Category Archives: history

 How England became the mother of modern politics

Robert Henderson

I was tempted to entitle this essay “England – the mother of modern democracy”, for the political structures of any  state which calls itself democratic today owe their general  shape to the English example. In addition, many modern dictatorships have considered it expedient to maintain the  form of representative democracy without the content.

But democracy is a slippery word and what we call by that  name is very far removed from what the Greeks knew as  democracy. The Greeks would probably have described our system as oligarchy – rule by the few. Many modern academics   would agree, for they tend to describe representative  government as elective oligarchy, a system by which the  electorate is permitted to select between competing parts of the political elite every few years, but which has little other direct say in how they are governed.

If democracy today is a debatable concept, the very  widespread modern institution of elected representative government is an objective fact. It is the foundations and evolution of this institution that I shall examine here to the point at which modern “democratic” politics emerged  during the English Civil Wars of the 1640s.

Elected representative government is an institution of the first importance, for it is a truism that the more power is shared the less abusive the holders of the power will be.  Imperfect as it may often be as a reflector of the will and interests of the masses, representative government is still by far the most efficient means of controlling the naturally abusive tendencies of elites and of advancing the interests of the ordinary man or woman, by imposing limits on what those with power may do, either through legal restraints in the form of constitutional law which is superior to that of the legislature, or through fear of losing office in an election. Indeed, no other system of government other than elected representative government manages that even in principle, for no other political arrangements place meaningful restraints on an elite. Whether democratic or not in the Greek sense, representative government is undoubtedly the only reliable and non-violent means by which the democratic will may gain at least some purchase on the behaviour of an elite.

Yet however much utility it has an organising political idea, the fact that we have representative government today  is something of a fluke, certainly a very long shot, for had it not developed in England we should probably not have it all. In the non-European world nothing of its nature ever developed before the Western model was imported. Elsewhere in Europe the many nascent parliaments of the later Middle Ages either never went beyond its embryonic form or were crushed by autocratic rulers. In England we have had continuous parliamentary development for the better part of eight centuries.

Why did the English alone developed such a political system? It was a mixture of such traits and circumstances  as the democratic spirit, egalitarianism, individualism and  royal weakness. But before examining the detail of those traits, consider first the utterly abnormal political success of the English.

The political success of the English

The first genius of the Anglo-Saxon may be reasonably said to be political. Above all peoples they have learned best to live without communal violence and tyranny. Set against any other country the political success of the English throughout history is simply astonishing. Compare England’s political history with that of any other country of any size and it is a miracle of restraint. No English government has been altered by unconstitutional means since 1688. No Englishman has killed an English politician for  domestic English political reasons since the  assassination of Spencer Percival in 1811, and that was an assassination born of a personal grudge, probably aggravated by mental illness, rather than political principle. (The assassin, John Bellingham, believed he had been unreasonably deserted by the British Government when imprisoned in Russia  and ruined by the economic circumstances of the war with  Napoleon. He killed Percival after unsuccessfully attempting  for a long time to get financial redress from the British Government).

Compare that with the experience of the other major states of the world. In the twentieth century Germany fell prey to  Nazism, Italy to Fascism, Russia to Communism. France, is on its fifth republic in a couple of centuries. The United States fought a dreadful civil war in the 1860s and assassinated a president as recently as 1963. China remains the cruel tyranny as it has always been and India, which advertises itself as the “largest democracy in the world”,  is home to regular outbreaks of serious ethnic violence, not least during elections which are palpably fraudulent in many parts of the country, especially the rural areas.

Why was England so different?

Why is England so different? Perhaps the immediate answer lies in the fact that she has been wonderfully adept in dealing with the central problem of human life – how to live together peaceably. A Canadian academic, Elliott Leyton, has made a study of English murder through the centuries in his book Men of Blood. Leyton finds that the rate of English (as opposed to British murder) is phenomenally low for a country of her size and industrial development, both now and for centuries past. This strikes Elliott as so singular that he said in a recent  interview “The English have an antipathy to murder which borders on eccentricity; it is one of the great cultural oddities of the modern age.” (Sunday Telegraph 4 12 1994).

This restraint extends to warfare and social disorder. That is not to say England has been without violence, but rather that at any point in her history the level of violence was substantially lower than in any other comparable society. For example, the English Civil War in the 17th Century was,  apart from the odd inhumane blemish, startlingly free of the gross violence common on the continent of the time during the 30 Years War, where the sacking and pillage of towns and cities was the norm. A particularly notable thing, for civil wars are notorious for their brutality.

The way that England responded to the Reformation is instructive. She did not suffer the savage wars of religion which traumatised the continent and brought human calamities such as the St Bartholomew Day’s Massacre in France in 1572, when thousands of French Protestants were massacred at the instigation of the French king.  It was not that the English did not care deeply about their religion, rather that they have been, when left to their own devices, generally loth to fight their fellow countrymen  over anything. English civil wars have always been essentially political affairs in which the ordinary person has little say, for the struggles were either dynastic or a clash between Parliamentary ambition and the monarch.

Even the persecution of the Lollards in the late  fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and the persecution of  Protestants under Mary I had a highly political aspect. The former was a vastly disturbing challenge to the established social order with men being told, in so many words, that  they could find their own way to salvation and the latter an attempt to re-establish not merely the Catholic order in England, which had been overturned since the time of Henry VIII’s breach with Rome, but also what amounted to a new royal dynasty with Mary’s marriage to Philip of Spain.

Even the prohibitions on Catholics and non-Conformists after the Reformation had a fundamental political basis to them, namely, they were predicated on the question of whether such people be trusted to give their first loyalty to the crown.

The treatment of foreigners

Compared with other peoples, the English have been noticeably restrained in their treatment of other peoples residing within England. A few massacres of Jews occurred  before their expulsion from England in 1290, but from that  time there has not been great slaughter of a minority living within England. Since 1290 there have been  occasional outbreaks of anti-foreigner violence. During the Peasants’ Revolt London-based Flemings were murdered. In  later times an anti-Spanish “No Popery” mob was frequently  got up in London and the influx of Jews and Huguenots in the 17th and 18th centuries caused riots, one so serious in 1753 that it caused the repeal of a law naturalising Jews and Huguenots. But these riots did not result in great numbers of dead, let alone in systematic genocidal persecutions of any particular group. Most notably, the English fonts of authority, whether the crown, church or parliament, have  not incited let alone ordered the persecution of a particular  racial or ethnic group since the expulsion of the Jews. They have persecuted Christian groups, but that was a matter of religion not ethnicity, the Christians persecuted being  English in the main. The only discrimination the English elite have formally sanctioned against an ethnic group for more than half a millennium was the inclusion of Jews within the general prohibitions passed in the half century or so after the Restoration in 1660 which banned those who were not members of the Church of England from holding a crown appointment such as an MP or election to public offices such as that of MP.

Peaceableness and constitutional development  Is this comparative lack of violence a consequence of England’s political arrangements, or are the political  arrangements the consequence of the comparative lack of  violence in the English character? Probably the answer is  that one fed the other. But there must have been an initial exceptional tendency towards reasonableness which started the  long climb towards settling disputes without violence.

Perhaps the fundamental answer to English peaceableness lies in the fact that the English enjoyed a level of racial cultural homogeneity from very early on. Long before the English kingdom existed Bede wrote of the English as a single people. The English have never killed one another in any great quantity simply because one part of the population thought another part was in some way not English. That is  the best possible starting point for the establishment of a coherent community.

The favoured liberal view of England is that it is the mongrel nation par excellence. In fact, this is the exact opposite of the truth. The general facts of immigration into England are these. The English and England were of course created by the immigration of Germanic peoples. The British monk, Gildas, writing in the sixth century,  attributed the bulk of the Saxon settlement to the  practice of British leaders employing Saxons to protect  the Britons from Barbarian attacks after Rome withdrew around  410 A.D. The English monk Bede (who was born in A.D. 673)  attributed the origins of the English to the Angles, Saxons  and Jutes who came to England in the century following the  withdrawal of the Romans at the request of British war  leaders.

Archaeological evidence suggests that substantial Germanic  settlement in England had a longer history and dated from  the Roman centuries, perhaps from as early as the third  century. What is certain is that in her formative centuries  following the exit of Rome, the various invaders and  settlers were drawn from peoples with much in common. They  were the same physical type, there was a considerable  similarity of general culture, their languages flowed from a  common linguistic well.

When the Norsemen came they too brought a Teutonic mentality  and origin. Even the Normans were Vikings at one remove who,  if frenchified, were not physically different from the  English nor one imagines utterly without vestiges of the  Norse mentality. Moreover, the number of Normans who settled  in England immediately after the Conquest was small, perhaps  as few as 5000.

After the Conquest, the only significant immigration into  England for many centuries were the Jews. They were expelled  from England in 1290. There was then no  large scale  and sudden immigration from outside the British Isles until  the flight of the Huguenots after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (which granted limited toleration to the Huguenots  within France) in 1684 by Louis X1V.

There was other immigration in the period 1066-1650, but it  was small and highly selective. Craftsmen of talent were  encouraged particularly in the Tudor period. Italian families  with trading and banking expertise (such as it was in those  days) appeared after the expulsion of the Jews. Foreign  merchants were permitted, but for much of the period on  sufferance and subject to restrictions such as forced  residence within specially designated foreign quarters.

The upshot of all this is that for six centuries after the Conquest England was an unusually homogeneous country, both racially and culturally. This is reflected in the absence  since the Norman Conquest of any serious regional separatist movement within the heart of English territory.

There has been meaningful resistance at the periphery – Cornwall, the Welsh marches and the far north, but even that has been effectively dead since the  sixteenth century. Englishmen have fought but not to create  separate nations.

The Free-Born Englishman

It may have taken until 1928 for full adult suffrage of English men and women to arrive, but the essential  sentiments which feed the idea of democracy – that human beings are morally equal and enjoy autonomy as individuals and a natural resentment of privilege and inequality – are ancient in England.

If there is one outstanding trait in English political history it is probably the desire for personal freedom. This might seem odd to the modern Englishman who sees the large majority of his country men and women consistently welcoming the idea of the most intrusive forms of ID cards and who stand by dumbly as many of the age-old and ineffably hard-won rights which protect the individual, such as the abridgement  of jury trial and the right to silence, being swept away by modern governments. But it was not always so and that “always so” was not so long ago. The great Austrian political and economic thinker Friedrich Hayek put it  forcefully during the Second World War:

 It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that only in  English society, and those societies deriving from it, is the notion of individual liberty built into the  social fabric. The English have been free not  primarily because of legal rights, but because it is  their evolved social nature. They accept liberty because it seems natural to them. (The road to Serfdom – chapter  Material conditions and ideal ends)

In short, individual liberty has been and is part of being  English and part of England. It would be going too far to  claim that the English masses have ever had any highly  developed sense of liberal with a small ‘l’ sentiments,  but throughout English history there has been both a widespread resentment of interference, either public or private, in the private life of English men and women and an acute awareness that privilege was more often than not unearned and frequently cruelly used to oppress the poor.

Most importantly, over the centuries the elite gradually adopted the ideal of personal freedom into their ideology.  Here is the elder Pitt speaking on the notion that the idea that an Englishman’s home:

The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to  all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail – its  roof may shake – the wind may blow though it – the  storm may enter – the rain may enter – but the King  of England cannot enter! – All his force dares not  cross the threshold of the ruined tenement! (Quoted in Lord Brougham’s Statesmen in the time of George III)

The desire for liberty and a freeman’s due is seen in the  constant demand by mediaeval towns for charters which would  free them from aspects of royal control, most particularly  taxation. In some respects it helped fuel the barons’ demand   for Magna Carta. It drove the Peasant’s Revolt. It  provided the emotional engine for the decline of serfdom  once circumstances were propitious after the Black Death.

The Levellers made it their ideological centrepiece in the 1640s, their leader, John Lilburne, revelling in the  name of “Freeborn John”. “Wilkes and Liberty” was the mob’s popular cry in that most aristocratic of centuries,   the eighteenth. The Chartists held tight to the ideal in  the nineteenth.

Equality and privilege

Intertwined with the desire for personal freedom was a  strain of those seeking material equality and opportunity. It also had its expression in the organisation of society, most notably in the widespread use of common fields which were a natural source of egalitarian feeling. These were a form of agricultural organisation whereby a group of farmers worked strips on a large common plot of land, with the strips being rotated regularly to ensure that no one had the best land permanently.

Prime examples of the egalitarian mentality are found in the Peasant’s Revolt of 1381 (which I shall deal with shortly in some detail), the sixteenth century has Thomas More’s Utopia, while the Digger Gerrard Winstanley writing in the  17th century spoke of “The cheat of men buying and selling” (The Law of Freedom 1652).

We also have the literary evidence. The English who people  the pages of Langland and Chaucer show a mediaeval England where commoners would not as a matter of course  willingly touch their forelock or allow their lives to be circumscribed by those with social status. Later,  Shakespeare’s lowlifes and the characters in Ben Johnson’s Bartholomew Fair often show a rumbustious lack of deference for their social betters. It is improbable in the extreme that the worlds depicted by these authors would not have reflected the societies in which they lived. Traits were exaggerated for dramatic effect doubtless, but the cultural story they told was fundamentally rooted in the England in which they wrote.

Langland’s Piers Ploughman is especially interesting because  the work begins with a catalogue of the people who  inhabited the world he knew (Prologue – The plain full of  people). Here are the worldly and the devout, the high and the low. The cleric and the noble jostle with minstrels, tramps, beggars, merchants, tradesmen, and the honest ploughman who tills “the soil for the common good”.

Langland’s clerics are often corrupt, the nobles capricious, the merchants avaricious, the workmen shoddy and cheating in their work, the beggars dishonest and the minstrels bawdy, but they are balanced by honest men in their various callings. In other words, it is a world not so different in terms of human personality to that we inhabit.

The mediaeval elite ideology

There was also in the mediaeval world the idea that although men were unequal in material wealth or social status, nonetheless society was a co-operative enterprise, that all had a place and that all were entitled to that place, which was what God had called them to. Not  egalitarianism but a recognition that men whatever their status had a right to life. The ideal was of course frequently breached but it nonetheless had a basis in both the attitude of the elite, especially in the Church, and in the organisation of society.

The ideas that men should just be left to buy and sell as they chose or that economic activity should be the lodestone of a man’s life was admirable or moral, were alien concepts. Usury was officially banned for many centuries and the example of the poverty of the early Christians was given fresh focus by the Friars of SS Francis and Dominic. More mundanely, there was also the concept of the just price, the price of staple foods such as bread, being fixed by magistrates. As a matter of social course it was accepted that the rich and great, and especially the Church, had moral and material obligations to the less fortunate. Noblesse  oblige was not an empty letter.

Turning men out of their homes and off the land for profit  crashed through this mediaeval moral standard. That was what  the grazing of sheep in particular accomplished, for it denuded the countryside of the need for agricultural workers. By the early years of the 16th century the problem

of landless men was becoming acute.

Some members of the elite rebelled against the cruelty of  leaving thousands of men and their families without a means  to live honestly and the alarming disruption of the  mediaeval social order. Thomas More addressed the question most famously in his satire Utopia (1516). More complained

that it was now thought moral to “buy abroad very cheap and  sell again exceeding dear”. He wrote of the mania for sheep  as that which “consume, destroy and devour whole fields,  houses and cities.” More also asked of those who turned men  and women off the land to feed sheep “What other thing do  you do than make thieves and punish them?” and castigated  the rich for a “strange and proud new fangleness in their  apparel and too much prodigal riot and sumptuous fare at  their table” while the poor starved or turned to crime or begging.

The Peasants’ Revolt

Nothing demonstrates the Englishman’s lack of deference and  desire to be his own man better than the Peasants’ Revolt in 1381. General resentment of privilege and particular  hostility to the imposition of a tax (the Poll Tax)  considered to be both unreasonable and illegitimate, was  given unambiguous voice. For a brief period the fog of  obscurity which ordinarily covers the masses in the mediaeval world clears. A remarkable scene meets the eye for we find not a cowed and servile people but a robust cast  of rebels who far from showing respect for their betters  display a mixture of contempt and hatred for everyone in authority bar the boy-king Richard II.

Perhaps most surprising to the modern reader is the extreme social radicalism of their demands which might, without too much exaggeration, be described as a demand for a classless society. The Revolt may have had its origins in the hated Poll Tax but it soon developed into a series of general political demands. One of the revolt’s leaders, the  hedge-priest John Ball, reputedly preached  “Things cannot go right in England and never will until goods are held in common and there are no more villeins and gentlefolk but we are all one and the same”, and the anonymous and revolutionary couplet “When Adam delved and Eve span/who was  then the gentleman?” was in men’s mouths.

The mediaeval  chronicler Jean Froissart has Ball preaching:  Are we not descended from the same parents, Adam and Eve? And what can they sow or what reason can they give why they should be more masters than ourselves? They are clothed in velvet and rich stuffs ornamented in ermine and other furs while we are forced to wear poor clothing. They have wines and fine bread while we have only rye and refuse of straw and when we drink it must be water. They have handsome manors…while we must have the wind and rain in our labours in the field and it is by our labours that they…support their pomp. We are called slaves and if we do perform our services we are beaten and we have no sovereign to whom we can complain…let us go to the King and remonstrate with him; he is young and from him we may obtain a favourable answer, and if not we must seek to amend our conditions ourselves. (Simon Schama A History of Britain p 248)

Whether or not these words bore any resemblance to Ball’s actual words, whether or not they were black propaganda (on behalf of the elite) by Froissart to show the dangers society faced from the Revolt, we may note that the sentiments are compatible with the demands made by the rebels in 1381.

When the Kentish men led by Wat Tyler, an Essex man, met the 14-year-old king Richard at Mile End on 14 June, they demanded an end to serfdom and a flat rent of 4 pence an acre. The king granted the plea. When the king met the  rebels a second time Tyler shook the king’s hand and called him “brother”. Tyler demanded a new Magna Carta for the common people which would have ended serfdom, pardoned all outlaws, liquidated all church property and declared that all men below the king were equal, in effect abolishing the peerage and gentry. Richard, much to the rebels’ surprise, accepted the demands, although cunningly qualifying the acceptance “saving only the regality of the crown”. A few minutes later Tyler was mortally wounded, supposedly  after he had attempted to attack a young esquire in the royal party who had called him a thief. His death signalled the beginning of the end of the revolt for without Tyler the Revolt lost direction and those who remained willing to resist were pacified in the next few weeks.

During the Revolt the rebels did not run riot, but acted in a controlled manner. There was no general riot but rather the , attacking the property of tax collectors, other important royal servants and any property belonging to the king’s uncle, John of Gaunt. Any identifiable Exchequer document was ripe for destruction.

The revolt began in Essex when the commissioners attempting to collect the Poll Tax were surrounded by a hostile crowd on 30 May 1381. Physical threats were made against one of the commissioners, and the commissioners  retreated from the immediate task of attempting to collect the tax. This brought in the Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas to restore order. He was captured by an even larger crowd and made to swear on oath that no further attempt would be made to collect the tax the area. The names of informers who had provided names to the commissioners was discovered and the culprits beheaded.

The spirit of rebellion soon spread. By 2 June a crowd in the village of Bocking had sworn that they would “have no law in England except only as they themselves moved to be ordained.” The rebellion had infected Kent by the end of the first week in June. By the time Wat Tyler, an Essex man by birth, had been elected to lead the Kentish men the demand was for the heads of the king’s uncle John of Gaunt, the Archbishop of Canterbury Simon Sudbury and the Treasurer Sir Robert Hales.  After Tyler’s first meeting with Richard, Sudbury and Hales were captured and beheaded by the rebels. No deference or want of ambition there.

The extent to which the Revolt frightened the crown and nobility can be seen in the violence of Richard’s words when he addressed another group of rebels at Walthamstow on 22 June, by which time the danger was felt to have largely passed:  You wretches, detestable on land and sea ; you who seek equality with lords are unworthy to live. Give this message to your colleagues. Rustics you were and rustics you are still: you will remain in bondage not as before  but incomparably harsher. For as long as we live we will strive to suppress you , and your misery will be an example in the eyes of posterity . How ever, we will spare your lives if you remain faithful. Choose now which you want to follow . (Simon Schama A History of Britain p 254 )

Anti clericism

There were two great sources of general authority in mediaeval England. The Crown was one, the other was the Church. Yet, before the Reformation the English were renowned throughout Europe for their anticlericism – a good example of this attitude was the response to Sudbury’s warning to Wat Tyler’s rebels that England would be put under an interdict by the Pope if he was harmed. This was met by hearty laughter followed by the grisly dispatch of the unfortunate cleric soon afterwards, whose head to did not part from his shoulders until a goodly number of blows had been struck.

The contempt in which many of the servants of the Church were held can be seen in both John Wycliffe’s complaints against clerical abuse in the latter half of the 14th century and in Geoffrey Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales and William Langland’s Piers Plowman, both written in the same century in which the Peasants’ Revolt took place. Both works are full of jibes at fat illiterate priests and cheating pardoners who peddled absolution from sins with their indulgences sold for money.

Wycliffe’s doctrine contained the fundamental ideas which  were later realised internationally in the Reformation. He questioned the reality of transubstantiation (the Catholic belief that the bread and wine at Communion turn literally into the body and blood of Christ), he attacked the authority of the pope, he railed against the abuses of simony and indulgences. He advocated a bible in English  and either he or his followers, the Lollards,  produced a complete translation before the end of  the fourteenth century.

Implicit within Wycliffe’s thought was the democratic spirit, because it is a short intellectual step from the  belief that each man could be his own mediator with God to the idea that he should have a say in his earthly life.

The Black Death

The Peasant’s Revolt  was  set in the context of the dramatic social changes wrought by the plague. When the Black Death came to England in 1349 it was a source of both immediate misery and future opportunity for those who survived. Estimates of the numbers who died range from a quarter to a half of the population, but whatever the true proportion it had the most dramatic effect on the organisation of society. The immediate result was a widespread transfer of property and consolidation of wealth  as the lucky survivors inherited. This consolidation aided people a long way down the social scale, for a man inheriting  no more than a couple of oxen and a plough was considerably better off than a man with none.

Most importantly, the country went from being one with an oversupply of labour – England prior to the Black Death was probably as well populated as it was in any time before 1700 – to a country where labour was scarce. Landowners were suddenly faced with a new economic world. They had either lost many of their workers through death or were faced with serfs who were no longer obedient and frequently  absconded, often lured to work as free men by other landowners, or drawn to the anonymity of the towns. Landowners had to employ free men who demanded what were considered extortionate wages. The Statute of Labourers of 1351 was a forlorn attempt to keep things as they had been before the Black Death by restricting wages but, like all attempts to buck fundamental economic forces, it failed.

It is probably not overly sanguine to see English society in the late medieval period after the Black Death as a golden age for the common man. Not only was labour scarce and land plentiful, but the great enclosure movement was still in the future and a very large proportion of the population were,  to a large extent, their own masters as they worked their  land. Even where labour services were still performed, they were not crushing, being commonly forty  days work in a year.  Moreover, agricultural work is seasonal, especially the arable, and for substantial parts of the year there is relatively little to do on a farm.

Beyond agriculture, many people had a large degree of control over their daily lives. This was the time before industrialisation, before the wage-slave and the factory.  Skilled craftsmen were often their own masters, and even those who worked for a master will have organised their own time because they worked from their homes. Indeed, most  English men and women today almost certainly have far less control of their time than the average mediaeval inhabitant of England.

The limits of state power

The hand of the state was also light by modern standards, especially so during the century long struggle of the  houses of Lancaster and York and partly because mediaeval kingship was of necessity very limited in what it could do administratively because of a lack of funds, the power of the peerage, primitive technology, poor communications, administrative naivety and a radically different view of what government and society should be – apart from looking after his own privileges and estates, kings were expected to  defend the land, put down rebellions, provide legal redress through the royal courts, maintain the position of the church and lead in war against other rulers. And that was about  it.

But there was also a further check on the monarch. Perhaps the most important practical adjunct of this desire  for freedom, has been that the English long hated and  mistrusted the idea of a standing army as the creature of  tyrants. The English were eventually content to have the strongest navy in the world because it could not be used against them, but a substantial army was not accepted as reasonable until the experiences of the Great War accustomed men to the idea. Soldiers were held in contempt before then. “Gone for a soldier” was little better than “taken for a thief”. The needs of Empire produced more ambivalence into the English view of soldiers as Kipling’s poem “Tommy” shows: “Oh, it’s Tommy this an’  Tommy that, and chuck him out the brute! But it’s ‘Saviour of ‘is country’ when the guns begin to shoot.” But the old resentment, fear and contempt remained until the stark democracy of experience in the trenches during the Great War  tempered the English mind to tolerance of the soldier.

Because of a lack of a large standing army, English kings  were ever been dependent on the will of others, be it their  nobles, parliament or the gentry. Even the most practically tyrannical of English kings, Henry VIII, was most careful to use Parliament to sanction his acts.

The consequences of this weakness was that power was localised. Incredible as it may see today, the practical governance of day-to-day life in England until well into the nineteenth century lay largely in the hands of  private gentlemen occupying the post of JP, whose powers were much greater than they are today. Indeed, the central state impinged very little on the ordinary Englishman before 1914. George Bowling, the hero of George Orwell’s “Coming up for air” reflecting on how the arms of the state touched an honest citizen before the Great War  could think only of the registration of births, deaths and marriages and the General Post Office.

By keeping the king dependent upon the will of others, the  English ensured that a despot such as Louis X1V could  not arise in England and in so doing underwrote their  general liberties. Without that, it is improbable that parliamentary government (as opposed to a parliament) would have arisen. England would almost certainly have been involved in many debilitating wars for the aggrandisement of the king. In those circumstances it is unlikely that England as a modern state would have arisen.

The mediaeval good times end

But the comparatively good times for the poor of the post-Black Death world did not last forever. The  enclosure movement began in earnest in the fifteenth century. Men were driven off the land and their place taken by graziers of sheep. The Tudors put an end to serious dynastic strife and expanded the power of the state.  Gradually the population recovered. Trade grew and towns thrived, but it was also, by mediaeval standards, a time of high inflation caused by a mixture of a debased currency under Henry VIII, the economic consequences of the Dissolution of the Monasteries, population growth and the influx of gold and silver from the recently discovered New World.

The way to political success

Whatever its cause, England’s political development is unparalleled. If political success lies in the general  tenor of English society, the institutions through which it was achieved were cultivated from the thirteenth century  The start of the long climb towards representative government and the neutering of monarchy may reasonably  be set in the reign of John. In 1215 he was forced by many of his barons to sign a charter which granted rights to all the free men of the kingdom. This charter, the  Magna Carta, was of immense significance because it  formally restricted the power of the king in an unprecedented way. The pope of the day thought it  such an abomination he granted John absolution for its repudiation. Perhaps for the first time since the  end of the classical world, a king had been forced to acknowledge unequivocally that there could be legal limits to his power.

Long regarded as a revolutionary document by historians, the fashion amongst them in recent times has been to treat the charter as little more than as an attempt to preserve and enhance the position of the barons or to restate existing English law and custom. Of course it did that but it did much more. Had it done nothing beyond circumscribing the power of the king it would have been revolutionary, but it went far beyond that by explicitly extending rights that we consider fundamental to a free society to all free men.  Perhaps its two most famous clauses show its importance in the development of the future sharing of political power:

 Clause 39 No free man shall be seized or  imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or  possessions, or outlawed or exiled or deprived of  his standing in any other way , nor will we proceed  with force against him or send others to do so,  except by judgement of his equals or by the law of  the land.

 Clause 40 To no one will we sell, to no one will we  deny or delay right or justice.

Until the security of a man and his property are secured, there can be no sustained spreading of power, for if a king may imprison and dispossess at will no man is safe. All merely live at the will of the monarch. By providing both, Magna Carta created the necessary legal and ideological infrastructure for the political development which culminated in parliamentary government.

Perhaps the most intriguing clause of Magna Carta was number  61, which gave a committee of 25 Barons legal authority and practical power over the king. It is long  clause but worth quoting in full:

Clause 61. Since, moreover, for God and the amendment  of our kingdom and for the better allaying of the discord that has arisen between us and our barons we have granted all these things aforesaid, wishing them to enjoy the use of them unimpaired and unshaken for ever, we give and grant them the underwritten security, namely, that the barons shall choose any twenty-five barons of the kingdom they wish, who must with all their might observe, hold and cause to be observed, the peace and liberties which we have granted and confirmed to them by this present charter of ours, so that if we, or our justiciar, or our bailiffs or any one of our  servants offend in any way against any one or transgress any of the articles of the peace or the security and the offence be notified to four of the aforesaid twenty-five barons, those four barons shall  come to us, or to our justiciar if we are out of the kingdom, and, laying the transgression before us, shall petition us to have that transgression corrected without delay. And if we do not correct the transgression, or if we are out of the kingdom, if our justiciar does not correct it, within forty days,  reckoning from the time it was brought to our notice or to that of our justiciar if we were out of the  kingdom, the aforesaid four barons shall refer that case to the rest of the twenty-five barons and those twenty-five barons together with the Community of the whole land shall distrain and distress us in every  way they can, namely, by seizing castles, lands, possessions, and in such other ways as they can, saving our person and the persons of our queen and our children, until, in their opinion, amends have been made; and when amends have been made, they shall obey us as they did before. And let anyone in the country who wishes to do so take an oath to obey the orders of the said twenty-five barons for the execution of all the aforesaid matters, and with them to distress us as much as he can, and we publicly and freely give anyone leave  to take the oath who wishes to take it and we will never prohibit anyone from taking it. Indeed, all those in the land who are unwilling of themselves and of their  own accord to take an oath to the twenty-five barons to help them to distrain and distress us, we will make  them take the oath as aforesaid at our command.  And if any of the twenty-five barons dies or leaves the country or is in any other way prevented from  carrying out the things aforesaid, the remainder of the aforesaid twenty-five barons shall choose as they think fit another one in his place, and he shall take the oath like the rest. In all matters the execution  of which is committed to these twenty-five barons,  if it should happen that these twenty-five are present  yet disagree among themselves about anything, or if some  of those summoned will not or cannot be present,  that shall be held as fixed and established which  the majority of those present ordained or commanded, exactly as if all the twenty-five had consented to it; and the said twenty-five shall swear that they will faithfully observe all the things aforesaid and will do all they can to get them observed. And we will procure nothing from anyone, either personally or through any one else, whereby any of these concessions and liberties might be revoked or diminished; and if any such thing be procured let it be void and null, and we will never use it either personally or through another, And we have fully remitted and pardoned to everyone all the  ill-will, anger and rancour that have arisen between us and our men, clergy and laity, from the time of the quarrel. Furthermore, we have fully remitted to all,  clergy and laity, and as far as pertains to us have completely forgiven all trespasses occasioned by the  same quarrel between Easter in the sixteenth year of our reign and the restoration of peace. And, besides,  we have caused to be made for them letten testimonial patent of the lord Stephen archbishop of Canterbury, the lord Henry archbishop of Dublin and of the aforementioned bishops.

The extreme nature of the concessions the king made – he gave permission for his subjects to act with force to remedy any Royal failure to observe the charter – is a graphic example of the inherent weakness of the mediaeval monarch. King he might be, but not a tyrant because he did not have the resources to dominate utterly.

This committee was never actually formed, but the clause has great interest. Once such a council of nobles to  restrict the behaviour of the king is accepted as  reasonable and possible, it is not such a great leap to the  idea of a larger assembly which might do the same.  That idea was realised before the century was out in a Parliament.

Magna Carta is not as is commonly said the first formal  restriction on the powers of a monarch. The coronation oaths  of mediaeval kings regularly contained promises to observe  the laws and customary freedoms of England, but there was no means of enforcing the oaths other than rebellion. There was even a previous occasion when Ethelred was forced to  agree to formal restrictions on his powers in 1014, but that had no practical effect because of his death and the Danish conquest in 1016.

Magna Carta unlike coronation oaths was both specific enough to usefully form the basis  of law and in 1215 England did not fall under foreign rule.  Instead, in modified form, it quickly became part of the  statute books which developed in the thirteenth  century. More importantly it acquired a mythological quality which lasts to this day. Every important English rebellion and political movement from 1215 until the Chartists in the 1840s has cited Magna Carta in their defence and derived their programme from it. The Levellers in the 1640s made constantly cited it. It was a benchmark which allowed the powers of the king to be progressively whittled away. Never again could an English king convincingly claim that such restrictions on the prerogative were unthinkable or unprecedented.

Parliament

The distinction of the English parliament is not that it is  the oldest such assembly in the world (although it is one of  the oldest), nor that it was unusual at its inception for  parliaments were widespread in mediaeval Europe. The English parliament’s distinction lies in its truly national nature – it was a national not federal assembly – its longevity  and the nature of its development. No other parliament in a country of any size was meaningfully maintained by regular meeting through seven or eight centuries, its only competitors for endurance being the tiny Icelandic assembly and the federal arrangements of the Swiss. Most importantly, before England created such an institution to act as a model, no other Parliament in the world developed into an fully fledged executive as well as a legislature. The English parliament made a very gradual progression to the place we know today. It began as an advising and  petitioning body in the 13th century and before the end of the 14th century had come to exercise considerable power over any taxation which was considered over and above the king’s normal and rightful dues, such as the excise. Gradually, this power transmuted into what was effectively a veto over most taxation. Parliament also added the power to propose and pass laws subject to their acceptance by the monarch. These developments meant that executive  power gradually drained from the King. From this came cabinet government as the monarch was more and more forced to take the advice of his ministers and by the end of the 18th century the struggle between Crown and Parliament for supremacy had been emphatically decided.

As the Parliament gained power, the Lords gradually  diminished in importance and the Commons became by the 19th century, if not before, the dominant House. The final act in the play was a century long extension of the franchise  culminating in a government dominated by an assembly elected under full adult suffrage from 1928 onwards.

A corrupted Parliament

By 1600 Parliament had become important enough to the governing of the country for Guy Fawkes and his fellow plotters to think it necessary to blow up Parliament rather than simply killing the king and his ministers. In any other major European country of the time, the idea of destroying Parliamentary representatives rather than just the monarch and his more powerful friends would have seemed rather odd, either because a parliament did not exist or was considered of little account because European monarchs had been generally very successful in abolishing or curtailing the powers of mediaeval assemblies and preventing their political development.

But Parliament, although growing in power and ambition, was  suffering the ills of any ancient institution. There were accretions of privilege and it had failed to keep pace with the changing times. In 1600 it neither represented the country as it was nor satisfied the growing wish of its members, especially the elected ones, to have a greater say in the management of England. At the heart of the  dissatisfaction lay the unsatisfactory nature of the Commons’ franchise. I shall examine this question in some detail because it will demonstrate the historical political backdrop against which the democratic radicals of the 1640s  acted.

The question of the franchise

Serious disquiet with the Commons’ electoral  qualifications, provisions and practices began in Elizabeth’s reign and reached its highest pitch, prior to the 1640s, during the years 1621 to 1623. The discontent was provoked primarily by the situation in  the boroughs rather than the counties, Since 1430,  the county electorate had been restricted to the  forty shilling freeholder, which qualification had become  almost sacrosanct by the end of the sixteenth century –  only one proposal before the 1640s (in 1621) was  made to raise or lower it. Tudor inflation had  greatly lowered the barrier it represented (40 shillings in 1600 was worth perhaps 15 shillings at 1430 values) and it is reasonable to suppose this  considerably increased the rural electorate. Also,  there is evidence to suggest that the qualification was not always enforced and some county electorates may have had a very broad manhood franchise indeed prior to 1640.

Borough franchises were anything but uniform. In some  the whole ‘commonalty’ (all householders) or even  all ‘potwallers’ (men with their own hearths)  voted. In others the vote was restricted to all taxpayers  (‘scot and lot’), freemen of the town, or those  in possession of burgage property. In extreme cases the vote might be restricted to the ruling corporation. Such discrepancies of representation were aggravated by a distribution of borough seats which took insufficient  account of the demographic changes of the past two centuries, during which time England’s population increased very substantially, especially during the 16th century, perhaps by as much as a third. These facts prepared a well mulched  political soil for agitation for more equal borough representation, both in terms of the breadth of the franchise and in the number of seats.

Tudor monarchs, not unnaturally, did not favour larger electorates. The existence of ‘rotten boroughs’ was a  source of patronage and, if the monarch could control  the oligarchies who returned the MP, a means of reducing  opposition to the Crown. As there was a significant number of such boroughs, this was no small advantage to the monarch.  The attitude of Parliament to the franchise was mixed. The Lords had a similar interest to the Crown in distrusting broad franchises. The peers often effectively controlled seats in the Commons. They also had a natural inclination to deny the ‘commonality’ any voice in the affairs of the kingdom. Conversely, it was obviously in the Commons’  interest to increase electorates, where such increases reduced the Monarch’s’ and the Lord’s opportunities for patronage.

There is particular evidence that the Puritans favoured larger electorates, at least in so far as it suited their own purposes. At Warwick in 1586 Job Throckmorton was elected after he threatened to invoke the right of the ‘commonality to vote. In 1587 John Field remarked to  colleague ‘seeing we cannot compass these things by suit or dispute, it is the multitude and people that must  bring the discipline to pass which we desire.’ (J.H, Plumb. The Growth of the electorate 1600-1715). As Puritans displaced many court nominees and the creatures of  aristocrats, this is significant in view of the attitude of the Commons towards electoral qualifications  between 1621 and 1628.

By 1621, the Commons had gained the right to decide  disputed elections and to revive lapsed borough seats and  even make new creations, The tendency until 1628 was to  decide in favour of wider franchise and to allow  all the ‘commonality’ to vote. At Bletchingly (1624)  and Lewes (1628) ‘all the inhabitants ,’ were to be  electors’, and at Cirencester (1624) all ‘resients:’.

In the case of Pontefract in 1624 a general principle  was formulated: ‘There being no certain custom nor prescription, who  should be the electors and who not, we must have  recourse to common right which, to this purpose was held to be, that more than the freeholders only ought  to have voices in the election, namely all  men, inhabitants, householders resient within the borough.’ (J.H, Plunb. The Growth of the electorate 1600-1715).

Further, in the case of Boston (1628) it was asserted that  the election of burgesses belonged by common right to the  commoners and only prescription or ‘a constant usage  beyond all memory’ could rob them of this. (K. Thomas, The Levellers and the Franchise p.62).

It is true that when the Commons revived or created  borough seats, they concentrated, as the Tudors had done, on small towns to promote their own advantage.  But, even so, they granted ‘scot and lot’  franchises in every case (except Weobley) which meant  that even small towns such as Great Marlow or Hilbourne Port had electorate of around 200.

Bills were introduced to regulate elections  and standardise,the franchise in 1621, 1623, 1625, 1628 and 1640, The 1621 Bill is of particular interest  because it proposed that the 40/- freeholder qualification  be increased to œ4 and to admit œ10 copyholders by  inheritance. The borough proposals add no more than the various decisions on individual cases (in fact even less), for electors were to be freemen except where they  numbered less than twenty-four, in which case all  inhabitants not in receipt of alms were to be included,

In 1640 the franchise was raised again by Sir Simonds  D’Ewes. It was he who first uttered the idea later made famous by Rainsborough ‘that the poorest man in England ought to have a voice, that it was the birthright of  the subjects of England and all had voices in the  election of Knights etc. previously.’ (K. Thomas, The Levellers and the Franchise p.63).

In 1641 a bill had reached second reading but was then  lost. D’Ewes favoured its contents except that he  ‘desired that whereas it was provided in the bill that  none that took alms should have voices in elections, which I well allowed, we would likewise provide  that no more monopolizing elections might be in cities and boroughs, that all men resients might have voices.’  (K. Thomas, The Levellers and the Franchise p.64)

It is also noteworthy, both for its own sake and  the part it played in Leveller literature, that many  believed that the Statute of 1430 had disenfranchised  people. William May, in 1621, said ‘Anciently, all the  commonality had voice, but because such a multitude made the  election tumultuous, it was after reduced to freeholders’.  The religious radical William Prynne put it even more plainly, ‘Before this Petition and Act every  inhabitant and commoner in each county had voice in the election of Knights, whether he were a freeholder or  not, or had a freehold only of one penny, six pence or twelve pence by the year as they now claim of  late in most cities and boroughs where popular  elections are admitted’ (K. Thomas, The Levellers and the Franchise p.64). It is a sobering thought that if the Statute of 1430 did disenfranchise large numbers of county electors, the county franchise may have been wider in medieval England than it was to be again before the end of the nineteenth century and conceivably wider than the Franchise before the 1918 Representation of the People Act.

What of the position of those deemed to be dependents:  the servants, wage-earners and almstakers? Resident  household servants were generally considered beyond  the electoral pale, although ‘servants’ were said to  have voted in the Worcestershire county election of 1604.

Wage-earners certainly did so, for those in the ‘potwaller’  and ‘scot and lot’ constituencies were granted the  right to vote. Almstakers were excluded in the 1621  and 1640 bills, yet at Great Marlow in 1604 77 of the 245 voters were said to be almstakers, nine of them  inmates of the almshouse. In 1640 the right of the  Bember inmates to vote was said to have been sustained  and in 1662 the St. Albans almsmen were said to have ‘had  voices time out of mind’.

It is clear from all this that those who promoted theradical or democratic cause in the 1640s, most particularly the Levellers, did not enter untilled ground. There are also three points of particular interest. First, the Commons, or at least an influential part of it,  was not unduly disturbed by the prospect of an  enlarged electorate. Second, those deemed to be dependent such as servants and almstakers – were included on occasion in the franchise long before the Civil War. Third, that there existed even gentlemen (such as Sir Simonds D’Ewes) who had an active and unambiguous democratic spirit.

The latter point is particularly pertinent because the chief Leveller, John Lilburne, was also of gentle-birth, albeit “small gentry”, a fact he never ceased to emphasise. Clearly, democratic ideas and feeling were not foreign political bodies suddenly introduced by the Levellers and others in the 1640s.

The English civil war, Commonwealth and Protectorate

Stuart society was a world on the physical, economic and intellectual move and waiting to move faster if the right engine appeared. The civil wars of the 1640s was that machine.

Representative government is one thing, democracy quite another. That did not come to England in its formal form of a full adult franchise until the twentieth century. But for a brief period in the 1640s a franchise for the House of Commons broader than any used before the late nineteenth century was more than a pipe dream.

The Civil War and its republican aftermath, the Commonwealth and Protectorate, changed English politics  utterly. It brought the end of claims by the English crown

to Divine Right and absolute monarchy. It promoted the political interests of the aristocracy and gentry as a class. It forced those on the Parliamentary side to exercise power on their own responsibility. It created a political class which saw politics as something they could control rather than merely be part of as an adjunct to the crown. It raised the idea that there should be a law superior to that which even a parliament could pass. It began the constitutional process which resulted in cabinet government.  It laid the foundations for the formation of political parties as we know them. In short, it planted the seeds of  modern representative government.

Into this new world were cast men whose political philosophies ranged from acceptance of the divine right of kings to unyielding communists. In the middle were those, such as Cromwell, who though socially conservative, realised that power and political interest had shifted not merely  from the king to Parliament, but also in some sense to an appreciably broader circle of people than before. Such people were willing to extend the franchise to a degree, although still restricting it to those with property for fear that the poor would dispossess the haves if they had the power to elect and that those with no material stake in the country would have no sense of responsibility and duty.

But that was insufficient from many, especially those who fought on the Parliamentary side in the wars, and something else occurred which was to be even more momentous in the long run. The belief that men generally should only be ruled by those they had themselves elected became a serious political idea. That the idea should find expression as a serious political idea in the 1640s was, of course, partly a consequence of the disruption of society by civil war, but that was more an opportunity rather than a reason. Innumerable civil wars  all over the world have come and gone without the democratic spirit being given rein. What made the England of the time unusual was the long-existing ideal of individual freedom which had reached a high degree of sophistication, including the notion that free debate, the sine qua no of democracy,  was of value in itself. Here are two passages which give a taste of the way minds were working in the 1640s. First,

John Milton writing in the Areogapitica in the 1640s:

 And though all the winds of doctrine were let  loose upon the earth, so truth be in the field  [and] we do injuriously by licensing and  prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and  falsehood grapple; who ever knew truth put to the  worse, in a free and open encounter…

The second statement comes from the Leveller Richard Overton’s ‘An Arrow against all Tyrants’ (19th October, 1646). It contains as good a refutation of the power of authority without consent over the individual as you will find:

 No man hath power over my rights and liberties,  and I over no man’s….for by naturall birth all  men are equally and alike borne to like propriety, liberty and freedom, and as we are delivered  of God by the hand of nature into this  world, everyone with a naturall, innate freedom and propriety….even so are we to live, every one  equally and alike to enjoy his birthright and  privilege…. [no more of which may be alienated]  than is conducive to a better being, more safety  and freedome….[for] every man by nature being  a King, Priest and Prophet in his own naturall  circuit and compasse, whereof no second may  partake, but by deputation, commission  and free consent from him, whose  naturall right and freedome it is. [An Arrow against all tyrants].

These were not odd voices crying in the wilderness. The  democratic spirit was widespread in the 1640s. By this I do not mean that men were commonly calling for full manhood suffrage, much less the emancipation of women. Even the most democratically advanced of the important groups which evolved during the Civil War, the Levellers, were unclear as to whether those who were deemed dependent in the sense of not being their own masters – servants and almstakers –  should be given the vote or, indeed, who counted as a servant or almstaker.

Rather, there was a sense that the social order had been  rearranged by the war, that men were on some new ground of equality and had a right to a public voice. In particular, there was a belief that those who had fought for Parliament had won the right to enfranchisement. There was also a widespread feeling, which penetrated all social classes, that the existing franchises (which as we have seen varied greatly) were frequently too narrow and that the towns, particularly those most recently grown to substantial size,  were grossly under-represented.

Ideas of social and political equality had, as we have seen, existed long before the Civil War, but never before had large swathes of the masses and the elite seen anything approaching representative democracy as practical politics under any circumstances. The political and social elite of the period after 1640 may have been desperately afraid of a general representation of the English people, but they did not say it was impossible, merely feared its consequences.

They may have loathed the idea of every man his own political master but they were forced by circumstances to admit that a Parliament elected on a broad franchise was not a fantasy. The Putney Debates in 1647 provide a vivid record of the political fervour and mentality of the times. Parliamentary and Army leaders including Cromwell and his son-in-law Henry Ireton, met with a variety of people on what might broadly be called the democratic side. A substantial part of the debate was taken down in shorthand. It is a most intriguing and exciting document, despite its incompleteness and some confused passages. The sheer range of political ideas it displays is impressive. It shows clearly that the 1640s  experienced a high degree of sophistication amongst the politically interested class and that this class was drawn from a broad swathe of English society. The ideas run discussed from the monarchical to the unreservedly democratic, epitomised in Col Thomas Rainsborough’s famous words:

 … I think that the poorest he that is in England hath a life to lead, as the richest he; and therefore truly, sir, I think it’s clear, that every man that is to live under a government ought first by his own consent to put himself under that government; and I do not think  that the poorest man in England is not at all bound in a strict sense to that government that he has not had a voice to put himself under… (Col Thomas Rainsborough Puritanism and Liberty The Putney debates p 53).

Democracy, the revolutionary idea

Why was the idea of every man being an elector so revolutionary? There was of course the age-old traditional fear, known to the Greeks, that the masses would dispossess haves if they had control of who was to hold power. But the matter went much deeper than that. The enfranchisement of a  wide electorate is perhaps the most fundamental political change a society can undergo. It forces the elite to take note of the masses in a way that no other system does. Even the humblest man must be considered as a man in his own right, a person with a vote and needs and wishes. Those needs and wishes may be heeded and met to varying degrees according to the success an elite has in subverting the representative process through such tricks as international treaties and the development of disciplined political parties, but what the majority needs and wants cannot as a  matter of course be ignored completely when each man has a vote.

A form of male-only democracy existed in the ancient world, but it was never inclusive because the citizens were only a part of the population of a Greek civis and the large numbers of unfree men and free men who were not citizens were excluded. The Roman Republic had enjoyed in varying degrees at various times democratic expression through  plebeian institutions such as the concilium plebis and offices such as that of tribune. But that was a class based  representation which arose to oppose the Patrician class, not a self-conscious representation of individual men.

Received wisdom it may be now, the idea that every man (but not woman then) should have an active voice in choosing those who would represent and govern them was to most people, poor and rich, a truly novel and disturbing concept in the middle of the 17th century.

The Levellers

The group which gave the strongest voice and effect to democratic feelings in the 1640s was the Levellers. They  were a disparate and ever shifting crew, drawing their support primarily from the ranks of the Parliamentary armed forces (especially after the New Model Army was formed in 1645), small tradesmen, journeymen and apprentices.  However, they also included those from higher social classes, their most famous leader, John Lilburne, being the child of minor gentry.

The Levellers time was brief. They were a serious political  force for, at most, the years 1646 to 1649 and that is probably being a mite too generous. They failed utterly in the end, not least because they were unable to carry the army, especially the junior officers, with them. But they were important both for giving voice to the ideas and creating many of the practices on which modern politics is founded.

Their opponents attempted to portray the Levellers as social revolutionaries who would take the property of the rich, most particularly their land, and give it to the poor.  Hence the epithet of Leveller which originated as a term of abuse. But the Levellers consistently denied that they had any such programme and were staunch defenders of the right to property. They might best be characterised as radical democrats with a very strong libertarian streak. Indeed, so far were they from being proto-communists that they had an almost sacramental belief in the individual’s right to personal property.

 

Intellectually, they started from the view that all Englishmen had a birthright which entitled them to have a say in who should govern them, although at times they accepted that the birthright might be breached through dependence on a master or by receiving alms. More  importantly, their ideology contained the germ of the idea of a social contract between the people and those who held power, an idea which was to come to dominate English political thinking for the next century or so through the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.

The Levellers were, with one or two exceptions such as Richard Overton, who was a deist at best and an atheist at worst, or John Wildman, who was a libertine and chancer,  religious. But their belief had a strong vein of rationalism in it. They saw God not as the often cantakerous and domineering supernatural being of traditional Christianity, but as a rational intelligence who entered every man and allowed him to see what was naturally just and reasonable.

For the Levellers, it seemed a natural right – a rational right – for a man to have a say in who should hold power and what they should do with the power. They  were happy to use historical props such as  Magna Carta and the legend of Norman oppression when it suited them, but their rationality led them to question how men were governed from first principles. One of the Leveller leaders Richard Overton actually called Magna Carta a “beggarly thing” and went on to comment:

 Ye [Parliament] were chosen to work our deliverance, and to estate us in natural and just liberty, agreeable to reason and common equity, for whatever our forefathers were, we are the men of the present age, and ought to be absolutely free from all kinds of exorbitancies, molestations or arbitrary power. (A Remonstrance. Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan Revolution)

More balanced was his fellow Leveller William Walwyn:

Magna Carta (you must observe) is but a part of the people’s rights and liberties, being no more but what with much striving and fighting, was wrested from the paws of those kings , who by force had conquered the nation, changed the laws and by strong hand held them in bondage. (England’s Lamentable Slaverie, Tracts on  Liberty in the Puritan Revolution.)

To call the Levellers a political party in the modern sense would be misleading. Yet they were the closest thing to it both then and, arguably, for several centuries. Their tactics and organisation were modern – the use of pamphletering and newspapers, the ability to get large number of supporters onto the streets (especially in London) at the drop of a hat, the creation of local associations.

Much of this was the work of Lilburne, a man of preternatural obstinacy, courage and general unreasonableness. It says much for the restraint of the English elite of the day and respect for the law that he was not killed out of hand. It is difficult to imagine such behaviour being tolerated anywhere in Europe in the seventeenth century.

Lilburne by every account of him was a most difficult man – it was said that his nature was so combative that he would seek a quarrel with himself if he were alone – ‘Jack would fight with John’. Yet this man, who came from a very modest gentry background, remained alive  despite challenging the authority of first the king and then  during and after the civil war, Parliament, Cromwell and the Commonwealth. He thus carried on this mortally dangerous  behaviour for almost a generation. To the end of his life in  1657, he was thought dangerous enough to imprison.

Lilburne first came to notice for seditious speeches and  writings in the 1630s. For that he was whipped from the Fleet  to the Palace Yard where he was stood in the stocks. Whilst  in the stocks, he removed copies of the pamphlets which had  caused his punishment and threw them to the crowd. That  little episode will give a good idea of the Lilburne’s  general mentality. He was an extreme example one of those  necessary unreasonable men without whom nothing great gets  done.

From the time of his flogging onwards, Lilburne’s career was  one of studied defiance of authority. He was one of the most  potent pamphleteers England has ever seen. For more than a  decade, he produced a flood of writings guaranteed to inflame  virtually anyone in public authority in the land. He faced  down judges in the most powerful courts in the land. He  controlled the London mob consummately. He treated the  greatest men in the land as equals. In any other place on the planet at that time, he probably would have been dead meat before his  career as an agitator began. But not in England. He might be  flogged. He might be put in the stocks. He might be  imprisoned. He might be tried twice for his life. But what the elite of  17th century England would not do was unreservedly murder him.

The Levellers developed an increasingly sophisticated political programme in a series of documents known as The Agreements of the People. These Agreements dealt extensively with political representation and structure. They were also very successful in creating a sense of historic grievance and an enemy. They did this by portraying 1640s England as  having declined from a golden age of freedom to an oppressed land and people under the heel of the Normans and their French successors.

The Levellers and the franchise

The Levellers changed their position on the franchise throughout their existence, tending to compromise when they thought that some accommodation with the likes of Cromwell could be made and ever more radical as political power slipped away from them, although there were times and places throughout their existence when this general tendency did not hold true.

What the Levellers did retain always was a belief that all  Englishmen were born with the same birthright. However, they accepted more often than not that certain  parts of this birthright could be forfeited under certain conditions. Religious, civil and even possibly economic rights could not be alienated justly, and as such should be protected constitutionally. The  right to elect, however, could be forfeited by  entering into a condition of dependence, either by  taking wages or alms. In such cases, a just  dependence resulted and the subservient individual’s  voice was deemed to be included in that of his master or benefactor, as far as a voice in elections was concerned,  just as that of a wife was deemed to be included in that of her husband. An idea of how the Levellers’ position changed can be gained from these extracts from Leveller tracts:

‘That the People of England,… ought to be more  indifferently proportioned according to the number  of inhabitants.’ (The first article of the First  Agreement.)

 [electors] ‘shall be Natives, or Denizen of England,  not persons receiving Alms … not  servants to, and receiving wages from any  particular person’ (The Second Agreement – D.H. Wolfe,Leveller Manifestoes p.403)

 ‘Whereas it hath been the ancient liberty of this nation, that all the freeborn people  have freely elected their representers in  Parliament, and their sheriffs and Justices of the Peace, etc. and they were abridged of that  their native liberty by a statute of the 8.H.6,7. That, therefore, the birthright of all English men be forthwith restored to all which are not, or shall  not be legally disenfranchised for some  criminal cause, or are under 21 years of age,  or servants or beggars .’ (The franchise clause  (section ll) of the Petition of January 1648 -D.H. Wolfe, Leveller Manifestoes P,269.)

By the time political opportunity had long passed the Levellers by we find in 1653 a pamphlet Leveller in tone – ‘A Charge of High Treason exhibited against Oliver  Cromwell’ summoning all the people of England to the polls ‘as well masters, sons of servants’.

Constitutional restraint

The Levellers did one more thing which was to have great influence in the future: they created the idea of constitutional law acting as a restraint on a parliament.  The Agreements of the People placed restrictions on what Parliament might do, removing the power from Parliament to  repudiate debts it had incurred, interfere with the operation of justice, destroy the rights to property or diminish the liberty of the individual. The Levellers even included provision granting the electorate the right to  resist Parliament if they acted beyond their powers. They also called for annual parliaments, i.e., a general election every year, which would have been a great restriction in itself on what those with power might do.

In 1648 the Levellers attempted but failed to convene a Constitutional Convention of the type which more than a century later produced the American constitution. However, the idea of restraining Parliament by superior law was given form in the Instrument of Government which set up the Protectorate. The idea of such constitutional restraint disappeared in England after the Restoration and the novel doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy eventually won the day after the “Glorious Revolution” of 1689, when the monarch became king not by right of birth but by gift of Parliament.

Other radicals

The most uncompromising of the democratic and egalitarian forces in the 1640s were the so-called Diggers or, “True Levellers” led by William Everard but best known through the writings of Gerrard Winstanley. In many ways the Diggers,  probably unwittingly, reiterated the most extreme egalitarian sentiments of the Peasant’s Revolt, such as the reputed words of John Ball, and reached back to the mediaeval idea of society as a communal enterprise.  They believed that the land belonged to no one saying “None ought to be lords or landlords over another, but the earth is free for every son and daughter of mankind to live upon.” ( Works, ed by Sabine p289).

For the Diggers the “natural” state of man was one of common ownership and the root of  evil the egotistic desire for individual advantage including  the “cheating art of buying and selling” by which king’s live  (Winstanley’s Law of Freedom 1652).

In 1649 a small group of Diggers attempted to put their philosophy into practice camped on St Georges Hill near Walton on Thames in Surrey and attempted to cultivate common land. Further Digger attempts were made at Cobham in Surrey and at Cox Hall in Kent and at Wellingborough in Northamptonshire. All met with a mixture of legal and physical harassment by local landowners and even attracted the attention of the Council of State which sent troopers to repress them. The Diggers were brought twice to court.

Their numbers were small, probably amounting to no more than a hundred or so at most and they had no lasting direct legacy. Yet they are a reminder that many Englishmen have never have never accepted willingly the unearned privileges of social rank or vast differences in wealth while the masses struggled to feed themselves.

The Diggers are also significant for giving voice through Winstanley to the novel idea that the end of politics should be the well-being of the common man and for the clear recognition that liberty rests on the economic state of society.

Exporting Representative Government

After the Cromwell’s establishment of the Protectorate, democratic ideas did not gain serious political currency in England for more than a century, but the example of England’s continually evolving parliamentary government proved a potent one.

The Restoration did not result in serious legal abridgements of the power of the monarch, but Charles II was in practice much restricted by a Parliament unwilling to adequately open the purse strings for a monarch who was, ironically, expected to do more and more as the formal power

of the state grew.

The “Glorious Revolution” of 1689 produced a true constitutional sea-change. From then on the English monarch ascended the throne only with the acceptance of Parliament and the Bill of Rights (1690) placed restrictions on the monarch. Amongst the long list of things the king was forbidden to do were:

Dispense with and suspend of laws, and the execution of laws, without consent of parliament.

Levy money for and to the use of the crown, by pretence of prerogative, for another time, and in other manner, than the same was granted by parliament.

To raise and keep a standing army within England in time of peace, without consent of parliament, and quartering  soldiers contrary to 4.

To violate the freedom of election of members to serve in parliament.

To demand excessive bail of persons committed in criminal cases, “to elude the benefit of the laws made for the liberty of the subjects.”

To impose excessive fines and illegal and cruel punishments.

The abuses of power by the crown listed in the Bill of Rights  are described as being ” utterly and directly contrary to the known laws and statutes, and freedom of this realm.”

That old reliance on the law and the traditional freedoms of the Englishman.

From 1689 began the century long decline of the monarchy as an executive power. The American War of Independence sealed the fate of the monarch and the Americans forged a new version of the English political model, with a formal separation of powers and a written constitution to restrict what governments and legislatures might do.

 

The received academic opinion on the American constitutional settlement is that it was the offspring of John Locke. In fact, it had at least as much affinity with the ideas of the Levellers. There is no direct intellectual link, but arguably the most important popular propagandist on the American side, the Englishman Tom Paine, shared much of his ideology with the Levellers. The Constitution is a balancing act between Locke Paine, granting a large degree of popular involvement in politics, whilst tempering it with restrictions such as electoral colleges and granting through the Bill of Rights  (which was inspired by the English Bill of Rights of 1690) constitutional protections for the individual against the state.

If the American Revolution owed its shape and  inspiration to England, the French Revolution was inspired by both English constitutional development and the America revolutionary example. Most political revolutions resulting in an attempt at representative government, have been  touched, consciously or not, by the legacy of the American and French revolutions.

England through control of the British Empire, ensured that the Westminster model of government was transplanted with widely differing success, to approximately a quarter of the world’s population, when the empire dissolved in the twenty years after 1945.

The astonishing upshot of the English example, the American and French Revolutions and the British Empire, is that the  political structures of most modern states are broadly based on the English constitution of King, Lords and Commons, the overwhelming majority having a head of state plus two assemblies. In addition, the widespread practice of a written constitution derives from the example of the United States, which of course drew its form and inspiration from  English settlements in North America, English history and political practices. These political structures apply as readily to dictatorships as they do to liberal democracies.

Of course, the balance of power between the head of  state and the assemblies varies widely and there is much difference between Parliamentary and Presidential government, but they all have their ultimate origin in the example of the English system of representative government.

One last thing. Look around the world. How many countries  can be said even today to have accepted elected representative government and the rule of law as a banal fact of life, the norm of their society? Britain, the USA, Australia, Canada, New Zealand certainly, Switzerland  and Scandinavia possibly. But where else? Not France which  as recently as 1958 overthrew the Fourth Republic. Not  Germany which embraced Hitler nor Italy the land of Mussollini. Not Spain so recently loosed from Franco.

As for the rest of the world, that tells a sorry tale of elites who generally have such a lack of respect for the individual and a contempt for the masses that the idea of shared power with and for the people is simply alien to them.

The fact that the only really stable examples of elected representative government in countries of any size are in  those countries which have their ultimate  origins in English colonisation strongly suggests that it was no accident that it was in England that the institution evolved. There must be something highly unusual about English society for it both to develop in a manner so different from any other country and to export this rare and valuable difference to colonies.

The Commons Education Select Committee  and the libelling  of the white working-class

Robert Henderson

The Commons Select Committee (CSC) on Education has  produced a report on the underachievement of white British working-class children.  This  ostensibly  highlights the poor educational performance of white British children who are eligible for free meals (FSM)  compared to those in receipt of FSM from ethnic minority groups such as those of Indian and Chinese ancestry.  I say ostensibly because there are severe flaws in methodology.  These are:

  1. The definition of white British is far from simple. The report distinguishes between Irish,  traveller of Irish heritage,  Gypsy/Roma and Any other white background (see CSC table 2 page 13).  The Any other white background is the largest.  It is not clear from the report how the white British were defined, for example , a child of white immigrants might well consider his or herself white British.  Who would whether they were or were not British?
  2. The numbers of  some of the ethnic minority groups cited are small, for example, at the end of Key Stage 4 (the end of GCSE courses) in 2013 there were only  168 Chinese in the country who pupils who qualified for FSM. (see CSC table 2 page 13).

3. The use of FSM  as a proxy for working-class  means that  white British apples are being compared with variously coloured ethnic minority  oranges. Most importantly the use of FSM means that the British white working-class as a whole is not represented , but only the poorest  section of it. Hence, the general treatment in the media of the report, that it shows the white working-class to be falling behind ethnic minorities, is grossly misleading. The report recognises this:

…measuring working class performance in education through FSM data can be misleading. The Centre for Research in Race and Education (CRRE) drew our attention to a mismatch between the proportion of children who were eligible for free school meals and the proportion of adults who would self-define as working class:17 in 2012/13, 15% of pupils at the end of key stage 4 were known to be eligible for free school meals,18 compared with 57% of British adults who defined themselves as ‘working class’ as part of a survey by the National Centre for Social Research.The CRRE warned that projecting the educational performance of a small group of economically deprived pupils onto what could otherwise be understood to be a much larger proportion of the population had “damaging consequences” on public understanding of the issue. The logical result of equating FSM with working class was that 85% of children were being characterised as middle class or above.

The  white British group  will be overwhelmingly drawn from the most deprived part of that  group’s population, while many of the ethnic minority groups  held up as superior to the white British children , will have a large  component of people who are not drawn from the lower social reaches of their society, but are poor simply because they are either  first generation immigrants or the children of first generation immigrants and  have not established themselves in well paid work – think of all the tales the mainstream media and politicians regale the British with about immigrant graduates doing menial jobs.  These  parents  will both have more aspiration for their children and a greater  ability to assist their children with their schoolwork.

The range  of  those qualifying for FSM is extensive and there is  considerable  complexity resulting from pupils  going in and out of the qualifying criteria, viz:

(Para 12 of the report) . Of the  Children are eligible for free school meals if their parents receive any of the following payments:

Income Support

• Income-based Jobseekers Allowance

• Income-related Employment and Support Allowance

• Support under Part VI of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999

• the guaranteed element of State Pension Credit

• Child Tax Credit (provided they are not also entitled to Working Tax Credit and

have an annual gross income of no more than £16,190)

• Working Tax Credit run-on—paid for 4 weeks after they stop qualifying for

Working Tax Credit

• Universal Credit

13. A report for the Children’s Society noted that the criteria for FSM mean that parents working 16 or more hours per week (24 hours for couples from April 2012) lose their entitlement to FSM since they are eligible for working tax credit; as a result there are around 700,000 children living in poverty who are not entitled to receive free school meals. In addition, not all those who may be eligible for FSM register for it; a recent report for the Department for Education estimated under-registration to be 11% in 2013. This figure varies across the country: in the North East under-registration is estimated to  be 1%, compared to 18% in the East of England and 19% in the South East. 

4. Greater resources, both material  advantages and better quality staff,  are being put into schools which have a  very large ethnic  minority component  than schools which are predominantly filled with white British children.  This is occurring both as a matter of deliberate government policy and through not-for-profit corporations such as charities.

Government policies are things such as the  pupil premium . This is paid to schools for each pupil  who qualifies under these criteria:

In the 2014 to 2015 financial year, schools will receive the following funding for each child registered as eligible for free school meals at any point in the last 6 years:

£1,300 for primary-aged pupils

£935 for secondary-aged pupils

Schools will also receive £1,900 for each looked-after pupil who:

has been looked after for 1 day or more

was adopted from care on or after 30 December 2005, or left care under:

a special guardianship order

a residence order

The amounts involved for a school can  be considerable. Suppose that a secondary school with 1,000 children  has 40% of its pupils qualifying for  FSM. That would bring an additional  £374,000 to the school in this financial year.   At present £2.5 billion is being spent on the pupil premium.

According to a Dept of Education (DoE) investigation published in 2013, Evaluation of Pupil Premium Research Report ,  a  good deal of this money is being spent on ethnic minorities and those without English as a first language     (see tables 2.1 and 2.2, pages 27 and 30) . The pupil premium can be used to provide extra staff, better staff, improved equipment after school activities and so on.

Schools can allocate the Pupil Premium money  at their discretion and often make the identification of where money has gone next to impossible because they do things such as merging the Pupil Premium money with money from other budgets and joining forces with other schools in the area to provide provision (see pages 14/15 in the DoE report).  It is probable that the Pupil Premium money brought into schools by white British working-class FSM children  is being used,  at least in part,  to benefit ethnic minorities. The converse is wildly improbable.

Ethnic minorities are concentrated in particular areas and particular schools. This makes it more  likely that ethnic children will go to schools with a higher  proportion of  free school meal pupils than schools dominated by  white pupils.  That will provide significantly greater funding for an ethnic  minority majority school than for one dominated by white Britons, most of whom will not qualify for the Pupil Premium. .

Because ethnic minority families, and especially those of first generation immigrants, are substantially larger on average than those of  white Britons, the likelihood of ethnic minority children qualifying for FSM will be greater than it is for white Britons because  the larger the family the more likely a child is to qualify for FSM.   This will boost the additional money from the pupils premium going to ethnic  minority dominated schools.

An example of not-for-profit intervention is  the charity Teach First.  The select committee report (para  116) describes their work:

 The Government’s response to the Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission’s first annual report noted that Teach First will be training 1,500 graduates in 2014 to 2015 and placing them in the most challenging schools, and that as of 2014/15 Teach First will be placing teachers in every region of England.

The Teach First  website states:  “Applicants to our Leadership Development Programme are taken through a rigorous assessment process. We select only those who demonstrate leadership potential, a passion to change children’s lives and the other skills and attributes needed to become an excellent teacher and leader. These participants teach and lead in our partner primary and secondary schools in low-income communities across England and Wales for a minimum of two years, ensuring every child has access to an excellent education.”

Apart from specific programmes such as the Pupil Premium and special training for teachers to prepare them what are euphemistically called “challenging schools” which end up disproportionately  favouring ethnic minority pupils,  there is also scope within  the normal funding of state schools to favour ethnic minorities because head teachers have a good deal of discretion in how funds are spent. That applies with knobs on to Academies and Free Schools.

There is also a considerable difference in funding between the funding of areas with large ethic minority populations, especially black and Asian groups,  and areas with largely white populations,  for example,   between East Anglia and London: “ The government has announced plans to raise per-pupil funding 3.7pc in Norfolk to £4,494, 7pc in Cambridgeshire to £4,225 and 2.5pc in Suffolk to £4,347 next year following a campaign by MPs.

“But councillors have called for a long term overhaul of the funding system, which will still see each student in the county receive around half of the allocation in the City of London, which will get £8,594.55 for each pupil.”

5. The effect of political correctness. With good reason any teacher,  and  especially white teachers,   will be fearful of not seeming to be devoutly political correct.  They know they are at the mercy of other teachers , parents and pupils and know that an accusation of racism from any  source could well end their teaching career at worst and at best seriously disrupt their lives while a complaint is being investigated. In addition, many  teachers will be emotionally attached to political correctness generally and to multiculturalism in particular.

In such circumstances it is reasonable to suspect that teachers in schools with a mix of ethnic minority and white British children  will devote more time and patience to ethnic minority pupils than   to white children.  They may do this without conscious intent, with either  fear or the ideological commitment making such a choice seem the natural one.

Such preferential treatment for ethnic minority children is facilitated by the large amount of continuous assessment  involved in GCSE.  (This is supposedly being reduced but the results of the change has not yet worked through to the end of a GCSE cycle.  Teachers routinely help children to re-write work which does not come up to par, in some cases re-doing the work themselves . Teachers have also been caught helping pupils  to cheat during exams . The opportunity and the temptation to help ethnic minority children is there and the pressure of political correctness may cause opportunity to become actuality.

6. The disruptive effect on schools of a large number of pupils from different backgrounds with English as a second language, the type of schools where the headmaster boasts “We have 100 languages spoken here”.   The most likely white British children to be in such schools are those from the poorest homes which means they qualify as FSM pupils.  They will be lost in these Towers of Babel not only because often they will be in the minority,  but also because, unlike children with English as a second language or  ethnic minority English speakers  who will have a good chance of enhanced tuition, the white British FSM pupils  will not enjoy  such a privilege and may be actually ignored to a large extent because of the desire of the staff to assist ethnic minority children.

7 . The downplaying of British culture. The school curriculum in Britain and  especially in England (where the vast majority of the British live)   is shaped to reflect the politically correct worldview.  This means that ethnic minority culture and history  are frequently  pushed ahead of British culture and history.   The larger the percentage of ethnic minorities in a school, the greater will be the tendency to marginalise the white British pupils, who will almost certainly be drawn largely from those qualifying for FSM. They will be deracinated and become culturally disorientated.

To this school propaganda is added the politically correct and anti-British, anti-white  propaganda which is pumped out  ceaselessly by mainstream politicians and the media. This  will reinforce the idea that being white and British is  somehow at best  inferior to that of ethnic minority cultures and at worst something to be ashamed of, something  to be despised, something which is a  danger  to its possessor.

Conclusion

As far as the general public is concerned, the Select Committee report is saying the white working-class children – all of them not just those receiving FSM  – are doing less well than ethnic minority children.   The reason for this is simple, the mainstream media have reported the story in a way which would promote such a belief, both in their  headlines and the stories themselves.

A comparison between  the  white British population as a whole and the ethnic minority populations as a whole would be nearer to reality, but it would still be comparing apples and oranges for the reasons given above. The ethnic minority children would still be likely to have on average parents who would not be representative of the ancestral populations they came from, political correctness would still drive teachers to favour ethnic minority pupils,  continuous assessment would still allow teachers to illegally aid ethnic minorities, heads could still decide to divert more funds towards ethnic minorities and the promotion of ethnic minority cultures and history would still exist.

What could be done to remedy matters? Continuous assessment should stop  and end of  course synoptic exams substituted . Ethnic minority children should not have more spent on them than white British children.  School funding in different areas should be broadly similar per capita.  British culture and history should be the dominant teaching driver.  Political correctness should be removed from the curriculum generally.

As for future studies, these should be controlled in a much more subtle manner than simply using FSM  as a criterion.  Any study of all or any part of group should control for parents’ education,  income, the amount of money spent on each pupil, the teacher pupil ratio,  the quality of the teachers and the general facilities of the school.

Those suggestions would not entirely cure the problem,  but it would be good start to both getting at the truth and ending the demonization of the white working-class  which has gathered pace ever since the Labour Party decided to drop the white working-class as their client base and substitute for them the politically correct groups of gays, feminists and most potently ethnic minorities.

See also

https://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2012/04/01/the-english-white-working-class-and-the-british-elite-from-the-salt-of-the-earth-to-the-scum-of-the-earth/

 

What the British people want from their politicians … and what they get

Robert Henderson

What do our politicians think of the electorate: precious little. All the major mainstream parties either ignore or cynically  misrepresent  the issues  which are most important to the British – immigration, our relationship with the EU, the English democratic deficit,  foreign adventures , the suppression of free speech and the precarious state of the economy. . These issues are  not addressed honestly because they either clash with the prevailing internationalist agenda or because to address them honestly would mean admitting how much sovereignty had been given away to the EU and through other treaties.

This antidemocratic failure to engage in honest politics is an established trait. The wilful removal from mainstream politics of vitally important issues has been developing for more than half a century. The upshot is that the British want their politics to be about something which is not currently on offer from any party with a chance of forming a government. The British public broadly seek what these days counts as rightist action when it comes to matters such as preserving nationhood, immigration, race and political correctness, but traditional leftist policies on items such as social welfare, the NHS and the economy (has anyone ever met someone in favour of free markets and free trade who has actually lost his job because of them?).

The electorate’s difficulty is not simply their inability to find a single party to fulfil all or even most of their political desires. Even on a single issue basis, the electorate frequently cannot find a party offering what they want because all the mainstream parties now carol from the same internationalist, globalist, supranational, pro-EU, pc songsheet. The electorate finds they may have any economic programme provided it is laissez faire globalism, any relationship with the EU provided it is membership, any foreign policy provided it is internationalist and continuing public services only if they increasingly include private capital and provision. The only difference between the major parties is one of nuance.

Nowhere is this political uniformity seen more obviously than in the Labour and Tory approaches to immigration. Labour has adopted a literally mad policy of “no obvious limit to immigration”. The Tories claim to be “tough” on immigration, but then agree to accept as legal immigrants more than 100,000 incomers a year from outside the EU plus any number of migrants from within the EU (350 million have the right to settle here). There is a difference, but it is simply less or more of the same. Worse, in practice there would probably be no meaningful difference to the numbers coming whoever is in power. The truth is that while we remain part of the EU and tied by international treaties on asylum and human rights, nothing meaningful can be done for purely practical reasons. But even if something could be done, for which serious party could the person who wants no further mass immigration vote? None.

A manifesto to satisfy the public

All of this set me thinking: what manifesto would appeal to most electors? I suggest this political agenda for the What the People Want Party:

We promise:

1. To always put Britain’s interests first. This will entail the adoption of an unaggressive nationalist ethic in place of the currently dominant internationalist ideology.

2. The reinstatement of British sovereignty by withdrawal from the EU and the repudiation of all treaties which circumscribe the primacy of Parliament.

3. That future treaties will only come into force when voted for by a majority in both Houses of Parliament and   accepted in a referendum . Any  treaty should be subject to repudiation following  Parliament passing a motion that repudiation should take place and that motion being ratified by a referendum.  Treaties could also be repudiated by a citizen initiated referendum (see 29).

4. A reduction in the power of the government in general and the Prime Minister in particular and an increase in the power of Parliament. This will be achieved by abolishing the Royal Prerogative, outlawing the party whip and removing the vast powers of patronage available to a government.

5. That the country will only go to war on a vote in both Houses of Parliament.

6. An end to mass immigration by any means, including asylum, work permits and family reunion.

7. An end to all officially-sponsored political correctness.

8. The promotion of British history and culture in our schools and by all publicly-funded bodies.

9. The repeal of all laws which give by intent or practice a privileged position to any group which is less than the entire population of the country, for example the Race Relations Act..

10. The repeal of all laws which attempt to interfere with the personal life and responsibility of the individual. Citizens will not be instructed what to eat, how to exercise, not to smoke or drink or be banned from pursuits such as fox-hunting which harm no one else.

11. A formal recognition that a British citizen has rights and obligations not available to the foreigner, for example, the benefits of the welfare state will be made available only to born and bred Britons.

12. Policing which is directed towards three ends: maintaining order, catching criminals and providing support and aid to the public in moments of threat or distress. The police will leave their cars and helicopters and return to the beat and there will be an assumption that the interests and safety of the public come before the interests and safety of police officers.

13. A justice system which guards the interests of the accused by protecting essential rights of the defendant such as jury trial and the right to silence, whilst preventing cases collapsing through technical procedural errors.

14. Prison sentences that are served in full, that is,  the end of remission and other forms of early release. Misbehaviour in prison will be punished by extending the sentence.

15. An absolute right to self-defence when attacked. The public will be encouraged to defend themselves and their property.

16. A general economic policy which steers a middle way between protectionism and free trade, with protection given to vital and strategically important industries such as agriculture, energy, and steel and free trade only in those things which are not necessities.

17. A repudiation of further privatisation for its own sake and a commitment to the direct public provision of all essential services such as medical treatment. We recognise that the electorate overwhelmingly want the NHS, decent state pensions, good state funded education for their children and state intervention where necessary to ensure the necessities of life. This promise is made to both reassure the public of continued future provision and to ensure that the extent of any public spending is unambiguous, something which is not the case where indirect funding channels such as PFI are used.

18. The re-nationalisation of  the railways, the energy companies, the water companies and any  exercise  of the state’s authority such as privately run prisons which have been placed in  private hands.

19. An  education system which ensures that every child leaves school with at least a firm grasp of the three Rs and a school exam system which is based solely on a final exam. This will remove the opportunity to cheat by pupils and teachers. The standards of the exams will be based on those of the 1960s which is the last time British school exams were uncontaminated by continuous assessment, multiple choice questions and science exams included practicals as a matter of course. .

20. To restore credibility to our university system. The taxpayer will fund scholarships for 20 per cent of school-leavers. These will pay for all fees and provide a grant sufficient to live on during term time. Any one not in receipt of a scholarship will have to pay the full fees and support themselves or take a degree in their spare time. The scholarships will be concentrated on the best universities. The other universities will be closed. This will ensure that the cost is no more than the current funding and the remaining universities can be adequately funded.

21. A clear distinction in our policies between the functions of the state and the functions of private business, charities and other non-governmental bodies. The state will provide necessary public services, business will be allowed to concentrate on their trade and not be asked to be an arm of government and charities will be entirely independent bodies which will no longer receive public money.

22. A commitment to putting the family first. This will include policies which recognise that the best childcare is that given by the parents and that parents must be allowed to exercise discipline over their children. These will be given force by a law making clear that parents have an absolute right to the custody of and authority over their children, unless the parents can be shown to be engaging in serious criminal acts against their children.

23. Marriage to be encouraged by generous tax breaks and enhanced  child allowances for children born in wedlock.

24. Defence forces designed solely to defend Britain and not the New World Order.

25. A Parliament for England to square the Devolution circle. The English comprise around 80 per cent of the population of the UK, yet they alone of all the historic peoples are Britain are denied the right to govern themselves. This is both unreasonable and politically unsustainable in the long-run.

26. A reduction to the English level of Treasury funding to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. This will save approximately £17 billion pa because the Celts receive overall approximately £1,600 per head per annum more than the English.

27. An end to Foreign Aid. This will save approximately £11  billion.

28. A written constitution to ensure that future governments cannot abuse their power. This will be predicated on (1) the fact that we are a free people, (2) the belief that in a free and democratic society the individual can be trusted to take responsibility for his or her actions and to behave responsibly and (3) that politicians are the servants not the masters of those who elect them. It will guarantee those things necessary to a free society, including an absolute right to free expression, jury trial for any offence carrying a sentence of more than one year, place citizens in a privileged position over foreigners and set the interests and safety of the country and its citizens above the interests and safety of any other country or people.

29. Citizen initiated referenda shall be held when ten per cent of the population have signed a petition asking for a referendum.

Those are the things which I think most of the electorate could embrace, at least in large part. There are also other issues which the public might well be brought to  support if there was proper public debate and a serious political party supporting them such as the ownership and bearing of weapons and the legalisation of drugs.

The positive thing about such an agenda is that either Labour or the Tories could comfortably support it within the context of their history.

Until Blair perverted its purpose, the Labour Party had been in practice (and often in theory – think Ernie Bevin), staunchly nationalist, not least because the unions were staunchly protective of their members’ interests and resistant to both mass immigration (because it reduced wages) and free trade (because it exported jobs and reduced wages).

For the Tories, the Thatcherite philosophy is as much an aberration as the Blairite de-socialisation of Labour. The true Tory creed in a representative democracy is that of the one nation nationalist. It cannot be repeated too often that the free market internationalist creed is the antithesis of conservatism.

The manifesto described above would not appeal in every respect to ever member of the “disenfranchised majority”. But its general political slant would be palatable to that majority and there would be sufficient within the detail to allow any individual who is currently disenchanted with politics to feel that there were a decent number of important policies for which he or she could happily vote. That is the best any voter can expect in a representative democracy. People could again believe that voting might actually change things.

Sixty years ago – we were naturally greener then

Robert Henderson

The world of sixty years ago

I was born in  England in 1947 into a world  where the national watchwords were  “make do and mend” and “waste-not-want-not“.   That was in part attributable  to  post-war austerity ,  but mostly  it was simply a continuation of what had always  been the case.

Packaging was still in its infancy.  Most  things which are now ready-wrapped , especially food, were  sold  loose.  People  routinely took their purchases away  from shops and market stalls in their own bags.  Where stores provided bags they were made of paper  which decomposed rapidly and naturally. .

Many glass bottles were could be  returned  to retailers for which the person returning them was paid a penny or two a bottle. The retailer then sent them back to the manufacturers for re-use. If not returned for re-use bottles , together with jam-jars were, commandeered to store home pickled fruit and vegetables ,  conserves such as chutney, jam and marmalade and  home brewed drinks like  elderberry wine.  Milk was  almost always supplied in  glass bottles which were commonly  collected by the milkman and  re-used more than once

Paper was commonly re-pulped.  As with bottles,  paper  could  be collected by private individuals and  sold  either to those collecting it for re-pulping or  to businesses which used paper as packaging.  Where it was not  sold it was frequently used around the home in functions as diverse as insulation, the lighting of fires and the preservation of food  (fruit  such as apples could be made to  keep throughout the winter by  wrapping  each individual fruit in paper which  cut off the supply of oxygen.)

Clothes and  footwear  were not considered things  which should be thrown  away at the first sign of wear. Instead, they  were repaired, normally in the home,  when torn. As they became worn clothes  and shoes  would be relegated from best to workaday to suitable for rough work involving  manual labour .. Or they might be given away or sold  to second hand dealers.  Even the rich were not as profligate  as they are now ,for they frequently passed their clothes down to their servants or  donated them to the poor.  Material which was beyond further use  as clothes or  household items such as sheets  was pulped to make cheap paper  re-worked into fresh cloth.

What applied to soft goods   was generally the order of the day . Hard durable  household goods, from crockery to  electrical  items were used for as long as possible. If they broke down,  became damaged or worn through use they were repaired.

The Rag and Bone man was a familiar sight, a breed of men  who  hoovered up  all manner of things now sent to landfill and incinerators., sorted them and sold them on  to anyone from the general  public to dealers in anything from clothes to scrap metal.

There was  a strong second-hand trade in virtually all  durable manufactured products. Today  the second hand trade in everything apart from motor vehicles and furniture  is a pale imitation of what it was 60 years ago, being largely confined to charity shops and  car-boot sales.

There were far fewer machines, both in the home and the workplace. In 1948 even a middleclass home would  be unlikely to have  more than  a refrigerator,  boiler for the water, a  radio, a cooker, a telephone, an electric fire  and  a washing machine and many would not have as many machines as that.  In a working-class home  a radio, cooker and fire would be the most which would be found and a  minority  would have no machines at all, gaining their power from the burning of wood, coal, paraffin  or coke.

Britain manufactured  most of  what it consumed . Where the country was not entirely self-sufficient   it  had a manufacturing capability  for  every  widely used manufactured product and all of the essential ones.   Unlike now,  Britain built its own ships, aircraft, trains  and road vehicles using British-owned and controlled  enterprises.   Our manufacturing base  was so comprehensive  we could   supply our  armed forces with virtually everything  they  needed.  Of course, a  larger manufacturing base meant  more raw materials were imported  than now,  but that entry on the debit side of the green ledger  was dwarfed by  the savings  on the  import of  manufactured goods,  even when the greater export of  manufactured goods  then than  now is added into the balance.

Most of the food consumed was grown in Britain and much of  it was consumed locally. It was rarely wasted because it  took  a larger proportion of the average family income than now  and  refrigerators and convenience foods were  not the norm.  The lack of refrigerators  meant food was brought  as it was definitely required  not  in anticipation of when it  might be  required, while the fact that  most  meals had to be prepared from scratch provided a natural check on preparing more than would be eaten because of the time and effort involved. .    What was not eaten ended up re-appearing on the diner table on another day or was re-constituted into another dish.  People, even  those in towns and cities, often grew  some of their own vegetables and fruit  with urban allotments and gardens being an important source of  many a family’s food.

Cars were  still  comparatively few in number and, consequently , for most  public transport was the order of the day. People tended to  work within easy travelling distance of  where they lived, frequently  walking to work.  When people went on  holiday it was  normally in Britain  and often not that far from home. International travel was still very much  the province of the better-off.

Public transport  even outside the  larger urban areas was adequate  and  much   goods traffic went by rail in the pre-Beeching days when the  railway network was truly national. and there were no motorways  to promote the use of gigantic  HGVs.

Oil consumption was low compared with  today because  of the small  number of private vehicles,  the widespread use of  coal. and the relatively primitive state of the chemical industry  –  plastics were in their infancy – which  meant oil derived products other than  petrol diesel  and paraffin  were few.

The widespread use of coal meant more carbon dioxide going into the air, but against that  most of the coal was produced from British mines  which greatly reduced  the need to transport  the raw materials of  energy  to and within Britain.  Industrial pollution was less  tightly controlled than today  with  much dumping of waste into  rivers.  However, that is balanced by  the fact that farming was much less reliant on chemicals   which today are  a major cause of environmental contamination.

The general mentality of the population was  to get  full value  from whatever they owned.  There was no widespread  desire  to  replace things with the latest  model simply because the thing  a person had was out of date.  Of course, people wanted new devices such as televisions  and washing machines, but once they had one they expected it to last for a long time.

People   paid cash for almost everything and  if they wanted something  saved for it. Sixty years ago credit was difficult to get. There were no credit cards, mortgages were given out very grudgingly after an extended  period of saving with a building society   and a bank loan  was something  only  readily  available  to the  middleclass, the majority of working people not having bank accounts.    Even hire purchase was  far from easy to obtain if you  were not in an employment which you had occupied for  at least  a year or two.

There was a general horror of debt.  Bankruptcy was seen as little better than theft.. Most people lived  from payday to payday. The welfare state was  in its infancy and  provided far less than  it does today. All of this meant that people had  to take responsibility for their own lives.

Advertising  was  far less potent in 1948. It  had been  growing in strength since  the rise of the popular press in the latter part of Victoria’s reign, but  sixty years ago it was still an infant  compared with what it is today.  Not only was there no Internet, there was no commercial radio or television  and  newspapers and most magazines were thin and drab. Full colour, high quality printing  for general consumption was  a long way in the future.  Cinemas were more important than today as advertising conduits, but  these were places people went to perhaps once a week and the advertising was fleeting and hidden amongst a host of trailers, shorts,  government sponsored propaganda films such as “This is life”  and  the normal double bill of two full length features.  The opportunities  for companies to  create a “must have  more and must  it now” mentality were very limited.

The world today  – how we got from A to B

Today we have a society whose watchword is throw it away if it is not brand new and buy something else.  Manufactured goods are   discarded  not because they are worn out but because people are tired of them; items which could be repaired are not repaired because it  is cheaper to buy a new  and “improved” model;  large amounts of food are  thrown away;  most things come in packaging  derived from petroleum products which do not naturally degrade; debt is taken on in astonishing  fashion without a  visible qualm and bankruptcy is commonly seen as nothing more than a shame-free  and legitimate means  to avoid paying your debts;  our industrial base  has withered, we import nearly half our food  and  most people appear to  have no sense of   wanting to get  full value from what they buy   by using  what they  own to its fullest extent.

Why have things changed so much in sixty  years?  It was not a rapid  reformation for the  make-do-and-mend, waste-not-want-not   mentality  took a long time dying.  Even today   older people  find wasting food and discarding things  which still have wear in them  unsettling  – I  do  myself.

The rot really began to set in during the Thatcher years  in the 1980s as the post-war British political  consensus  dissolved  and  Thatcher began the process of   deliberately dismantling private British industry  through the removal of protectionist  barriers, most notably  by her agreement to the Single European Act. At  the same time  Thatcher ruthlessly diminished  directly provided public services  by  means ranging from the wholesale privatisation  of  the  nationalised utilities to  piecemeal  disengagement  by allowing  private firms to take on vast swathes of work previously done in-house by the British state. Some of the newly privatised industries  such as ship building and mining , which other states still protected , were,  unsurprisingly rapidly destroyed by the  removal of state protection.   The Thatcherite mantra  was continuously repeated: Private enterprise good,  public provision bad. The work of Thatcher has been  religiously continued  by Major, Blair and Brown.

The consequence of  a quarter of a century of Thatcherite economics allied to liberal internationalist politics has been the wholesale   export of jobs to the Third and Second  Worlds., most notably to China.  Manufacturing  has suffered most,  but increasingly  service jobs have been  lost.  In the past ten years the middle-class have discovered that  their jobs are at risk as well as those of the working-class.

Job availability and security has also been attacked  from within. Immigration has run riot since  Labour came to power in 1997,  especially since  new countries such as Poland joined the EU and were allowed free access to  Britain to live and work. This recent  immigration has put intense pressure on scarce resources such as housing and healthcare and undercut the wages of  many  Britons, especially  those in manual trades and unskilled and semi-skilled jobs.  Often Britons have not merely been undercut  but have found themselves wilfully  excluded from jobs because employers prefer to employ  immigrants because they are easier to control.

The transfer of much of our manufacturing capacity  by both off-shoring  British operations and the simple substitution of  home-produced goods with imports has produced   very cheap consumer goods  in certain areas, most notably  clothing and electronics. This has certainly been the main cause of the constriction of  the second hand  trades  and  one of the  prime drivers prompting  people to change goods more regularly.

These policies  have  created  of a large  reserve army of indigenous  labour, mostly   from within the working class,  whose natural employments  had been destroyed wholesale, and  a general   feeling  that nothing is permanent any more. This sense  of   insecurity has been religiously fed  by  the political elite. For a quarter of a century British Governments  have  routinely spoken  of  “being in a global economy” and   that “there is no such thing as a job for life now”  and how  “people must retrain several times within their lifetime”. In the past 15 years the elite  generally have taken up the  cry.   Most morally damagingly perhaps,  the British  have been  constantly told  by those in positions of power and  influence, directly and by implication,  that  to be rich  is  the ultimate  end of life, that the pursuit of  wealth  is morally  desirable without regard to its consequences, a mentality summed up graphically by Gordon Gecko in the film Wall Street with the line “Greed is good“.  Life, the neo-liberals  imply,  is   no more than a  web of economic  relations.

The sense of powerlessness  felt by the  ordinary person  has been  enhanced by the growing power of the EU over British affairs and  the persistent denigration of the nation  state by those with access to the mainstream media, a denigration which was  couched by the political elite in terms of how the nation state was a thing of the past  at best and   a positive evil at worst.

Most damaging in the long term  is mass immigration. This  both introduced a fracture into British society  which had never existed before and  provided the  liberal  elite  with the means to  suppress native  disquiet   about  the immigration  and promote the internationalist creed under its new title of multiculturalism. The message of multiculturalism was stark and simple: all people from wherever they come and whatever their  culture and  loyalties have equal rights and  the indigenous population of  Britain has no special place or rights within their ancestral land.  Those who opposed the new creed  – and the vast majority instinctively did – were censored,  threatened with the criminal law, lived in fear of the loss of their employment and were subjected to a totalitarian tide of  “anti-racist” propaganda.   Unsurprisingly, overt  public opposition of any sort  was rare  and those amongst the elite who were disturbed by what was happening  remained entirely mute.  The natural  emotional mooring posts of a society  were cut down and the individual left to drift in a  soulless materialist world..

At the same time as their  world was made impermanent and  feelings of insecurity grew and they  were denied the comfort of  both feeling part of a nation and of expressing their sense of belonging, , the majority became steadily  richer, despite the high inflation of the late eighties and early nineties and the housing slump of the early nineties.  The average wage increased  remorselessly in real terms  until recent years,  and those who managed to get on the housing ladder before, say,   2000  saw their  equity  in the property shoot up  dramatically , a most significant fact because  around  70% of the adult population now live in properties in which they  have  some equity, in most cases substantial equity. A  significant part of  that equity has been  released. through the taking out of second mortgages or other  borrowing against the property.  The consequence of rising wages and equity release  was an immense amount  of money swilling around in the economy.  To that must be added the vast  growth in  other credit .

The home ownership boom was driven by  two main developments. In the twenty years after 1979 mortgages  became  virtually granted on demand  as  lenders relaxed the rules and made ever laxer checks on the information given by applicants.  The multiplier of a person’s  income  rose from the traditionally cautious  two times  salary to three or four times by the late nineties.   Deposits were reduced until  100% mortgages were common. Eventually, a healthy market even developed in mortgages for more than the value of the property as lenders gambled on the  seemingly ever rising house prices rapidly covering the difference.  The second  driver was  the introduction of the Right-To-Buy  law which  transferred  large amounts of public housing  to private ownership by giving those in public housing large discounts on the market price of their dwellings.

Similar irresponsible  behaviour was seen in  the other credit markets. Private individuals  were bombarded by  offers of credit cards, bank loans  and store cards . Even more than in the case of mortgages  the lenders were lax  in  checking  the veracity of the information given and people frequently managed to obtain  a dozen or more credit lines, the repayment of which were utterly beyond their resources.

Add together  the growing sense of  uncontrollable impermanence, the suppression of  national expression, the incessant pro-laissez faire propaganda   and  the rising disposable wealth  and  it is not surprising   that rampant consumerism  took  hold.

Can the mentality  change?

Will we go on  in this fashion or  is there a possibility that we might return if not exactly to make-do-and-mend  to a  less economically  hectic way of living?  There are good reasons why we might. Governments  including our own are starting to acknowledge the dangers of being dependent on foreigners for   fundamental things such as  energy and food  and the frighteningly large recent immigration  has at last forced  some honest public discussion of the  ill-effects of   massive numbers of foreigners having free  entry to our  country.

To this may be added  the uncertain state of  both the British and the World economy. Due to an abdication of  responsibility for controlling credit  by  governments  throughout the advanced world, and nowhere  has been  more culpable than Britain,  there is now a general contraction of  credit.  In Britain we have the frightening spectacle of a  bank created out  of a converted building society , Northern Rock, being   actively  financed  by the taxpayer  via the Bank of England  to the tune of some £25-30 billion as  I write (December 2007)  with a further £25 billion or so of  the Bank’s deposits  being underwritten by the  taxpayer through Treasury guarantees.  To  put this in context  total UK Government spending  for the financial year 2007/8  is estimated in the  Red Book as £586 billion. (The Red Book is the Treasury publication which contains the budget details and the  estimates for government spending and revenue  in the financial year to which the  budget refers).

The fact that a single bank has produced a government commitment of  8-10% of total  Government spending  should put the fear of God into the Government and cause them to keep credit tight. (If they do that it  will probably be by keeping Bank Rate high rather than  targeted credit controls such as restrictions on the multiplier of  income  which mortgage providers  may offer). However, do  not bet on it because  modern Governments have made a God of growth and higher rates mean lower growth. The fact that  the supposedly independent Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee reduced Bank Rate  in December 2007 despite rising inflation suggests that  this Government may continue to behave irresponsibly.

But even if the Government does not  act to tighten credit the market  may  do the job sufficiently to make things unpleasant enough to  change  the public mentality. In fact, it already  has, with restrictions on the granting of   credit  to private individuals ,  both by a  higher level of outright refusal and by  less attractive terms for  mortgages and personal loans  for those  who can obtain credit. At  the corporate level,  credit is becoming more difficult  to obtain and  expensive  where it can be obtained. Small businesses  are  finding it particularly  hard going.. Even  clearing banks  such as Barclays have struggled to obtain enough credit  as they  reduce the amount of  inter-bank loans.  It is also interesting that the  Bank Rate cut in  December 2007  did not  produce an equivalent drop in the short-term lending rate  between the banks which is what is causing the immediate problem. It is a moot point whether  the central Bank’s prime rate is still  an effective credit control instrument.

Unless  the credit crisis  is  quickly overcome it could well drive the world into a serious recession or even a full blown depression.  Even if it turns  out to be  a temporary phenomenon , there are still plenty of other reasons why  the  British economy could be in trouble.  The countries which have been producing   manufactured goods   at absurdly low prices  are rapidly getting richer. This has the effect of both raising their prices  to meet higher wages and  of creating  an ever greater international competition for raw materials  and skills  In Britain  today only one of the four  material essentials of life –   shelter, food,  energy and clothing  –   is  still cheap and even that  one (clothing)  is starting to  rise.  People are  starting to get poorer. They may  be rich in trifles such as  an array of cheap electronics  undreamt of by earlier generations,  but  in the things that really matter, especially  housing, they are poor.

There may be a another  reason why thing may change.   For a quarter of a century the people have been fed on bread and circuses through the concentration on trivial materialism,  but that is a diet  which has little nourishment in it   Perhaps most  are becoming sated with  choice, especially when that choice concerns non-essentials, many of which are either a burden to many  because of the learning process needed to operate them, for example, mobile phones,  or of passing interest and soon discarded. Perhaps people would prefer  a government which defended their  jobs even if this was at the cost of higher  prices.  Perhaps they would prefer to be more secure and a little poorer   On a moral level does it matter that we now live in  a society  where most seem to have  little sense of valuing  what they own , of being  obsessed with things which are essentially trivial such as having the  newest mobile phone?   I think it does because  people have substituted  to a  significant degree    the  worship of  the trivial gods  of material possessions  and  the immediate gratification of   wants  (note wants not needs) for the fundamental  gods of  the family, the local community and  the nation .

The test  by which such questions should be judged  is simple: has the change in mentality  produced a more settled, coherent  and happier society than what went before?    It is difficult to see how it has. The birth rate has dropped below  replacement level  and people are more insecure than they were sixty years ago . Most noticeably, the native population  now live in an atmosphere of fear generated by the successful enforcement of political correctness by the British elite. Sixty years ago there simply was no fear of  losing your job or being prosecuted simply for expressing an  opinion about politics and society.

The indigenous British generation  which is now reaching adulthood  have a  bleak future before them  if things do not radically change:  home ownership becoming an impossible dream for most,  the chances of a secure job paying enough to live a normal life becoming less by the day, public provision being  cut back  ever more ruthlessly and   the control of their ancestral land  being steadily handed to  foreigners by  a Quisling elite.

 

 

 

 

 

You have to understand religion and the religious mentality to understand history

Robert Henderson

YouGov have just undertaken a poll on behalf of the Oxford University Education Department to judge the attitude  of people in England to the teaching of  Religious Education (RE).  (http://www.ox.ac.uk/media/news_releases_for_journalists/121126.html). The support for such teaching was strong:

In the poll of a random sample of 1,832 adults in England, 64 per cent agreed that children need to learn about Christianity in order to understand English history; 57 per cent agreed it was needed to understand the English culture and way of life; and 44 per cent said they thought that more attention should be given to such teaching. Areas of Christianity that people regarded as particularly important for children to learn about in RE were the history of Christianity (58 per cent), major Christian events and festivals (56 per cent), and how Christianity distinguishes right from wrong (51 per cent).”(

This is  very welcome. In the Go-Between the novelist L P Hartley famously wrote  “The past is a foreign country”. Clichéd  as that now is it contains a serious truth.  When, for example,   an Englishman goes to America  he finds much that is familiar; the trappings of modernity in the cities and towns, the motorways, the cars and so on. It is not difficult for an Englishman to feel comfortable there. But there are also differences: the ways in which  English is spoken, the food , the conduct of the law and politics and much more.  Less obvious but more important are the differences in mentality between one culture and the next, even two such as England and the USA which have much culturally in common.    If an Englishman goes to France he still sees much which is  familiar because France has the trappings of modernity, but the differences between England and France are more pronounced  If an Englishman visits China the differences will be starker still and if he goes to a Third World country such as Rwanda the sense of being in an alien culture will be profound.

Studying the past is akin to visiting foreign countries.  Even when it is the history of the country in which a person has been born and raised, there are always the differences, many  subtle, some  glaring.  That is why having a good understanding  of the surface facts – dates, battles, institutions and so on – as retailed by  historians is not enough for a firm  grasp of the past, although the surface facts, especially the chronological details, are essential.   The differences in how those in the past viewed the world,  especially what was of prime importance to them compared with what we think is important,  must be understood.  For most of the English past nothing has been more important than religion as both a shaper of the individual mentality and the  creator of institutions and social norms.  That is why an understanding of Christianity is essential  for English children) because so much of English  history was shaped by Christianity and much of the general shape of English society today is ultimately the consequence of the actions of those driven by Christian beliefs.  (I write incidentally, not as a believer but an agnostic  – see  http://livinginamadhouse.wordpress.com/2010/09/19/what-is-the-rational-position-on-religion/).

Much of what we value in our society is the result of a sense of  Christian religious duty  to aid the unfortunate. The idea of  charity lies at the heart of  Christianity.  Academic education (and even literacy)  survived in the English mediaeval world  because of the Church and until the latter half of the nineteenth century English education was dominated by schools which were religiously inspired. Many of England’s  best known  schools (Eton, Winchester, Westminster, Charterhouse)  and her two premier universities Oxford and Cambridge have their origins in  Christian endowments, as do some of her most famous hospitals   (Barts, the Royal Free,  Guy’s and St Thomas’ ). Trade unions  and  the co-operative movement  – major  sources  of non-state corporate social support for the poor  well into the 1960s –  both had strong religious roots in Christian socialism.  Much of Britain’s most impressive architecture is contained within its  churches and cathedrals.   The English language is gilded with many phrases from the King James’ Bible: A broken heart, A fly in the ointment, A leopard cannot change its spots, A multitude of sins  (http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/bible-phrases-sayings.html).  In its many small fields and hedgerows , the  English countryside caries the marks of the enclosure movement  whose first wave was led by the monasteries before the Reformation.

More broadly the development of  parliamentary government (an English invention) can be ascribed in large part to the strains of Protestantism  (the English Nonconformist sects) which treated the relationship between the individual and God  as one which did not need to be mediated by priests but, rather, was something which came to fruition through self-constructed prayers and study by the lay individual of the Bible and the book Common Prayer in English.  This  individualism began in the 14th Century with the first complete translation of the Bible into English (the Wycliffe or Lollard Bible) and came to full flower with the Reformation.  Men and women could for the first time, if they were literate, read the Bible for themselves.  This religious individualism could and did translate itself  into political individualism where the individual was seen not  as a vassal but as  an active political player. This mixture of religious  and political activism  reached its height in the  period 1640-60, the time of Civil War, Commonwealth and Protectorate (see http://englandcalling.wordpress.com/the-beginnings-of-english-democratic-thought/).

The spirit of individualism also flowed into economic behaviour and played at least a significant part in the commercial  and then industrial development which led to the first and only bootstrapped  industrial revolution.  Many of the great(and lesser)  entrepreneurs of the industrial revolution  – Josiah Wedgewood and Abraham Darby are good examples –  were Nonconformists.  These were people who saw success in business, as evidence of  God’s favour or at least proof of the  living of a godly life, but   it may also have been a consequence of the fact , as we shall shortly see, that  Nonconformists  were excluded from public life  until the 19th century.

The religious mentality

But there is far more to  understanding Christianity than counting  the outcomes of  Christian belief.  Even more important is to get inside the heads of those living in an intensely religious world. It is immensely difficult for English men and women today, even if they are professing Christians,  to comprehend  what religion has meant in England  in the past. Imagine a world in which a belief, or at least a professed belief,  in Christianity  was not simply a question  of  personal choice but  a matter of life or death.  Nor was it a case of simply believing in a Christian God, it had to be the “right” variety  of Christian belief  That was England until  well into the 17th century  when the death penalty for   heresy,  blasphemy, atheism and suchlike offences remained until the  Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Act 1677 was passed removing the ultimate punishment.  But until well into the 19th century  Non-conformists, Catholics , Jews and unbelievers remained under considerable legal disadvantages  such as a bar to holding  many public offices – including being an MP – because  the Corporation Act of 1661 and the  Test Act of 1673 required office holders to at least pretend to be Anglicans. The Acts were not invariably rigorously enforced for Nonconformists,  but they were still a considerable bar to playing a part in public life.

Apart from the legal deterrents to not following the  “right” beliefs, there was immense social pressure to conform.   The philosopher David Hume, almost certainly an agnostic at best and atheist at worst,  remained coy about his exact beliefs until he lay on his deathbed  in the late 18th century because of the fear of being thought an unbeliever.  Remnants of that social pressure can  still be seen in the reluctance of leading present day politicians to publicly declare themselves unbelievers.

But the imposition of a prescribed religion by the state was not simply a matter of social control, although the hierarchical nature of the relationship of  the god in Christianity, Islam and Judaism  and believers  does serve that purpose, it mimicking the relationship between lord and vassal.   Large numbers of people, including those with power and influence, took their religion extremely seriously for  it was the very centre of their lives.   Part of that was the individual’s  fear of Hell and Purgatory opposed to the promised reward for the virtuous of  Heaven.  But there was also a social dimension because people believed that worshipping in the “right” manner was essential to the wellbeing of society, that to do otherwise would bring the wrath of God  in the form of war, pestilence and famine.  To cry heretic when that is sincerely believed is not a contemptible act in the eyes of believers but a matter of social responsibility. (It is entirely different from the politically correct today crying racist,  because the imposition of politically correct ideas arises not from a belief that their absence will result in punishment by an outside agency but from a wish to create the world in the image of the politically correct. )

There was also something which might be described as religious infatuation. Men and most commonly women had an intensely personal relationship with their imagined  God.   Those who took the veil and entered convents  were brides of Christ and some displayed behaviour which suggests a sublimated sexual infatuation with the idea of  Jesus.  Men subscribed to worship of the virgin Mary in similar fashion.  Saints were venerated and their places of burial the sites of pilgrimage.  Relics of  saints and best of all Christ – a thorn supposedly from Christ’s  crown of thorns or even better a splinter from the True Cross stood at the top of the relic pecking order – were treated with immense reverence and accorded what in other circumstances would be accounted occult powers, especially of healing and protection against disaster.

There was a baser side to religion. Human nature being what  it is, the clergy often seemed more intent on growing rich than tending their flocks or worshipping God.  Indulgencies to expunge the wages of sin and reduce time in Purgatory were sold cynically by Pardoners.  Pride was shown both by  priestly display and in the claims of some of the more exhibitionist ascetics to being the most unworthy of men. The Reformation of the 16th Century  was in large part  the child  of many centuries of dissatisfaction with the venal  and unconscientious nature of many of the clergy.  Nor was the great mass of the English population models of Christian restraint  and piety. William Langland’s 14th Century Piers Plowman draws a vivid picture of both the failures of the clergy and the often riotously disrespectful laity.

But these abuses were seen as  the shortcomings of men not of God.  Religious belief was often not merely sincere but intimidatingly sincere. The dire torments which the religious have willingly borne when they could have been avoided  simply by recanting (as was normally the case with the Inquisition and something prescribed in canon law)  or accepting that the emperor was a god  (as with Imperial Rome ) are astonishing.    There are few if any of the dimensions of torture which the religious have not suffered, death by fire, pressing with weights and  being slowly lowered into molten lead are just a few.  Nor were the exalted spared.  Bishops Hugh  Latimer and Nicholas Ridley  and the Archbishop of Canterbury Thomas Cranmer (collectively the Oxford Martyrs)  were  burnt at the stake in 1555 during the reign of  the Catholic Mary I.

Beneath Christianity lay the ancestral remnants of older religions and superstitions. Most English men and women  still lived in a world full of  the supernatural.  Satan and his manifestations and helpers were aboard in the world in the minds of  even many of the educated. As late as the 17th Century  witches were regularly accused and frequently  executed,  often by burning.  Eclipses of the sun could provoke widespread panic.

To the modern mind raised in a society which is both secular  in spirit and rational in intent  (because of scientific knowledge),  beliefs in the supernatural will often  seem absurd . But place yourself in a world without any scientific understanding and it does not seem ridiculous.  It is not difficult to see how belief in the supernatural would arise in a big-brained animal with a high degree of self-awareness.  It would be natural for hunter-gatherers  to think that the world was  controlled  by gods and spirits as they witnessed volcanic eruptions, floods, thunder and lightning  or saw anything inanimate which moved such as a river to be in some sense alive. What more natural in such circumstances to imagine the sun was dying as winter drew in and the days shortened and the gods needed to be placated by sacrifice to prevent the death?  What more natural if you believe in gods and spirits  to turn to the  shaman to control and placate the gods and spirits with potions and spells or to practice sympathetic magic  by enacting or drawing on cave walls an event such as a successful hunt for game?

Even when societies become considerably larger and more sophisticated than that of the hunter-gatherer tribe the same fears exist. Superstition exists strongly in the most advanced societies as evidenced by the many people who are psychologically dependent on a talisman such as a lucky object (which can be anything) or performing certain actions in a certain order – professional sportsmen are particularly prone to this type of self-comforting. Perhaps there is little difference between this and the belief in Christian relics. Obsessive compulsive disorders  could be seen as extreme examples of  the superstitious trait diverted to other overt purposes.  Human beings wish to be in control and even in a modern advanced state they often do not feel they are and seek comfort blankets where they can.

The broader picture

A knowledge and understanding of  Christianity is of course also a necessary  tool for interpreting European history.  Just as England’s history has been shaped by Christianity, so has Europe’s  and that of the  vast lands which have their origins in European colonialism  and exist today with a population predominantly  drawn from Europe and  cultures  which have their roots in those of Europe:  North America, much of central and Southern America , Australia and New Zealand.

More broadly still, the traits which are evident in Christians are a guide to the religious experience of other non-Christian lands, for the religious impulse if not the theology is the same.

Ideological capture

Tiger got to hunt, bird got to fly

Man got to sit and  wonder why, why, why?

Tiger got rest, bird got to land,

Man got to tell himself he understand

(Cat’s Cradle Kurt Vonnegut)

But the utility of understanding the sociology and psychology of religion goes far beyond  religion. It provides a guide to secular ideologies and their adherents.  By ideology I mean a set of ideas, religious or secular, to which an individual subscribes blindly regardless of the objective and testable truth of  the ideology or of any contradictions which it may contain.

The same qualities which create religious belief  can be placed in the service of  secular all-encompassing ideologies such as Marxism and  Fascism which offer the same psychological anchors and incentives as religions such as Christianity and Islam provide: the idea that there is something  greater than the individual; a universal guide to living a life;   the promise of the jam of a better life if not tomorrow at least sometime; the satisfaction of the tribal urge; the absolution from moral obligation to those who are outside the group and, perhaps above all, the sense of a journey  which lends meaning  to the individual life.

The totalitarian ideology which is political correctness is the best modern example in the West of  how the religious impulse has been shifted from formal religion to a secular belief.  The politically make objectively incorrect claims such as a heterogeneous society is superior and much desirable  to a homogeneous one (objectively incorrect because the heterogeneous society is invariably  more unstable and fractious than the heterogeneous one – let the reader provide an contrary example if they  wish to dispute this), that race is simply a social construct (the general physical differences in populations which we call races would not exist if humans did not treat racial difference as a potent barrier to interbreeding) or there is no  innate  difference between the capabilities and mentality of a man and a woman  (tell that to a woman giving birth), the apparent differences being simply a matter of social conditioning.   These assertions are every bit as absurd, because reality contradicts them, as the belief of Catholics that transubstantiation means that literally the blood of and body of Christ enter the wine and bread during  Holy Communion or the belief of  Muslims that the Koran was dictated to Mohammed by the Archangel Gabriel.

How do ideologies develop? The evolutionary scientist Richard Dawkins’ concept of the meme applies with especial force  to ideologies sacred or profane.   The meme is  the mental equivalent of a gene.  It is, like the gene, a replicator. Here is Dawkins defining it:

Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches.  Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperms or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation.  If a scientist hears, or reads about, a good idea, he passed it on to his colleagues and students.  He mentions it in his articles and his lectures.  If the idea catches on, it can be said to propagate itself, spreading from brain to brain.  As my colleague N.K. Humphrey neatly summed up an earlier draft of this chapter: `… memes should be regarded as living structures, not just metaphorically but technically.(3)  When you plant a fertile meme in my mind you literally parasitize my brain, turning it into a vehicle for the meme’s propagation in just the way that a virus may parasitize the genetic mechanism of a host cell.  And this isn’t just a way of talking — the meme for, say, “belief in life after death” is actually realized physically, millions of times over, as a structure in the nervous systems of individual men the world over.’  (http://www.rubinghscience.org/memetics/dawkinsmemes.html)

Memes are  arguably the most important evolutionary insight since Darwin’s formulation  of natural selection.  Dawkins has not received the praise he deserves ,  most probably because the concept does imply a great deal of determinism in human thought , something  which makes most human beings , if they think about the matter at all, decidedly uncomfortable.

Ideologies are a special class of meme because they are not a single discrete entity as many memes are.  They have the ability to not merely mutate, which could be said of any meme just as it could be said of any gene,  but the capacity to build endlessly complicating systems of thought, chains of memes link in a network of belief.  These systems of thought at their most extreme purport to not merely explain how to seek a given end but to provide a model of the entirety of reality.

Homo  Sapiens is very susceptible to the passing  of memes both because many are useful or enjoyable and because being a big-brained animal with language and a high degree of self-awareness  human beings are innately curious and questioning.  Those qualities also make humans acutely aware of possible dangers and opportunities which require reasoning and solutions.  But like genes memes can be beneficial, indifferent  or harmful in their effects.   Ideologies are never entirely benign because they require coercion to maintain their dominance for there will always bee dissenters from the ideology.  That is particularly true of secular ideologies, not least  because unlike religions they can be tested against reality.  Nonetheless,  there is a clear difference between ideologies which require people to behave in a way which acts  against the coherence and stability of their society and those which result in obnoxious consequences for those within the society deemed heretics  but do not strike at the natural unity that a homogeneous society displays.

An example of the former type of ideology  is political correctness,  which has at its centre the principle of  non-discrimination regardless of race, ethnicity,  gender or sexual inclination.  This principle leads to a policy of  large scale immigration of those who cannot or will not  assimilate, into very homogeneous societies such as England and the suppression of dissent  by the native population against the practice. This both neglects the wishes of the native population and invariably results  in a fractured (because immigrant ghettos always form)  and authoritarian society  as those responsible for the resulting multicultural/racial mess  desperately try to prevent the native population shouting treason and traitor and holding those responsible to account.

The latter type of ideology can have very different effects on a society  however damaging they may seem to be when witnessed at a particular point.   For example,  any theocracy will almost certainly have an innate tendency to enhance the natural tribal instincts of whatever society it holds in thrall.  It may damage individuals who are deemed heretics or unbelievers, but by its nature it will not allow vast numbers of  immigrants who do not share whatever is the faith to enter.  Not only that, by espousing a system of belief which is to be shared by all, those who do share the faith to the satisfaction of the theocrats will form a natural barrier against any attempt by those who are different even if they nominally share the faith because there will always be reasons to be found  for saying those not wanted for racial or ethnic reasons other than religion  are doctrinally unsound.  By retaining the integrity of the group, the ideology has, however damaging it may have been in other ways, has preserved the means for the society to survive and in time evolve to a less oppressive state.  The society made heterogeneous by creeds such as political correctness  is damaged fundamentally and may never recover.

How should religion be taught in schools?

I suggest this.  The English school curriculum is overflowing with subjects competing for space so it is pointless proposing a scheme of religious education which would take up much time.   An hour a week is probably what most pupils will get at present.   That might seem too little to encompass the curriculum I suggest,  but a great deal can be taught even in an hour a week over a period of twelve or thirteen years in school.  There is also a strong case for cancelling religious education as a separate subject and incorporating it into history teaching. That could extend the time available for religious teaching by one or two hours, although  sadly history teaching is badly neglected in English state schools at present.  However, there are serious moves afoot to increase its presence in schools  and develop a  decent English/British history curriculum. (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/9733464/History-is-not-all-Hitler-and-Henrys-say-MPs.html) .  The subject could also be worked into lessons dealing with politics to show the dangers of ideology.

The tenets of religion should be taught not as a fact or with the intention of either engendering religious belief  or of reinforcing an existing belief, but as propositions which can be examined  for their truth or falsity, as history  and, most importantly, as psychological and sociological  traits and events.

Obviously not all those things could be taught to all ages. The teaching of primary school children should concentrate on facts (I always give at least  two cheers for Mr Gradgrind) and Bible stories. As the child moves into secondary education they can begin to receive the intellectual, psychological and sociological ramifications of religion.

In England the emphasis should be overwhelmingly  on Christianity for the simple reasons that it is the religion which has been written into the English story  for over  fourteen centuries and  is the religion, in its various forms,  which has  written much of the  stories of the foreign lands  into whose historical clutch  England has longest been, namely, the countries and peoples of Europe.

Knowledge of other religions should be given briefly  to show the things they share both with Christianity and amongst themselves.   Islam  and Judaism should be given more prominence than the others because  the former is the one major no-Christian religion  to war directly with Europe and for a time to occupy European territory while the latter is a religion which has existed in Europe  for longer than Christianity.

The intent of the new religious curriculum is simple: it is not to make children into theologians,  but to give them a glimpse of the way people were in the religious past and how this affected their  lives, the wars they fought , how they thought and  the influence they have on English society today.

Elizabeth I’s speech at Tilbury before the defeat of the Armada

Delivered by Elizabeth to the land forces assembled at Tilbury
(Essex) to repel the anticipated invasion of the Spanish Armada, 1588.

My loving people, we have been persuaded by some that we are careful of our safety, to take heed how we commit ourselves to armed multitudes for fear of treachery; but, I do assure you, I do not desire to live to distrust my faithful and loving people.

Let tyrants fear, I have always so behaved myself, that under God I have placed my chiefest strength and safeguard in the loyal hearts and goodwill of my subjects; and, therefore, I am come amongst you as you see at this time, not for my recreation and disport, but being resolved, in the midst and heat of battle, to live or die amongst you all – to lay down for my God, and for my kingdoms, and for my people, my honour and my blood even in the dust.

I know I have the body of a weak, feeble woman; but I have the heart and stomach of a King – and of a King of England too, and think foul scorn that Parma or Spain, or any prince of Europe, should dare to invade the borders of my realm; to which, rather than any dishonour should grow by me, I myself will take up arms – I myself will be your general, judge, and rewarder of every one of your virtues in the field.

I know already, for your forwardness, you have deserved rewards and crowns, and, we do assure you, on the word of a prince, they shall be duly paid you. For the meantime, my Lieutenant-General Leicester shall be in my stead, than whom never prince commanded a more noble or worthy subject; not doubting but by your obedience to my General, by your concord in the camp, and your valour in the field, we shall shortly have a famous victory over these enemies of my God, of my kingdom and of my people.

http://www.luminarium.org/renlit/tilbury.htm



The gratuitous denigration of things English – the reign of Elizabeth I

Robert Henderson

Allan Massie, a Scot be it noted, decided to celebrate the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Elizabeth II  with a deprecating piece on her great predecessor and namesake, Elizabeth I designed to pour  cold water on the idea that hers was a glorious reign. (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/9307110/Lets-not-overlook-the-gory-details-of-Gloriana.html). He complains of the general treatment of Catholics, the use of torture on Catholic priests and those who harboured them,  nudges the reader to consider the likes of Francis Drake to be hovering on or going over edge of piracy and in best liberal bigot fashion invokes the ultimate condemnation of English adventurers of the time by dwelling on Sir John Hawkins’ involvement in the slave trade. In addition, Massie belittles the defeat of the Armada and Elizabethan military exploits on the continent, bemoans English involvement in Ireland and stands aghast as he considers the Earl of Essex’s execution of one in ten of his army after they failed to press hard enough in battle.  As for the great intellectual glory of the reign, the  sudden flowering of literature symbolised by Shakespeare,  this is dismissed as being a mere tailpiece to the Elizabethan age.

Massie, a professional historian so he has no excuse, has committed  the cardinal sin of historians by projecting the moral values and customs of his own time into the past. For a meaningful judgement Elizabeth’s reign has to be judged against the general behaviour of European powers of the time and that comparison , ironically, shows   Gloriana’s England’s   to be considerably nearer to what Massie would doubtless consider civilised values than any other state in Europe.

There were no terrible wars of religion as there were in France ; no Inquisition as there was in Spain.; no burning of those deemed heretics as there was under Mary Tudor.  Torture was used  in Elizabeth’s England, and in the reigns which immediately followed,  but sparingly and  only for cases which had national importance,  normally involving treason,  such as those involved in the Gunpowder Plot which took place only two years after Elizabeth’s death .  On the continent it was a commonplace of judicial process.  English law, by the standards of the time, was generally remarkably fair, not least because of the widespread use of juries. Those who gasp with horror at Essex’s execution of his troops should bear in mind that in the First World War several hundred British soldiers were shot for behaviour such as desertion and failing to go forward when ordered  over the top.

In Elizabeth’s reign the first national legislation anywhere in the world to provide help to the needy was passed, a legislative series which began in 1563 and culminated in  the Poor Law of 1601. This legislation put a duty on every parish to levy money to support the poor and made it a requirement to provide work for those needing to call on the subsistence provided by the Poor Law.   Educational opportunities, whilst far from universal, increased substantially.  Despite , by pre-industrial  standards,  very high inflation and the inevitable bad harvests, which included a  series of poor years in the late 1590s,  the population grew  substantially, possibly  by as much as a third from 3 to 4 million (http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/tudors/poverty_01.shtml). London expanded  to be the largest city in Europe by the end of the  Elizabeth’s reign with an estimated  population of  200,000 by 1600 (http://www.londononline.co.uk/factfile/historical/ ).

It was also in Elizabeth’s reign that Parliament began to take on aspects of modernity as opposition to Royal practices and policies were made unambiguously not on the sole ground  that the monarch was ill-advised, the traditional ground of complaint,  but simply because of what we would now call ideological differences between the growing Puritan group and  the  still newly minted Anglicanism.  This laid the foundations for the evolution of Parliament from being little more than a petitioning and tax raising assembly to what eventually became parliamentary government with the monarch at the will of Parliament not Parliament at the will of the monarch, an evolution which was to take several centuries more to be complete.  That Parliament was already seen as being central to the process of government by the end of Elizabeth’s reign is shown by the Gunpowder Plot of 1605. That the conspirators thought  blowing up Parliament was a necessary act  or even just the most effective way of reducing England to a state of headless misrule speaks volumes.

The importance of the English Parliament  under Elizabeth cannot be overstated because it is from the English Parliament that all modern assemblies take their inspiration.  There were many mediaeval assemblies in Europe,  but by the end of the  16th Century most of them had been  rendered obsolete through disuse and the few  meaningful assemblies  which remained had not moved nor ever did move to Parliamentary government.  It was only in the English Parliament that the step to placing executive power within Parliament and away from the monarch  occurred.  Had the English Parliament been suppressed  by, for example,  the conquest of England by Phillip II or the early Stuarts’ adherence to the doctrine of the Divine Right of kings,  it is difficult to see how representative government could have arisen because the seventeenth century was the century of absolute monarchs, or as near absolute as it was possible to get.  These were rulers who were utterly opposed  to the idea of sharing power. Consequently, if England had not  made the jump  to representative government  it is  most improbable any other country would have done so. Monarchies would have probably been overthrown in time,  but they would have been almost certainly  been replaced by dictatorships not elected governments.

Elizabeth’s  reign was also a time of great artistic and considerable intellectual achievement.  The development of the theatre and poetry may have come in the last 12 years or so of  her time, but  their legacy was seen in the 35 years running up to the Civil War.  Music, particularly in the form of the madrigal, flourished.  William Gilbert  examined magnetism in a manner which was essentially scientific in the modern sense,  arguably the first example of  such research.  Francis Bacon, the progenitor of the scientific method,   spent most of his life as an Elizabethan  having been born in 1561.

Catholics were rightly seen to be a fifth column. Most English Catholics did not actively seek to commit treason,  but they had varying degrees of sympathy with those who did, whether it was the hiding of priests or a secret wish to see a foreign Catholic monarch on the throne.  Not only that, but all English Catholics had by definition  an allegiance to a foreign power  (the papacy) which was hostile to England under a Protestant monarch.  Throughout  Elizabeth’s reign popes  funded  and generally encouraged, both morally and materially,  Catholics in England to subvert the laws against Roman Catholicism and for much of  the reign   the papacy was actively working for her overthrow.   No pope was more enthusiastic in this behaviour than Pius V who in 1570 published   the papal bull Regnans in Excelsis which  declared Elizabeth I a heretic  and  a false Queen and  released Elizabeth’s  subjects from their allegiance to her.

Those who plotted to reintroduce Catholicism to England were unambiguous traitors. They  did not simply seek to overthrow the existing monarch, but to entice  a foreign Catholic king  to invade and seize the throne with the primary purpose, in their eyes, of  enforcing the return of Catholicism.

Elizabeth’s reign took place in the context of  a world in which England had to guard against many enemies from the counter-revolutionary forces on the continent to the threat of Scotland attacking England when she was distracted by continental matters  or still Catholic  Ireland being used  as a sidedoor  for the invasion of England by continental powers .   The most forbidding threat came from  Spain, the greatest power in Europe at the time.  Phillip II’s marriage to Mary I gave Phillip a permanent interest in  England – he tried to marry Elizabeth and considered a plan to use his departure from England for Spain in 1559 following Mary’s death as cover  to land troops as he sailed down the Channel (http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/tudors/adams_armada_01.shtml )-  and , quite reasonably, placed in English minds  the  idea of a constant threat of Spanish invasion of England and its enforced reconversion to Catholicism – in 1584 Philip II of Spain  signed the Treaty of Joinville with the French Catholic League, with the aim of eradicating Protestantism.  Attacks on Spanish treasure ships can reasonably be seen not as simple piracy but as acts of war engendered by the  Spanish threat.  In addition, the claim of Spanish and Portuguese ownership of the New World  was really no more than a self-arrogated exclusion zone created by the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 and the  English attacks on Spanish ships and New World settlements were in response to this exclusion.  (It is important to understand that the scramble for overseas colonies by European powers was driven as much by the fear that  monarchies such as Spain and France would become too powerful in relation to the monarchies which did not have colonies as by a desire to simply conquer new territory or personal gain).

Massie’s dismissal of the defeat of the Armada as a victory for the elements rather than the Elizabethan navy is distinctly odd. He overlooks the fact that before the Spanish were sunk by the weather the English navy had prevented the Spanish  from clearing the Channel  of English warships in readiness for the embarkation of the Spanish invasion troops who were waiting at Dunkirk.  Massie also makes no mention of the raid on Cadiz in 1587  by Drake which probably delayed the Armada for a year giving the English time to prepare against the intended invasion.

As for English military continental adventures, there  were  failures, but the  most important contributions of England to the battle between the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation was her financing of Protestant powers  on the continent, most notably the United Provinces,   and the very fact of England remaining unconquered, the latter being of immense importance because the Protestant states  on the continent were weak and  fragmented and England was by far the most important Protestant power of  the time.  If England had fallen to Spain, it is doubtful whether Protestantism could have survived, if it had survived at all,   as more than a family  of persecuted sects.

The casting of John Hawkins as beyond the Pale  because he was a slave trader clankingly  misunderstands the mentality of the age.  Forms of legal unfreedom, ranging from full blown chattel slavery to indentured labour  (which could be for years particularly in the case of apprenticeships), were common throughout  Europe.  Moreover,  the poor who were not formally legally restrained in their freedom were under severe economic restraints to do what they were told and take what work they could get.  Slavery was not seen as an unmitigated , unforgivable evil.  It is also worth bearing in mind that  although serfdom was never formally abolished in England, by Elizabethan times it had practically vanished through  a  process of  conversion of the   land worked for themselves by serfs  to land held by copyhold tenancies.  The reverse took place in central and Eastern Europe where feudal burdens became more stringent and widespread  in the sixteenth century  and even France retained serfdom in some places, most notably, Burgundy and Franche-Comté, until the Revolution in 1789 and seigneurial privileges  which required  freemen holding land of the seigneur  to have a relationship which  in practice was not so different from that of the serf.

The great triumph of Elizabeth’s reign was that both she and Protestantism survived. This meant that  England was never again in thrall to a foreign power until Edward Heath and his fellow conspirators signed away Britain’s sovereignty by accepting  the Treaty of Rome in 1972 and entangling Britain within the coils of what is now the EU.  It was not that Protestantism was in itself superior to Catholicism, rather that in embracing Protestantism the question of divided loyalties between monarch and papacy was removed.

It is true that the idea of Gloriana was propaganda both during the reign itself  and in the Victorian period most notably in the hands of the historian J A Froude painted too sunlit a picture.   But the reign was of immense importance in creating the England that became writ so large on the history of the next four centuries.  If it had not been Elizabeth who came to the throne in 1558 the odds are that Phillip II would have conquered England. Had she not reigned for so long Protestantism would not have become the irrevocable religion of England.  If  she had not called  Parliament regularly it would not have laid the ground for eventual Parliamentary government and any other monarch would almost certainly have emasculated  the Commons.    The existence of behaviour which offends Mr Massie’s twenty-first liberal bigot sensitivities is irrelevant.

The utilitarian case for the monarchy

Robert Henderson

The utilitarian case for the monarchy is not about pageantry, deference  or the vulgar belief that it is worth keeping because it acts as a tourist magnet. It is not about the cost of the monarchy compared with a president. It is not about whether the individual members of the Royal family are worthy beings or if its very  existence is an insult to ideas of politically correct equality. The utilitarian case is purely political: our monarchy underpins Parliamentary government.

In resisting the abuse of the many by the few, Britain begins with the great advantages of a parliamentary system and an in practice non-executive head of state chosen by a means utterly outside political manipulation short of the outright  criminality of murder,  blackmail,  illicit threats and bribery, namely birth. These provide a massive barricade against a Prime Minister who would be a despot. He cannot act without the support of an elected parliamentary majority. His cabinet in practice must be overwhelmingly drawn from elected politicians. He may change his cabinet but he cannot do so without regard to a cabinet member’s status and popularity within the party on whose support he depends.

Most importantly, the prime minister (or any other politician) cannot become head of  state.  This is of central importance, because whether the powers of a president be executive or ceremonial, the mere   existence of the office of president provides an avenue for those who would subvert parliamentary control of the  executive. The example of De Gaulle in France
in the early years of the Fifth Republic demonstrates how easily a President’s powers may be extended by the overtly democratic means of a referendum against the wishes of a Parliament.  As things stand, a would be British dictator would have to do one of two things. The constitutionally legitimate path would  require him to first persuade Parliament to
adopt the idea  of an executive  presidential system and  then win the  backing of the electorate for a change to a presidential  system either through a referendum or an electoral mandate.  His illegitimate path would consist of either a referendum  put to the country against the wishes of Parliament or an outright coup backed by the military and police.

This is not to say that a prime minister equipped with a large majority cannot have a great deal of freedom  and personal power.  Both Thatcher and Blair achieved this. But however big their majority or great their personal authority they could not routinely make policy without some regard to the wishes of their ministers, backbenchers and the electorate. Whatever dark thoughts Thatcher may have had about  mass immigration or membership of the EU, she was in practice hamstrung in doing anything about it  by the opposition of powerful ministers  such as Nigel Lawson and Geoffrey Howe.  Tony Blair’s desire to severely reduce the welfare state was thwarted over many years by his Chancellor Gordon Brown.   To those leashes on their dictatorial desires can be added the fact that both Thatcher and Blair left office before they wanted to as a result of dissent amongst their parliamentary parties.   Had either been an elected president  operating outside parliament,  neither would have been removed before the end of their term of office.

A parliamentary system such as that of Britain has other restraints on abuses of power. First-past-the-post elections based on constituencies means that  MPs are not solely beholden to their party elite s as is the case with a party list system, and general elections, at least  since 1945, have normally produced a single party with a majority in the House of Commons.
This latter fact  means that the vast majority of modern British government have not been able to fail to honour their manifestos on the grounds that they  were part of a coalition.

If a demand for a president arose in  Britain  there would be an opportunity for those pressing for such a change to seek an executive president  with the executive removed from Parliament on the grounds that it was “more democratic” and provided a check on the power of the executive. . Anyone who thinks this is a good idea should look at the American experience where the powers of the president are constrained by a division of powers outlined in a written constitution administered by a supreme court. The President appoints his cabinet subject only to the agreement of the Senate, the President’s nominees being normally accepted.  Supreme Court judges are also nominated by serving presidents and vetted by the Senate.  These nominations   meet more Senate opposition, but most of those nominated are passed and if one is rejected, the President still gets to nominate an alternative.  That means a president  will broadly speaking get a judge into the court who is sympathetic to the president’s political views. As Supreme Court judges are elected for life,  a president
who is able to get even two new judges onto the court may affect its political bias for decades.

Even if a supposedly non-executive president was adopted with the executive remaining in Parliament,   the relationship between the prime minster  and head of state would be different. If the president was elected, there would be a second font of democratic authority regardless of the president’s powers. This would mean that there would be a constant temptation for a powerful politician to get themselves or a stooge elected to the presidency and then use their control  of Parliament to increase the president’s powers. If the president was simply appointed by politicians  a prime minster with a large majority could either take the presidency themselves and use his parliamentary control to increase his powers or place a stooge in as president, use Parliament to increase the presidential powers then control the stooge.

None of this is to pretend that the British system of government is perfect for the executive  has  found many ways of thwarting proper parliamentary oversight and control . The way it does this is fivefold (1) the entanglement  of  Britain in treaties, most devastatingly those related to the EU,  which remove sovereign power from not only Parliament but Britain; (2)  the increasing grip of party elites on the selection of candidates for Westminster seats, something of particular importance with the rise of the career politician who has never done
a job outside of politics; (3) an ever swelling use of secondary legislation, particularly statutory instruments,  which provide  much less opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny than primary legislation; (4)  the increasing appointment  of peers as ministers and non-politicians as “Tsars” for particular policy areas and   (5) the use of the Royal Prerogative by prime ministers.

There are ready cures for these ills. Treaties could be repudiated to regain sovereignty; the power of selection of Parliamentary candidates invested  solely  in local constituency parties would greatly reduce the power of  party elites;  a requirement that a Parliamentary candidate should have ten years  work experience unconnected with politics before being able to stand for Parliament would end the career politician; withdrawal from the EU would greatly reduce the amount of secondary legislation and increased time to scrutinise what was left and the use of peers and non-politicians banned.

That leaves the Royal Prerogative which represents  a particularly danger to democratic control because the powers exercisable under it are large. This is because of the long, organic
development of the relationship between Parliament and the Crown, the powers and rights of the Crown are little circumscribed by law, although most, and all the important ones, are now invested in practice in the office of PM. The dissolution or proroguing of Parliament and the calling of elections are by the prerogative. The PM and his ministers are appointed by
the Crown.  In principle, the monarch could appoint a Government in which none of its members sat in Parliament. No Bill can become a law without the monarch’s signature. Treaties and the making of war and peace can and are made without the assent of Parliament. All foreign relations are in principle within the monarch’s remit.  Justice is the monarch’s. The Monarch can do no wrong. Many senior state appointments such as appointments to the higher judiciary and bishoprics are one by the prerogative.  The monarch is head of the armed forces. There is prerogative power which allows the Crown to expropriate or requisition private property (with proper compensation) in time of war or apprehension of war. The Crown has limited powers of legislation under the prerogative, principally as respects the civil service and UK dependent territories.  This legislation is made by  Orders in Council, ordinance, letters patent and royal warrant. A ragbag of other rights such as treasure trove  and bona vacantia (the reversion to the Crown of property where there is no inheritor) and arcane rights such as the monarch’s right to (most) swans also exists.

The simplest thing would be  to cancel all prerogative rights which have a serious political dimension. This would reduce greatly the power of the PM and consequently  pass power to Parliament.  Such powers as are left to the monarch  should be laid down clearly in law. That would do a great deal to increase the power of Parliament and the ordinary member.
However,  more could be done without producing a situation which would leave a Parliament with an executive unable to act.  I would ban the whipping of MPs,  restrict the size of government to reduce the government “payroll vote” ( modern governments draw in more than 100 MPs) and make  the justice system truly independent by removing the political officers – Lord Chancellor, Attorney-General and Solicitor-General  – from the process of justice.

The banning of whips would not mean a government with a working  majority was constantly defeated because most party members will vote for their party programme. Governments would have to get used to accepting the odd defeat on even important policies as a fact of life not a cause to call a motion of confidence.  The reduction of the “payroll vote” would lead
to more independent minded backbenchers who would see  being a backbencher as an honourable and worthwhile end it itself.  The removal of the politicians from the process of justice is necessary to observe natural justice.

Two other things would be s desirable as a check on the executive: a written constitution designed not to promote a political agenda but to protect democratic control and prevent governments from undertaking anti-democratic policies or reckless behaviour which self-evidently will be damaging to the country.  If there is a Supreme Court to administer it, judges should be selected for a fixed period of five years and chosen by a free vote of the Commons. Alternatively, the administration could be done by a reformed second chamber (see below).

The second thing is electoral reform.  To address the problem of parties with even  less than 40% of the popular vote ending up with large majorities,  for the Commons  I would suggest double member constituencies  with each elector having a single vote. The two candidates  receiving the most votes in each constituency  would be  elected. This would probably  both reduce the size of majorities whilst giving any elector a choice of two MPs to go to rather than one.

As for the Lords, if you want a house which will not engage in a democratic mandate war with the Commons or simply replicate the party dominance of the Commons, I suggest selecting a house by lot from all those who put themselves forward to serve a single term of ten years, sufficient time for them to become proficient as a revising chamber.

The right of self-defence in England

Robert Henderson

The Current State of Things

If there is such a thing as a natural right it is surely the right to self-defence, for any organism will defend itself when attacked. To deny a man the right to defend himself when attacked would be literally inhuman and, of course, in England we have that right in law. We may defend ourselves even to the extent of killing another if it is to save ourselves or another who is threatened. The problem is that our law has become so hemmed about by conditions and restrictions, that most people are both confused about what is permitted in practice and fearful of the consequences of using force in their defence. This is scarcely surprising when cases where burglars have been killed, such as that of Tony Martin, have resulted in the victim of burglary going to prison, while lesser cases which have resulted in non-fatal struggles all too frequently seem to result in the person who was attacked being punished.

At the same time as this confusion over the law exists, the British state is growing ever more paranoid about the private citizen owning and carrying weapons. Guns are so severely restricted that few people will go to the trouble of applying for a licence for anything other than a shotgun and there is a law against carrying a knife of any sort, even a pocket knife, with a blade of more than 3 inches in a public place without good cause, e.g. for the purposes of work.

The third piece in the jigsaw of our uncertainty is the increasing failure of the police to provide protection to the private citizen, especially in country districts. This was the prime cause of Tony Martin’s action in illegally arming himself with a pump action shotgun to defend himself in his remote farmhouse. (Martin knew from past experience that he regularly was subject to intruders which the police could not or would not do anything to prevent.)

The failure of the police adequately to protect people breaches the implicit contract between the state and the individual in relation to personal safety: the individual gives up his right absolutely to control his personal security on the understanding that the state will provide both physical security and meaningful redress for injuries which the individual may suffer from others. Small wonder that people take things into their own hands on occasion. The police failure to protect also makes the need for weapons more necessary to the individual for self-defence .

The Right to Self. Defence in English Law

The law on reasonable force as it is presently interpreted goes something like this: if you are attacked with a knife you may defend yourself with a knife: if you are attacked with bare fists you may defend yourself likewise. Do more in either instance and you will be in danger of being charged with an offence against the person, anything from common assault to murder. Pedantic proportionality is all. If you carry on assaulting your assailant after he is disabled, you will most likely face charges. If you have the opportunity to run away but do not, that may count against you in any assessment of whether you should be prosecuted. All this is demonstrably absurd. It assumes that people under attack can reasonably be expected to make judgements in the heat of the moment which in reality require calm consideration.

What is Reasonable Force?

Consider a few of the variables in assessing what is ‘reasonable force’. Women, the disabled, children, and older men cannot reasonably be expected to defend themselves from a simple physical assault from a fit, strong assailant. Other things being equal, a small man cannot be expected to fight a large man; an older man a younger man, a fit man an unfit man. But, of course, other things  are often not equal. Many men who are physically capable of fighting are absolutely hopeless at it. I have known a man of six and a half feet allow himself to be beaten by a man a foot smaller. Fighting is a matter of  heart above all else.

But it is also a matter of practice. Most men throwing a punch at someone’s face would be more likely to harm their fists than their opponent because they have never been taught to punch correctly. (For those without any experience of fighting, I would recommend the knee in the groin or a good old-fashioned head butt.) More importantly , those who are not used to fighting (and middle-class men generally fall into this category) are not psychologically prepared for a fight. This will mean one of two things: the person either capitulates utterly or goes into a berserk rage and keeps on damaging their opponent until the rage passes.

To these disparities of size, sex, age, and mental and physical competence, we may add others. Someone who is assaulted does not know whether an assailant is going to restrict themselves to simple assault without a weapon. They may be armed for all the victim knows. Nor need this be obvious. Take a  well-publicised case, that of Kenneth Noye who was convicted of murder in a road-rage incident. Noye carried a knife when he got out his car to confront his victim, but he only produced and used the knife when he began to get the worse of things as the two fought. (Noye is also a good example of the effect of age on the ability to fight. He was 48 at the time of the murder. His victim was in his twenties. Noye was a career criminal with a reputation as hard man. Yet until he produced a knife, he got the worst of a fight he might reasonably have expected to win. Age had caught up with him.)

It is also true that even if an assailant does not have a weapon, the victim cannot know how far the assailant is likely to go. Will he restrict himself to punching? Or is the assailant the sort to put the boot in when someone is on the floor? No one can know. Perhaps even the assailant does not know.

The obviously armed assailant presents a particular problem in judging what constitutes proportionality of response. If someone comes at you with a knife, is it in order to use a gun? If the assailant has a club, may one use a knife? The law as it stands gives no clear guidance. It is all “every case has to be judged on its merits”.

Then there is the question of what happens should you disable your opponent. Suppose that a small man fells a much larger man with a lucky blow of, shall we say, a candlestick. The smaller man is then left with the problem of what to do next. If he allows the more powerful man to recover, the smaller man will in all probability end up being badly hurt. The smaller man might be able to avoid that fate simply by running away (this is what the law would want you to do), yet he may be unable to reasonably do this even if he wishes to. That would be the case if the temporarily disabled man was a burglar and the smaller man’s wife and children were in the house where the fight took place. Let us further assume that there is no phone and the house is isolated, as was the case with Tony Martin. In such circumstances, it could be argued with some force that it was reasonable deliberately to disable the burglar by a further assault while he was unconscious to prevent the chance of violence from the burglar when he recovered consciousness.

Behind all these circumstantial problems stand the very human emotions of panic and rage. When one is attacked, the only desire is to ensure one’s safety. Adrenaline flows and to say that any human being is in control of themselves in such circumstances is patent nonsense. The law does in practice take into account panic, but again it is all very hit-and-miss. Rage on the other hand is no excuse for what is judged a disproportionate assault.

The law as it presently stands effectively ignores human nature. It says that someone who is attacked must exercise truly marvellous self-control. In defending himself, the victim must not lose his temper and carry on attacking the attacker after the attacker has been disabled. This is utterly unrealistic. Someone in a blind rage or panic is manifestly not in control of their actions. There are good evolutionary reasons for that. When someone is responding to an attack, an uncontrolled response is the best way of responding to protect oneself. The evolutionary bottom line is: dead attacker equals safety.

What is a Reasonable Law of Self-defence?

What then is a reasonable law of self-defence? The great bugbear at present is proportionality of response. In drafting a new law, I would start from the premise that an attacker forfeits his right to the protection of the law, that he literally takes his life into his hands.

If the attacker is seriously wounded or even killed, that should be seen simply as a reasonable consequence of the attack. The test of ‘reasonable force’ would become defunct. All that would have to be investigated after an assault was whether there was evidence that suggested that the claimed attacker was in fact not the attacker.

Provided such evidence did not exist, the person assaulted would have no case to answer. I would also remove from an attacker who suffers injury any opportunity to take civil action against his victim.

The great danger with such a law is that murder could take place under the guise of self-defence. I would make two responses to that. Firstly, murder is very rare in Britain: approximately 800 murders take place in England and Wales each year. The majority are ’domestics’, that is,  the murder of a sexual partner. Murder for purely criminal reasons, for example,  robbery, is rare.

Murder has also been rare historically. The Canadian criminologist Elliott Leyton published a study of murder in England a few years ago entitled Men of Blood. He found that throughout history murder in England had been abnormally low, so low as to be inexplicable except in terms of the social norms of the society. In other words, there are good sociological reasons to believe that few murders would take place under such an amended law.

My second point is that a claim of self-defence would still have to conform to the facts of the death. It would be no use, for example, claiming that a fight had taken place at on the morning of May the 3rd,  if the forensic evidence dearly showed that the body had been dead before that time.

I would introduce one further criterion to determine whether self-defence was proved, namely was the threat offered by the assailant credible. For example, most people have encountered the mad old lady who suddenly for no apparent reason sets about people in the street with a newspaper or some other equally inoffensive instrument. Clearly, such a person would not present a credible threat to anyone other than another old lady or a young child. It would be ridiculous for a fit, younger adult to be able to claim self-defence against such an assailant. If on the other hand that same old lady entered someone’s house uninvited in the middle of the night and was struck down and killed by the householder in the dark under the apprehension that she was a burglar, that would be self-defence.

A law on the lines that I have suggested would not be perfect. There would still be problems about establishing who was the assailant and who the victim. But that problem already exists under the present law. What such a law would definitely do is prevent the prosecution of householders such as Tony Martin who surprise those within their homes.

My proposal would also accommodate perhaps the most contentious part of self-defence, namely, pre-emptive action. An assault that results in physical action against someone is clear-cut. But the law does not say that to commit assault physical violence has to be used. A person may believe themselves to be in imminent danger of being assaulted someone may be making threatening statements or carrying a weapon or coming rapidly towards someone else. In such circumstances, the law gives the person who fears he or she is about to be assaulted the right to defend themselves before they are assaulted However, a person who engaged in such behaviour as things presently stand would have the greatest difficulty in sustaining such a claim if reliable witnesses were not present at the time. And if such witnesses were present, a prosecution might well result on the grounds that the presence of witnesses made an assault unlikely or one that could have been resisted. It is a ticklish problem to say the least. But one could use one of the main criteria for determining whether a physical assault had taken place to decide whether an assault was likely to take place, namely the credibility of the witnesses.

In short, all my law would require someone to do would be to show that they had been assaulted by an assailant in circumstances where a credible threat existed. If that was proved, no prosecution would take place. There might be some rough justice in that, but less than there is at the moment. Moreover, what rough justice there was would most probably be at the expense of the wrongdoer rather than the law-abiding citizen.

The Right to Own and Carry Weapons

The right to self-defence is intimately connected with the right to own and carry weapons. If a man or woman cannot keep a weapon, in many circumstances he or she will be effectively defenceless. The problem in Britain is that the possession of any weapon by the private individual is being made increasingly difficult, ostensibly on the grounds of public safety, but in reality from of a desire by those with political power to control the general population. This elite behaviour is merely conforming to the historical norm.

The desire to restrict the possession of weapons has always come from those who wished not only to monopolise power but to do so on their own terms. When the crossbow was invented, the medieval nobility attempted to ban it because it reduced the effectiveness of the armoured and mounted knight. Failing in that, they attempted to restrict, with some success, its ownership to people they could control. The Samurai in Japan enforced ruthlessly their rule that only Samurai should carry swords. When the demobbed conscripts of British Army returned to Britain after the First World War, the British government passed the first serious laws regulating gun ownership not because they feared that the British would begin to murder one another in great numbers but because they feared Red revolution.

As things stand in Britain, legal gun ownership has become so onerous, that many long-time licence holders have given up. The effort in obtaining a licence and in maintaining it is considerable, because of both the Draconian storage conditions required by the police and their eagerness to engineer the revocation and denial of licences. Even if you legally own a gun, woe betide you if you are spotted openly carrying it in a public place. Assuming you are not gunned down by over-excited policemen, you will not merely have your licence revoked but probably end up in court as well.

As for other weapons, if the police want to pick you up for possessing an offensive weapon there is a fair chance they can do so even if you do not mean to carry one. Forget about knives or coshes, which are complete no, nos, you are conceivably committing an offence if you have an aerosol of hairspray about your person or a hammer, for the 1953 Prevention of Crime Act creates a general offence of possessing an offensive weapon in a public place,  an offensive weapon being anything from a gun to a piece of wood or stone or a kitchen knife which is made, adapted or intended to cause physical injury to a person.

Is There an Historical Basis for Private Weapon Ownership in England?

This is an impossible question to answer categorically. It is undeniably true that weapons were held widely by private individuals. Feudal military obligation was in fact built on the private provision not merely of men but of arms and equipment. In late medieval times, statutes were enacted to encourage longbow practice. The Spanish Armada that attempted to invade England in 1588 was repulsed by a mixed English fleet of private and Royal ships.

Yet although weapons were commonly held by private individuals for many centuries, the right of the individual to hold weapons, especially guns, was far from being absolute or accepted by authority. The Bill of Rights passed after William of Orange came to the throne in 1689 stated:

“By causing several good subjects, being Protestants, to be disarmed, at the same time when papists were both armed and employed, contrary to law.” (Clause 6 of the Bill of Rights 1690.)

“That the subjects which are Protestants, may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions , and as allowed by law.” (Clause 7 of the Bill of Rights 1690.)

There are four points to note. First, Catholics were not thought to have the right to have arms. Second, the clear implication is that Protestants were to be armed to defend themselves against Catholics. Third, the very fact that such a clause was included means that the right to weapons was not so much part of English life that it was taken for granted. Fourth, it uses the phrase “suitable to their conditions”. This must mean that the right to weapons was limited and not limited merely in the sense that a private individual might not have a cannon but might have a musket.

It is also illuminating that when the US Bill of Rights was created a century later it ran:

A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” (American Constitution Second Amendment.)

The American Bill of Rights was based firmly on English tradition, the founding fathers of the USA considering themselves to be preserving English liberty when it had fallen into corruption in England. Yet they did not say that a man has the right to bear and keep arms full stop. They say he has it because of the need to maintain a militia.

Nonetheless, the 1690 Bill of Rights does grant right to bear arms of some sort. Leaving aside the question of what arms are permitted, does the Bill of Rights have any force today? The problem for those who would say it has is that the Bill of Rights is simply an Act of Parliament. It has no special constitutional status, any more than does any other British law with constitutional implications. As such, it is difficult to see how it cannot have been amended by the subsequent passing of laws restricting the ownership of weapons. It is true that none of those laws specifically nullifies the Bill of Rights, but it is a long established practice in English law that the passing of a new law which contradicts a previous law is treated a automatically nullifying the earlier law. Whether this practice is entirely sound in law is perhaps debatable, but I cannot imagine the Lords overturning the de facto principle retrospectively simply because of the immense implications of doing so if the illegitimacy of the practice was allowed (all past laws not explicitly repealed by later Act would have to be considered ‘live’ where the) clashed with later Acts. The result would be legal chaos. The best that could be reasonably expected from Government is an Act making an future legislation require the specific repeal of Acts or clauses where a fresh Act contradicts the original Act.

It is true that the judgement in the recent so called ‘Metric Martyrs’ (2001/2) case appeared to create two levels of law and sanctioned the idea that later ‘ordinary’ Acts do not implicitly repeal through simple contradiction, the earlier, superior constitutional’ Acts. However, I believe that the judgement was a literal absurdity. As stated previously, in Britain there is no such thing as a constitutional Act in the sense that it has any superior status to any other Act. What we have are Act that deal with constitutional matters. Consequently, I cannot see that judgement has any basis in law or customary British practice.

It is also argued by some people that a Common Law right to bear and own weapons exists because in the past men were permitted to own and bear arms and a Common Law right developed accordingly. Whether this is true or not is irrelevant. A Common Law right can be removed by statute and indeed the vast majority of our law today is Statute law. Our present gun laws are all statute based.

The position with regard to history is dearly confused and contradictory. Resting a claim for a right to bear arms on it is pointless because those who resist such a thing will simply point out the lack of certain evidence and the evidence that contradicts the idea. Much better to rest the argument on the twin reasons of self-defence and the means to resist an intolerant and oppressive state should one arise.

What the Position Should be in a Free Society

In my perfect world, a man would be able to purchase a gun and ammunition in England as easily as he might buy a pound of potatoes. Similarly, a man should be able to carry any other weapon or implement he chooses. He should have the right to keep and carry weapons not merely for self-defence, but because otherwise arms are left in the hands of governments and criminals and denied to the ordinarily law-abiding citizen. Not only should a man be able to own a gun (or any other weapon) he should be able to do so without accounting for it to the police.

What, you say, anyone able to own a gun and no licences to boot? Would not that result in Britain being turned into the Wild West? The answer is no. Consider this, at present there are plenty of guns in private hands in Britain, whether held illegally or legally, yet gun crime remains pretty rare: less than 100 gun murders in 2001.

Even if all guns were made illegal, there would still be a large and by all accounts increasing number of illegally held guns in private hands. Now comes the clincher. The vast majority of gun crime is committed with illegally held guns. In other words the present wearisome system of licensing and the penal conditions of security under which guns must be stored on private premises have next to no effect on solving gun crime.

If guns were allowed to everyone without restriction, the situation would be essentially the same as it is today. Gun crime would be committed with weapons that were unregistered. But would not more guns mean more gun crime? ‘That presumes there would be a massive increase in gun ownership. This is far from being certain. Before serious legal restrictions on gun ownership in Britain were enacted, gun ownership was not the norm. Nor does the ownership of a gun mean the owner will habitually carry it any more than the near universal ownership of lethal knives has meant that most people carry such knives. It is also worth reflecting on the fact that even criminals in Britain rarely use guns, despite their widespread availability in our larger cities. If criminals do not routinely use them to kill and wound , why should we believe the law-abiding citizen will?

Generally, it does not matter if people are not policed because Man, being a social animal, will not normally act in a fatally harmful way to others. Moreover, in a very law abiding society such as ours, there is less chance of seriously socially disruptive behaviour than in most, perhaps all, other societies.

As mentioned previously, the English have a remarkably low murder rate generally (about 800 a year in a population of 60 million) and always have done. The paucity of English murder is not the result of a careful control of weapons through the ages, especially guns, for as mentioned above for much of our history weapons were available. The only rational explanation for it is that there is something in the English character and society, that has made extreme personal violence rare. If any people can be trusted to own weapons the English can.

That guns do not equal mass homicide can also be seen from the example of Canada where seven million guns are owned legally in a population of 30 million. They have a higher rate of gun killing than England, but it is still very low. Switzerland with its citizen army with all males of military age having a gun at home is another example of widespread ownership with a low gun crime rate.

 What weapons should people be allowed?

Should private individuals be allowed to have anything from a revolver to nuclear bombs (as Michael Moore suggested in Bowling for Columbine)? Well, there is a compromise that is self-policing. The individual should have any weapon that the state is willing to use against the individual.

If you want a lethal weapon you can always get one quite legitimately because there are so many things which will do. The Government bans commando style knives? No problem, you just go to your local hardware store and buy a decent 6 inch blade cook’s knife. Or why not make yourself an old-fashioned cheese cutter out of cheese wire with a couple of pieces of wood to act as grips and Bob’s your uncle once you have the wire wound around someone’s neck. The state trying to outlaw lethal weapons is like the state trying to outlaw pornography in the age of the internet.

Published in THE INDIVIDUAL FEBRUARY 2003

 

The English white working-class and the British elite – From the salt of the earth to the scum of the earth

Robert Henderson

1. How it used to be 

Thirty years ago the Labour Party primary client base was the white working-class, while the Tories still had remnants of the heightened sense of social responsibility towards the poor created by two world wars. Fast forward to 2006 and the white working-class are treated by the entire British political elite as a dangerous, almost subhuman species.

The mixture of contempt, fear and hatred which the white working-class now draws from the political class is echoed by the elite generally, indeed by not just the elite but the middleclass as a whole. Where once the white working-class were next to uninsultable publicly, sneering references to “chavs” and “chav culture” are now commonplace in the mainstream media where they pass with barely a critical public word, while ethnic minorities seemingly have licence to publicly  insult the white working-class with impunity, vide the Coronation Street episode in January 2006 where a male Asian character accused his sister of behaving like “poor white trash”.

What caused this immense change in the status of the white  working-class? There were three direct primary engines of change. The first was the success of Thatcher and her ideology, the second a critical point was reached in post war mass immigration, the third Britain’s membership of the EU and other restrictive treaties which tainted her sovereignty.

2. Globalism and laissez faire economics

When Margaret Thatcher became Tory Leader in 1975 the neo-paternalist stance the party had adopted since the smashing Labour victory of 1945 was changed to one of laissez faire non-interventionism, with its an inherent disdain for public provision and service. Thatcher threw away the protectionism which had sustained the white working-class, allowed much of British industry, especially heavy industry, to go to the wall, and privatised the nationalised industries. Unemployment, already at a post-war high at the end of the Callaghan government, rose dramatically to around 3 million. The unions were then weak enough to successfully attack with severe legal restraints on strikes and a ban on secondary picketing.

Unemployment has remained high since the early 1980s – the current official employment figures are bad enough taken at face value (around 2.7m by the international Labour survey method) – but in reality it is probably considerably higher – there are 2-3 million on long term sick benefit now compared with around 600,000 in the early 1980s  ago. Common-sense says the country cannot in 2012 have four or five times the number of seriously incapacitated people it had 30-odd  years ago. This high unemployment has kept the white  working-class largely quiescent and the unions emasculated.

Thatcher also threw away the post-war consensus that the white working-class was admirable, or at least deserving of special consideration because of their disadvantaged social circumstances. Thatcherite Tories were only interested in the working-class insofar as its members were willing to buy into the narrow aspirational template which Thatcher promoted. If you were working-class and wanted to buy your council flat and were happy to gobble up the shares of privatised national industries, the Tories approved of you; if you wanted to maintain traditional working-class employments and communities, you were a soldier in the ranks of the enemy.

Labour did not immediately cast off the white working-class as clients. That took 18 years of opposition. Through four election defeats Labour gradually jettisoned all that they stood for in their cynical quest for a way back to power. The end result was a supposedly Labour Government headed by Blair which became, quite bizarrely, even more fanatically committed to “free markets” and “free trade” than the Tories.

3. Immigration reaching a critical level

By 1979 immigration had swollen the population of blacks and Asians in Britain to a point where their numbers were significant enough to pose a serious threat to British society if racial conflict got out of hand.

Until the end of the 1970s the official line on immigrants from all the mainstream parties was they must assimilate. Towards the end of the decade it was obvious to even the most fervent advocate of integration that assimilation was not happening. Rather, large populations of various ethnicities were stubbornly continuing to form ghettoes in the major British towns and cities and were attempting to lives which as far as possible replicated those of their ancestral countries.

To avoid having to admit what a disaster immigration had been, the British liberal left adopted an ideology to fit the facts of what was happening. That ideology was multiculturalism, a creed which rested on the fantasy that a coherent society could be produced by allowing every ethnic group in Britain to retain its separate identity. Indeed, the multiculturalists did more than say we should allow such a development, they positively encouraged ethnic minorities to remain separate. The kindest interpretation of their behaviour is that these were people enthusiastically pouring paraffin onto a fire in an attempt to put it out.

But the multiculturalists were faced by a most awkward fact. The white working-class was and always had been resolutely opposed to mass post-war immigration. Not only that but they were willing to say so publicly – the dockers had marched with Enoch Powell. Therefore, the liberal left had to do two things to prevent the white working-class from expressing their discontent both with the immigration which had occurred and with the new policy of multiculturalism , in which the native British culture was to have no privileged place but was to be merely one amongst many competing cultures. Worse, in practice the  native culture (or cultures if you prefer) was not even to be  allowed to compete because to do so would be to give the native population a public voice and a focus for their discontent.

The Labour Party at the parliamentary level was generally willing to espouse the new ideology uncritically because it fitted with their internationalist rhetoric. It also helped that the immigrants overwhelmingly voted Labour and were neatly consolidated in ghettos in the larger towns and cities where their votes were likely to elect Labour candidates more often than not.

Of course there was the seemingly ticklish problem for the multiculturalists of Labour being out of power for 18 years. In practice it did not matter, for it was not only the overt liberal left who embraced multiculturalism. Whatever their rhetoric, in practice,

the Tories climbed on the multiculturalist bandwagon quickly enough. Thatcher had spoken not long before being elected in 1979 of Britain being “swamped” by immigrants. But once in office she did nothing and the position continued to worsen, not least because she signed the Single European Act in 1985 which granted any person legally resident in another EU state the right to work in Britain. And of course throughout the 18 years of Tory office, people with the “right” multiculturalist views controlled the media, academia and increasingly the civil service. They were always on hand, both behind the scenes and publicly, to ensure the Tory Government did not actually do anything to disturb the multiculturalist programme.

Worse was to follow. In opposition the Tories followed the course of the Labour Party. Three election defeats in a row persuaded them elect as leader David Cameron, a man who adopted the same strategy for the Tories as Blair had pursued when he dumped everything Labour stood for. Cameron quickly got rid of everything which was considered “Old Tory” . This included wholeheartedly embracing multiculturalism. The electoral circle on immigration was formally closed. There is no major party to vote for if you do not want further mass immigration.

The silencing of the white working-class voice on immigration was achieved by a number of means over the past quarter century. Most potent was the mixture of legal threats such as the various Race Relations Acts and associated legislation such as the Public Order Act of 1986 and  the religious exclusion of anti-immigration views from the mainstream media. British culture was gradually relegated to a less prominent place in schools. Pupils were taught, if they were taught anything about the past, of white wickedness. The Atlantic slave trade was represented as the greatest crime of history, the British Empire nothing more than a cruel invasion and subjugation of defenceless peoples. Any sign of publicly expressed native English pride was jumped on from everyone from politicians to teachers and denounced as xenophobia at best and racism as worst.

It did not take long for anyone who was not a supporter of multiculturalism to be beyond the liberal elite Pale. By 2006 multiculturalism had been formally embedded into public life through a mixture of ideological sharing amongst the elite and their auxiliaries and the law, most notably in recent years by the Race Relations (Amendment Act) of 2000 which effectively places an obligation on all employers who receive public funding to demonstrate that they are not being discriminatory.

The contemptuous mentality of those who currently permit and advocate mass immigration to Britain is epitomised by a speech in 2006 to business leaders by the Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King:

“If the increased demand for labour generates its own supply in the form of migrant labour then the link between demand and prices is broken. Indeed, in an economy that can call on unlimited supplies of migrant labour, the concept of output gap becomes meaningless….The UK is not in that extreme position, but the inflow of migrant labour, especially in the past year or so from Eastern Europe, has probably lead to diminution of inflationary pressure in the labour market,relative to previous experience.

“The Home Office estimates that around 120,000 workers entered the UK from the new member countries of the European Union between March 2004 and March 2005. Without this influx to fill the skills gap in a tight labour market, it is likely earnings would have risen at a faster rate, putting pressure on employers, and, ultimately, inflation”.’ Daily Telegraph 14 6 2006.

There you have the elite view of the day: human beings are to be treated purely as factor of production along with land and capital. No greater contempt for the masses, including the white working-class, can be held.

4. The EU and other treaties

Whatever their public words, both the Tory and Labour parties were generally nationalist in their behaviour until well after the second world war. Traditional Tories were nationalists by conviction, while even the Labour left were in practice protective of the nation state because they strongly opposed the importation of cheap goods and cheap labour. British membership of the EU (then the EEC) from 1973 onwards changed the rules of the game for both parties.

The Treaty of Rome made Britain generally subordinate to a foreign authority. It was not like a normal treaty such as that of NATO which is formed simply for a particular limited purpose and which can be ended or withdrawn from cleanly. The Treaty of Rome was a full blown political project with the specific aim of creating a supranational political entity. Even when Britain joined, the EU’s powers to interfere with British political decisions were substantial, although nothing like as extensive as they are in 2012. It simply was not possible to be a wholehearted nationalist any more. That undermined traditional Toryism and paved the way for Thatcherism, which was predicated on the individual rather than the community.

For the Labour Party learning to love the EU took a long time. Their 1983 manifesto advocated withdrawing because the EU was viewed as a capitalist club. But as the Party painfully lurched towards accepting the globalist market-led creed, there came the realisation on the left that both globalism generally and membership of the EU were wonderful promoters of internationalism. They did not deliver the internationalism which the left had traditionally sought, all brotherly love and material sharing, but they accomplished a central part of the internationalist dream, the destruction of nations. This realisation, together with the fear they would never hold power again drove Labour away from their practical nationalism.

As the years passed the entire political class also discovered general benefits from globalism and EU membership. Being in international clubs such as the EU and the WTO effectively destroyed democratic accountability. Any policy relevant to a treaty could be pushed through with the excuse that Britain was legally bound by treaty to do this. Membership of the EU in particular ensured that the excuse could be used over vast swathes of policy. This loss of democratic accountability removed the last vestiges of white working-class power because there was no mainstream Party with a chance of forming a government to speak or act for them. The white working-class might as well have stopped voting then for all the good it now did them.

5.Devolution and demonising the English

Up to 1997 the white working-class in the UK as a whole suffered much the same decline in prestige and strength. Blair’s victory in that year altered matters fundamentally. Primarily for the self-serving political reason that Labour normally depends heavily on Scots and Welsh MPs to achieve a working majority in the Commons, the Party adopted a policy of devolution for Scotland and Wales. (Northern Ireland was also brought into the devolution mix but for other reasons). It was one of the first major pieces of NuLabour manifesto-promised legislation to be enacted.

Devolution created a ticklish problem. How could it be that England, where more than 80% of the population of the UK resided and where even more than 80% of the UK’s GDP was generated, should have no national representation? Why did England not deserve its own political voice if Wales and Scotland and even tiny Northern Ireland did? Because there was no reasonable answer to that question Labour (and the liberal left generally) invented unreasonable ones: England was too big, there was no such thing as Englishness, the English had no desire for a parliament, such a parliament would only mean more politicians and expense and, most tellingly, the English could not be trusted with nationalism, a claim best translated as “The ruling liberal elite are determined at all costs to prevent the English having a voice because if they do they will look after their own interests which are currently being outrageously neglected”.

When I say ruling liberal elite I am of course including the entire political elite. A prime example of the cross-party agreement on the “dangers” of English nationalism came in a BBC Radio 4 programme Brits which went out on 10 January 2000. The then Home Secretary Jack Straw and the Tory leader of the moment William Hague appeared. This is what they said:

Straw: “[the English] are potentially very aggressive, very violent [and had in the past] used their propensity for violence to subjugate Ireland, Wales and Scotland”.

Hague:” English nationalism is the most dangerous form of nationalism that can arise in the United Kingdom, because England is four-fifths of the population of the UK…Once part of a united country or kingdom that is so predominant in size becomes nationalistic, then really the whole thing is under threat…”

The unresolved question of English devolution within an otherwise devolved UK led to a shift by politicians from the denigration of the white working-class generally to denigration of the English in general and the English white working-class in particular, the latter being commonly portrayed by politicians and the media as brutish people with the unspoken subtext “they cannot be trusted with power”. As most of the British white working-class are English, the white working-class were further marginalised.

Devolution also had a direct material effect on England and in particular the English poor. The amount spent per head on public services has for a long time grossly disadvantaged the English, viz:

According to official figures from the Treasury, 2010/11 projected average UK government spending per person was £10,212 in Scotland, compared to just £8,588 in England. Spending was also higher in Wales (£9,829) and Northern Ireland (£10,706). (http://tinyurl.com/cxmgwly)

The rate of increase of the per capita payments accelerated after devolution and consequently weakened public provision in England compared with the rest of the UK . That diminution of provision has struck most profoundly at the English white working-class.

6.The ethnic minority problem

Where do ethnic minorities stand in a devolved UK? German-born Labour MP Gisela Stuart writing in online magazine openDemocracy.net in December  005 described the problem, whilst also gaily insulting the English: “It  as only been in the last five years or so that I have heard people in my constituency telling me ‘I am not British – I am English’. That worries me.

“British identity is based on and anchored in its political and legal institutions and this enables it to take in new entrants more easily than it would be if being a member of a nation were to be defined by blood.

“But a democratic polity will only work if citizens’ identification is with the community as a whole, or at least with the shared process, which overrides their loyalty to a segment.” (Quoted in Birmingham Mail 18 11 2005)

The problem for people such as Ms Stuart is that Britishness was destroyed by devolution. There is no longer a comfortable overarching label of British under which everyone can be placed. All that is left for the people of Britain to cling to are emotional ethnicities.

The situation is most acute in England because that is where the majority of ethnic minorities in the UK live. There is hard evidence that ethnic minorities in England routinely do not think of themselves as English. In 2005, the CRE commissioned from the research firm Ethnos a poll designed to discover how Britons identify themselves (http://www.cre.gov.uk/downloads/what_is_britishness.pdf). A couple of passages are particularly telling:

“In England, white English participants identified themselves as English first and British second, while ethnic minority participants perceived themselves as British. None identified as English, which they saw as meaning exclusively white people.”

“Britishness was associated with great historical and political achievements, but only amongst white participants (whether from England, Scotland or Wales), not those from ethnic minority backgrounds”.

This tells us two things: ethnic minorities in England routinely reject the idea of Englishness and ethnic minorities everywhere in the UK have no identification with Britain’s past. So much for Britishness.

 7. Balkanising England

Recognising the danger that English nationalism represented to Labour’s domestic political hopes (and quite possibly to the EU’s wish to divide the UK into a series of regions), the Blair government attempted to create a political structure which would make an English Parliament next to impossible. Their method was to Balkanise the country through the creation of regional assemblies (the artificial regions chosen just happened to fit the regions into which the EU bureaucrats have decided England should be divided). But this plan fell over, at least for the foreseeable future, when a referendum to set up an assembly in the least artificial of the regions, the North-East, was humiliating by an overwhelming NO vote.

 8. The gradual demoralisation of the white working class

If laissez faire economics, immigration reaching a critical level and international treaties were the immediate reasons why the white  working-class has fallen so far from favour, the ground for their realisation was prepared during the thirty-five years which followed the Labour victory of 1945.

It is important not to be sentimental about the white working-class before their desertion by the British political class. Britain was far from being a peaceful society. Industrial relations were seriously fraught from the Eighteenth century onwards, long before nationalisation and the modern welfare state. Much crime went unreported because working class communities refused to report it. Vicious fights regularly took place in places such as the docks and the mines. There was considerable football hooliganism. Until the Irish Free State was founded, Irish nationalism was a constant  running sore. Violent criminal gangs controlled places such as the Elephant and Castle and Brighton.

British education until after the second world war (and the Butler Act’s implementation) was seriously flawed, with most children leaving school at 14 having received no more than a primary education – only those who committed themselves to staying until 16 received  secondary education. The general standard of education was not high,  although, unlike now, the members of the political elite were frequently well educated.

There was also a great deal of abject poverty right up to 1939 with many working people living from wage packet to wage packet, often  with the aid of a weekly trip to the local pawnbroker. There was only a rudimentary welfare state and to fall ill if you were poor was to place yourself at the mercy of the charity of others.

Despite these shortcomings, at the outbreak of the second world war working class society was much more coherent and secure than it is today. Most important was the fact that mainland Britain was racially and ethnically a very homogeneous society, even the ancestral  cultural divisions between the English, Scots and Welsh were largely shadings within a single cultural spectrum rather than violently competing ethnicities. Across the water Ireland was a problem, but even there the divisions were political and religious rather than matters of  profound ethnic difference. Such serious ethnic tension as there was resulted from the influx of Jews fleeing Nazi Germany, but even there the persistent failure of Mosley’s Blackshirts to gain electoral support in the midst of the Depression tells its own story: vehement anti-semitism was not a widespread problem.

The homogeneity of Britain generated a sense of security because the mainland British at least did not have the distraction of chronic and serious ethnic strife. That sense of security was bolstered by the fact that each of the four home nations had their own territory which they dominated in terms of occupation of the land even if they did not formally control their territory. The white working-class generally did not feel threatened by people whom they felt had no place in Britain. Most felt, whatever their personal troubles, that at least they were secure in their own land.

Added to, and arguably arising from, this marvellous ethnic and territorial security were potent and well established social support mechanisms of the working class, viz:

1. Unions, including their large welfare role.

2. Co-Operative Societies – Harrods for the working class.

3. Friendly societies.

4. Homogeneous working-class communities which mutually  supported their members.

5. Large scale manual employment for the working class.

That was the position at the end of WW2, and for a considerable time after 1945 the condition of the white working-class actually improved as a full blown welfare state, rising wages and very low employment significantly increased their security and advantage.

The 1944 Butler Education Act gave all British children the chance to go to a grammar school and even those who did not gain a grammar school place got an extra year of schooling, schooling which went beyond the primary level. It was a far from perfect educational system but it was a considerable improvement on what had gone before. Most importantly, for the first time it gave large numbers of white  working-class children the chance of a first rate education and, for a significant minority, the chance to go to university.

Unions remained strong and both major political parties were committed to maintaining by protectionist measures the British economy, a fair slice of which was in any case nationalised. The white working-class were both the electoral bedrock of the Labour Party and courted by a Tory Party which realised it had to abide by the Attlee Government’s social reforms if it was to be elected (in the mid-fifties one of the proudest boasts of the Tory Government was that they had built 300,000 council houses in a year).

To this growing advantage was gradually added a de facto censorship of criticism of the white working-class. Throughout the period 1945 to 1975 there developed a pernicious habit amongst the British elite whereby public criticism of the white working-class became unacceptable in much the same way that over the past thirty years ethnic minorities have ceased to be publicly criticised.

Like any powerful class which is exempted from criticism the white  working-class abused their position, or perhaps more correctly, allowed their elected representatives whether in politics or unions, to lead them into abusive ways. The unions were all too ready to call strikes, strikes which when they affected the nationalised industries had the power to cripple British life.

The unions had become too powerful and it was their extreme propensity for “industrial action” – strikes, working-to-rule, demarcation disputes and violent picketing – which began to break down the public silence over white working-class abuses. Gradually it became acceptable for politicians and the media to criticise the white  working-class. They needed little prompting because politicians of all colours and mediafolk were more often than not were middleclass, and the middleclass had very little natural empathy with the white  working-class, just as today politicians and the media have no natural empathy with the ethnic minorities who are their current client class.

By 1970 the white working-class was outwardly as secure as a class as they had ever been and would be again. But even at the seeming height of their class advantage they were weaker than they once had been, naturally weaker than ever before in fact because sociological rats  had been gnawing away at their natural cohesion since 1945.

The mass post-war immigration began in the late 40s but it was not a major problem for the white working-class until the 1960s. More immediately damaging were the slum clearances which dominated the twenty five years after the War. These destroyed many working class communities by the simple expedient of dividing them up  between different housing estates. The working class were still living together but they were no longer the tightly knit coherent communities which had existed for generations. Instead it was strangers living together and living together not in housing which allowed an easy social life to develop, but more often than not in high rise buildings which destroyed social intimacy.

Ironically the new welfare state damaged the white working-class because it weakened the informal traditional social supports deriving from a well established community (help from friends and extended family) and led to the decline of formal supports such as friendly societies and the co-operative movement.

9. Education subverted

In the 1960s came the disaster of comprehensive schools and progressive educational theory. Comprehensivisation took away the ladder by which the bright white working-class child progressed, the grammar schools. The secondary modern -technical school- grammar school established by the Butler Act was far from perfect because it left large numbers of children labelled as educational failures, but that which replaced it was far worse a system. Most comprehensives simply did not have the resources or the will to provide a grammar school level education for their brightest pupils.

Progressive educational theory caused a general diminution in educational standards through a combination of its “discovery” method of learning, ie, do not actually teach them anything, and a self-denying ordinance which forbade any criticism of a child’s work. Stir in the lunacy of producing school exams to be taken by children of all ability (GCSE) and the incontinent expansion of higher education from the late 1980s onwards, season with the quasi-commercialisation  of schools and universities through money following the pupil or student, top with school examination boards becoming overtly commercial, and you have the recipe for the mess which is modern British education, where exam grades rise inexorably while performance moves just as remorselessly in the opposite direction.

The percentage of working-class children at university is actually lower in 2012 than it was forty years ago. Of course the numbers of children in higher education has expanded massively since the mid-sixties and in absolute numbers far more white working-class pupils go on to university in 2006 than 1966. But it counts for nothing. If more white working-class pupils may have GCSEs, A Levels and degrees now, the standard of the education they receive to gain such qualifications is so degraded from what it was forty years ago that the qualifications are next to worthless as guides to employers of a person’s ability and the education received while taking them fails to equip students for the world of work even at the basic level of literacy and numeracy.

Had the major sources of traditional white working-class employment not been largely destroyed in the 1980s and 1990s, comprehensive education would not be so dire in its consequences for the white working class, because they would still have been employed in secure jobs which do not require much education. Instead, millions  are trapped in unemployment (admitted unemployment or disguised as ill, retired early or attending worthless courses in higher education) or in insecure and ill-paid jobs, stranded without the education to find decent, well-paid work.

Any society also has to take into account the fact that any population contains many people who are naturally poorly equipped to do anything other than unskilled jobs. Ten per cent of the British population has an IQ of 80 or less. An IQ of 80 is the level at which psychologists generally agree someone begins to struggle to cope with the demands of an advanced society such as Britain. Such people require jobs they can do. Immigrants take those jobs and depress wages. The white working-class are being left with less and less.

With their traditional employments largely destroyed, subject to a state educational system which leaves them ill-equipped for any job other than the unskilled, beset by cheap immigrant labour competing  for unskilled jobs and crippled by the cost of housing, the white  working-class are ever more dependent on public provision. That provision is becoming increasingly uncertain as immigrant demand for social provision multiplies, public spending soars to dangerous heights and Blair’s mania for introducing private money and companies into public provision runs riot.

What were once the public utilities – gas, electricity, water, the railways – are becoming dearer and dearer despite providing an increasingly poor service through a lack of investment in maintenance and the shedding of jobs (the government cannot do anything to subsidise utility prices because of our membership of the EU). The poorer you are the larger part of your income is taken by these vital products and services.

Benefits and the state pension are linked to the Retail Price Index (RPI) but this understates inflation substantially, primarily because the cost of housing, i.e. what it costs to buy a property, is not included (only average mortgage repayment costs and rents are). This understatement of inflation means that benefits and the state pension are gradually losing their value in real terms.

There are also many people for whom the basket of goods and services is unrepresentative. For example, 14% of the index is devoted to motoring expenses which means that the RPI figure is barely relevant to non-car owners. RPI also excludes from its spending pattern such inconvenient people as OAPs surviving on the state pension because they are not “typical”. Generally, the poorer you are, the less representative of your spending RPI will be.

Wages are also affected by official inflation figures because they are used as a benchmark for both public service and private industry wage increases. I say inflation figures because more than one index is used. The Consumer Prices Index (CPI) is the index used these days to give the headline rate of inflation. This is even less accurate a guide to the true rate of inflation than RPI because it excludes housing costs altogether. Where this figure is used to guide wage increases the real value of the wage decreases even more rapidly in real terms than benefits and the state pension.

Then there is taxation. The poorest people in work in the population pay by far – in direct and indirect taxes combined – the highest proportion of their income in tax of any part of the population.

10. How could the present position be remedied?

Britain needs to do four things. (1) withdraw from the EU and  repudiate any other Treaty which prevents the country exercising her sovereignty over immigration and her economy. (2) Recognise that public provision is generally best supplied by the state directly providing it. (3) Substitute for the globalist ideology an unaggressive nationalist one which steers a middle course between protectionism and manic free trade and which clearly distinguishes between the status of  citizens and foreigners. (4) End mass immigration.

The first two are essentially acts of domestic political will. Withdrawing from the EU and treaties such as the UN Convention on Refugees would doubtless cause a great deal of political huffing and puffing but would be unlikely to produce any profound ill-effects because the EU would still wish to trade with Britain and the UN is becoming increasingly irrelevant. Public services – by which I mean genuine public services such as the NHS and prisons – are essentially a domestic matter and should concern no one outside this country.

The last two are more problematic. Adopting an unaggressive nationalism and clearly distinguishing between the status of citizens and foreigners would be no difficulty in practice because those are decisions which have little practical effect on other nations, but what of our trading treaty relationships, especially our membership of  the World Trade Organisation? If we remained within the WTO would that make a middle course between protectionism and free trade impossible?

The WTO in practice permits many protectionist measures – readers will recollect how the USA suddenly slapped tariffs on foreign steel a year or so back. There is a good deal of wriggle room which Britain could use to protect her domestic economy. For example, if another WTO member is doing something protectionist and getting away with it, and many are, then the WTO will scarcely be able to penalise Britain. If the worst comes to the worst and we had to leave the WTO, bilateral agreements with other countries could be made – Britain has too large an economy for other states en bloc to forgo the opportunity for trade.

11. The end of mass immigration

That leaves mass immigration which I shall deal with in some detail because it is the most dangerous threat to the welfare of both the white working-class and the native British population as a whole. The stopping of further mass immigration alone would do more for the white working-class than any other single action by government. It would tighten the labour market and improve their employment opportunities. That in turn would improve their status. The pressure on public services, transport and housing would be lessened making access to them cheaper and easier for the white working-class. More generally, the moral climate would change because the ending of mass immigration would signal that there is a clear distinction between the rights of British citizens and the rights of foreigners.

With control resumed over our borders through withdrawal from the EU and the repudiation of other treaties, there would be in principle no problem with stopping further mass immigration. But what about the economic effects? The liberal internationalists tell us that the woes of the world would come upon us should we do such a thing,  although, like Lear threatening retribution, (“I shall do such things ….I know not what they are”) they are strangely unable to quite  say what the woes will be.  If reality, there would simply be a manageable period of economic and social reconstruction.

The immediate economic effect would be  a redistribution of labour. Labour would move into those occupations which are essential and which cannot be provided at a distance, for  example  healthcare  and education. We would discover how  occupations rank in terms of utility. Wages would rise in those occupations which had most utility to attract staff from elsewhere.

Employers would respond to labour tightening by using labour more efficiently. Automation would increase and employers would  change their attitude to the older person and the disabled.

Both employers and government would take vocational training more seriously. Government would provide incentives to employers to train their staff and increase the training of public service  professionals such as doctors and dentists. Government would also be forced to tackle the mess which is our public education to ensure an adequately educated workforce.

Employers who could not find the labour to run their business in this country would have to accept they could not do so. No one has a right to engage in an enterprise regardless of the effects on the welfare of the community as a whole. Capital which cannot be used in this country can be invested abroad.

12. Would there be an unmanageable labour shortage?

The idea that Britain is short of labour for most purposes is demonstrably absurd. The official figure for those under the state retirement age who are economically inactive in the UK is 7 million. Clearly not all of those would be able or willing to work, but equally clearly a large proportion would be able and willing to work if the conditions were right, i.e., wages rose, employers became more accommodating and the benefits system was tightened as the number of opportunities for work rose.

The claim that the indigenous population will not do the jobs immigrants take is demonstrably false. In areas of the country with few immigrants native Britons do them willingly. In many instances where foreign workers are employed it is not because native Britons will not work. Take the case of the cockle-pickers who died in Morecombe Bay several years ago it was widely reported in the media that the Chinese cockle pickers clashed with British cockle pickers who resented them invading their territory. These Chinese were not filling jobs which were unfilled by the British but competing with the British for the work.

The experience of the cockle-pickers is found elsewhere, not least because employers, particularly  gangmasters,  are frequently immigrants. They generally prefer to employ people of their own ethnicity.  The consequence is that the British are not found in some occupations in some places because the  immigrant employers deliberately avoid recruiting them.

The other thing which prevents native Britons taking jobs in some parts of the country is the fact that the native Briton does not want to work for employers whose workforce is predominantly formed of immigrants or native-born ethnic minorities. Like every other people, native Britons do not wish to be forced to work in their own land in a employment where they are in the minority.

It is also important to remember that the menial jobs immigrants take are worth far more to them than a native Briton. If you earn as little as £250 a week net – many immigrants work cash in hand – and live in accommodation either supplied by an employer or in crowded accommodation for very little rent, you will probably still be able to save a a substantial amount, say, £2,000 pa.

If you come from China where wages even in the big cities are 50 pence an hour, you would earn œ1,000 pa for a 40 hour week. Working at a menial job in Britain allows you to save double the average Chinese big city annual wage in a year. That money remitted to China takes on the local purchasing power. The multiplier for Eastern Europeans is less but even there œ2,000 saved in a year would be a good professional salary in places such as Poland. Give native Britons the chance to save the equivalent of a British professional’s salary in a year doing a menial job and they will flock to the work and put up with basic living conditions. Of course, no such employments are on offer to Britons.

13. Conclusion

The crime of the post-war British elite of all political colours has been to destroy the social and economic structures which gave  security and viability to white working-class society without replacing them with something else. The elite mashed their communities through slum clearance, thrust mass immigration into the areas in which the white working-class lived, destroyed through “free trade” the great industries which traditionally employed them and hamstrung the unions by a mixture of legislation, cheap foreign labour both at home and abroad and the creation of a perpetual “reserve army of labour” from the native population. At the same time the white working-class were deprived of the means to create new lives and social structures through a decent education. Whatever the white working-class are now, they are the product of decisions made by the British political elite since 1945.

I am not a sentimentalist who imagines that the ideal world would be one in which the white working class continued unchanged as noble “sons of toil” or that ” working-class culture” should be preserved in aspic. Had every white working-class person in the country been converted into part of the middleclass by an unforced process of improved education and rising wages I would have seen that as part of a natural sociological change. But that of course did not happen, probably in principle could never have happened in a country the size of Britain. The white working-class have been disenfranchised. The British middle class have been at best complicit in the attack on the white working-class and at worst have taken an eager and active part in it. For decades they thought themselves personally safe from the consequences of immigration and, later, imagined that they were immune from the effects of globalisation. They find themselves unable to buy houses because of the absurd prices They are beginning to learn the hard facts of sociological life: mass immigration and globalisation eventually affects all but the truly rich, a poetic justice but one which harms the country.

Can things change? For the first time in half a century British politicians (and the liberal elite generally) are beginning to display realism over the effects of immigration. This realism is coming from both the major Parties. Here is the Tory MP Julian Brazier writing in a pamphlet for the Cornerstone group:

“Overcrowding is a key cause of many of the factors which are destroying quality of life: mortgage slavery, over-development, congested roads, water shortages, flooding and overstretched public services. We should do everything we can sensibly – and fairly – to reduce the level of immigration to well below the level of emigration.” (The Times August 01, 2006)

On the other side of the political fence is Labour MP Jon Cruddas, MP for the Essex seat of Dagenham. Writing a commentary on a Rowntree Trust study THE FAR RIGHT IN LONDON which deals with the recent success of the BNP in his constituency he comments:

“…it [the Blair Government] has tacitly used immigration to help forge the preferred flexible North American labour market. Especially in London, legal and illegal immigration has been central in replenishing the stock of cheap labour across the public and private services, construction and civil engineering…

“For many of my constituents the value of their social wage is in decline. House prices appear to rise inexorably upwards whilst thousands and thousands seek nonexistent, new social housing. Public service improvements fail to match localised population expansion let alone the long term legacy of underinvestment…

“At work their terms and conditions are under threat as they compete for work with cheap immigrant labour. In terms of access to housing  and public services and their position in the workplace many see immigration as a central determinant in their own relative impoverishment….

“Those communities that must accommodate the new immigrant communities are the ones least equipped to do so they themselves have the most limited opportunities for economic and social mobility…”

But realism from a few politicians acting as individuals is worthless if the major political parties do nothing or indeed, with our various treaty obligations, can do nothing legally while we are bound by them. The only way Britain could meaningfully regain control of immigration is to leave the EU and renounce all other treaties, such  as the UN Convention of Refugees, which prevents Britain from controlling her borders. There is absolutely no sign that any major party or even individual politician is willing to contemplate such a policy.

Immigration is only one part of the problem. There is still very little realism from even by individual MPs over the effects of laissez faire economics and freer trade, both of which severely undermine the condition of the white working-class (and increasingly, much of the middleclass).

The manic drive to privatise everything in sight, whether by outright privatisation or the introduction of private money into public services, shows no sign of abating. The immediate consequence of this is all too often reduced services at greater cost, while the long –term effect may be to reduced public provision generally, either because the costs simply go out of control or because the fact that a service is provided by a private contractor rather than by direct labour public provision makes it easier to reduce the service or stop providing it altogether..

On the education side so much damage has been done to our education system, from primary schools to universities, that it is difficult to see how things could be changed in less than a generation.

Perhaps the greatest problem is the current state of our political system which has become utterly unresponsive to the needs of the British people in general and the white working-class in particular.

The Labour MP John Cruddas wrote this recently in his commentary on a Joseph Rowntree Trust report “The rise of the Far right”. “The [Blair] government is not a coalition of traditions and interests who  initiate policy and debate; rather it is a power elite whose modus operandi is the retention of power.” The words could be as readily applied to the modern Tory Party.

Compare this with George Orwell’s words in 1984:” “The Party seeks power entirely for its own sake. We are not interested in the good of others; we are interested solely in power. Not wealth or luxury or long life or happiness: only power, pure power. …We are different from the oligarchies of the past, in that we know what we are doing. All the others, even those who resembled ourselves, were cowards and hypocrites. The German Nazis and Russian Communists came very close to us in our methods, but they never had the courage to recognise their own motives. They pretended, perhaps they even believed, that they had seized power unwillingly and for a limited time, and that just around the corner there lay a paradise where human beings would be free and equal. We are not like that. We know that no one ever seizes power  with the intention of relinquishing it. Power is not a means, it is an end. One does not establish a dictatorship in order to safeguard arevolution; one makes the revolution in order to establish the dictatorship.” (O’Brien speaking to Winston Smith during his interrogation).

That is the political system we have now: a simple desire for power. The only thing which will change it is fear, fear in the political elite that things are running out of control, that they may be brought to account. Then they will shamelessly amend their ideology, what they said was black yesterday will become white tomorrow. Elites only have one settled principle – to do whatever is necessary to preserve their power and privilege.

“British identity is based on and anchored in its political and legal institutions and this enables it to take in new entrants more easily than it would be if being a member of a nation were to be defined by blood.

“But a democratic polity will only work if citizens’ identification is with the community as a whole, or at least with the shared process, which overrides their loyalty to a segment.” (Quoted in Birmingham Mail 18 11 2005)

The problem for people such as Ms Stuart is that Britishness was destroyed by devolution. There is no longer a comfortable overarching label of British under which everyone can be placed. All that is left for the people of Britain to cling to are emotional ethnicities.

The situation is most acute in England because that is where the majority of ethnic minorities in the UK live. There is hard evidence that ethnic minorities in England routinely do not think of themselves as English. In 2005, the CRE commissioned from the research firm Ethnos a poll designed to discover how Britons identify themselves (http://www.cre.gov.uk/downloads/what_is_britishness.pdf). A couple of passages are particularly telling:

“In England, white English participants identified themselves as English first and British second, while ethnic minority participants perceived themselves as British. None identified as English, which they saw as meaning exclusively white people.”

“Britishness was associated with great historical and political achievements, but only amongst white participants (whether from England, Scotland or Wales), not those from ethnic minority backgrounds”.

This tells us two things: ethnic minorities in England routinely reject the idea of Englishness and ethnic minorities everywhere in the UK have no identification with Britain’s past. So much for Britishness.