructive.

What happens in football occurs in all our major team spectator sports. County cricket games commonly start with four or five foreigners in a side; rugby union teams  are awash with South Africans, New Zealanders, South Sea Islanders  and Australians.

What goes for sport goes for the rest of British society. Our industry and commerce is
increasingly run by foreigners or exported abroad  incontinently; senior public service positions go  increasingly to foreigners. Immigration on a massive scale continues to undermine the economic prospects of native Britons.

Generally, the elite attitude is that a foreigner has exactly the same status in Britain
as a British citizen, who is no longer privileged by the fact of being British in culture as well as name. That is a recipe for the dissolution of a nation state.

Scottish independence? Yes, but only on these terms

The Scots Numpty Party (SNP) has managed to defeat the  attempts of the unionists who deliberately devised the electoral system to thwart single party government (and hence leave independence off the practical political agenda) and get a majority in Scotland.  The SNP leader Alex Salmond  can  now call  a referendum on independence . However, to have a referendum which is binding,   the SNP needs the sanction of the UK Parliament. From  his public comments David Cameron appears to accept that such a referendum would be binding because he has stated since this SNP victory that if a referendum was held he would campaign for a NO.

Whether or not Scotland would vote for independence is debatable.   Polls consistently show a majority against, although there are always a substantial number of “don’t knows”.  In a  referendum held only in Scotland with the YES campaign headed by  Salmond and the  NO campaign led by Scottish non-entities or people from outside of Scotland such as Cameron, it is possible  that a Yes result might be obtained.

I have no visceral objection to Scots independence, but the strongest objection to Scotland walking away from the Union  without taking full responsibility for themselves and leaving the English to pick up the financial mess which a mixture of regular English subsidy of Scotland and the massive costs of the rescuing  the Scottish banks RBS and HBOS.   To this end the conditionsCameron should lay down for Scottish independence are these :

1. Scotland to take a share of the UK National debt (excluding the costs involved in supporting Scottish  banks and building societies, mainly the RBS and HBOS banks)  proportionate to the percentage of the UK population in Scotland.  The servicing of this debt to be the first charge on Scotland’s public financing.

2.  Scotland to pay for the past and future costs  of bailing out  Scottish  banks and building societies.

3.  The huge English subsidies to Scotland to cease immediately on  a Yes vote being achieved.

4. All English public sector jobs which have been exported to Scotland to be brought back to England.  This would include not merely traditional civil service posts,   but facilities such as those supporting UK nuclear submarines.

5. Scotland to launch its own currency or join the Euro.  If they remain tied to the pound they would have no true independence and practically be  dependent on England for the macro management of their economy.

6. The division of the oil and gas fields to be made on the basis of  extending a line at the angle of the coastline on the England-Scotland border.  This is in accordance with the UN  convention  on the Law of the Sea article 7  – see http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.
This would give England a substantial proportion of the oil and even more of the gas fields.

7. Scotland to be gifted any state owned building in Scotland but to have no claim on publicly owned facilities in the remainder of the UK.

8. Nuclear submarines and any other  fundamentally important military equipment to
be moved to England

9.  All military research to be moved to England.

10. All future UK defence expenditure to be made in the remainder of the UK.

11.  Scotland to form its own armed forces. These will have to be capable of not only defending Scottish land but also of policing Scottish  territorial waters.

12. Scotland to be gifted all military  establishments  in Scotland , but Scotland to have no claim on military establishments elsewhere in the UK or abroad.

13. Military equipment. Scotland to be gifted existing equipment sufficient to equip whatever forces Scotland forms provided this equipment does not exceed what is available to similar UK forces.

14. All publicly funded non-military research in Scotland to be moved to the remainder of the UK.

15. Scotland to be responsible for the payment of all public sector pensions earned in Scotland before independence.

16. Scotland to be responsible for  a share proportionate to the percentage of the
UK population in Scotland  of  EU related pension earned before independence.

17. Scotland to be responsible for the  financing all government contracts relating to
building, goods and services supplied in Scotland which were entered into before
independence.

18. Property relating to UK diplomatic missions to remain the property of the remainder of the UK.

19. Scotland to be responsible for  a share  of diplomatic pensions earned before independence proportionate to the percentage of the UK population  in Scotland.

20. Scotland to be responsible for  a share  of any  public service pensions other
than those related to the diplomatic corps which is earned abroad  before independence proportionate to the percentage of the UK population  in Scotland.

21.  Immigration to Scotland from outside the EU and for any future new EU members to be controlled on the same basis as the UK  controls immigration.

22. Scotland to make its  own application for EU membership  without support from the Westminster government.

23. If the remainder of the UK or England alone leaves the EU, the following  may be put in place:

a) border controls between Scotland and the remainder of the UK

b) Scotland to be treated as any other member of the EU would be treated

c) UK protectionist barriers to  Scotland

d) an end to free movement from Scotland to the remainder of the UK

e)an end to Scots citizens enjoying the benefits of the UK Welfare State

24. If Scotland is unable to gain EU membership, all of  23  may apply apart from (b).

Conditions 1-22 can be enforced while  the UK  without Scotland remains in the EU. If  the UK without Scotland leaves the EU or England alone leaves the EU,  then condition 22 is legal.

Scots will  complain about not being given a share equivalent to their proportion of the UK
population of  the material assets of the UK armed forces or of diplomatic assets abroad. However, it is not unreasonable to advantage the remainder of the UK because England has massively subsidised  Scotland since the Union in 1707.  The subsidy began with the Act of Union, viz:

“Clause IX. THAT whenever the sum of One million nine hundred ninety seven thousand seven hundred and sixty three pounds eight shillings and four pence half penny, shall be enacted by the Parliament of Great Britain to be raised in that part of the United Kingdom now called England, on Land and other Things usually charged in Acts of Parliament there, for granting an Aid to the Crown by a Land Tax; that part of the United Kingdom now called Scotland, shall be charged by the same Act, with a further Sum of forty-eight
thousand Pounds, free of all Charges, as the Quota of Scotland, to such Tax, and to proportionably for any greater or lesser Sum raised in England by any Tax on Land, and other Things usually charged together with the Land; and that such Quota for Scotland, in the Cases aforesaid, be raised and collected in the same Manner as the Cess now is in Scotland, but subject to such Regulations in the manner of collecting, as shall be made by the Parliament of Great Britain.” Act of Union (http://englandcalling.wordpress.com/the-act-of-union-1707/)

The population of England was five times that of Scotland in 1707. Had Scotland  paid the  tax listed in Clause IX at the same rate as England  they would have paid £400,000.
Instead they were required to pay only  £48,000, roughly a ninth of the pro rata sum.

As for the oil and gas revenues, a substantial  part of that has come from oil and gas English  waters. Moreover,  oil revenues have only been flowing for around thirty years and Scotland was being subsidised by England for the better part of three centuries before that.   Nor is it true that oil and gas revenues have been consistently high because the oil and gas price was very low for a decade or more. In most years since 1980 Scotland would not have been contributing more to the UK Treasury than they took out even if ALL the oil and gas tax was allocated to them.

If the Scots wished to start claiming they should be compensated for things such as the UK  military expenditure , the retort would be all right we will let you  have that,  but in return we will expect you to repay all the subsidies Scotland has received since the Union began.

It is very improbable that Scotland would vote for independence on the terms I have outlined, but anything less would mean that England was taken for a ride and Scotland allowed to evade their responsibilities.  There is a very real danger that Cameron would pander to the Scots and let them escape these obligations. That is why English campaigners should begin now to press politicians to make sure the Scots are not allowed an easy ride to independence at England’s expense.