Category Archives: Celts

Bring the Nuclear Deterrent to England now

Robert Henderson

A Daily Telegraph report  of 27 January 2012  ”Nuclear subs will stay in Scotland”  ( James Kirkup –http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9043092/Nuclear-subs-will-stay-in-Scotland-Royal-Navy-chiefs-decide.html) is most disturbing. The essence of the story is that should  Scotland votes for independence the  UK nuclear deterrent would for years have to remain  in what would then be  a foreign country.

Why could the subs, warheads and missiles not be brought to England?  Kirkup claims  the Ministry of Defence (MoD)  believes  the  provision of  new facilities for the nuclear deterrent  in England could take up to ten years to build.

The Trident missiles carrying  Vanguard-class submarines are  based at Faslane on the Gare Loch; the missiles and warheads are stored and loaded from  the nearby Royal Naval Armaments Depot Coulport, on Loch Long.  Kirkup quotes an unnamed source:  “Berths would not be a problem – there are docks on the south coast that could be used without too much fuss. But there simply isn’t anywhere else where we can do what we do at Coulport, and without that, there is no deterrent.” In other words, the subs could be accommodated immediately in England but the storing and arming facilities of Coulport could not.

The official description of Coulport is:

The Royal Armaments Depot at Coulport, eight miles from Faslane, is responsible for the storage, processing, maintenance and issue of key elements of the UK’s Trident Deterrent Missile System and the ammunitioning of all submarine-embarked weapons.

It also stores conventional armaments for Royal Navy vessels.

Because of the nature of its work, the site is subject to the most stringent external security regulators who authorise the depot to process nuclear weapons and provide support to nuclear submarines berthed at the Explosive Handling Jetty. (http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/The-Fleet/Naval-Bases/Clyde/RNAD-Coulport

The claim that there is and will be the “most stringent external security” is questionable because the site has fallen prey to the privatisation mania with the day-to-day management moving in February 2012 from the MoD to  a commercial consortium led by the Atomic Weapons Establishment in alliance with  Babcock and Lockheed Martin (http://wmcnd.org.uk/news/nuclear-power-fukushima-and-chernobyl and http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/lockheed-group-to-manage-uk-nuke-installation/).

Kirkup reports an unnamed source saying “Maintaining the deterrent is the first priority for any UK government, so ministers in London would have to pay Salmond any price to ensure we kept access to [the Clyde bases]…It would be an unbelievable nightmare.”

The idea that it would take ten years to replace the  facilities Royal Naval Armaments Depot at Coulport is surely absurd. We know how quickly things can be done in wartime. This should be treated as a situation of equivalent urgency. Salmond must not be allowed to use it as a bargaining chip on the conditions of either independence or DEVOMAX.

Even if the referendum vote goes against independence, you may be sure that something like DEVOMAX will  be granted to Scotland by the current Westminster Government  which appears to have no sense of  protecting English interests. That will simply be a stepping stone to full independence.  If the nuclear facilities are left in Scotland in such circumstances they would ever be a hostage to fortune. The Government should not wait for a referendum, but begin the process of removing the nuclear deterrent facilities to England now.

If the nuclear deterrent was left in Scotland for years after independence it is almost certainly going to cause problems, not least with the Americans who supply the UK with the delivery system to for  the British made and owned warheads.  They might well be reluctant to allow their technology to be sited in what would then be a foreign   country with all the security implications that carries. (Amazingly, you may think, the UK only leases the missiles and they are pooled with the Atlantic squadron of the USN Ohio SSBNs at King’s Bay, Georgia).

In addition, there could be no certainty about what a future government of  an independent Scotland would do, or indeed how resolute a future Westminster government would be. The example of the three  Irish  Free State “treaty ports”  the Royal Navy continued to use  after the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty  is not encouraging. This agreement was abruptly terminated in 1938, a year before the feared  U-Boat menace to British shipping became a reality. The most dismaying thing with that episode was that the British government behaved in the most supine way – they gave and the Free State took – simply to end  a long-standing trade war with the Free State.

The worst case scenario would be to do nothing before the referendum, the vote is  for independence and Salmond  then insists  on the removal of the deterrent immediately because of the Scotch Numpty Party’s long-standing commitment to a nuclear free Scotland.

The MoD declined to discuss details of Kirkup’s story but a spokesman said  “The UK government position is clear and we are arguing the case for Scotland to remain within the Union. However, any decisions on Scotland’s future are for people in Scotland to decide.” This points to the coalition taking the Micawber strategy of waiting for something to turn. That will be unreservedly to England’s (and the British Isles) disadvantage.

It must be no to Devomax

Robert Henderson

The leader of the Scots Numpty Party  (SNP) Alex Salmond has a secret love. He has a long-time partner Independence , but also  a burgeoning  affair with  the siren Devomax.    No, this not a relative of the cyber personality Max Headroom, although  it is just as artificial and improbable a creation.

Like all lovers with two mistresses who know of the others existence the SNP leader has been drifting into a fevered incoherence as he tries to keep both the objects of his affection satisfied. Only the other day he said that if Scotland votes for independence  it will still be part of the UK:  “That union, that United Kingdom if you like, would be maintained after Scottish political independence.”  (http://www.scotsman.com/news/politics/i_still_want_to_be_in_uk_says_alex_salmond_1_ 2085533)

Exactly what finery  Miss Devomax   should be clothed in when he finally presents her to the world, Master Salmond  has not crystallised  even in his own mind, but he knows that her garb would indubitably involve a skirt of full fiscal autonomy.  As Scotland under the reign of Mistress Devomax would be technically part of the UK,  her political clothes  would also mean  keeping the Queen as head of state, continuing to use the Pound and  sharing defence,  foreign affairs,  EU membership   and the servicing of the  National Debt and all other financial obligations in the UK  including Foreign Aid.   (Strangely,  when speaking of his ever less secret love,  the SNP leader  always omits to mention the  “servicing of the  National Debt and all other financial obligations in the UK”).  In short , it would be Home Rule more or less.

The biggest fly in the Devomax   ointment  is fiscal autonomy which  would mean Scotland raising all its government revenue from taxes which it imposed and collected itself. Some of those  taxes would have to be used to pay a share  proportionate  to Scotland’s fraction of the UK population (around 9%) of the UK defence budget, the foreign affairs budget and the servicing of the  National Debt and all other accrued financial obligations in the UK.   (Devomax would also mean that Scotland would have to fund the  cost in Scotland of  welfare, education,  housing,  the arts, the NHS , transport,  roads, the environment, PFI and PPP projects in Scotland, policing and  justice .  Some of this is already funded from the Treasury disbursement to Scotland but much is not, for example, most of Scottish welfare. )

A fiscally independent  Scotland would radically change the relationship between Scotland and the rest of the UK.  If  the Scots were  paying part of  the expenditure on UK projects such as defence  and Foreign Aid  they would expect to have some say in those projects.  This would cause immense difficulty both in terms of the level of expenditure and  how the UK project  expenditure was deployed.

How much would Scotland have to contribute to the UK budget under Devomax?  It would be a substantial. Let us have a look at the financial year 2011/12. The UK defence budget for  2011/12 is £40 billion,  National Debt interest is £50 billion,  http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/2011budget_complete.pdf p6), Foreign Aid is £8.7 billion (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1391334/Britain-doles-aid-country-despite-savage-cutbacks-home.html ), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is £1,6 billion (go to http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/publications-and-documents/publications1/annual-reports/business-plan and click on Business Plan).  The net UK contribution to the EU in 2010 (the latest figure available) was £9.2 billion with the gross contribution being a whopping £19.7 billion. (http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/danielhannan/100081949/britains-net-contribution-to-the-eu-budget-has-risen-by-74-per-cent-in-one-year/).   The total (taking only the net contribution to the EU into account)  is £110 billion. That would mean Scotland’s share would have been £10 billion. If the accrued liabilities of UK taxpayer funded pensions  at the point of fiscal separation were dealt with at the UK level  as well that would add billions more Scotland would have to put into the UK pot.  In addition, there is the question of how much of the financial chaos created by the Scottish banks RBS and HBOS should be laid at the Scotland’s door.  The headline amounts involved in rescuing the banks are large enough (£45 billion for RBS and £20 billion  for HBOS via the Lloyds Banking Group rescue (http://money.uk.msn.com/news/articles.aspx?cp-documentid=152384309), but the  true figure runs into hundreds of billions (http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/nov/12/bank-bailouts-uk-credit-crunch and http://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2011/06/02/the-wages-of-scottish-independence-public-debt/.)

That is the position now. By the time a referendum is likely to be held and a decision made, it is likely to be 2015. By then the national debt is projected to be around £1.4 billion as against £1 trillion in 2012. That would add something like £45 billion for Scotland to service.  Foreign Aid is due to increase to £11.5 billion by 2014 (http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/latest-news/2010/spending-review-2010/).  The EU net contribution is also due to rise after 2013.

Although it is impossible to give more than a rough  approximation of what a Scottish government would have to be handing over to the UK Treasury under Devomax,   realistically it would  be in the region of £20 billion per annum, a sum which would probably represent  at least a quarter of the total Scottish budget by the time Devomax was a fact.  That would  put great pressure on domestic Scottish government spending and heighten the already natural desire of a Devomax Scottish government to demand a strong say in the UK’s affairs.

The general difficulty with UK projects is obvious. Scotland would expect a say on the amount spent and the nature of the spending ,  but the rest of the UK  – which is 91% of the UK population – would overwhelmingly outweigh the Scots  in any democratic procedure to make decisions.  It is impossible have an arrangement which did not have one of two outcomes that  would be unpalatable to one of the two parties. Either Scottish wishes  would be ignored  or the Scottish tail would  wag the rest of the UK dog by giving them a disproportionately powerful  say.

The situation would be exceptionally sharp in the case of defence. The SNP is ideologically against a nuclear deterrent.  There is probably a  majority of the Scottish public who support this view.  Any likely Scottish government for the foreseeable future  will  have the SNP as at least a strong partner in a coalition. This state of affairs has three possible consequences.  If things stay as they are  with the  nuclear facilities  in Scotland continuing,   they would be a  high value bargaining chip for a Scottish government to extract substantial concessions  from  Westminster on other subjects, for example, the servicing of the UK national debt.  Alternatively, if the  nuclear deterrent facilities were placed entirely in England  the Scots will  cavil at paying a proportionate share of its costs even though they would  benefit from the protection it offers.  More generally, a Scottish government ideologically opposed to a nuclear deterrent might try to refuse to  pay anything towards it.

The other great military problem  would be action overseas which would have profound foreign policy implications.   It would clearly be absurd to get into a situation where  Westminster decided on foreign action and the  Scottish government  could  veto the deployment.   There would  also be occasions where even if a fighting role was not being contemplated  disputes could arise, for example,  over the military being used in policing roles such as those in the Balkans or substantial amounts of the military budget being used to defend the Falklands. In addition,  Scotland might well  try to engineer a situation where there were military assets  such as Scottish regiments which,  while they were not formally under the control of the Scottish government,  were in practice always stationed in Scotland or at least in the UK , with an understanding that they were not to be deployed overseas .

The second  immediate and pressing problem would be  foreign policy in general and the EU in particular. Apart from foreign policy relating to the armed forces,  there would also be many points of potential conflict  between Scotland and the rest of the UK.  For example, Scotland might object to funding  or facilitating the British arms trade while the UK government was in favour or the  UK government could be in favour of restricting immigration and Scotland for increasing it.

But those problems would be nothing compared to the  perpetual wrangles over the EU.  Assuming  the UK remains a member of the EU and the EU is not dissolved by the economic acid bath which is the Euro collapse, how would the UK’s relations with the EU be decided with a quasi-independent  Scotland  paying part of the annual membership fee?   Scotland would undoubtedly ask for some form of official representation and however that was delivered it would weaken the hand of the UK government because it would seem to the rest of the EU that the UK was speaking with two voices.  That could provide a lever for the EU to weaken the UK by playing Scotland off against the rest of the UK.

In any discussions of new policy or bargaining over such things as the UK rebate,  fishing  quotas  or the disbursement of that part of the money from the UK EU budget contribution which is returned to the UK in various ways, the UK could find itself in a similar position  to that UK domestic politics is presently in with the coalition government:  no clear  public voice but one perpetually moving as deals are done behind the scenes. Most dramatically, imagine a situation where there is a new EU treaty which greatly increases the move towards a United States of Europe.   Scotland would be in favour: the UK government probably would oppose such a treaty.  Even if the decision  was left to a UK referendum would a quasi-independent Scotland  accept  such a referendum? Would they not seek a referendum for Scotland only?  In the medium term the likely response by the EU would be to try to expand their  long-held regionalist  plan to dissolve the power of nation states  within the EU to allow places such as Scotland  a large and ever increasing autonomy within  the EU while  Scotland  remain legally part of a member state.

The other great immediate Devomax  problem would be the management of the Pound. Many of the problems associated with a supposedly  independent Scotland continuing  to use the pound also apply to Devomax– see  http://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2012/01/22/an-independent-scotland-must-not-be-allowed-to-have-the-pound-as-their-official-currency/. Foreigners at both the business and government levels would  begin to see the UK not as single economic sphere but  as two separate economies.  That would create uncertainty which would  of itself weaken the Pound.

If Scotland had a much weaker economy than the rest of the UK under Devomax,  which is probable because of the dangerous narrowness of the Scottish  economy and its massive public sector,  something similar to the Euro situation  would arise. The  value of the Pound against other currencies would be suppressed, just as the Euro  has not reflected the strength of the German economy because of the other weaker vessels such as Greece and Italy.     An artificially low Pound might sound attractive for exports,  but it also means more expensive imports and creates a risk that the currency may slip into the dangerous territory of precipitously devaluing until the credibility of the  currency itself is in danger.   At the very least a Pound dependent on  two separate fiscal policies would mean that the massively larger entity  – the UK minus Scotland – would  to some degree be dependent on the behaviour of the much smaller entity – Scotland.

Fiscal autonomy also means, in theory at least,  no transfer of money from the rest of the UK (in practice from England)  to Scotland if the Scottish economy runs into serious  trouble.   This could easily happen because of the size of the tax take Scotland would have to generate to meet their present  obligations under Devomax.

The quick way of getting a quick approximation of the  amount of money a Scottish government under Devomax would have to raise to fund present expenditure . The total budget projection for £2011/12 is £710 billion (http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/2011budget_complete.pdf p6). 9% of that is £64 billion.

In 2009/10 – the last year for which there are official Scottish government figures for public expenditure in Scotland : Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland ( GERS)  –  Scottish tax revenues were  £42,201 billion excluding North Sea oil and £48,132 billion with what are coyly called “an illustrative geographical share “ of North Sea oil revenues  with expenditure for the year of  £62.086 billion (http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/06/21144516/1). Even with the Oil revenues included there was a shortfall of £14 billion in  tax revenue.

But there  are problems with GERS which could well substantially understate public expenditure in Scotland.  For many items there are no official statistics collected for Scotland alone. Consequently, the GERS figures are often based on extrapolations from UK statistics with methodologies which even the GERS compilers warn do not produce objective data:  “… these methodologies are subjective and therefore the figures should be viewed accordingly” (http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/06/21144516/2).  The other  problem is the treatment of North Sea Oil revenues.  The “illustrative geographical share  of North Sea oil revenues”   are based on a study by the University of Aberdeen (http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/06/21144516/7).

The fact that both the GERS estimates and the North Sea oil revenue estimate have been made in Scotland rather than by non-Scottish bodies puts a large question mark against their impartiality.   If there is partiality favouring Scotland in the GERS  estimates it does not have to be conscious.  It is human nature to always put the best appearance on things from the individual’s point of view.  That is particularly true when a study is commissioned by those with political power.

Even if there is no overestimating of the bare figures they would not tell the whole story.  Scotland’s GDP is dangerously  dependent on public spending.  By 2012 it will be in the region of 67% of Scottish GDP (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/4217793/Scotlands-dependence-on-state-increasing.html). The important thing to understand about  tax collection is that tax collected from those drawing their pay from the public purse is that it is simply recycled taxpayers’ money. It is only the money derived from private enterprise which drives an economy.  We can see this graphically in the present UK financial position. Only the private sector can grow the economy to allow larger tax receipts to reduce the deficit.  To have two thirds of an economy dependent on public expenditure is profoundly precarious because the tax base can shrink radically very rapidly. It is doubly dangerous for a small country of only 5 million people which does not have much diversity in in the little there is of a private sector.

Even if 90% of the oil tax revenues were allocated to Scotland this would not, on average,  compensate for the loss of a subsidy of some £8 billion pa which Scotland presently receives from the UK treasury through higher per capita funding  resulting from the Barnett Formula.   Not only that but revenues veer about wildly. In 1991/2 they were a paltry £647 million; in 2008/9 £13 billion; in 2009/10 they dropped dramatically to £6.4 billion.   (http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/06/21144516/7).  The remaining oil in Scottish waters is also declining  rapidly and becoming more expensive to extract as the major oil discoveries run down (http://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2011/05/14/the-truth-about-uk-oil-and-gas/).  While it is true that overall oil consumption is rising because of the countries such as China and India,  which might be expected to keep the price of oil high, there are also dramatic developments around shale oil and gas so there is no guarantee that the price of oil will remain high or continue to rise.  In any event it would be a rash government to base its future on a single crock of gold.

There is also the strong possibility under Devomax of  the English public sector jobs exported to Scotland being repatriated (http://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2011/05/06/scottish-independence-yes-but-only-on-these-terms/)  and of  companies in Scotland moving out of Scotland if a Scottish government cannot afford to offer them financial incentives to say.

There would also be a problem  with new  national debt. With a  fiscally independent Scotland  neither England nor Scotland would  wish to run up new UK National Debt.  After Devomax Scotland would have to take sole responsibility for any new finance raised by the Scottish government, while the rest of the UK would assume responsibility for any new post Devomax  debt it incurred. There is the risk of Scotland being unwilling to cut its public financial cloth much closer because it has become substantially poorer and running up unsustainable Scottish debt.

It is only to easy to imagine Scotland getting into the same mess that the Republic of Ireland and Iceland got into by a mixture of reckless spending and a failure to control credit or risky financial operations generally.   The rest of the UK (essentially England for reasons already given) would either have to bail out the Scots or see Scotland go effectively bust with the dire  effect that would have on the Pound  and the UK international financial and political credibility. The latter  would also bring large numbers of Scots to England after jobs, housing, schools and welfare which their own government could no longer afford.  Which option would a UK government take? Almost certainly the bailing out of Scotland with English money because of the damage anything else might do.   This might be done as a supposed loan, but there would be no guarantee that  it would be repaid.

The best that could be hoped for from Devomax  from an English perspective would be that Scotland would not be reckless and would pay their share of UK projects such as defence.  But along with that would come a perpetual uneasiness and clashing of democratic wills. It would be, as mentioned previously, akin to the situation we have with the coalition government  with no clear position on anything.  Unlike the coalition government there would be no end to it.   If Scotland is to leave the UK, it must be as a fully independent state asking no favours from England.

Salmond’s proposed referendum question is heavily biased

The Scotch Numpty Party (SNP) leader Alex Salmond’s proposed referendum question “‘Do you agree that Scotland should be an independent country?” is strongly biased. (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9040988/Alex-Salmonds-independence-question-is-loaded-and-biased.html).

The question is biased because it is (1) asking people to positively agree not merely choose from neutral options and (2) it would require a positive yes or no by the voter. It is well established that humans are predisposed to agree and say yes rather than disagree and say no, because both of the latter seem negative and confrontational.

A neutral question, as far as any can be devised, would be something like this:

Scotland to remain within the UK?

Scotland to be independent ?

With a box against each question  and a cross put in one box. That would remove the need to vote Yes or No directly.

There would still be the problem of putting one question before the other which tends to make more people go for the first question. This could be obviated by printing half the ballot papers  with one of the questions first and the other half of the  ballot papers with the other question first. 

A question in the form  proposed  by Salmond would never be used by a mainstream  polling company or in academic research because of its slanted nature.

An “independent” Scotland must not be allowed to have the pound as their official currency

Robert Henderson

The Scottish Numpty Party leader Alex Salmond desperately wants to have his independence cake and eat it. He wishes to have DEVOMAX as well as independence on the “independence” ballot and, if the vote is for independence, he blithely imagines that the Queen will remain head of state, defence will be shared with the remainder of the UK (henceforth the UK) and , most tellingly because of his constant boasts about the robustness of an independent Scotland’s economy , that the pound Sterling will continue to be currency used by Scotland. It is the last which I shall concern myself with here.

It is vital that Scotland should not continue to use the Pound as their national currency whilst pretending to be independent, because of the potential and probable damage it could do to Pound and the UK economy .

If an independent Scotland was allowed to retain the Pound the situation would not be like that of a heavily devolved country such as the USA , a single state where general monetary and fiscal policy is set at national level and, most importantly, money can be transferred from richer to poorer parts of the country. Rather, the position of the UK and Scotland split into two independent states would be akin to that of the Eurozone where there is no shared fiscal policy and no ability to move money from richer states to poorer states and chaos currently reigns. Chaos could well be the state the UK and an independent Scotland arrived at and probably sooner than later.

The situation with a UK/Scotland currency grouping could be more extreme than that of the Eurozone, because the Eurozone at least has theoretical rules to prevent member states from debauching the currency. If Scotland simply used the Pound without any rules the situation could deteriorate much more rapidly than the Eurozone, a likelihood reinforced by the much smaller size of the economic grouping UK/Scotland compared with the Eurozone. Whether an independent Scotland would agree to restraints on what they could do with stringent rules designed to protect the Pound is dubious: even more dubious is whether, if they agreed to such rules, they would abide by them when shove came to push .

If there is one thing which international traders and markets do not respond well to it is uncertainty. That is what the sharing of a currency between two independent states would guarantee. At present the Pound is freely traded currency which still has enough international credibility to be held widely as part of national reserves. Foreign investors and traders would rapidly begin to harbour doubts about who was exercising control over a currency being used by two supposedly independent states. Nor would international investors be reassured by the idea that whatever form control took, there would be two economies almost certainly being driven by seriously different political agendas. Without Scottish MPs, the House of Commons would have, at least for quite some time, a Tory majority with a strong free market agenda, an agenda which it is improbable that any likely Scottish Parliament and government would follow. This international uncertainty would extend to British based industry and commerce.

Whether an independent Scotland had no control over the pound or whether it exercised some control there would be serious difficulties. If the Scots had no control over the monetary and fiscal policy set at Westminster, these policies might be directly at odds with the wishes and needs of Scotland. Should that be the case you may be sure that a continuous barrage of complaint would come from north of the Tweed with pleas for monetary and fiscal policies to suit Scotland which might well disadvantage the rest of the UK. These pleas could of course be ignored at Westminster, but that would come at a cost because any serious financial or economic crisis in Scotland would result in a weakening of foreign confidence in the Pound and the general economic performance of not Scotland alone but of the UK and Scotland. This would again create uncertainty at home and abroad.

If the UK and an independent Scotland shared the pound, its fortunes would be judged by those who matter on the economic prospects and performance of the UK and Scotland combined, not as two separate economies. That would leave the UK and Scotland with many new disadvantages and precious few if any of the advantages which the Pound currently enjoys as a currency used by a single nation state with a long history of meeting its obligations.

The worst case scenario would be an independent Scotland which became another Republic of Ireland or Iceland through reckless spending and/or lax credit controls. The Pound would suffer severe consequences no matter how prudently and successfully the economy of the rest of the UK, was managed just as the German economy is suffering because of the less disciplined countries in the Eurozone. In such circumstances the rest of the UK would be faced with a choice between a rapidly depreciating and unstable pound if nothing was done or the provision of vast amounts of English taxpayers’ money to bail out Scotland.

The splitting of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993 is instructive. The official division took place on 1 January. Initially both countries retained the old Czechoslovak currency the koruna, but by 8 February they had set up separate national currencies (each also called the koruna) because the Czech Republic was substantially richer than Slovakia and having the same currency made no sense because she could only be a loser. In effect, the Czech Republic would have been subsidising Slovakia if they had continued to share a currency. (Once the new national currencies were established the Czech koruna traded at a substantially higher value than the new Slovakian koruna.)

In the case of an independent Scotland and UK sharing the Pound the UK (in effect England because Wales and Northern Ireland receive far more from the Treasury than they raise in tax) would be subsiding Scotland. This is because England is by population ten times the size of Scotland, has a much broader based economy and that economy is nowhere near as dependent on public money than Scotland. Even with Wales and Northern Ireland (both heavily dependent on public money) to support England is in far better economic shape than Scotland.

The Scottish private sector is very heavily dependent on a few industries: tourism, whisky, financial services and oil ; the proportion of Scottish GDP derived from public spending is above 60% (http://www.scotsman.com/news/scottish-news/edinburgh-east-fife/60_of_gdp_comes_from_public_sector_1_1412305) and a substantial part of the GDP is derived from the higher per capita Treasury payment to Scotland compared with England – the Scots currently get around £1,600 per head more than the English which gives them around £8 billion more pa than they would get if they were paid the same as the English. (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2031543/UK-government-spending-Scots-1-600-year-spent-English.html).

What would there be to stop people in Scotland using the pound as currency regardless of the agreement of Westminster? Nothing in the sense that any Sterling held in Scotland could be used by those living in Scotland just as using the dollar or the Euro in England could be done if people were willing to accept it. But an independent Scotland would have no means of printing Sterling notes or minting Sterling coins, so it would be impractical to run an economy in that way because it would have no means of readily expanding the money supply. In addition, if the Scottish economy deteriorated badly holders of Sterling in Scotland could rapidly shrink the money supply by moving it out of the country.

That brings us to the matter of the three banks in Scotland which at present have the authority to issue sterling bank notes: Bank of Scotland, Clydesdale Bank and The Royal Bank of Scotland. If the Pound was denied to Scotland by Westminster or the Scots did not choose to use it, their issuing powers would be removed.

If the Pound was shared between the UK and an independent Scotland the Sterling banknote issuing rights of Scottish banks would either have to be rescinded or strictly limited. If this was not done Scotland could print as much money as they chose. Such controls over banknote issue would not be difficult for Westminster to enforce regardless of the wishes of a Scottish government. As things stand Scottish banknotes are legal currency as authorised by the Westminster Parliament but not legal tender .(http://www.scotbanks.org.uk/legal_position.php). Not being legal tender means amongst other things that no one is obliged to accept them in payment. That alone would prevent an independent Scotland having carte blanche to issue as many notes as they wanted , because although they could issue them they would be worthless outside Scotland if no one would accept them as they certainly would not. In addition, the note issuing banks are effectively beyond an independent Scotland’s control. RBS is more than 80% owned by the UK taxpayer, the Bank of Scotland is part of the Lloyds group which is 43% owned by the UK taxpayer and the Clydesdale Bank is part of National Australia Bank Group.

But the issuing of banknotes and coins is only a part of the money supply, and a diminishing one at that because of the ever increasing use of credit cards, direct debits and other non-physical money means of payment (http://www.paymentscouncil.org.uk/files/payments_council/future_of_cash2.pdf).   In addition there is the ability of financial institutions to expand the money supply by making loans directly to individuals and corporations, the use of state power to “print money” through procedures such as quantitative easing and the general fiscal tenor of a government in terms of such things as credit controls, taxation policy and regulation of the economy, especially the regulation of the banks and their ilk.

If all or any of these matters were left for the UK and an independent Scotland to decide each for themselves there would be inevitably serious political clashes. More fundamentally the effect of clashing policy decisions would be to undermine the Pound and by extension the economy of one or both countries. For example, if the UK introduced credit controls and Scotland did not, Scotland could run into the type of trouble created by the pre-2008 bubble while the UK did not, but the Pound would be weakened by the Scottish behaviour. If the Pound was shared between the UK and Scotland there would have to be very strict rules to ensure that reckless financial and fiscal behaviour was not possible. As mentioned previously, it is very doubtful that an independent Scotland would agree to such rules or observe them if they did officially accept them.

Allowing Scotland to use the Pound would have only disadvantages for England and would carry with it the risk of a sudden and drastic failure if Scotland became another Republic of Ireland or Iceland. For Scotland it would be all benefit because they would gain the advantage of using a recognised currency and know that the rest of the UK would have to bail them out if the Scottish economy went down the pan. Westminster should make it clear now that there is no question of an independent Scotland continuing to use the Pound.
The SNP are peddling a bogus independence .

If they really wanted Scotland to be its own master they would be seeking to establish their own currency not remain with the Pound or become enmeshed in the Euro.

SNP 2011 XMAS Novelties

Independence Puzzle

Based on the Rubik Cube principle,  when solved the puzzle represents  a map of the Scotch mainland with the word INDEPENDENCE  in the its centre.  WARNING: this is a very demanding puzzle and even the brightest players will almost certainly find it impossible to solve

Guess the English Subsidy Sweepstake

Each player puts  part of their English subsidy into a pot. Players write down  their guess  for a given year. The winner is the person with the guess which is closest to the actual figure. They collect the pot. The other players say it isn’t fair and send a petition to Westminster asking for even more English money.

Educational moneybox

The money  box is in the shape of mainland Britain. When money is to be saved it is put into an opening situated over central London  from where it slides quickly  to a point north of the Tweed. When money is  to be spent a lever is pressed and the money is disgorged  from another opening  placed over Edinburgh.

Jock-in-a-box

When opened a  figure   modelled on Alex Salmond  pops up saying with the characteristic whine of the Jock-in-a-box either  INDEPEEENDENCE or DEVOOO MAXXX .   The choice of word uttered when the box is  random. Bet on which it will be every time the box is opened.   Hours of innocent fun from this traditional favourite!

Independence  Crystal Ball

Look into the Crystal Ball to see when Independence will be gained.  WARNING: an inability to see any date is not evidence of  the item not being of merchandisable quality.

Tartan Snap

The cards contain various tartans. When two cards with the same tartan are placed down  consecutively  SCOTT is shouted in honour of Sir Walter Scott who created  the  idea of clan tartans to amuse George 1V on his visit to Scotland.

Animatronic  SNP Member

Dressed in a kaleidoscope of various clan tartans with a shape which resembles a beachball in human form,  the toy  Has a library of 50 phrases  including  “It isnae fair”, “t’Anglish are stealin’’ ouir oil”, “We wunt muir t’Anglish money” , “Independence an’ t’Anglish money” , “It’s  the fault of t’Anglish”.   Unlike the 2010 model , the phrases “Arc of Prosperity” and “Independence in Europe”  are not included in  the repertoire of phrases. Startlingly lifelike

The deep-fried cookbook

Contains SNP MSPs’ favourite recipes. Everything from the classic deep fried Mars Bars to deep fried porridge balls. Base your diet on these and look like your average SNP MSP!

My little Loch Ness Monster bath  toy

Spends most of the time submerged but surfaces every now and then to display the words  “Independence for Scotland Sometime! ” illustrated on its coils.  Bright pink, it will appeal to  girls as an alternative to My Little Pony.

Devolution Max Jigsaw

This is a jigsaw with a difference.  It comes with the pieces marked with legends  such as “Armed Forces”;  Unemployment Benefit”, “Sick Benefit”, “State Pension”, “Westminster Parliament”,  and “Continuing English Subsidy”. The trick is to form the jigsaw picture with the “Continuing English Subsidy”  at the centre even though the pieces are cut so as not to fit together.

Oil Monopoly

A game for a maximum of six players. Instead of a  board marked “Victoria Station”;  “Mayfair” and “Gasworks” and so on , there is one consisting  of squares carrying legends such as “Shetlands”, “Aberdeen Refinery” and   “English North Sea Oil and Gas” . When players pass  GO they receive £200 of English money.  The Community Chest   and Chance cards are marked  with messages such as “There is a LibLab Coalition government,  collect  £1,000 extra from England” and “Independence is cancelled. Return the “Wee Pretendy Parliament money to England” .  The winner is the player who accumulates most of the oil and gas assets around the UK. Oil and gas in English waters scores treble.

Porridge Oats Modelling Set

A kit consisting of a set of moulds, oats, mixing bowl  and  measuring jug.  Oats and water are mixed and then poured  into the mould.  Moulds include  Alex Salmond,  The Wee Pretendy Parliament and the Edinburgh tram system.

Warning: toxic: not to be  put in mouth

HURRY…HURRY…HURRY… WHILE JOCKS LAST

The complete “Wages of Scottish independence”

I have now completed the series on the implications of Scottish independence on the Calling England blog. They cover all the important ground relating to the question:

The wages of Scottish independence – England, Wales and Northern Ireland must be heard

In the matter of Scottish independence, the British political elite and the Scottish Numpty Party (SNP) are flatly ignoring the interests of the English, Welsh and Northern Irish. This is unreasonable for two reasons: firstly, the granting of independence to … Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – If Parliament says NO

Whether or not Scotland would vote for independence is debatable. Polls consistently show a majority against, although there are always a substantial number of “don’t knows”. In a referendum held only in Scotland with the YES campaign headed by the … Continue reading →

Geographically Scotland is very isolated. It is a stranded at the top of mainland Britain with a single land border with England. Any goods or people coming and going to Scotland have a choice of independent access by air and … Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – a divided country

The divided country is not the UK but Scotland. Its divisions are cultural, geographical, religious, demographic and racial. Demographically Scotland is a most peculiar place. It has a population estimated at 5.2 million in 2010 (http://www.scotland.org/facts/population/) set in an area … Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – membership of the EU

The Scottish Numpty Party (SNP) leader Alex Salmond has a dream; well, more of an adolescent fantasy really. He imagines that an independent Scotland would immediately be embraced enthusiastically by the EU. In the more heroically bonkers versions of the fantasy, … Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – The monarchy

The Scottish Numpty Party (SNP) has committed itself to the Queen being Scotland’s head of state should independence occur. http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/wintour-and-watt/2011/may/25/alexsalmond-queen). As with so much of the SNP policy towards independence this presumes something which is far from self-evident, namely, that …Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – immigration

The Scots Numpty Party (SNP) fondly imagines that an independent Scotland would continue to have free access to England. They recklessly assume Scotland’s position would be akin to that of the Republic of Ireland. However, that assumption rests on a …Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – Public Debt

One thing is certain about an independent Scotland: it would begin life with a massive national debt. Exactly how much is problematic because the Scottish referendum on independence will probably not be held until 2015. The Scots Numpty Party (SNP) …Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – the currency problem

The most problematic decision for an independent Scotland is the currency. There are three choices: to keep using the pound, join the Euro or create their own currency. If they choose the pound or Euro they will not be truly … Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – the loss of the military

 

One of the most complex aspects of disentangling Scotland from the rest of the UK should Scotland become independent is defence. It is complex because of (1) the siting of the Trident submarines and other major ships at Faslane; (2) … Continue reading →

The wages of Scottish independence – public sector employment

One of the many major issues which an independent Scotland would have to address is the extent to which the Scottish economy is dependent on public spending and in particular the number of public sector jobs which would be moved … Continue reading →

These posts also address the same subject:

The truth about UK oil and gas

 

The Scots Numpty Party (SNP) bases its case for the viability of Scotland’s independence on the idea that wicked England has been “stealin’ ouir oil” and that if only they had control of the tax revenues from UK oil and gas … Continue reading →

Make sure the costs of Scottish independence get into the media

The letter below was published in the Times 10 May 2011. It is extremely important that the debate on independence for Scotland is conducted on the basis that Scotland will not be allowed to walk away from the financial obligations … Continue reading →

Scottish independence? Yes, but only on these terms

The Scots Numpty Party (SNP) has managed to defeat the attempts of the unionists who deliberately devised the electoral system to thwart single party government (and hence leave independence off the practical political agenda) and get a majority in Scotland. The …Continue reading →


The wages of Scottish independence – England, Wales and Northern Ireland must be heard

In the matter of Scottish independence, the British political elite and the Scottish Numpty Party (SNP) are flatly  ignoring the interests of the English, Welsh and Northern Irish.  This is unreasonable for two reasons: firstly, the granting of independence to Scotland has considerable political, economic and security implications for the remainder of the UK and, secondly, the conditions on which Scotland might be allowed to leave the Union are of direct interest to the rest of the UK, because if they are too generous to Scotland they will disadvantage England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

The granting of over-generous conditions to the Scots  is probable with the present Coalition Government, which has done nothing to abate the appeasement of the Scots so assiduously practised by New Labour since 1997  by continuing the Barnett Formula and tossing juicy bones to Edinburgh such as increasing the number of armed forces personnel in Scotland at a time of massive reductions in Britain’s defence forces (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/8646134/Liam-Fox-Scottish-defence-footprint-to-increase-despite-RAF-Leuchars-closure.html).  There is also the strong possibility that the present Government would attempt to placate Scots by going for devolution max or independence lite, either of which would shift major powers to Scotland such as fiscal independence and the revenues from the oil and gas in Scottish waters without the Scots taking on a share proportionate to their population of the UK’s financial obligations.

It is also true that even if the cutting adrift of Scotland was entirely equitable in terms of the division of debts and assets, the rest of the UK (and especially England) would have a serious interest in blocking the divorce. To begin with, an independent Scotland would not be able to guard its own borders or patrol the oil and gas fields in its waters because of its small population, the large territory in relation to the population and the sheer cost of doing so. The rest of the UK (in reality England because Wales and Northern  Ireland receive far more from the UK Treasury tax pot than they put in)  would in practice be providing Scotland’s defence,  because no country could imagine that an attack on Scotland would not bring in England.

There would also be the threat of immigration from an independent Scotland to England. Scotland could operate an open door policy in the sure knowledge that immigrants entering Scotland would overwhelmingly head for England. Scotland might even act as a national people trafficker by selling entry to Scotland and/or Scottish citizenship. If both Scotland and England remain within the EU, the Westminster Government would be unable to do anything about the immigration to England via Scotland  of any number of people from both within and without the EU.

Lastly, there would be the question of what would  happen if  an independent Scotland ran into the sort of economic trouble experienced currently by the Republic of Ireland and Greece. As sure as eggs are eggs, England would be called upon to bail her out.  Even if that did not happen it is probable that an independent Scotland would not be able or willing to finance her share of the accrued financial obligations of the UK. There would be no way of guaranteeing that an independent Scotland could service even her 9 per cent share of the UK national debt (which is officially projected to be  at least £1.3 trillion at
the proposed referendum date of 2015) let alone her PFI and other public service debt (http://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2011/06/02/the-wages-of-scottish-independence-public-debt/). The reality  is that if Scotland had a nominal independence England would be the guarantor of last resort, underwriting Scotland’s obligations accrued both before and after independence.

The rest of the UK, and especially England, clearly have a pressing interest in the question of  Scottish independence. How should that interest be given a  political voice? This can be done either with a referendum on Scottish independence in which they (but not the Scots) vote on a simple question such as “Should Scotland be allowed to vote on whether they want independence” or by a referendum held in England, Wales and Northern Ireland on any conditions for independence which have been agreed between the UK and Scottish Governments and accepted by the two parliaments. It is important to understand that UK Government cannot simply decide to grant Scotland independence, because the 1707  Act of Union would have to be repealed by the Westminster Parliament  and the Scottish Parliament would have to accept the conditions for independence and pass legislation preparing Scotland for independence if a YES vote was obtained. (The later Acts bringing  Ireland into the Union and then adjusting the Union to include Northern Ireland rather than Ireland,  would be amended by the doctrine of implied repeal. However, a new Act might be passed clarifying the new situation).

A  vote on the simple question of independence should be held in England, Wales and Northern Ireland  and a YES vote obtained  before a Scottish referendum is  held.  If a NO vote resulted then Scottish independence would be off the agenda.   Similarly, if the conditions are voted upon, this should be done before the vote is put to the Scots.  A NO vote would mean that either Scottish independence was off the agenda or that the conditions had to be changed and put to the English, Welsh and Northern Irish electorates again.  Nothing short of Westminster abolishing the Scottish parliament and government by repealing the devolution settlement as it applied to Scotland could prevent a referendum, being organised by the Scottish government and sanctioned by the Scottish parliament, but such a referendum would have no legal or constitutional status.

If Scotland declared UDI they would legally  be in rebellion. That would not only lay Scotland open to catastrophic sanctions by Westminster but also put them at odds with the EU because  an independent Scotland created illegally would not automatically  have EU status. It would also be a very dangerous thing for the EU to offer any support on encouragement to part of an established EU member seceding from the member because there are so many parts of the EU which might do the same. In theory this might play into the hands of Eurocrats because it undermines the powerful  national state, but in practice it would simply strengthen nationalism and in the most messy and chaotic manner with
micro-states popping up all over the EU.  This consideration would also prevent the EU
pushing for Scotland to be made  independent in the case of Scotland voting YES in a referendum which had no legal status.  However, the EU might well push for greater
devolved powers short of independence for Scotland in  such circumstances. That needs watching.

There is also the ticklish question of what the franchise should be for the Scottish referendum on independence. Like the rest of the UK, Scotland is far from being ethnically monolithic. The 2001 census showed 88 per cent of the population being White Scottish, 9 per cent White non-Scottish  and 2 per cent black or Asian. (http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2004/02/18876/32939).
There are also different electoral qualifications for voting in Scotland and the rest of the UK, these varying between UK national elections, elections to the devolved assemblies, EU elections and local elections. Elections to the Scottish parliament include Scottish residents from other EU countries in the electorate, while elections to the Commons do not. Conversely, ex-patriot Britons are allowed to vote for Westminster MPs while they are not allowed the privilege in the election of MSPs to the Scottish parliament even if they are on Scottish electoral registers. As there are large numbers of Scots living outside
Scotland,  this is no small difference.

The Scottish government Draft Referendum (Scotland) Bill Consultation Paper  states “Eligibility to vote will follow the precedent of the 1997 referendum in being based on who
can vote at Scottish Parliament and Scottish local government elections. However, the draft Bill provides that those aged 16 or 17 on the electoral register on the date of the referendum will also be entitled to”.   (http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2010/02/22120157/7)

That is all very well on paper, but there is no guarantee that the Commons would accept such a franchise because that would mean a large proportion of voters could be either without British citizenship or possessed of dual citizenship. It would in principle be possible to identify people from outside Scotland who would be willing to vote for independence, ship large numbers of them into the country shortly before a referendum, get them registered as resident in Scotland and effectively fix a YES vote.

There is also the strong possibility that there would judicial challenges from those excluded particularly ex-patriot Scots. In a country such as modern Britain they might well succeed, so hemmed about with laws and treaties obligations restricting what parliaments and governments may do. Most particularly Article 3 of the first Protocol to the Human Rights Act runs “The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.”  It is all too easy to foresee the type of legal wrangles over who comes within the definition of “the people”, especially in the case of ex-patriot Scots.  Would a Scot have to live outside Scotland for six months, a year, five years or what to count as not being part of the people?

If the Scottish parliament could not simply lay down who should vote in the referendum large numbers of possibilities arise. Here are a few. Should every adult living in Scotland get the vote? Should it be every adult who is qualified to vote for the Scottish Parliament? Should it be only British citizens living in Scotland?  Should it be only Scots living in Scotland? Should it be Scots living throughout the UK? What about Scots living abroad? Should they be allowed to vote as ex-pat Britons are allowed to vote in Westminster elections? Should it be any adult in Scotland entitled to vote in EU elections? Should it be every adult in Scotland entitled to vote in local elections?

The above facts speak for themselves: there is considerable doubt about when and in what form a referendum on Scottish independence might be held. It is vital that the many unresolved questions are answered before any referendums are held and that the political elite in the UK does not simply railroad an independence referendum through without giving the people of  England, Wales and Northern Ireland a say in that which so directly concerns them.

The wages of Scottish independence – If Parliament says NO

Whether or not Scotland would vote for independence is debatable.  Polls consistently show a majority against, although there are always a substantial number of “don’t
knows”.  In a  referendum held only in Scotland with the YES campaign headed by the Scottish Numpty Party  (SNP) leader Alex  Salmond and the  NO campaign led by Scottish
non-entities or people from outside of Scotland such as Cameron, it is possible  that a YES result might be obtained, especially if there is a low turnout and there is no minimum turnout required for the referendum to have force.  If  the referendum is held before  the conditions for independence are decided, as Salmond wants,  the chances of a YES vote would be considerably increased because voters would be buying into the idea of independence based on the wildly irresponsible SNP fantasy of a Scotland made rich by oil revenues rather than the reality.

From his public comments David Cameron appears to accept that the results of a referendum held in Scotland  would  be binding because he stated in June 2011 that
if a referendum is  held he will  campaign as vigorously as possible  for a NO. But it is not in Cameron’s gift to  say that a referendum will be binding,  because the Act of Union of 1707 would require repeal. Before any referendum is held Cameron  would  have to persuade the Westminster Parliament to pass a Bill which granted Scotland independence in the event of  a YES vote, with the YES  triggering a repeal of the  Act of Union. As a matter of practicality it would also have to contain the conditions under which Scotland would be granted independence, because it is improbable in the extreme  that the House of Commons would give an absolute promise  of independence, that is, allow the Scots to vote  for independence without the conditions being agreed in advance of the referendum. (If  the Commons did perpetrate such an act of folly it would create untold strife between the Westminster and the SNP because it is a fair bet that Salmond would ask for impossible terms). What could happen is that there are either two referenda, one on an undefined independence with a second after conditions have been agreed between Westminster and Edinburgh, or a single referendum on an undefined independence with a vote in the Commons on conditions for independence after these have been agreed between Westminster and Edinburgh.   This would be the disadvantage of the rest of the UK because the SNP would be arguing for favourable conditions with the propaganda tool of a YES vote behind them.

It is unclear where Cameron stands on the agreeing of conditions for independence, viz: “ He [Cameron] has made it clear that the referendum question would have to be  straightforward rather than the multiple-choice version favoured by the SNP: Cameron wants the voters to be asked a simple question, along the following lines “Do you wish Scotland to remain part of the United Kingdom?” Last night a Westminster source with inside knowledge of the new hard – line stance being adopted by Mr Cameron commented: “Mr Salmond must be honest and straightforward with the Scottish people in his phrasing of the question for the referendum. If he isn’t we will conduct the referendum.” ‘(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/8565826/David-Cameron-might-take-Scottiish-independence-referendum-off-Alex-Salmond.html).
This  does not  indicate whether the conditions would  be decided before or after  the referendum, but,  as mentioned previously, it is  unlikely that the Commons would accept a binding commitment without knowing the conditions. Again, the Commons would have control of what happened because if Cameron wished for the Coalition to run a referendum new legislation by Westminster would be needed. If Cameron takes charge of the referendum it would provide the SNP with a recruiting sergeant for independence because they could march under their favourite banner of “the English are oppressing us”.

Bt whatever the result of  a referendum,  there would still be the need for legislation to dissolve the Union and it is by no means certain that the Coalition Government or any other would be able to force such a Bill through the House of Commons. There are three reasons for this. The first is the self-interest of  the Labour and LibDem parties, both of which rely disproportionately on Scottish seats in their representation in the  Commons. At the 2010 General election  41 out of 257 Labour seats were  in Scotland, as were  11 of the Libdems total  of 57.
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/election_2010/scotland/8663161.stm).  If the 59 Scottish seats were removed from the House of Commons,  it would be very  difficult for Labour ever to form a government by themselves.  A coalition of   Labour and the LIbDems  would perhaps stand a better chance of forming a government in a rump UK, but it would not be that much better , especially in the disillusionment of LibDem voters in the aftermath of the formation of the Coalition which has seen them both break election promises, most notably their written pledge on university tuition fees, and attach their
name to many unpopular policies such as the rapid reduction of public debt and  further
privatisation of the NHS. There are also sincere unionists in both the Labour and the LibDem parties who would vote against on principle.

But it is not  only Labour and the LibDems who might vote against a Bill to dissolve the  union.  It would be in the interest of the Tory party to see an independent Scotland because it would greatly increase the likelihood a Tory Government in the rump UK. But the Tory Party is by history and inclination a unionist party.  Some Tory MPs might feel strongly enough to vote against the Bill on principle.  The fact that Cameron is firmly in the unionist camp would give individual Tories, especially the backbenchers, encouragement to vote independence down.

The Bill could also be rejected  by the Commons  if were unduly generous to Scotland, for example,  it did not require Scotland to take a share proportionate to their population of UK National debt at the time of  independence.

It is also a moot point whether MPs for Scottish seats would be allowed to vote on the repeal of the Act of Union. If they argue to be allowed to vote it could be argued that if the whole of the UK, as represented by the Commons, is voting on the matter, the referendum should include the whole of the UK.   There is also the possibility that before the conditions for independence as  agreed between the Government and the SNP (or
any other Scottish government)  are accepted as binding, they should be put to a referendum in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.  This would be both reasonable and  emasculate any Commons objection to conditions.

There is also a potential delay of several years lying in wait in the Lords.  If the Lords rejected either a Bill enacting Scottish independence or a Bill laying down conditions thought to be unacceptable, the Parliament Act would have to be used which entails both a statutory delay of one year  and possibly (although this would be highly unusual) further substantial delay when the Bill returned to the Commons for re-presenting to the Lords.   It is also worth remembering that when any Bill goes to the Lords initially there are plenty of opportunities delay matters.

What would happen if the Commons rejected Scottish independence after a Yes vote?  It would depend to a substantial degree on the turnout and the size of the Yes majority. If the
turnout and majority were small, say 35 per cent voting and a majority of a five per cent or less, it would be uncomfortable for the Government and would provide a very strong propaganda tool for the SNP and any other party supporting independence to either  raise the number in Scotland wanting independence at any price or to extract serious concessions from  the Government which could be anything from the continuance of the Barnett Formula and  massive funds for infrastructure projects in Scotland to arrangements leading to an independence lite or devolution max settlement.  The latter course would be much more likely  because the Alex Salmond has been pushing independence lite or devolution max very heavily since the SNP won a majority in the Scottish parliament  in May 2011.

If  a referendum resulted in a  low turnout but a large majority voting for independence, it would become more difficult for the Commons to vote against independence. It would also give the SNP more bargaining power to reach independence lite or devolution max.  A high turnout with a narrow majority would probably give Salmond less bargaining power because the Government and the Commons would be able to point to the large minority of the electorate voting against and claim  that such a serious step as independence needed a solid majority of the people behind it.

The most problematic situation would  be a high turnout with a substantial majority for independence. That would cause problems for both the Government and the SNP. The Government and  the Commons  would not be able to argue that the vote was not conclusive because either only a small proportion of the population had voted for independence in the case of a low turnout or that almost as many had voted NO as had voted Yes in a high turnout. The difficulty for the SNP would be that with a clear mandate the pro-independence Scots  would not accept anything less than full and unambiguous independence. The other great unknowable is what the political situation at Westminster will be in 2015 or whenever a referendum is held. The Coalition Government may say that  they will not go to the  country until 2015, but there is no certainty about that. Even if the Bill stipulating that Parliaments must run their full term is passed, it will still have a mechanism for going early, for example, sixty per cent of the Commons voting for  dissolution.   The relationship between the Coalition  partners is looking increasingly fractious and the News Corp phone hacking scandal bids fair to both make that worse,
strengthen Labour and conceivably force Cameron from the Premiership as more and  scandalous associations between Cameron and News Corp power players and journalists comes out.

If  the Parliament is dissolved before any referendum is held,  that will potentially scupper any agreement which Cameron (or any successor) may have made with Salmond. Any new Government would not be bound to honour such an agreement and even if an Act is on the Statute Book  which provides for a referendum and has a clause which  repeals the Act of Union, a new Government would still be under no obligation to honour it – a simple Bill repealing it would be all that is needed to prevent a referendum.

To add to the Westminster confusion, Lords Reform is still on the cards.   This will  not be
reform but in effect the abolition of the Lords and its replacement with a new House.  No one knows what the relationship will be between that House and the Commons. If it is elected in whole or part it would be difficult to deny it great powers than the Lords has. Those might be greater powers of veto, amendment of Commons legislation or delay of
Commons legislation.

An elected second chamber or one based on appointments to represent a greater range of British society than the Lords presently does would have a very different make-up from the Lords.  This could mean a second chamber much less responsive to the prevailing British political elite culture and mores. Such a chamber might well be hostile to the idea of placating Scotland, as Cameron seems to be determined to do, because growing English resentment of the privileges given to the Celtic Fringe and the subordination of English interests would be likely to be expressed more strongly in a reformed second chamber, especially a an elected one under proportional; representation, than  in the Lords which is overwhelmingly the creature of the mainstream political parties.

Speaking of English interests and resentment, there is the undelivered to date promise of “English votes on English laws” which Cameron made before the 2010 election.  If that promise is honoured  before a  referendum on Scottish independence, especially if an English Grand Committee is formed,  that would provide a focus and vehicle to either oppose such a referendum or influence the conditions for independence or the nature of the referendum to be held.

There is also the possibility that the SNP may cease to have a majority in the Scottish Parliament or even to be part of a Scottish Government before any referendum is held or conditions are decided. This is not that improbable because the SNP has the referendum on independence pencilled in for 2015, the very end of the present Parliament even if it runs its full term.

If the referendum has not been held by then there will be another set of elections to the Scottish parliament. The SNP could easily lose their majority because the economic realities are beginning to strike home in Scotland. The Brown Government agreed to delay cuts to Scotland’s block grant for a year and the Coalition  honoured this when they formed a Government in May 2010 (http://scotlandonsunday.scotsman.com/scotland/Tories-to-delay-cuts-for.6168741.jp).
This means that it is only in this financial year (2011/12) that cuts are occurring. But because the 2010/11 cuts were delayed, the cuts this financial year  includes those plus any others made since the Coalition gained office.   All the Scottish government did was put off
the pain.

If a situation is reached where a referendum has been held and a YES vote achieved but the House of Commons refuses to pass the necessary legislation  or a referendum is held  without conditions being agreed in advance and the Westminster Government is unable to agree  terms with Holyrood, what would be the position?  The Westminster Parliament and Government would hold all the aces if they  chose to play them because the Scottish government is dependent on Westminster raising the money to fund them. Even if  Scotland declared UDI (wildly improbable)  they would not be able to raise anything like the money they would need to fund everything in Scotland that is now funded by the taxpayer. To take one example, the Centre for Economic and Business Research  predicted in 2009 that by 2013 67 per cent of Scottish GDP would come from public spending (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article5489654.ece).
Anything short of UDI and Westminster could simply strangle Scotland by, for example, reducing the Treasury block grant to Scotland to the per capita level of England. That would remove around £8 billion pa from the Scottish government’s revenue.  The only question at issue is whether the Westminster Government would have the will to take such action.

The wages of Scottish independence – The monarchy

The Scottish Numpty Party (SNP) has committed itself to the Queen being Scotland’s head of state should independence occur.  http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/wintour-and-watt/2011/may/25/alexsalmond-queen). As with so much of the SNP policy towards independence this presumes something which is far from self-evident, namely, that
this would be acceptable to the Queen, practical or agreeable to the remainder of  the UK.

It  might seem a simple thing for the Queen to be Scotland’s  head of state for many of Britain’s ex-colonies and dominions, including substantial states such as Australia and
Canada, retain such a link with the old colonial power.   If she can act as head of state for them why not for an independent Scotland, a much smaller and more insignificant entity?   The answer is simple; all the Commonwealth  countries of which she is queen  are not intimately connected with Britain  geographically, administratively or economically.   Scotland is. In addition, if Scotland retained the pound she would have something no other Commonwealth country has, her fiscal policy substantially decided by Westminster.

To understand the potential dangers of the Queen as head of state of an independent Scotland a familiarity with the nature of the monarchy as it is today.  Britain’s monarchy
evolved from an executive to a constitutional one largely through convention rather than law.  For example, the  monarch stopped vetoing Acts of Parliament after the advent of the Hanoverians in 1714 not because the power was removed by Parliament,  but because the monarch did not use the power. In time this became a convention.  The consequence is that there are few constitutional bars placed on the Crown’s powers and the Royal prerogative is essentially what it was after the Bill of Rights was passed in 1690 in the aftermath of the overthrow of James II. (An up to date description of the Royal Prerogative can be found at (http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/briefings/snpc-03861.pdf).  However, all of the important  powers  which remain bar two  are exercised today by the Prime Minister.  The important exceptions  are (1) where the appointment of a prime minister  is to be made when there is no party with a clear majority in the Commons and the monarch has to decide whether a government can be formed and if so who is best able to do so and (2) the monarch’s decision whether to grant  a dissolution of  Parliament is not straightforward.  For example, suppose a coalition government breaks up and there is the possibility of forming a different coalition with a working majority, the monarch might  decide that the denial of a dissolution and the acceptance of a different coalition might be preferable to another General Election. That could be the case where there have been two General Elections in a short period which have failed to return a House of Commons with a workable  majority for a single party.  If the present Coalition pushes through the promised Bill to make future Parliaments go the full five years unless a strong majority in the Commons votes for a dissolution, this objection would  be much weakened. If the present arrangements for   general elections  in Scotland continue, namely that they be called only every four years , (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/46/part/I/crossheading/general-elections)
the difficulty will not arise.  However, in the case of an independent Scotland there would be more opportunity  for the monarch to be called upon to appoint a new government during the course of a parliament because  the electoral system is likely to produce coalitions and often coalitions of more than two parties.   At present the formation of the Scottish devolved Parliament and government does not involve the monarch. If Scotland became independent she would have to do one of three things: have a Governor-General as the Queen’s representative ;  have a  relationship in which the Queen performs  the same duties in Scotland as she does in the UK as it is presently constituted or some entirely new relationship which reduces the monarch to nothing more than a figurehead with no prerogative power or influence, for example, no Royal warrants, no part in hung parliaments and so on.  This strikes me as unlikely because it would offer  an example to  other Commonwealth states which persuade them to  lobby top change their relationship
with the Crown.

In the case of the appointment of a Governor-General,  that in itself would be a difficult political decision because the Scots would doubtless call for a Scot. The appointment of a Scot could produce a person  with divided loyalties or even worse one wholeheartedly biased towards Scotland’s interests.  Conversely, the failure to appoint a Scot could result in a continuous running political sore. But appointing a Scot as  Governor-General  would be no guarantee of compliance to Edinburgh’s wishes.  The Governor-General of Australia who dismissed Gough Whitlam as Australian Prime Minister in 1975, Sir John Robert Kerr, was Australian.

Any relationship other than one which was new  would produce constitutional difficulty, because the major element of the prerogative which the monarch still exercises which would be applicable to Scotland –  the decision of who should form a government where there is no clear cut electoral decision –  would force the monarch into politics, either
directly or through a High Commissioner.  This might not matter if coalitions were a
rarity in an independent  Scotland. But they would probably be the norm rather than a rarity.  If Scotland retains the  electoral system used for her devolved parliament, the monarch (or Governor-General)  would have to make such a decision  after most  Scottish general elections . Coalitions being fragile, there would also be multiple opportunities for more than one such decision to be made in any parliament.   If that were the case, the monarch (or Governor-General)  would constantly be brought into active politics. Should the monarch (or Governor-General ) make a decision which  was questionable, for example, accepting a coalition which excluded the party with the most seats, the monarch could be subject to personal political attacks. That could undermine the position of the
monarchy in the rest of the UK as well as Scotland.

Scotland could adopt a first-past-the-post electoral system, but that is most unlikely because of the vested interest all parties in  Scotland have in retaining the present system,
that is, all know they will have a chance of at least some seats, something which would not be the case under first-past-the-post.  But  even if a first-past-the-post system was adopted there would still be occasions when a   coalition was needed. This would be much
more likely in a small assembly such as the devolved parliament than in the House of Commons , which has more than  five times the members of the  Scottish parliament.

A small number of elected representatives means that any overall majority is going to be small whatever the electoral system.  That is simply a matter of arithmetic.  In a House with 646 members such as the House of Commons, a party winning 55% of the seats  has 355 members  which gives a majority of  64.  60% of the seats in the Scottish parliament (129 members)  is 71 seats and a majority of 13.  Managing a parliament for four or five years on a majority that small would be difficult. Every death or retirement of a member would take on considerable importance.  The opposition would be constantly on the alert to embarrass the government with “ambush” voting and refusals to pair.  This would make coalitions even where an overall majority likely within their potential for politically embarrassing the monarch.

That is not the only chance of political embarrassment or worse for the monarch. The Queen acts a conduit for  the UK Government’s legislative programme through the Queen’s speech. She does not do the same for the devolved government in Edinburgh.   If  an independent Scotland wished the Queen to give a Queen’s speech in an independent Scottish parliament , she could easily find herself proclaiming contradictory policies in Westminster and Edinburgh, for example,  Westminster might decide to raise duty on Scotch whiskey while Edinburgh opposed such a move. More dramatically, if Scotland continued to use the pound the Scottish government might, for example,  argue for lower
interest rates and Westminster to raise them.

The monarch might also find herself having to speak words written for her by either government which would insult or enrage either Westminster or Edinburgh. It is easy to imagine Alex Salmond putting anti-English rhetoric into a Scottish Queen’s speech.

Embarrassment could also arise if those who were persona non grata to either  Westminster and Edinburgh were entertained by the other and monarch had to meet them. Or the monarch might be called upon to undertake a public duty which was unpalatable to one of the governments, for example opening a nuclear power station in England and praising it as the best way of ensuring future energy supplies while Scotland continued with a no nuclear policy.    The same problems would arise with any lesser royal, in whom they me, the speeches they might give and the places they might visit.

If an independent Scotland decided to use the Royal Prerogative powers which the Westminster Government  uses,  they would be much more potent in Scotland than they are at Westminster. The small size of the  Scottish Parliament would lend itself much more easily to corruption and intimidation because there would be few people who would need to be corrupted or intimidated. That would, for example,  make the use of existing prerogative powers which allow ministers to produce law without having to put legislation through Parliament a potentially dangerous weapon  in the hands of a Scottish Prime Minister inclined  to govern autocratically. In the latter days of the last Labour Government  The Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill 2008-0 (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/46/part/I/crossheading/general-elections)
was passed. This did put some restrictions on the Royal Prerogative such as giving Parliament  a say in the  waging of war and the agreement to Treaties . But that Act only applies to the Westminster Parliament and UK Government. An independent Scottish Parliament could use the Prerogative in its form prior to that Act.  They could, amongst other things,  make treaties or declare war without  Parliamentary approval.  The Queen could end up supporting a treaty  or war in one country and opposing it in another.

A particularly fraught  problem  is the position of the armed forces. The UK armed forces owe their loyalty to the monarch not Parliament or Government.  Imagine the situation after Scottish independence if both Scotland and the UK had their separate armed forces who were yet all subject to the authority of the monarch.   The opportunities for disagreement would be immense, as indeed they were before the Union when the English and Scottish crowns were united.  In the 1690s Scotland  developed a madcap scheme to establish a colony on the Isthmus of Panama  http://www.rogermoorhouse.com/article2.html).  Its promoters knew nothing about the reality of the site, which was inhospitable. It also fell within the Spanish  ambit.  The promoters of the scheme  called on William III  as King of Scotland to use English colonial power,  English troops and the Royal Navy to support the colony and to generally aid them to the disadvantage of English interests.   William refused because he did not wish to give Spain grounds for war  or create opposition in England.  It is conceivable that similar clashed of interest could arise again, for example, if an independent Scotland could not defend  its territorial waters and called on  the Royal Navy to do so.

That would be an awkward enough marriage of dissonant interests, but the SNP leader is hoping for an independent Scotland and the remainder of the UK to share a common defence force (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/scotland/8515034/Sir-Mike-Jackson-tells-Alex-Salmond-British-soldiers-have-only-one-master.html).
That would create an impossible situation whereby Scotland might wish to  withhold  troops and equipment  from Westminster  if there was disagreement about how they might
be deployed.  Servicemen cannot  have two political masters.

Those are some of the problems which would come with an independent Scotland with the Queen as head of state. There are others, for example, the funding of the monarchy. What would Scotland pay?  Or the diplomatic service; how would UK and Scottish ambassadors in the same country, both appointed by the monarch, reconcile different views on the
same diplomatic matters?   What is clear is that a return to the 1707 situation of one crown but two countries would be immensely messy and not in England’s interest.  If Scotland becomes independent it should be without  the Queen as head of state.   The Queen (or her successor) could not veto this,  because the Parliamentary settlement of 1689 with William III puts the ascension of a monarch to the throne of England  in the gift of Parliament.

Scottish independence? Yes, but only on these terms

The Scots Numpty Party (SNP) has managed to defeat the  attempts of the unionists who deliberately devised the electoral system to thwart single party government (and hence leave independence off the practical political agenda) and get a majority in Scotland.  The SNP leader Alex Salmond  can  now call  a referendum on independence . However, to have a referendum which is binding,   the SNP needs the sanction of the UK Parliament. From  his public comments David Cameron appears to accept that such a referendum would be binding because he has stated since this SNP victory that if a referendum was held he would campaign for a NO.

Whether or not Scotland would vote for independence is debatable.   Polls consistently show a majority against, although there are always a substantial number of “don’t knows”.  In a  referendum held only in Scotland with the YES campaign headed by  Salmond and the  NO campaign led by Scottish non-entities or people from outside of Scotland such as Cameron, it is possible  that a Yes result might be obtained.

I have no visceral objection to Scots independence, but the strongest objection to Scotland walking away from the Union  without taking full responsibility for themselves and leaving the English to pick up the financial mess which a mixture of regular English subsidy of Scotland and the massive costs of the rescuing  the Scottish banks RBS and HBOS.   To this end the conditionsCameron should lay down for Scottish independence are these :

1. Scotland to take a share of the UK National debt (excluding the costs involved in supporting Scottish  banks and building societies, mainly the RBS and HBOS banks)  proportionate to the percentage of the UK population in Scotland.  The servicing of this debt to be the first charge on Scotland’s public financing.

2.  Scotland to pay for the past and future costs  of bailing out  Scottish  banks and building societies.

3.  The huge English subsidies to Scotland to cease immediately on  a Yes vote being achieved.

4. All English public sector jobs which have been exported to Scotland to be brought back to England.  This would include not merely traditional civil service posts,   but facilities such as those supporting UK nuclear submarines.

5. Scotland to launch its own currency or join the Euro.  If they remain tied to the pound they would have no true independence and practically be  dependent on England for the macro management of their economy.

6. The division of the oil and gas fields to be made on the basis of  extending a line at the angle of the coastline on the England-Scotland border.  This is in accordance with the UN  convention  on the Law of the Sea article 7  – see http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.
This would give England a substantial proportion of the oil and even more of the gas fields.

7. Scotland to be gifted any state owned building in Scotland but to have no claim on publicly owned facilities in the remainder of the UK.

8. Nuclear submarines and any other  fundamentally important military equipment to
be moved to England

9.  All military research to be moved to England.

10. All future UK defence expenditure to be made in the remainder of the UK.

11.  Scotland to form its own armed forces. These will have to be capable of not only defending Scottish land but also of policing Scottish  territorial waters.

12. Scotland to be gifted all military  establishments  in Scotland , but Scotland to have no claim on military establishments elsewhere in the UK or abroad.

13. Military equipment. Scotland to be gifted existing equipment sufficient to equip whatever forces Scotland forms provided this equipment does not exceed what is available to similar UK forces.

14. All publicly funded non-military research in Scotland to be moved to the remainder of the UK.

15. Scotland to be responsible for the payment of all public sector pensions earned in Scotland before independence.

16. Scotland to be responsible for  a share proportionate to the percentage of the
UK population in Scotland  of  EU related pension earned before independence.

17. Scotland to be responsible for the  financing all government contracts relating to
building, goods and services supplied in Scotland which were entered into before
independence.

18. Property relating to UK diplomatic missions to remain the property of the remainder of the UK.

19. Scotland to be responsible for  a share  of diplomatic pensions earned before independence proportionate to the percentage of the UK population  in Scotland.

20. Scotland to be responsible for  a share  of any  public service pensions other
than those related to the diplomatic corps which is earned abroad  before independence proportionate to the percentage of the UK population  in Scotland.

21.  Immigration to Scotland from outside the EU and for any future new EU members to be controlled on the same basis as the UK  controls immigration.

22. Scotland to make its  own application for EU membership  without support from the Westminster government.

23. If the remainder of the UK or England alone leaves the EU, the following  may be put in place:

a) border controls between Scotland and the remainder of the UK

b) Scotland to be treated as any other member of the EU would be treated

c) UK protectionist barriers to  Scotland

d) an end to free movement from Scotland to the remainder of the UK

e)an end to Scots citizens enjoying the benefits of the UK Welfare State

24. If Scotland is unable to gain EU membership, all of  23  may apply apart from (b).

Conditions 1-22 can be enforced while  the UK  without Scotland remains in the EU. If  the UK without Scotland leaves the EU or England alone leaves the EU,  then condition 22 is legal.

Scots will  complain about not being given a share equivalent to their proportion of the UK
population of  the material assets of the UK armed forces or of diplomatic assets abroad. However, it is not unreasonable to advantage the remainder of the UK because England has massively subsidised  Scotland since the Union in 1707.  The subsidy began with the Act of Union, viz:

“Clause IX. THAT whenever the sum of One million nine hundred ninety seven thousand seven hundred and sixty three pounds eight shillings and four pence half penny, shall be enacted by the Parliament of Great Britain to be raised in that part of the United Kingdom now called England, on Land and other Things usually charged in Acts of Parliament there, for granting an Aid to the Crown by a Land Tax; that part of the United Kingdom now called Scotland, shall be charged by the same Act, with a further Sum of forty-eight
thousand Pounds, free of all Charges, as the Quota of Scotland, to such Tax, and to proportionably for any greater or lesser Sum raised in England by any Tax on Land, and other Things usually charged together with the Land; and that such Quota for Scotland, in the Cases aforesaid, be raised and collected in the same Manner as the Cess now is in Scotland, but subject to such Regulations in the manner of collecting, as shall be made by the Parliament of Great Britain.” Act of Union (http://englandcalling.wordpress.com/the-act-of-union-1707/)

The population of England was five times that of Scotland in 1707. Had Scotland  paid the  tax listed in Clause IX at the same rate as England  they would have paid £400,000.
Instead they were required to pay only  £48,000, roughly a ninth of the pro rata sum.

As for the oil and gas revenues, a substantial  part of that has come from oil and gas English  waters. Moreover,  oil revenues have only been flowing for around thirty years and Scotland was being subsidised by England for the better part of three centuries before that.   Nor is it true that oil and gas revenues have been consistently high because the oil and gas price was very low for a decade or more. In most years since 1980 Scotland would not have been contributing more to the UK Treasury than they took out even if ALL the oil and gas tax was allocated to them.

If the Scots wished to start claiming they should be compensated for things such as the UK  military expenditure , the retort would be all right we will let you  have that,  but in return we will expect you to repay all the subsidies Scotland has received since the Union began.

It is very improbable that Scotland would vote for independence on the terms I have outlined, but anything less would mean that England was taken for a ride and Scotland allowed to evade their responsibilities.  There is a very real danger that Cameron would pander to the Scots and let them escape these obligations. That is why English campaigners should begin now to press politicians to make sure the Scots are not allowed an easy ride to independence at England’s expense.