Tag Archives: Scotland

SNP 2011 XMAS Novelties

Independence Puzzle

Based on the Rubik Cube principle,  when solved the puzzle represents  a map of the Scotch mainland with the word INDEPENDENCE  in the its centre.  WARNING: this is a very demanding puzzle and even the brightest players will almost certainly find it impossible to solve

Guess the English Subsidy Sweepstake

Each player puts  part of their English subsidy into a pot. Players write down  their guess  for a given year. The winner is the person with the guess which is closest to the actual figure. They collect the pot. The other players say it isn’t fair and send a petition to Westminster asking for even more English money.

Educational moneybox

The money  box is in the shape of mainland Britain. When money is to be saved it is put into an opening situated over central London  from where it slides quickly  to a point north of the Tweed. When money is  to be spent a lever is pressed and the money is disgorged  from another opening  placed over Edinburgh.

Jock-in-a-box

When opened a  figure   modelled on Alex Salmond  pops up saying with the characteristic whine of the Jock-in-a-box either  INDEPEEENDENCE or DEVOOO MAXXX .   The choice of word uttered when the box is  random. Bet on which it will be every time the box is opened.   Hours of innocent fun from this traditional favourite!

Independence  Crystal Ball

Look into the Crystal Ball to see when Independence will be gained.  WARNING: an inability to see any date is not evidence of  the item not being of merchandisable quality.

Tartan Snap

The cards contain various tartans. When two cards with the same tartan are placed down  consecutively  SCOTT is shouted in honour of Sir Walter Scott who created  the  idea of clan tartans to amuse George 1V on his visit to Scotland.

Animatronic  SNP Member

Dressed in a kaleidoscope of various clan tartans with a shape which resembles a beachball in human form,  the toy  Has a library of 50 phrases  including  “It isnae fair”, “t’Anglish are stealin’’ ouir oil”, “We wunt muir t’Anglish money” , “Independence an’ t’Anglish money” , “It’s  the fault of t’Anglish”.   Unlike the 2010 model , the phrases “Arc of Prosperity” and “Independence in Europe”  are not included in  the repertoire of phrases. Startlingly lifelike

The deep-fried cookbook

Contains SNP MSPs’ favourite recipes. Everything from the classic deep fried Mars Bars to deep fried porridge balls. Base your diet on these and look like your average SNP MSP!

My little Loch Ness Monster bath  toy

Spends most of the time submerged but surfaces every now and then to display the words  “Independence for Scotland Sometime! ” illustrated on its coils.  Bright pink, it will appeal to  girls as an alternative to My Little Pony.

Devolution Max Jigsaw

This is a jigsaw with a difference.  It comes with the pieces marked with legends  such as “Armed Forces”;  Unemployment Benefit”, “Sick Benefit”, “State Pension”, “Westminster Parliament”,  and “Continuing English Subsidy”. The trick is to form the jigsaw picture with the “Continuing English Subsidy”  at the centre even though the pieces are cut so as not to fit together.

Oil Monopoly

A game for a maximum of six players. Instead of a  board marked “Victoria Station”;  “Mayfair” and “Gasworks” and so on , there is one consisting  of squares carrying legends such as “Shetlands”, “Aberdeen Refinery” and   “English North Sea Oil and Gas” . When players pass  GO they receive £200 of English money.  The Community Chest   and Chance cards are marked  with messages such as “There is a LibLab Coalition government,  collect  £1,000 extra from England” and “Independence is cancelled. Return the “Wee Pretendy Parliament money to England” .  The winner is the player who accumulates most of the oil and gas assets around the UK. Oil and gas in English waters scores treble.

Porridge Oats Modelling Set

A kit consisting of a set of moulds, oats, mixing bowl  and  measuring jug.  Oats and water are mixed and then poured  into the mould.  Moulds include  Alex Salmond,  The Wee Pretendy Parliament and the Edinburgh tram system.

Warning: toxic: not to be  put in mouth

HURRY…HURRY…HURRY… WHILE JOCKS LAST

The complete “Wages of Scottish independence”

I have now completed the series on the implications of Scottish independence on the Calling England blog. They cover all the important ground relating to the question:

The wages of Scottish independence – England, Wales and Northern Ireland must be heard

In the matter of Scottish independence, the British political elite and the Scottish Numpty Party (SNP) are flatly ignoring the interests of the English, Welsh and Northern Irish. This is unreasonable for two reasons: firstly, the granting of independence to … Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – If Parliament says NO

Whether or not Scotland would vote for independence is debatable. Polls consistently show a majority against, although there are always a substantial number of “don’t knows”. In a referendum held only in Scotland with the YES campaign headed by the … Continue reading →

Geographically Scotland is very isolated. It is a stranded at the top of mainland Britain with a single land border with England. Any goods or people coming and going to Scotland have a choice of independent access by air and … Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – a divided country

The divided country is not the UK but Scotland. Its divisions are cultural, geographical, religious, demographic and racial. Demographically Scotland is a most peculiar place. It has a population estimated at 5.2 million in 2010 (http://www.scotland.org/facts/population/) set in an area … Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – membership of the EU

The Scottish Numpty Party (SNP) leader Alex Salmond has a dream; well, more of an adolescent fantasy really. He imagines that an independent Scotland would immediately be embraced enthusiastically by the EU. In the more heroically bonkers versions of the fantasy, … Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – The monarchy

The Scottish Numpty Party (SNP) has committed itself to the Queen being Scotland’s head of state should independence occur. http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/wintour-and-watt/2011/may/25/alexsalmond-queen). As with so much of the SNP policy towards independence this presumes something which is far from self-evident, namely, that …Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – immigration

The Scots Numpty Party (SNP) fondly imagines that an independent Scotland would continue to have free access to England. They recklessly assume Scotland’s position would be akin to that of the Republic of Ireland. However, that assumption rests on a …Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – Public Debt

One thing is certain about an independent Scotland: it would begin life with a massive national debt. Exactly how much is problematic because the Scottish referendum on independence will probably not be held until 2015. The Scots Numpty Party (SNP) …Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – the currency problem

The most problematic decision for an independent Scotland is the currency. There are three choices: to keep using the pound, join the Euro or create their own currency. If they choose the pound or Euro they will not be truly … Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – the loss of the military

 

One of the most complex aspects of disentangling Scotland from the rest of the UK should Scotland become independent is defence. It is complex because of (1) the siting of the Trident submarines and other major ships at Faslane; (2) … Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – public sector employment

One of the many major issues which an independent Scotland would have to address is the extent to which the Scottish economy is dependent on public spending and in particular the number of public sector jobs which would be moved … Continue reading →

These posts also address the same subject:

The truth about UK oil and gas

 

The Scots Numpty Party (SNP) bases its case for the viability of Scotland’s independence on the idea that wicked England has been “stealin’ ouir oil” and that if only they had control of the tax revenues from UK oil and gas … Continue reading →

Make sure the costs of Scottish independence get into the media

The letter below was published in the Times 10 May 2011. It is extremely important that the debate on independence for Scotland is conducted on the basis that Scotland will not be allowed to walk away from the financial obligations … Continue reading →

Scottish independence? Yes, but only on these terms

The Scots Numpty Party (SNP) has managed to defeat the attempts of the unionists who deliberately devised the electoral system to thwart single party government (and hence leave independence off the practical political agenda) and get a majority in Scotland. The …Continue reading →


The wages of Scottish independence – England, Wales and Northern Ireland must be heard

In the matter of Scottish independence, the British political elite and the Scottish Numpty Party (SNP) are flatly  ignoring the interests of the English, Welsh and Northern Irish.  This is unreasonable for two reasons: firstly, the granting of independence to Scotland has considerable political, economic and security implications for the remainder of the UK and, secondly, the conditions on which Scotland might be allowed to leave the Union are of direct interest to the rest of the UK, because if they are too generous to Scotland they will disadvantage England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

The granting of over-generous conditions to the Scots  is probable with the present Coalition Government, which has done nothing to abate the appeasement of the Scots so assiduously practised by New Labour since 1997  by continuing the Barnett Formula and tossing juicy bones to Edinburgh such as increasing the number of armed forces personnel in Scotland at a time of massive reductions in Britain’s defence forces (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/8646134/Liam-Fox-Scottish-defence-footprint-to-increase-despite-RAF-Leuchars-closure.html).  There is also the strong possibility that the present Government would attempt to placate Scots by going for devolution max or independence lite, either of which would shift major powers to Scotland such as fiscal independence and the revenues from the oil and gas in Scottish waters without the Scots taking on a share proportionate to their population of the UK’s financial obligations.

It is also true that even if the cutting adrift of Scotland was entirely equitable in terms of the division of debts and assets, the rest of the UK (and especially England) would have a serious interest in blocking the divorce. To begin with, an independent Scotland would not be able to guard its own borders or patrol the oil and gas fields in its waters because of its small population, the large territory in relation to the population and the sheer cost of doing so. The rest of the UK (in reality England because Wales and Northern  Ireland receive far more from the UK Treasury tax pot than they put in)  would in practice be providing Scotland’s defence,  because no country could imagine that an attack on Scotland would not bring in England.

There would also be the threat of immigration from an independent Scotland to England. Scotland could operate an open door policy in the sure knowledge that immigrants entering Scotland would overwhelmingly head for England. Scotland might even act as a national people trafficker by selling entry to Scotland and/or Scottish citizenship. If both Scotland and England remain within the EU, the Westminster Government would be unable to do anything about the immigration to England via Scotland  of any number of people from both within and without the EU.

Lastly, there would be the question of what would  happen if  an independent Scotland ran into the sort of economic trouble experienced currently by the Republic of Ireland and Greece. As sure as eggs are eggs, England would be called upon to bail her out.  Even if that did not happen it is probable that an independent Scotland would not be able or willing to finance her share of the accrued financial obligations of the UK. There would be no way of guaranteeing that an independent Scotland could service even her 9 per cent share of the UK national debt (which is officially projected to be  at least £1.3 trillion at
the proposed referendum date of 2015) let alone her PFI and other public service debt (http://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2011/06/02/the-wages-of-scottish-independence-public-debt/). The reality  is that if Scotland had a nominal independence England would be the guarantor of last resort, underwriting Scotland’s obligations accrued both before and after independence.

The rest of the UK, and especially England, clearly have a pressing interest in the question of  Scottish independence. How should that interest be given a  political voice? This can be done either with a referendum on Scottish independence in which they (but not the Scots) vote on a simple question such as “Should Scotland be allowed to vote on whether they want independence” or by a referendum held in England, Wales and Northern Ireland on any conditions for independence which have been agreed between the UK and Scottish Governments and accepted by the two parliaments. It is important to understand that UK Government cannot simply decide to grant Scotland independence, because the 1707  Act of Union would have to be repealed by the Westminster Parliament  and the Scottish Parliament would have to accept the conditions for independence and pass legislation preparing Scotland for independence if a YES vote was obtained. (The later Acts bringing  Ireland into the Union and then adjusting the Union to include Northern Ireland rather than Ireland,  would be amended by the doctrine of implied repeal. However, a new Act might be passed clarifying the new situation).

A  vote on the simple question of independence should be held in England, Wales and Northern Ireland  and a YES vote obtained  before a Scottish referendum is  held.  If a NO vote resulted then Scottish independence would be off the agenda.   Similarly, if the conditions are voted upon, this should be done before the vote is put to the Scots.  A NO vote would mean that either Scottish independence was off the agenda or that the conditions had to be changed and put to the English, Welsh and Northern Irish electorates again.  Nothing short of Westminster abolishing the Scottish parliament and government by repealing the devolution settlement as it applied to Scotland could prevent a referendum, being organised by the Scottish government and sanctioned by the Scottish parliament, but such a referendum would have no legal or constitutional status.

If Scotland declared UDI they would legally  be in rebellion. That would not only lay Scotland open to catastrophic sanctions by Westminster but also put them at odds with the EU because  an independent Scotland created illegally would not automatically  have EU status. It would also be a very dangerous thing for the EU to offer any support on encouragement to part of an established EU member seceding from the member because there are so many parts of the EU which might do the same. In theory this might play into the hands of Eurocrats because it undermines the powerful  national state, but in practice it would simply strengthen nationalism and in the most messy and chaotic manner with
micro-states popping up all over the EU.  This consideration would also prevent the EU
pushing for Scotland to be made  independent in the case of Scotland voting YES in a referendum which had no legal status.  However, the EU might well push for greater
devolved powers short of independence for Scotland in  such circumstances. That needs watching.

There is also the ticklish question of what the franchise should be for the Scottish referendum on independence. Like the rest of the UK, Scotland is far from being ethnically monolithic. The 2001 census showed 88 per cent of the population being White Scottish, 9 per cent White non-Scottish  and 2 per cent black or Asian. (http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2004/02/18876/32939).
There are also different electoral qualifications for voting in Scotland and the rest of the UK, these varying between UK national elections, elections to the devolved assemblies, EU elections and local elections. Elections to the Scottish parliament include Scottish residents from other EU countries in the electorate, while elections to the Commons do not. Conversely, ex-patriot Britons are allowed to vote for Westminster MPs while they are not allowed the privilege in the election of MSPs to the Scottish parliament even if they are on Scottish electoral registers. As there are large numbers of Scots living outside
Scotland,  this is no small difference.

The Scottish government Draft Referendum (Scotland) Bill Consultation Paper  states “Eligibility to vote will follow the precedent of the 1997 referendum in being based on who
can vote at Scottish Parliament and Scottish local government elections. However, the draft Bill provides that those aged 16 or 17 on the electoral register on the date of the referendum will also be entitled to”.   (http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2010/02/22120157/7)

That is all very well on paper, but there is no guarantee that the Commons would accept such a franchise because that would mean a large proportion of voters could be either without British citizenship or possessed of dual citizenship. It would in principle be possible to identify people from outside Scotland who would be willing to vote for independence, ship large numbers of them into the country shortly before a referendum, get them registered as resident in Scotland and effectively fix a YES vote.

There is also the strong possibility that there would judicial challenges from those excluded particularly ex-patriot Scots. In a country such as modern Britain they might well succeed, so hemmed about with laws and treaties obligations restricting what parliaments and governments may do. Most particularly Article 3 of the first Protocol to the Human Rights Act runs “The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.”  It is all too easy to foresee the type of legal wrangles over who comes within the definition of “the people”, especially in the case of ex-patriot Scots.  Would a Scot have to live outside Scotland for six months, a year, five years or what to count as not being part of the people?

If the Scottish parliament could not simply lay down who should vote in the referendum large numbers of possibilities arise. Here are a few. Should every adult living in Scotland get the vote? Should it be every adult who is qualified to vote for the Scottish Parliament? Should it be only British citizens living in Scotland?  Should it be only Scots living in Scotland? Should it be Scots living throughout the UK? What about Scots living abroad? Should they be allowed to vote as ex-pat Britons are allowed to vote in Westminster elections? Should it be any adult in Scotland entitled to vote in EU elections? Should it be every adult in Scotland entitled to vote in local elections?

The above facts speak for themselves: there is considerable doubt about when and in what form a referendum on Scottish independence might be held. It is vital that the many unresolved questions are answered before any referendums are held and that the political elite in the UK does not simply railroad an independence referendum through without giving the people of  England, Wales and Northern Ireland a say in that which so directly concerns them.

The wages of Scottish independence – If Parliament says NO

Whether or not Scotland would vote for independence is debatable.  Polls consistently show a majority against, although there are always a substantial number of “don’t
knows”.  In a  referendum held only in Scotland with the YES campaign headed by the Scottish Numpty Party  (SNP) leader Alex  Salmond and the  NO campaign led by Scottish
non-entities or people from outside of Scotland such as Cameron, it is possible  that a YES result might be obtained, especially if there is a low turnout and there is no minimum turnout required for the referendum to have force.  If  the referendum is held before  the conditions for independence are decided, as Salmond wants,  the chances of a YES vote would be considerably increased because voters would be buying into the idea of independence based on the wildly irresponsible SNP fantasy of a Scotland made rich by oil revenues rather than the reality.

From his public comments David Cameron appears to accept that the results of a referendum held in Scotland  would  be binding because he stated in June 2011 that
if a referendum is  held he will  campaign as vigorously as possible  for a NO. But it is not in Cameron’s gift to  say that a referendum will be binding,  because the Act of Union of 1707 would require repeal. Before any referendum is held Cameron  would  have to persuade the Westminster Parliament to pass a Bill which granted Scotland independence in the event of  a YES vote, with the YES  triggering a repeal of the  Act of Union. As a matter of practicality it would also have to contain the conditions under which Scotland would be granted independence, because it is improbable in the extreme  that the House of Commons would give an absolute promise  of independence, that is, allow the Scots to vote  for independence without the conditions being agreed in advance of the referendum. (If  the Commons did perpetrate such an act of folly it would create untold strife between the Westminster and the SNP because it is a fair bet that Salmond would ask for impossible terms). What could happen is that there are either two referenda, one on an undefined independence with a second after conditions have been agreed between Westminster and Edinburgh, or a single referendum on an undefined independence with a vote in the Commons on conditions for independence after these have been agreed between Westminster and Edinburgh.   This would be the disadvantage of the rest of the UK because the SNP would be arguing for favourable conditions with the propaganda tool of a YES vote behind them.

It is unclear where Cameron stands on the agreeing of conditions for independence, viz: “ He [Cameron] has made it clear that the referendum question would have to be  straightforward rather than the multiple-choice version favoured by the SNP: Cameron wants the voters to be asked a simple question, along the following lines “Do you wish Scotland to remain part of the United Kingdom?” Last night a Westminster source with inside knowledge of the new hard – line stance being adopted by Mr Cameron commented: “Mr Salmond must be honest and straightforward with the Scottish people in his phrasing of the question for the referendum. If he isn’t we will conduct the referendum.” ‘(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/8565826/David-Cameron-might-take-Scottiish-independence-referendum-off-Alex-Salmond.html).
This  does not  indicate whether the conditions would  be decided before or after  the referendum, but,  as mentioned previously, it is  unlikely that the Commons would accept a binding commitment without knowing the conditions. Again, the Commons would have control of what happened because if Cameron wished for the Coalition to run a referendum new legislation by Westminster would be needed. If Cameron takes charge of the referendum it would provide the SNP with a recruiting sergeant for independence because they could march under their favourite banner of “the English are oppressing us”.

Bt whatever the result of  a referendum,  there would still be the need for legislation to dissolve the Union and it is by no means certain that the Coalition Government or any other would be able to force such a Bill through the House of Commons. There are three reasons for this. The first is the self-interest of  the Labour and LibDem parties, both of which rely disproportionately on Scottish seats in their representation in the  Commons. At the 2010 General election  41 out of 257 Labour seats were  in Scotland, as were  11 of the Libdems total  of 57.
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/election_2010/scotland/8663161.stm).  If the 59 Scottish seats were removed from the House of Commons,  it would be very  difficult for Labour ever to form a government by themselves.  A coalition of   Labour and the LIbDems  would perhaps stand a better chance of forming a government in a rump UK, but it would not be that much better , especially in the disillusionment of LibDem voters in the aftermath of the formation of the Coalition which has seen them both break election promises, most notably their written pledge on university tuition fees, and attach their
name to many unpopular policies such as the rapid reduction of public debt and  further
privatisation of the NHS. There are also sincere unionists in both the Labour and the LibDem parties who would vote against on principle.

But it is not  only Labour and the LibDems who might vote against a Bill to dissolve the  union.  It would be in the interest of the Tory party to see an independent Scotland because it would greatly increase the likelihood a Tory Government in the rump UK. But the Tory Party is by history and inclination a unionist party.  Some Tory MPs might feel strongly enough to vote against the Bill on principle.  The fact that Cameron is firmly in the unionist camp would give individual Tories, especially the backbenchers, encouragement to vote independence down.

The Bill could also be rejected  by the Commons  if were unduly generous to Scotland, for example,  it did not require Scotland to take a share proportionate to their population of UK National debt at the time of  independence.

It is also a moot point whether MPs for Scottish seats would be allowed to vote on the repeal of the Act of Union. If they argue to be allowed to vote it could be argued that if the whole of the UK, as represented by the Commons, is voting on the matter, the referendum should include the whole of the UK.   There is also the possibility that before the conditions for independence as  agreed between the Government and the SNP (or
any other Scottish government)  are accepted as binding, they should be put to a referendum in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.  This would be both reasonable and  emasculate any Commons objection to conditions.

There is also a potential delay of several years lying in wait in the Lords.  If the Lords rejected either a Bill enacting Scottish independence or a Bill laying down conditions thought to be unacceptable, the Parliament Act would have to be used which entails both a statutory delay of one year  and possibly (although this would be highly unusual) further substantial delay when the Bill returned to the Commons for re-presenting to the Lords.   It is also worth remembering that when any Bill goes to the Lords initially there are plenty of opportunities delay matters.

What would happen if the Commons rejected Scottish independence after a Yes vote?  It would depend to a substantial degree on the turnout and the size of the Yes majority. If the
turnout and majority were small, say 35 per cent voting and a majority of a five per cent or less, it would be uncomfortable for the Government and would provide a very strong propaganda tool for the SNP and any other party supporting independence to either  raise the number in Scotland wanting independence at any price or to extract serious concessions from  the Government which could be anything from the continuance of the Barnett Formula and  massive funds for infrastructure projects in Scotland to arrangements leading to an independence lite or devolution max settlement.  The latter course would be much more likely  because the Alex Salmond has been pushing independence lite or devolution max very heavily since the SNP won a majority in the Scottish parliament  in May 2011.

If  a referendum resulted in a  low turnout but a large majority voting for independence, it would become more difficult for the Commons to vote against independence. It would also give the SNP more bargaining power to reach independence lite or devolution max.  A high turnout with a narrow majority would probably give Salmond less bargaining power because the Government and the Commons would be able to point to the large minority of the electorate voting against and claim  that such a serious step as independence needed a solid majority of the people behind it.

The most problematic situation would  be a high turnout with a substantial majority for independence. That would cause problems for both the Government and the SNP. The Government and  the Commons  would not be able to argue that the vote was not conclusive because either only a small proportion of the population had voted for independence in the case of a low turnout or that almost as many had voted NO as had voted Yes in a high turnout. The difficulty for the SNP would be that with a clear mandate the pro-independence Scots  would not accept anything less than full and unambiguous independence. The other great unknowable is what the political situation at Westminster will be in 2015 or whenever a referendum is held. The Coalition Government may say that  they will not go to the  country until 2015, but there is no certainty about that. Even if the Bill stipulating that Parliaments must run their full term is passed, it will still have a mechanism for going early, for example, sixty per cent of the Commons voting for  dissolution.   The relationship between the Coalition  partners is looking increasingly fractious and the News Corp phone hacking scandal bids fair to both make that worse,
strengthen Labour and conceivably force Cameron from the Premiership as more and  scandalous associations between Cameron and News Corp power players and journalists comes out.

If  the Parliament is dissolved before any referendum is held,  that will potentially scupper any agreement which Cameron (or any successor) may have made with Salmond. Any new Government would not be bound to honour such an agreement and even if an Act is on the Statute Book  which provides for a referendum and has a clause which  repeals the Act of Union, a new Government would still be under no obligation to honour it – a simple Bill repealing it would be all that is needed to prevent a referendum.

To add to the Westminster confusion, Lords Reform is still on the cards.   This will  not be
reform but in effect the abolition of the Lords and its replacement with a new House.  No one knows what the relationship will be between that House and the Commons. If it is elected in whole or part it would be difficult to deny it great powers than the Lords has. Those might be greater powers of veto, amendment of Commons legislation or delay of
Commons legislation.

An elected second chamber or one based on appointments to represent a greater range of British society than the Lords presently does would have a very different make-up from the Lords.  This could mean a second chamber much less responsive to the prevailing British political elite culture and mores. Such a chamber might well be hostile to the idea of placating Scotland, as Cameron seems to be determined to do, because growing English resentment of the privileges given to the Celtic Fringe and the subordination of English interests would be likely to be expressed more strongly in a reformed second chamber, especially a an elected one under proportional; representation, than  in the Lords which is overwhelmingly the creature of the mainstream political parties.

Speaking of English interests and resentment, there is the undelivered to date promise of “English votes on English laws” which Cameron made before the 2010 election.  If that promise is honoured  before a  referendum on Scottish independence, especially if an English Grand Committee is formed,  that would provide a focus and vehicle to either oppose such a referendum or influence the conditions for independence or the nature of the referendum to be held.

There is also the possibility that the SNP may cease to have a majority in the Scottish Parliament or even to be part of a Scottish Government before any referendum is held or conditions are decided. This is not that improbable because the SNP has the referendum on independence pencilled in for 2015, the very end of the present Parliament even if it runs its full term.

If the referendum has not been held by then there will be another set of elections to the Scottish parliament. The SNP could easily lose their majority because the economic realities are beginning to strike home in Scotland. The Brown Government agreed to delay cuts to Scotland’s block grant for a year and the Coalition  honoured this when they formed a Government in May 2010 (http://scotlandonsunday.scotsman.com/scotland/Tories-to-delay-cuts-for.6168741.jp).
This means that it is only in this financial year (2011/12) that cuts are occurring. But because the 2010/11 cuts were delayed, the cuts this financial year  includes those plus any others made since the Coalition gained office.   All the Scottish government did was put off
the pain.

If a situation is reached where a referendum has been held and a YES vote achieved but the House of Commons refuses to pass the necessary legislation  or a referendum is held  without conditions being agreed in advance and the Westminster Government is unable to agree  terms with Holyrood, what would be the position?  The Westminster Parliament and Government would hold all the aces if they  chose to play them because the Scottish government is dependent on Westminster raising the money to fund them. Even if  Scotland declared UDI (wildly improbable)  they would not be able to raise anything like the money they would need to fund everything in Scotland that is now funded by the taxpayer. To take one example, the Centre for Economic and Business Research  predicted in 2009 that by 2013 67 per cent of Scottish GDP would come from public spending (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article5489654.ece).
Anything short of UDI and Westminster could simply strangle Scotland by, for example, reducing the Treasury block grant to Scotland to the per capita level of England. That would remove around £8 billion pa from the Scottish government’s revenue.  The only question at issue is whether the Westminster Government would have the will to take such action.

The wages of Scottish independence – infrastructure

Geographically Scotland is very isolated. It is a stranded at the top of mainland Britain with a single land border with England.  Any goods or people coming and going to Scotland have a choice of independent access by air and  sea  or dependent  entry and exit via rail and road through England.

Why does this matter?  Two reasons: Scotland cannot assume free passage for goods and  people through England in perpetuity. They might not have it immediately after independence if  Scotland  is  unable to gain EU membership,   either because the  reduced UK (henceforth the UK) opposed it or the other EU members did.  Alternatively the UK (or England on its own) might leave the EU.  It would also be in the UK Government’s hands
to impose its own restrictions on the free movement of Scottish imports and exports.

In any of these eventualities Scotland would be severely hampered in its importing and exporting.  EU law would prevent the free export of Scottish goods to and through the rest of the UK  if Scotland was not part of the EU and to the EU through the UK if the  UK  did not remain in the EU.  If the UK did not remain in the EU, exports to Scotland  from the UK would also be subject to EU protectionism and even goods from the EU could become subject to tariffs and quotas if they passed through the UK.  As for the UK Government taking steps off their own bat to impose restrictions, that could be a real possibility if the UK left the EU,  either in retaliation for EU imposed restrictions on UK trade with the
EU or EU restrictions on the movement of goods to and from the non-EU nations of Europe  to the UK . There might also be disputes between the UK and Scotland which could result in restrictions, for example, Scotland failing to pay the interest on their share of the UK National debt at the time of independence or Scotland operating too lax  an
immigration policy resulting in immigrants coming into Scotland with the intention of moving across the border to England.

The precarious geographical situation of Scotland shows the importance of it remaining on good terms with the UK  in the event of independence.  But it also means that  the UK  would have no incentive in improving railways and roads right up to the Scottish/English border.  In the UK  it may make sense for political  reasons to build a high speed rail line from London to Glasgow and Edinburgh as is presently under discussion (http://news.scotsman.com/edinburgh/Scotland-must-be-on-new.6606935.jp),
although the proposed HS2 route is being fiercely resisted by those parts of England through which it will wend on its way to Scotland (http://www.rail.co/2011/01/31/why-britain-needs-hs2/).  But if Scotland were independent , at best it would make no  political sense for the UK to extend such as line further than Carlisle, a city ten miles short
of the Scottish border and  70 odd miles from Glasgow.  More likely than extending  the high-speed line to Carlisle  would be a decision to extend it no further than Manchester, a city 170 miles from Glasgow. The same reasoning would be likely to apply to all rail and road access between England and Scotland,  because there would be little benefit  to the UK in improving  the links right up to or anywhere near the Scottish border.

But even if the UK was willing to improve railways  and roads up to the Scottish border, it is doubtful whether an independent Scotland could afford to extend the links to Glasgow and Edinburgh. HS2 if it ever gets built will cost tens of billions of pounds  (http://stophs2.org/news/2368-hs2-bill-1000-family).  A substantial part of the line, around a fifth of its length, would be in Scotland if it runs  to Glasgow and/or Edinburgh.  Bearing  mind that Scotland’s GDP at present is  less than £140 billion (in 2009 it was
officially estimated at £131 billion – http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/06/21144516/5), it is difficult to see how Scotland would fund the construction, maintenance and running of the HSE on their side of the border.

Poor communications,  external and internal,  would  not hinder only Scottish exports and imports of goods . It would  also adversely affect large sections of the private enterprise part of the Scottish economy  such as tourism and dissuade talented  individuals from coming to work in Scotland or businessmen to invest there. Poor infrastructure generally would be a disincentive to individuals and businesses.  Existing well qualified individuals and companies located in Scotland might well decide to move elsewhere.

But infrastructure is about much more than main roads and rail links to major cities. An independent Scotland would have to fully fund all new capital projects in  Scotland including the rail and road network over the sparsely populated highlands and islands, and maintain the existing networks.  This would not be easy to do even under the present devolution arrangements because  Network Rail (which has responsibility for the
railway in Scotland)   is projecting  considerable cuts in funding (http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/may/31/rail-industry-prepares-for-public-funding-cuts)

Amongst other things, an independent Scotland would also have to build new schools, universities, prisons, law courts   and hospitals and maintain the old ones;  prevent coastal erosion (a considerable task with such an extensive coastline for such a small population);  fund most the local council’s infrastructure spending and maintain state-owned Scottish Water  infrastructure . Of course much of this is already done via the UK Treasury block grant Scotland receives each year, but  thereby hangs a tale: in the first ten years of devolution public spending in Scotland increased dramatically. Now it is due to fall, viz:  “In the last decade, Scottish Government departmental expenditure has grown by over 5% a year on average in real terms. It is projected that between 2011/12 and  2014/15 it could fall by an average of 2.9% in real terms per annum and be £3.5 to £4bn lower.” (http://www.scdi.org.uk/downloads/SCDIBlueprintforScotland.pdf).  That  is the official estimate in the event of Scotland remaining within the UK  with  all the benefits that provides, such as assurance for business investors that Scotland is effectively  underwritten by England  and   a massive annual subsidy from England. (Shortly before Labour left office in 2010, the monetary benefits to Scotland since devolution in 2000 were calculated by  the Scottish Secretary Jim Murphy’s office at £76 billion, that is the difference between tax raised in Scotland and public expenditure in Scotland since 2002 – http://www.scotsman.com/news/Scotland39s-76-billion-39devolution-dividend39.6009619.jp).

In short, infrastructure spending in the ten years since devolution has taken place in the most benign economic and fiscal circumstances. Those circumstances would not exist come independence. Indeed, they would probably be far  worse by the time independence was reached because  according to the Murphy report the tax deficit is already at  dangerous levels : ‘… an examination of “real money” government expenditure that excludes capital spending, Scotland Office economists found total expenditure in Scotland currently amounts to 145 per cent of all Scottish tax receipts.”

An independent Scotland would find itself immediately saddled with a massive national debt as the result of taking on a proportionate share of the financial obligations of the UK at the time of independence (this would be in excess of £200 billion – https://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2011/06/02/the-wages-of-scottish-independence-public-debt/), further debt in the shape of PFI contracts for work undertaken in Scotland
and local authority debt. On the other side of the fiscal ledger, the tax base in an independent Scotland would shrink because of the unhealthy  proportion of its GDP which is  dependent  on public spending (https://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2011/05/19/the-wages-of-scottish-independence-public-sector-employment/) and the receipts from oil in Scottish waters would not compensate for the £8 billion pa Scotland receives in extra funding from the UK Treasury because the per capita funding is around £1,500 per head higher in Scotland than it is in England.  The oil is also a rapidly declining asset. (https://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2011/05/14/the-truth-about-uk-oil-and-gas/).
It is also a fact that Scotland has a dangerously narrow private sector being far too dependent on oil, Scotch whisky, material and tourism.  This means it could easily be blown off course by a sudden change of fortune in one of the main revenue earners .

With additional costs and tax revenue falling, it is improbable in the extreme that Scotland’s infrastructure could be maintained at its present level let alone substantially improved.  Nor  is there any reason to believe that  an independent Scotland would be wise in its use of money for infrastructure investment.  The Scottish parliament was estimated to cost £40 million and cost  £414 million (http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-03357.pdf) and a tram scheme in Edinburgh which bids fair to waste £750 million with
precious little to show for it (http://scotlandonsunday.scotsman.com/comment/Edinburgh39s-disgrace-II-Tram-fiasco.6783582.jp).  Those are serious amounts of money for an economy the size of Scotland. A massive like England could shake them off, but a few fiascos of this magnitude could seriously damage Scotland.

The likely outcome for infrastructure in an independent Scotland is more ridiculously expensive projects, less of it and worse maintained.

The wages of Scottish independence – The monarchy

The Scottish Numpty Party (SNP) has committed itself to the Queen being Scotland’s head of state should independence occur.  http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/wintour-and-watt/2011/may/25/alexsalmond-queen). As with so much of the SNP policy towards independence this presumes something which is far from self-evident, namely, that
this would be acceptable to the Queen, practical or agreeable to the remainder of  the UK.

It  might seem a simple thing for the Queen to be Scotland’s  head of state for many of Britain’s ex-colonies and dominions, including substantial states such as Australia and
Canada, retain such a link with the old colonial power.   If she can act as head of state for them why not for an independent Scotland, a much smaller and more insignificant entity?   The answer is simple; all the Commonwealth  countries of which she is queen  are not intimately connected with Britain  geographically, administratively or economically.   Scotland is. In addition, if Scotland retained the pound she would have something no other Commonwealth country has, her fiscal policy substantially decided by Westminster.

To understand the potential dangers of the Queen as head of state of an independent Scotland a familiarity with the nature of the monarchy as it is today.  Britain’s monarchy
evolved from an executive to a constitutional one largely through convention rather than law.  For example, the  monarch stopped vetoing Acts of Parliament after the advent of the Hanoverians in 1714 not because the power was removed by Parliament,  but because the monarch did not use the power. In time this became a convention.  The consequence is that there are few constitutional bars placed on the Crown’s powers and the Royal prerogative is essentially what it was after the Bill of Rights was passed in 1690 in the aftermath of the overthrow of James II. (An up to date description of the Royal Prerogative can be found at (http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-03861.pdf).  However, all of the important  powers  which remain bar two  are exercised today by the Prime Minister.  The important exceptions  are (1) where the appointment of a prime minister  is to be made when there is no party with a clear majority in the Commons and the monarch has to decide whether a government can be formed and if so who is best able to do so and (2) the monarch’s decision whether to grant  a dissolution of  Parliament is not straightforward.  For example, suppose a coalition government breaks up and there is the possibility of forming a different coalition with a working majority, the monarch might  decide that the denial of a dissolution and the acceptance of a different coalition might be preferable to another General Election. That could be the case where there have been two General Elections in a short period which have failed to return a House of Commons with a workable  majority for a single party.  If the present Coalition pushes through the promised Bill to make future Parliaments go the full five years unless a strong majority in the Commons votes for a dissolution, this objection would  be much weakened. If the present arrangements for   general elections  in Scotland continue, namely that they be called only every four years , (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/46/part/I/crossheading/general-elections)
the difficulty will not arise.  However, in the case of an independent Scotland there would be more opportunity  for the monarch to be called upon to appoint a new government during the course of a parliament because  the electoral system is likely to produce coalitions and often coalitions of more than two parties.   At present the formation of the Scottish devolved Parliament and government does not involve the monarch. If Scotland became independent she would have to do one of three things: have a Governor-General as the Queen’s representative ;  have a  relationship in which the Queen performs  the same duties in Scotland as she does in the UK as it is presently constituted or some entirely new relationship which reduces the monarch to nothing more than a figurehead with no prerogative power or influence, for example, no Royal warrants, no part in hung parliaments and so on.  This strikes me as unlikely because it would offer  an example to  other Commonwealth states which persuade them to  lobby top change their relationship
with the Crown.

In the case of the appointment of a Governor-General,  that in itself would be a difficult political decision because the Scots would doubtless call for a Scot. The appointment of a Scot could produce a person  with divided loyalties or even worse one wholeheartedly biased towards Scotland’s interests.  Conversely, the failure to appoint a Scot could result in a continuous running political sore. But appointing a Scot as  Governor-General  would be no guarantee of compliance to Edinburgh’s wishes.  The Governor-General of Australia who dismissed Gough Whitlam as Australian Prime Minister in 1975, Sir John Robert Kerr, was Australian.

Any relationship other than one which was new  would produce constitutional difficulty, because the major element of the prerogative which the monarch still exercises which would be applicable to Scotland –  the decision of who should form a government where there is no clear cut electoral decision –  would force the monarch into politics, either
directly or through a High Commissioner.  This might not matter if coalitions were a
rarity in an independent  Scotland. But they would probably be the norm rather than a rarity.  If Scotland retains the  electoral system used for her devolved parliament, the monarch (or Governor-General)  would have to make such a decision  after most  Scottish general elections . Coalitions being fragile, there would also be multiple opportunities for more than one such decision to be made in any parliament.   If that were the case, the monarch (or Governor-General)  would constantly be brought into active politics. Should the monarch (or Governor-General ) make a decision which  was questionable, for example, accepting a coalition which excluded the party with the most seats, the monarch could be subject to personal political attacks. That could undermine the position of the
monarchy in the rest of the UK as well as Scotland.

Scotland could adopt a first-past-the-post electoral system, but that is most unlikely because of the vested interest all parties in  Scotland have in retaining the present system,
that is, all know they will have a chance of at least some seats, something which would not be the case under first-past-the-post.  But  even if a first-past-the-post system was adopted there would still be occasions when a   coalition was needed. This would be much
more likely in a small assembly such as the devolved parliament than in the House of Commons , which has more than  five times the members of the  Scottish parliament.

A small number of elected representatives means that any overall majority is going to be small whatever the electoral system.  That is simply a matter of arithmetic.  In a House with 646 members such as the House of Commons, a party winning 55% of the seats  has 355 members  which gives a majority of  64.  60% of the seats in the Scottish parliament (129 members)  is 71 seats and a majority of 13.  Managing a parliament for four or five years on a majority that small would be difficult. Every death or retirement of a member would take on considerable importance.  The opposition would be constantly on the alert to embarrass the government with “ambush” voting and refusals to pair.  This would make coalitions even where an overall majority likely within their potential for politically embarrassing the monarch.

That is not the only chance of political embarrassment or worse for the monarch. The Queen acts a conduit for  the UK Government’s legislative programme through the Queen’s speech. She does not do the same for the devolved government in Edinburgh.   If  an independent Scotland wished the Queen to give a Queen’s speech in an independent Scottish parliament , she could easily find herself proclaiming contradictory policies in Westminster and Edinburgh, for example,  Westminster might decide to raise duty on Scotch whiskey while Edinburgh opposed such a move. More dramatically, if Scotland continued to use the pound the Scottish government might, for example,  argue for lower
interest rates and Westminster to raise them.

The monarch might also find herself having to speak words written for her by either government which would insult or enrage either Westminster or Edinburgh. It is easy to imagine Alex Salmond putting anti-English rhetoric into a Scottish Queen’s speech.

Embarrassment could also arise if those who were persona non grata to either  Westminster and Edinburgh were entertained by the other and monarch had to meet them. Or the monarch might be called upon to undertake a public duty which was unpalatable to one of the governments, for example opening a nuclear power station in England and praising it as the best way of ensuring future energy supplies while Scotland continued with a no nuclear policy.    The same problems would arise with any lesser royal, in whom they me, the speeches they might give and the places they might visit.

If an independent Scotland decided to use the Royal Prerogative powers which the Westminster Government  uses,  they would be much more potent in Scotland than they are at Westminster. The small size of the  Scottish Parliament would lend itself much more easily to corruption and intimidation because there would be few people who would need to be corrupted or intimidated. That would, for example,  make the use of existing prerogative powers which allow ministers to produce law without having to put legislation through Parliament a potentially dangerous weapon  in the hands of a Scottish Prime Minister inclined  to govern autocratically. In the latter days of the last Labour Government  The Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill 2008-0 (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/46/part/I/crossheading/general-elections)
was passed. This did put some restrictions on the Royal Prerogative such as giving Parliament  a say in the  waging of war and the agreement to Treaties . But that Act only applies to the Westminster Parliament and UK Government. An independent Scottish Parliament could use the Prerogative in its form prior to that Act.  They could, amongst other things,  make treaties or declare war without  Parliamentary approval.  The Queen could end up supporting a treaty  or war in one country and opposing it in another.

A particularly fraught  problem  is the position of the armed forces. The UK armed forces owe their loyalty to the monarch not Parliament or Government.  Imagine the situation after Scottish independence if both Scotland and the UK had their separate armed forces who were yet all subject to the authority of the monarch.   The opportunities for disagreement would be immense, as indeed they were before the Union when the English and Scottish crowns were united.  In the 1690s Scotland  developed a madcap scheme to establish a colony on the Isthmus of Panama  http://www.rogermoorhouse.com/article2.html).  Its promoters knew nothing about the reality of the site, which was inhospitable. It also fell within the Spanish  ambit.  The promoters of the scheme  called on William III  as King of Scotland to use English colonial power,  English troops and the Royal Navy to support the colony and to generally aid them to the disadvantage of English interests.   William refused because he did not wish to give Spain grounds for war  or create opposition in England.  It is conceivable that similar clashed of interest could arise again, for example, if an independent Scotland could not defend  its territorial waters and called on  the Royal Navy to do so.

That would be an awkward enough marriage of dissonant interests, but the SNP leader is hoping for an independent Scotland and the remainder of the UK to share a common defence force (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/8515034/Sir-Mike-Jackson-tells-Alex-Salmond-British-soldiers-have-only-one-master.html).
That would create an impossible situation whereby Scotland might wish to  withhold  troops and equipment  from Westminster  if there was disagreement about how they might
be deployed.  Servicemen cannot  have two political masters.

Those are some of the problems which would come with an independent Scotland with the Queen as head of state. There are others, for example, the funding of the monarchy. What would Scotland pay?  Or the diplomatic service; how would UK and Scottish ambassadors in the same country, both appointed by the monarch, reconcile different views on the
same diplomatic matters?   What is clear is that a return to the 1707 situation of one crown but two countries would be immensely messy and not in England’s interest.  If Scotland becomes independent it should be without  the Queen as head of state.   The Queen (or her successor) could not veto this,  because the Parliamentary settlement of 1689 with William III puts the ascension of a monarch to the throne of England  in the gift of Parliament.