Category Archives: EU

Brexit and surviving Mrs Maybe

Robert Henderson

The shamelessly   anti-democratic remainers are queuing up to cheat the British electorate of Brexit. Those in the media and the likes of Gina Miller  shriek that a hard Brexit is dead and it is already  reported that remainer MPs from both the Tory and Labour parties are plotting to overturn  Brexit and Theresa May knows about it but does nothing.  May’s Chancellor Philip Hammond openly defies her on Brexit by saying that no deal with the EU would be a “very bad outcome”.

In Scotland the SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon beats the same drum and the leader of the Tories in Scotland Ruth Davidson talks of legally detaching the Scottish Conservatives  from  the UK  Party whilst  insisting that a hard Brexit should be watered down and stating baldly that  the  13 MPs from Scotland who are now sitting in the Commons should vote according to their consciences not to the dictates of Tory Party whip.

There is also another possible legal challenge brewing with a  claim that the Act passed to allow the letter to be sent to the EU triggering Article 50 did not such thing because it did not  address the question of the legality of the UK leaving the EU.

More immediately worrying  is the proposed supply and confidence arrangement   with the Democratic Unionists (DUP)  of Northern Ireland  and the  concessions the  DUP will insist on and the knock-on effects with Scotland and Wales which will undoubtedly want  for themselves  whatever  the DUP gets or something of similar political value.    The terms of the arrangement have yet to be agreed,  but we can be sure that the DUP will insist on not having a hard border between the  Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland . Anything other than a hard border would utterly undermine one of the primary objects of Brexit, namely, control of the UK’s borders.  Nor is it certain that any deal will be made.

All in all a very pretty political mess with no risk free way of escaping.  Calling another election soon  would probably   result in  a Labour win or at least a Labour led coalition government.  At best it is unlikely that it would leave  the Tories in a better position than they are in.  Moreover, the Fixed Term Parliaments Act is still in place. To call an election before the end of the five year Parliament stipulated in the Act  requires a two-thirds majority of   the  full complement of MPs  (currently 650) whether  or not a constituency has an MP at the time of voting or whether an MP abstains.   In short at least 417 MPs  must vote for an election.   There is a good chance that neither  the Parties with seats  in the Commons nor many individual MPs with smallish majorities would want another election soon: the Parties because of the cost (if an election was held this year it would mean  funding three elections in two years) and   individual MPs for  the fear of losing their seats.

There is one way the Tories might be able to cut this Gordian knot because  they are so close to a majority in the Commons the Government is in a much stronger position than might be thought  from the media and general political  response following the failure of May to gain a majority .  May  or a successor could  try governing  without a majority.

The  number of MPs  needed for a Commons majority is pedantically 326. But this is misleading because the  seven Sinn Fein MPs will not  take their seats as a matter of principle (they refuse to swear an oath of allegiance to the Crown)and the Speaker only votes in the event of a tie (when by convention he votes for the status quo). Hence, the figure in practice for a Commons majority is  322. This means the Tories are a  mere 4 MPs short of a majority.

The Tories  could probably govern as a minority government without any support most of the time, because any defeat of  government legislation would require almost every non-Tory MP  to vote against the government. That is not easy to organise day in day out, week in week out.  Moreover, it is most unlikely that MPs from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland would want to hold up many of the  money Bills because that would mean their countries  would not get their  part of the money .  In addition, it is likely that the DUP would support the Tories on most occasions simply because they agreed with Tory policies and for the fear of something worse, that is, a Corbyn government. .

The main danger for the Tories  would be a  vote for a motion of No Confidence.   But it would not be easy to marshal the disparate MPs who make up the opposition.  It is possible that some Tories might abstain or even vote against on individual Tory policies , but improbable  that they would vote for a motion of No Confidence.

It is conceivable that a few  Tory remainers might cross the floor of the House of Commons and join a Corbyn  government. This idea  is unlikely  but  not absurd because Brexit is one of those rare defining issues which could cause remainer  Tory MPs to defect.  More probable would  be Tory remainers being willing to vote on  Bills put forward  by a Corbyn government which relate to Brexit.

But let us assume that a motion of No Confidence was passed, what then?  Could Corbyn form a government with a majority? He might well struggle because he  would have to take all the Ulster  Unionist MPs with him. Given Corbyn’s  record of  enthusiastically consorting with Irish Republicans of dubious provenance  it is unlikely he would be able to bring them on board even on the basis of confidence and supply. But even if he could cobble together a government of all MPs other than Tory ones,  it would be hopelessly  unstable because of the vast  spread of political opinions it would have to encompass and the fact that the Labour Party is nowhere near to being able to form a government on its own.   The proposed hook-up between the Tories and the DUP has a much better chance of surviving.

It is possible that no government could be formed which could command  the confidence of the Commons. That would create an interesting constitutional problem because the Fixed Term Parliaments Act  would mean that Parliament could not be dissolved unless two thirds of the Commons voted for it. That would mean that any new election could not be painted as the responsibility of the Tory Party as many MPs other than Tory ones would have to vote for it. That would remove part of the toxicity  of an early election for the Tories.

If May (or a Tory successor) could get through another 18  months in power that might be enough for the public to turn against Corbyn and/or simply get bored with his antics and those of the likes of McDonnell. It would also allow enough to time get the negotiations  for Brexit so well entrenched that it would be difficult to overturn them even if a different government took office. The fly in the ointment is of course the likely attempts at betrayal by the present Government or any successor government  headed by a Tory other than Theresa May.

If the Tory government does survive it must operate  for the foreseeable political future on the basis that Brexit comes before everything else apart from maintaining  the functions of the state and civil order. Any legislation in policy areas other than Brexit which is contentious should be shelved until Brexit is completed.

There must also be red lines drawn. One of the primary problems with May was her refusal or inability to spell out what she would and would not accept when negotiating with the EU.  The government whether led by May or someone else must make clear the following:

That there is no hard and soft Brexit there is simply Brexit

That the UK will leave the single  market.

That the UK will leave the customs union .

That the UK will have full control over her borders for people, goods and services.

That the UK will have full control of her territorial waters including those relating to the 200 mile limit.

That after leaving the UK will not be subject to the European Court of Justice or any other judicial body  linked to the EU or the EEA.

That the UK will not pay any leaving fee.

That the UK will be paid a proportionate share of the EU’s assets.

That would both reassure the majority who voted of Brexit and make any backsliding by the government very difficult.

The remainers throw away their best chance of sabotaging Brexit.

Robert Henderson

Astonishingly, the remainers have missed their best chance to hinder the Brexit  process by  failing to seriously oppose the motion  put down by Theresa May that a General Election be held on 8 June. The motion was passed on 19 April 201`7 by 522 votes to 13.

This is an extraordinary result on the face of it. What is even more astonishing is the fact that the remainers could have defeated the motion quite easily. All  they had to do was muster 217 votes or abstentions to overthrow the motion for an early election. Indeed, they could have done it simply by getting 217 MPs to abstain. The Labour Party, with 229 MPs, could have managed the matter on their own, as could a coalition of, say,  two thirds of Labour MPs, the Scots Nat MPs and the LibDem MPs voting against or abstaining.

Let me divert for a moment to explain the status of abstentions in this context. In this vote an abstention has the same value as a vote against. This is  because it is the total number of MPs who vote for the motion that matters, not the percentage of those who actually vote for or against a motion.

Under the Fixed Term Parliaments Act  two thirds of the 650 member House of Commons have to vote for a motion proposing  an early election.   Two thirds of 650 is 434. Hence one  vote against   or one abstention can make a difference. If 433 MPs vote for the motion with, say,  only 100 voting against but with 117 abstaining,  the motion fails because it is one short of 434.

Even without any party opposing the motion a substantial number of MPs did not vote for it.  Only 13 MPs may have voted against the motion but 115 abstained.  This figure of 115  is arrived at as follows:

522  voted  for  the motion

13  voted against the motion

Therefore 115 MPs are unaccounted for after deducting  those who voted.  Six of these are:

The Speaker (who doesn’t vote unless there is a tie), Eric Kaufman (deceased, and his constituency was  awaiting  a by election), and 4 Sinn Fein MPs  (who don’t take their seats and consequently don’t vote.)

That leaves 109 other wilful or accidental abstainers.

As 115 votes were either not used or used to vote against,  it would only have required another 102 to either abstain or vote against the motion to stop the attempt to have a general election on 8 June. Had the various remainer Party leaders in the Commons put their weight behind a vote against.  the motion it is probable that the motion would have been defeated.

Alternatively, if  remain MPs of all parties had come together they might well have defeated the motion.

The fact that the remainer MPs failed to defeat the motion when it was well within their grasp to do so,  or indeed to make any public noise about doing so, suggests that they were more afraid of losing their seats than they are motivated to carry on the battle against Brexit. Ironically,  I suspect that was a false fear for many remainer MPs because they represent constituencies which voted to remain.

As far as the party leaders are concerned, voting against the motion could have been represented as reasonable both because Theresa May had said she would not call an election as it would be  destabilising and on the grounds that this Parliament is only two years old and the clear intention of the Fixed Term Parliaments Act was  to stop PMs calling elections to suit themselves and their party rather than the national interest.

If the remainer MPs had gathered enough votes and abstentions to defeat the motion it would have placed   Theresa  May in a very awkward position personally and removed  from her the possibility of using a larger majority after an early  General Election  to drive through Brexit. It  is indicative of a  lack of commitment  by remainers to their  cause when it involves any danger or sacrifice. That is very useful to know.  If they have looked  gift horse in the mouth because they did not fancy the state of its teeth once they are very likely to do it again when the pressure is on.

As historians look back at the remainers ‘ failure to keep Theresa May locked in the position she was in before the motion was passed  – stuck with a small majority and  a General Election coming in 2019 just as the Brexit negotiations and the UK’s departure are due to come to a head – they will surely shake their heads in astonishment .  No wonder for it is truly bewildering  that there was no attempt by one or more of the Westminster parties which support the remainer cause  to defeat the motion for an early General Election, thereby potentially greatly strengthening Theresa May and her government’s  position.

Theresa May decides to go to the country  – Start counting the spoons

Robert Henderson

Theresa May has announced that she wants an early General Election on 8 June. However, this is no longer a simple matter of the PM going to see the Queen and requesting that Parliament be dissolved and  an election called. Under the Fixed Term Parliaments Act  Mrs May will require a two thirds majority in the House of Commons to vote  to call an early election.

The odds are on May   getting  a two thirds majority because the leaders of the Labour and LibDem parties, Jeremy  Corbyn and Tim  Farron have both welcomed the idea of an early election . However, the position  is not quite as straightforward as it might seem. The two thirds majority in the Commons is not two thirds of those who vote,  but two thirds of the entire Commons personnel, that is,  417 of the 650 MPs. If there  is a heavy abstention – the  coward’s way out for an MP – May could  struggle to reach 417 voting in favour.

Suppose that 100 MPs abstain. That would mean May would have to gain 417  votes out of 550, a majority of those  voting of 75%. Only 134 votes against an early   general election would be needed.   If the SNP with 56 MPs voted en bloc against the attempt  to call an early General Election it would require only 77 other MPs to vote against the same way.  Are the SNP likely to vote en bloc? Well, there has been no definitive statement from the SNP leadership but their leader Nicola Sturgeon appears to be taking the proposed General Election as a fact rather than a possibility, viz  ‘[Nicola Sturgeon] said the election would “once again give people the opportunity to reject the Tories’ narrow, divisive agenda, as well as reinforcing the democratic mandate which already exists for giving the people of Scotland a choice on their future.”’

All that  seemingly makes a vote against an early election unlikely. However, that is what the party leaders are saying. There is an outside chance that a hardcore of remainer MPs might spoil the party and defeat the motion for an early election.  As the figures above show relatively few MPs would have to rebel either by voting against or simply abstaining. There are strong reasons for them to do so.  Apart from wanting to sabotage the Brexit vote for ideological reasons many remain  MPs also a  venal interest in not having an election now because they fear that they might lose their seats.

If May loses the vote

If May is unable to get a vote for an early election she will be in something of a pickle for her  authority will be diminished and she will then have to endure over three years of the dismal picture she painted in her speech announcing her intent to seek a dissolution of Parliament, viz:

“The country is coming together, but Westminster is not. In recent weeks Labour has threatened to vote against the deal we reach with the European Union.

 The Liberal Democrats have said they want to grind the business of government to a standstill.

The Scottish National Party say they will vote against the legislation that formally repeals Britain’s membership of the European Union.

And unelected members of the House of Lords have vowed to fight us every step of the way. “

What would be May’s options if she cannot get the Commons to vote itself into a General Election? She  could attempt to repeal the fixed term Parliaments Act which could be done by a simple majority , but she would have to get that through the Lords which  would probably   prove impossible. In theory she could engineer  a vote of no confidence in her own government to bring about an election,  but that would be both absurd and uncertain of success. The reality is that if May  cannot get the motion passed permitting an election on 8 June that will be the end of any immediate prospect of a General Election.

If  a  General Election is called for 8 June

If a General Election is called it is important that  Brexiteers,  especially those who are supporters of the Tory Party, do not relax.   The polls show the Tory Party hugely in front of Labour with an average of five  polls in April having  the Tories at 43% and Labour at 25%.  That looks very solid,   but importantly the proposed  election will be held before boundary changes to constituencies are made.   These  are thought to be worth at least a   a couple of dozen seats to the Tories  and cost Labour a similar number,  so the increase in the Tory majority may not as large as anticipated. .  It is also true that most  Labour seats have sizeable majorities so that gaining large numbers of seats from them  is a big ask. .

A June  General Election now would  not be a normal one. Like the Peers v the People Election of 1910  it will be predominantly  about a single issue, namely, Brexit. Indeed, it  could reasonably be portrayed as a proxy for re-running the EU Referendum.

There is a considerable psychological difference between voting in a referendum with a clear cut yes or no decision for the voter to make and a General Election,  which  is about choosing a people to make decisions on a multiplicity of subjects for several years . Many of those who voted to Leave the EU are not natural Tory voters, especially those working-class  Labour voters who did much to win the referendum. Those voters  may not be anything like as willing to vote for a Tory government as they were to vote for Brexit.

Motivation to vote will also be important.  It is arguable that the remainers will tend to be  more strongly committed  to vote than Brexiteers simply because they  were the referendum  losers and consequently  will be without any feeling of complacency. They will see this as an occasion to vent their anger and frustration. Brexiteers may be more inclined to think that the Brexit   job is, if not done, is at least on a track from which it cannot be derailed and be less inclined to vote, especially if they are the  people who are not natural  Conservatives.

Remainer voters will also be  energised by the fact that May has said repeatedly that she would not attempt to call an early  General Election. Some leave voters may also  feel  uneasy about this and be persuaded not to vote on 8 June.

Finally, there is sheer  voter fatigue. British voters have had a General Election in 2015, the EU referendum in 2016 and face local elections . Scottish voters had  the independence referendum in 2014 and Northern Ireland had devolved elections in March 2017 .  Getting voters out for elections where voters are voting for parties have been in decline since the 1950s. It is probable that the turnout of a June General Election will be significantly below the turnout for the EU referendum which saw a turnout of 72%.  If the turnout was significantly below this the remainers will use it to cast aspersions on May’s claim that she had a mandate from the British people.

All of this adds up to a need for all those who want to see Brexit completed to be both committed to the coming election and to think forward  beyond it.  If, as seems most likely, Theresa May comes back from the election with a substantial  majority that does not mean Brexiteers can relax. A large majority might allow May to push Brexit through but it will also allow her to be dishonest. It should never  be forgotten that she is a remainer and most of her cabinet and Parliamentary Party are remainers.  They would in their heart of hearts like to have something far less than Brexit. Already there have been disturbing signs of May’s r intentions to sabotage the vote to leave. For example, in the prime areas for Brexit of   immigration and the Single Market,   Home Secretary Amber Rudd  says immigration may not drop significantly  after Brexit , while  the supposedly rock solid Brexiteer David Davis suggested in December  that the UK might  pay a fee to the EU to retain access to the Single Market.

The watchword for Brexiteers must be as ever eternal vigilance. Start counting the spoons.

 

 

Funny Business at No 10

Posted on April 13, 2017 by Robert Henderson  

The No 10 petitions unit  rejects  a petition to get the UK out of the EU using the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
On 2nd  April 2017 I submitted a petition to the No 10 website  which hosts petitions created by  any British citizen. My petition, including the further explanatory details which are allowed on the No 10 site,  was this:
The EU can spend two years giving the UK the run around whilst pocketing two years of further UK contributions and obliging the UK to honour all EU laws and regulations including freedom of movement. At the end of the two years the UK is unlikely to have an agreement which will effect Brexit .
More details:
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties gives the UK ample grounds for repudiating all EU Treaty obligations on the grounds of bad faith by the other treaty members and the failure to apply the rules of the EU, for example, the repeated failure to produce accounts which satisfy the auditors, the multiple breaches of Eurozone rules and the failure to enforce government aid rules against the likes of Germany, France and Italy – see https://englandcalling. wordpress.com/
When I submitted the petition the No 10 website software brought up a message stating there was no similar petition already on the site.
The second  hurdle a petition has to clear is to get five sponsors for the petition. This I rapidly achieved, with a total of 19 sponsors.
When I sent the petition I received an acknowledgement  saying that a decision to allow or disallow a petition “ usually takes a week or less.”
It  took  11 days to reject mine.
The  rejection
My petition was eventually rejected on the single ground that a similar petition was already on the No 10  website.
This is the Petition:
End negotiations with the EU forthwith.
The PM has no mandate to negotiate with the EU. We voted for a hard Brexit and demand it. Time to tell the EU “no deal, end of negotiations, goodbye.”
The reason given for the rejection is literally absurd, for the two petitions do different things.  My petition gives a legal way to leave rapidly, the other petition  offers no legal route out of the EU. In fact it urges the Government to act illegally by breaching a treaty.
The difference between my petition and the  other one is so striking that it is not unreasonable to suspect that the refusal of my petition is for political reasons rather than the reason the No 10 Petitions Unit has given.
What might that reason be? Well, the Vienna  Convention on the Law of Treaties  allows the UK  to  get  out of  the  EU a good deal faster and  with a much cleaner exit. The delay in rejecting the petition is also suspicious as it suggests there was an extended  debate about it taking place.
The other suspicious thing is the fact that the petition which is supposedly similar to mine has only just be posted to the No 10 site. Each accepted petition expires after six months on the site. The expiry date  for this one is 11 October 2017. Hence, it must have been put up after I sent in my petition on 2nd April. The odds are that this petition is one concocted by those opposed to Brexit  after my  petition was submitted to provide an  excuse for rejecting mine.  It is worth  remembering that public servants are generally remainers. 
Whatever the reason is for refusing my petition, it indubitably qualifies to go  up on the N 10 website.  
Let us hope the civil servants responsible for the  petitions  see sense and change their mind. 
——————————————————————————————————————————

   I am waiting for a reply from the No 10 unit to this email

13 April 2017

  Dear Sirs, 

 
The reason for your rejection is literally  absurd. My petition gives a legal way to leave rapidly  the petition you cite offers no legal route out of the EU. In fact it  urges the Government to act illegally by breaching a treaty.  I would also point out that when I registered the petition with you your own software created a message saying  there was no  similar petition already in existence on the site. 
 
In the light of these facts I ask you to reconsider your rejection of  my  petition. 
 
I also ask  you to give me the name of the person heading  your unit  and a phone number on which I can contact him or her. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
Robert Henderson       

Petition on Number 10 website : The UK to use the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to leave the EU now

Message body

The Vienna Convention on  the Law of Treaties gives  the UIK the right to leave the EU immediately

Robert Henderson

If the UK is trapped for two years within the EU ( or even longer if all parties agree to extend the negotiating period)  a great deal of damage can be inflicted upon the UK  by hostile EU member states egged on by  the British remainers who have not accepted the referendum result and will do anything to produce a  “Brexit” which is no Brexit in anything but name.  Consequently our best course of action is for the UK to leave now and trade under WTO rules, a course of  action embraced by  the  likes of Lord Lawson and  James Dyson .

Leaving the EU now and trading on WTO rules would have considerable benefits. These are:

  1. The payments the UK makes to the EU would cease immediately . The UK makes a payment each year to the EU. When the British rebate (won by  Thatcher)  is deducted,   the money left is divided into two parts. The first  is the money which is spent as the  EU  dictates.  The second is the money which  the EU simply takes and distributes to other EU members.  Exactly how much is taken away  is debatable because of complications such as the UK  Aid money the UK  gives to the EU. But even taking the lowest estimates of how much money the EU keeps for itself  this is in the region of £6-7 billion and another  £6 billion for money is  returned to fund  public and private bodies and programmes in the UK   but with EU instructions on how it is to be spent .

If   we continue with the two years after the activation of Article 50 that will mean  the UK will have paid 33 months worth of contributions  to the EU since the referendum.

  1. The UK immediately gains control of  our  borders. As things stand free movement is likely to continue until March 2019. The UK government wants to introduce a cut off date from which  the free movement and the state supplied benefits  which arise from it  will cease. Their  favoured date is the 29 March this year, the day Article 50 is triggered.  The EU insists  that free movement must remain until the UK has left the EU.  If this happen several s million could flood in before the UK leaves the EU.
  2. The UK can immediately start negotiating trade and other deals with any country outside the European Economic Area. If the UK goes through the two year period of negotiation no  such deals can be made or at least finalised.
  3. The UK can immediately start to regain control of its fisheries.
  4. The UK will immediately be free to remove or adapt any EU laws and regulations which already exist and will not be subject to any future law. If we spend two years or  more negotiating the UK cannot amend or repeal and existing EU laws and regulations and , most importantly, the UK will have to implement any new EU laws and regulations passed during the negotiating period. This would allow the rest of the EU to engage in a great deal of mischief with the intention of damaging the UK.
  5. Leaving now will remove the opportunity for the remainers with power and influence to sabotage Brexit . That is probably the greatest benefit of all because there are  cabinet ministers, shadow cabinet members, backbench MPs, peers , public servants or the wealthy who  are willing  to fund court cases who would be only too willing to overturn Brexit, either  overtly or covertly.

The Vienna Convention on the  Law of Treaties provides the legal basis for the UK walking away from the EU right now. The relevant passages are these: .

PART III. OBSERVANCE, APPLICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES

SECTION 1. OBSERVANCE OF TREATIES

Article 26 “Pacta sunt servanda” Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.

SECTION 3. INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES

Article 31 General rule of interpretation 1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.

Article 32 Supplementary means of interpretation Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.

SECTION 2. INVALIDITY OF TREATIES Article 46 Provisions of internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties

  1. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith.

  Article 60 Termination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of its breach

  1. A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part.
  2. A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles: (a) the other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of the treaty in whole or in part or to terminate it either: 20 (i) in the relations between themselves and the defaulting State; or (ii) as between all the parties; (b) a party specially affected by the breach to invoke it as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting State;

 Article 62 Fundamental change of circumstances

  1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: (a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and 21 (b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty

These provisions mean the UK could summarily leave by arguing (1) the EU are not acting  in good faith because of the many threats  to punish the UK for leaving the EU made by EU functionaries and politicians; (2)  that  the Treaty  leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable or (3)  that the circumstances which now exist are radically different from what existed when the last EU treaty was signed by the UK (The Lisbon Treaty).

Statements by EU politicians and functionaries that Brexit will be deliberately punitive  for the UK to dissuade other members from leaving clearly go against the provisions of Article 50 – see examples at the bottom of this post.  Having a provision for leaving  in a treaty implies that states leaving  according to the provisions of the  treaty have a right to leave. Deliberately making leaving very  damaging for the leaving member of a treaty nullifies the right to leave. Ergo, that is  clear and emphatic  bad faith.  In this context it is important to understand  that the Vienna Convention does not require all parties to a treaty to act in bad faith to nullify a treaty – see section 2 of the Convention quoted above

But it is not only  direct threats of penal treatment of the UK which matter when it comes to bad faith.   Suppose   the EU  passed legislation during the negotiating period which  placed the UK  at a grave disadvantage  the UK would still have to implement the legislation regardless of its effects on the  UK during the period of negotiation. A good example, would be legislation   which would have severe  ill effects on the City of  London such as  a  transaction tax.

As for circumstances  being radically different take  the massive deterioration in economic performance by some Eurozone countries resulting from  the actions of the European Central Bank which are arguably directly at odds with the  rules of the ECB  for managing the Euro.  This mismanagement has created severe problems within the EU both in terms of economic instability and the increased tendency of migrants from the suffering countries to move to the richer EU countries  including the  UK.  The failure of the Eurozone to manage its affairs honestly must  count for a radical change of  circumstances.   (The vote by the  UK to leave does not  count as  a radical change of  circumstances because it is something engineered by  the UK and the Vienna Convention disqualifies such deliberate changes  as a cause to repudiate a treaty.)

Even though Article 50 has now been triggered that does not mean the UK could not leave under one or more of the Vienna Convention permitted reasons because any of those reasons and especially  that of bad faith could be invoked at any  point in the negotiation process.

Examples of EU functionaries and politicians threatening the UK with a damaging Brexit

Here  is just a minute sample of the many threats made to the UK about Brexit:

French President  Francois Hollande  “There must be a threat, there must be a risk, there must be a price, otherwise we will be in negotiations that will not end well and, inevitably, will have economic and human consequences,” the French president said.

Robert Fico, Slovakia’s prime minister, on Monday said that member states intend to make it “very difficult for the UK” and said Britain is “bluffing” when it says it can get a good Brexit deal.

The British people will be treated as “deserters” following a vote to leave the European Union, Jean-Claude Juncker has warned.

Spain will ‘take control of Gibraltar as soon as Britain leaves EU’ says Spanish Foreign Minister

Wolfgang Schäuble , the German finance minister also said the UK would be forced to pay EU budget bills for more than ten years, echoing proposals for the UK to pay an exit bill of up to £43billion.

Guy Verhofstadt has now said he expects Britain to cough up over £500bn to the European Union as it extricates itself from Brussels.

Former Belgian Prime Minister  Guy Verhofstadt claimed Britain will have to foot a €600billion bill before leaving the EU.

Tony Blair, the ghost of ‘Prime Minister’s Past’, comes out of the cupboard to frighten us over Brexit!


Tony Blair, the ghost of ‘Prime Minister’s Past’, comes out of the cupboard to frighten us over Brexit!


I was interested in the coverage over last weekend of Tony Blair’s foray in the Brexit debate. All the commentators and papers seem to be reporting that he is very much “yesterday’s man” and that nobody was listening to what he had to say. I thought that was an interesting deflection from the likely purpose of his intervention.

The first thing that we need to bear in mind and accept about Tony Blair is that he remains one of the slickest British political operators of recent times. The idea that he has completely lost his touch at his age is frankly incredible.

So what was he trying to achieve? Well for a start the “people” that he was calling on to “rise up” were not you or I. He was, no doubt, focussed on supporting his old friends Peter Mandelson and Peter Hains and the motley crew of Europhile/Remainiac Lords to “rise up” and use their undemocratic position in the Upper Chamber of our legislature to block the democratic vote.

This is of course exactly the sort of thing that so-called “liberal democracy” is all about, whereby the institutions of the State have a role in preventing “we the People” from getting our way on anything which the British Political Establishment doesn’t think we ought to get our way on. This is normally done behind closed doors with an orchestrated effort by the mainstream media to bamboozle us in to thinking that it is done as a result of a mass demand, rather than just because of a small gang of elitists.

Given the decisive EU referendum result, that covert option is not open to Remainers.

Blair would have been well aware of this and has put himself up to be the “scapegoat” and “whipping boy” for those of us who do not like what he was saying, whilst at the same time emboldening the Remainers opposition in the House of Lords.

It is an often ignored part of politics that by standing up for what you believe in, you do embolden others to do the same. This works just as well for those of us in “insurgent” parties as for those in the Establishment.

I firmly believe that Blair’s behaviour is better explained by a calculated effort to take the flack and thus embolden more of a protractive Remainers’ battle in the House of Lords than would otherwise have happened.

We will have to see over the course of the next few weeks how effective that call has been!

THE BBC THINKS “LEAVE” VOTERS ARE:- ‘POOR, THICK, OLD WHITES’?


THE BBC THINKS “LEAVE” VOTERS ARE:- ‘POOR, THICK, OLD WHITES’?

The BBC’s Freedom of Information specialist, Mr Martin Rosenbaum, has published an article which I produce below, in which he claims that the data shows that the poorer, less well-educated, or elderly “white” population voted more heavily for Leave than for Remain in the EU Referendum.

Although he does quote briefly Dominic Cummings who was the internet and data focussed campaign director of Vote Leave. Dominic Cummings says the better educated are more prone to irrational political opinions because they are more driven by fashion and by group mentality.

In effect Mr Rosenbaum dismisses this view since it does not suit his or the BBC’s agenda to acknowledge that in today’s England the better educated have been subjected to a more longer and more sustained effort to convert them to ensure that they emerge as left, liberal internationalists and far more likely to support the EU’s transnational statist agenda.

Mr Rosenbaum also ignores those analysts who have talked about “Clacton man” as being of the sort that he has characterising as Leave voters and also “Crawley man” who has higher education qualifications and is an aspirational, striving middle class person.

In my view however the most glaring failure of the article is so very typical of the BBC group mentality. This is over the question of what he calls “ethnicity”. The first point to make is that he has clearly made no effort to understand what the law means by the word “ethnicity”. This has been set out now for decades, clarified in the Mandla – v – Dowell-Lee [1983] UKHC7 case in the House of Lords Appeal Court, which in effect ruled that ethnicity was limited to self-identified sub-sets of a national racial group i.e. that Sikhs without any of their Sikh specific clothes or styles or equipment were indistinguishable from other North Indians, but because of their cultural markers and self-identification were an identifiable sub-set of North India and therefore an “Ethnicity”.

On this legal basis the English, for example, are an identifiable sub-set of British and therefore an ethnicity.

The English have also been specifically accepted by courts as a national identity, national origin, nationality and as a racial group.

Despite this long established legal position, Mr Rosenbaum uses the word ethnicity in a context which shows he has virtually nothing in the way of a definition behind the word except that they are perhaps non-“White”.

This leads him to the absurd position of talking about “Asian” as if they were all the same. So it is a monochrome world in which he cannot tell the difference between a Sikh, a Muslim, a Hindu, an Indian, a Pakistani, a Bangladeshi, a Gujarati, a Tamil etc! Nor does it seem that Mr Rosenbaum is able to tell the difference between the English, the Scottish or the Welsh. This leads him to ignore one of the key findings of the Ashcroft polls which was that of the top 30 Leave voting local authorities, 100% – that is every single one of them – were constituencies which had the highest proportion of people who responded to the 2011 Census stating that they were “English only”.

Isn’t it interesting and certainly typical of the BBC that its group think mentality even now still makes it impossible for it to understand or accept that the English had by and large and very sensibly realised that the EU was and is an enemy of “the very idea of England”?

So no Mr Rosenbaum. The English are not poor, stupid or uneducated, they are merely people who care for England and didn’t want to see England broken up into EU “Regions” and overwhelmed by unrestricted mass immigration from other parts of the EU. Also they don’t want or to be made to pay for the poor and economically failing parts of the EU – when we have got enough problems that need to be fixed before we can think about dealing with other people’s problems!

Here is the article:-

Local voting figures shed new light on EU referendum


The BBC has obtained a more localised breakdown of votes from nearly half of the local authorities which counted EU referendum ballots last June.

This information provides much greater depth and detail in explaining the pattern of how the UK voted. The key findings are:

The data confirms previous indications that local results were strongly associated with the educational attainment of voters – populations with lower qualifications were significantly more likely to vote Leave. (The data for this analysis comes from one in nine wards)

The level of education had a higher correlation with the voting pattern than any other major demographic measure from the census

The age of voters was also important, with older electorates more likely to choose Leave

Ethnicity was crucial in some places, with ethnic minority areas generally more likely to back Remain. However this varied, and in parts of London some Asian populations were more likely to support Leave

The combination of education, age and ethnicity accounts for the large majority of the variation in votes between different places

Across the country and in many council districts we can point out stark contrasts between localities which most favoured Leave or Remain

There was a broad pattern in several urban areas of deprived, predominantly white, housing estates towards the urban periphery voting Leave, while inner cities with high numbers of ethnic minorities and/or students voted Remain

Around 270 locations can be identified where the local outcome was in the opposite direction to the broader official counting area, including parts of Scotland which backed Leave and a Cornwall constituency which voted Remain

Postal voters appear narrowly more likely to have backed Remain than those who voted in a polling station

The national picture

Education

A statistical analysis of the data obtained for over a thousand individual local government wards confirms how the strength of the local Leave vote was strongly associated with lower educational qualifications.

Wards where the population had fewer qualifications tended to have a higher Leave vote, as shown in the chart. If the proportion of the local electorate with a degree or similar qualification was one percentage point lower, then on average the leave vote was higher by nearly one percentage point.

Using ward-level data means we can compare voting figures in this way to the local demographic information collected in the 2011 census. Of the main census statistics, this is the one with the greatest association with how people voted.

In statistical terms the level of educational qualifications explains about two-thirds of the variation in the results between different wards.

The correlation is strong, whether based on assessing graduate and equivalent qualifications or lower-level ones.

This ward-by-ward analysis covers 1,070 individual wards in England and Wales whose boundaries had not changed since the 2011 census, about one in nine of the UK’s wards. We had very little ward-level data from Scotland, and none from Northern Ireland.

It should be noted, however, that many ward counts also included some postal votes from across the counting area, and therefore some variation between wards will have been masked by the random allocation of postal votes for counting. This makes the results less accurate geographically, but we can still use the information to explore broad national and local patterns.

Age

Adding age as a second factor significantly helps to further explain voting patterns. Older populations were more likely to vote Leave. Education and age combined account for nearly 80% of the voting variation between wards.

Ethnicity

Ethnicity is a smaller factor, but one which also contributed to the results. Adding that in means that now 83% of the variation in the vote between wards is explained. White populations were generally more pro-Leave, and ethnic minorities less so. However, there were some interesting differences between London and elsewhere.

The ethnic dimension is particularly interesting when examining the outliers on the graph that compares the Leave vote to levels of education.

wards in Birmingham illustrate the pattern of ethnic minority populations being more likely to support Remain.

There are numerous wards towards the bottom left of the graph where electorates with lower educational qualifications nevertheless produced low Leave and high Remain votes. This is where the link between low qualifications and Leave voting breaks down.

It turns out that these exceptional wards have high ethnic minority populations, particularly in Birmingham and Haringey in north London.

In contrast, there are virtually no dramatic outliers on the other side of the line, where comparatively highly educated populations voted Leave. Only one point on the graph stands out – this is Osterley and Spring Grove in Hounslow, west London, a mainly ethnic minority ward which had a Leave vote of 63%. While this figure does include some postal votes, they are not nearly enough to explain away this unusual outcome.

In fact, in Ealing and Hounslow, west London boroughs with many voters of Asian origin, the ethnic correlation was in the other direction to the national picture: a higher number of Asian voters was associated with a higher Leave vote.

Overview

This powerful link to educational attainment could stem from the lower qualified tending to feel less confident about their prospects and ability to compete for work in a competitive globalised economy with high levels of migration.

On the other hand some commentators see it as primarily reflecting a “culture war” or “values conflict”, rather than issues of economics and inequality. Research shows that non-graduates tend to take less liberal positions than graduates on a range of social issues from immigration and multi-culturalism to the death penalty.

The former campaign director of Vote Leave, Dominic Cummings, argues that the better educated are more prone to holding irrational political opinions because they are more driven by fashion and a group mentality.

Of course this assessment does not imply that Leave voters were almost all poorly educated and old, and Remain voters well educated and young. The Leave side obviously attracted support from many middle class professionals, graduates and younger people. Otherwise it couldn’t have won.

While there was undoubtedly a lot of voting which cut across these criteria, the point of this analysis is to explore how different social groups most probably voted – and it is clear that education, age and ethnicity were crucial influences.

After these three key factors are taken into account, adding in further demographic measures from the census does little to increase the explanation of UK-wide voting patterns.

However, this does not reflect the distinctively more pro-Remain voting in Scotland, since we are short of Scottish data at this geographical level. It is clear as well that in a few specific locations high student numbers were also very relevant.

To a certain extent, using the level of educational qualifications as a measure combines both class and age factors, with working class and older adults both tending to be less well qualified.

But the association between education and the voting results is stronger than the association between social or occupational class and the results. This is still true after taking the age of the local population into account.

This suggests that voters with lower qualifications were more likely to back Leave than the better qualified, even when they were in the same social or occupational class.

The existence of a significant connection between Leave voting and lower educational qualifications had already been suggested by analysis of the published referendum results from the official counting areas.

The data we have obtained strengthens this conclusion, because voting patterns can now be compared to social statistics from the 2011 census at a much more detailed geographical level than by the earlier studies.

The BBC analysis is also consistent with opinion polling (for example, from Lord Ashcroft, Ipsos Mori and YouGov) that tried to identify the characteristics of Leave and Remain voters.

Local patterns

The data we have collected can be used to illustrate the sort of places where the Leave and Remain camps did particularly well: it is hard to imagine a more glaring social contrast than that between the deprived, poorly educated housing estates of Brambles and Thorntree in Middlesbrough, and the privileged elite colleges of Market ward in central Cambridge.

It is important to bear in mind, however, that most of the voting figures mentioned below also include some postal votes, so they should be treated as approximate rather than precise. It is also important to note that the examples are limited to the places for which we were able to obtain localised information, which was only a minority of areas. The rest of the country may well contain even starker instances.

Leave strongholds

Of the 1,283 individual wards for which we have data, the highest Leave vote was 82.5% in Brambles and Thorntree, a section of east Middlesbrough with many social problems. Ward boundaries have changed since the 2011 census, but in that survey the Thorntree part of the area had the lowest proportion of people with a degree or similar qualification of anywhere in England and Wales, at only 5%. And according to Middlesbrough council, the figure for the current Brambles and Thorntree ward is even lower, at just 4%.

Second highest was 80.3% in Waterlees Village, a poor locality within Wisbech, Cambridgeshire. This area has seen a major influx of East European migrants who have been doing low-paid work in nearby food processing factories and farms, with tensions between them and British residents.

Other wards with available data which had the strongest Leave votes were congregated in Middlesbrough, Canvey Island in Essex, Skegness in coastal Lincolnshire, and Havering in east London.

Remain strongholds

The highest Remain vote was 87.8% in Market ward in central Cambridge, an area with numerous colleges and a high student population, in a city which was strongly pro-Remain.

This was followed by Ashley ward (85.6%) in central Bristol, a district featuring ethnic diversity, gentrification and alternative culture.

Next highest was Northumberland Park (85.0%) in Haringey, north London, which has a substantial black population.

Other wards with available data which had the strongest Remain votes were generally located in Cambridge, Bristol and the multi-ethnic London boroughs of Haringey and Lambeth.

In the middle

The count for Ashburton in Croydon, south London, split 50-50 exactly, with both Leave and Remain getting 3,885 votes, but that did include some postal ballots.

Nationally representative

As for being nearest to the overall result, the combined count of Tulketh and University, neighbouring wards near the centre of Preston, was 51.92% for leave, very close to the UK wide figure of 51.89%. The individual ward of Barnwood in Gloucester had Leave at 51.94%. Both figures however contain some postal votes.

Given that a few councils provided even more detailed data down to the level of polling districts, it is possible to identify some very small localities that were nicely representative of the national picture.

The 527 voters in the neighbouring districts of Kirk Langley and Mackworth in Amber Valley in Derbyshire, whose two ballot boxes were counted together, produced a leave proportion of 51.99%. And this figure is not contaminated by any postal votes.

So journalists (or anyone else for that matter) who seek a microcosm of the UK should perhaps visit the Mundy Arms pub in Mackworth, the location for that district’s polling station.

Similarly, the 427 voters in the combined neighbouring polling districts of Chiddingstone Hoath and Hever Four Elms to the south of Sevenoaks in Kent delivered a leave vote of 51.6% (again, without any postal votes).

Switching areas

The data obtained points to 269 areas of various sizes (wards, clusters of wards or constituencies) which had a different Leave/Remain outcome compared to the official counting area of which they were part.

This consists of 150 areas which backed Remain but were part of Leave-voting counting areas; and 119 in the other direction.

The detailed information therefore gives us an understanding of how the electorate voted which is more variegated than the officially published results.

Scotlandvoted to Remain – but some wards backed Leave, analysis shows

Every one of Scotland’s 32 counting areas came down on the Remain side. Yet, despite the fact that most Scottish councils did not give us much detailed information, we can nevertheless identify a few smaller parts of the country which actually backed Leave.

A cluster of six wards in the Banff and Buchan area in north Aberdeenshire had a strong Leave majority of 61%. There is much local discontent within the fishing industry of this coastal district about the EU’s common fisheries policy.

An Taobh Siar agus Nis, a ward at the northern end of the Isle of Lewis in Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Western Isles), also voted Leave, if very narrowly.

And at a smaller geographical level, in Shetland the 567 voters in the combined polling districts of Whalsay and South Unst had an extremely high Leave vote of 81%. The island of Whalsay is a fishing community, where EU rules have been controversial and in 2012 numerous skippers were heavily fined for major breaches of fishing quotas.

London

Ealing and Hounslow are neighbouring multi-ethnic boroughs in the west of London with large Asian populations, where – in contrast to the national picture – non-white ethnicity was associated with voting Leave, particularly in Ealing. Both boroughs shared a varied internal pattern of prosperous largely white areas voting strongly Remain, poorer largely white areas preferring Leave, and the Asian areas tending to be more evenly split.

Ealing voted 60% Remain, with Southfield ward hitting 76%, but in contrast the Southall wards which are over 90% ethnic minority were close to 50-50.

In Hounslow the richer wards in Chiswick in the east of the area voted heavily Remain (73%), but the poorer largely white wards at the opposite western end in Feltham and Bedfont voted Leave (64-66%). Osterley and Spring Grove was also 63% Leave, the highest Leave vote in any individual ward in the UK with a non-white majority for which we have data.

The south London borough of Bromley narrowly voted Remain. Those parts which did not do so by a significant margin were the Cray Valley wards, largely poor white working class areas; and Biggin Hill and Darwin wards, locations to the south which contain more open countryside and lie outside the built-up commuter belt.

In Croydon in south London, places which voted Leave by substantial amounts were New Addington and Fieldway, neighbouring wards with large council estates.

Other areas

Beyond the areas with the strongest backing for Leave and Remain, examining the detailed breakdown of votes in various places gives greater insight into the pattern of support for the two sides – as can be seen from the following examples.

In several places (for example, Birmingham, Bristol, Nottingham, Portsmouth) there was a strong contrast between the Leave-voting populations of large, rundown, predominantly white, housing estates in the urban periphery, versus Remain-voting populations in inner city areas with large numbers of ethnic minorities and sometimes students.

Birmingham had several wards with large Remain votes, although the city as a whole narrowly voted Leave. These pro-Remain wards tended to be the more highly educated, better off localities, or minority ethnic areas which strongly backed Remain despite low levels of educational qualifications. I have written about this before.

In Blackburn with Darwen, Bastwell ward had the highest Remain vote at 65%, compared to only 44% in the area as a whole. This ward has an ethnic minority proportion of over 90%. Other Blackburn wards which voted Remain were also ones with high minority populations.

Bradford voted to Leave (54%), but the area included some starkly contrasting places which went over 60% Remain: the prosperous, genteel, spa town of Ilkley, and strongly ethnic minority wards in the city, such as Manningham and Toller.

Bristol voted strongly Remain on the whole (62%), but there were some striking exceptions, particularly the large, deprived, mainly white estates to the south of the city. Hartcliffe and Withywood backed Leave at 67%. Similar neighbouring wards (Hengrove and Whitchurch Park, Filwood, Bishopsworth and Stockwood) also voted Leave, as did the more industrial area of Avonmouth and Lawrence Weston to the north west of the city.

As a county Cornwall voted to Leave. But one of its six parliamentary constituencies, Truro and Falmouth, voted 53% to Remain, possibly linked to a significant student population.

In Lincoln, which voted 57% to Leave, Carholme ward stands out as very different – it voted 63% to Remain. This ward includes Lincoln University, and 43% of the residents are students

Middlesbrough voted 65% to Leave. As already noted, it had several wards with extremely high leave votes of over 75%. But one ward, Linthorpe, voted very narrowly to Remain – a comparatively well-to-do inner suburb which includes an art college; and another ward, Central, which contains Teesside University, nearly did.

Mole Valley in Surrey exhibited a dramatic contrast between two neighbouring districts with very different demographics and housing. The highest Remain vote was in the very prosperous location of Dorking South, which voted 63% Remain, but the neighbouring ward of Holmwoods, dominated by large estates on the edge of the town of Dorking, voted 57% Leave, the area’s highest Leave vote.

Nottingham voted narrowly to Leave, but the inner city ward of Radford and Park voted 68% Remain. This has both a comparatively high proportion of ethnic minorities and considerable numbers of students from two nearby universities. There was a lot of variation within the area. Bulwell – a market town to the north of the city with many social problems – voted 69% Leave

There was also a high Leave vote in the housing estate locations of the Clifton wards in the south of Nottingham.

Oldham voted to Leave at 61%, but Werneth, the city ward with the highest ethnic minority population, voted Remain (57%). Other wards with high minority populations also voted Remain.

central wards in Oxford had high Remain votes

In Oxford the cluster of polling districts which included Blackbird Leys and other deprived estates on the southern edge of the city voted to Leave at 51%. In contrast the central areas containing colleges, university buildings and student accommodation voted to Remain at over 80%.

Plymouth voted 60% Leave, but Drake ward which includes the university had the city’s highest Remain vote at 56%.

Portsmouth was another place with wide variation. Paulsgrove ward, with its large estate on the edge of the city, had the highest Leave vote at 70%, whereas at the other end of the spectrum Central Southsea, an inner city ward and student area, voted 57% Remain.

Rochdale voted 60% Leave. The place which bucked this trend by voting 59% Remain, Milkstone and Deeplish, was the most predominantly ethnic minority ward. Central Rochdale had the second highest Remain vote and is the other ward that is mainly not white.

Walsall voted strongly Leave (68%). The only ward which voted Remain, Paddock, is both a comparatively prosperous and multi-ethnic locality.

The most local data

A few councils released their data at remarkably localised levels, down even to individual polling districts (ie ballot boxes) in the case of Blackburn with Darwen and Bracknell Forest, or clusters of two/three/four districts, in the case of Amber Valley, Brentwood, Sevenoaks, Shetland, South Oxfordshire, and Tewkesbury.

This provides very local and specific data, in some cases just for neighbourhoods of hundreds of voters.

At its most detailed this reveals that the 110 people who cast their votes in the ballot box at St. Alban’s Primary School in central Blackburn split 56-52 in favour of Remain, with two spoilt papers.

It also discloses stark contrasts in some neighbouring locations. The 953 people who voted at Little Harwood community centre in north Blackburn had a Leave vote of only 31%, while the 336 electors who voted in the neighbouring ballot box at Roe Lee Park primary school produced a Leave percentage over twice as high, at 64%.

Postal votes

The very detailed data we obtained also provides some rare evidence on the views of postal compared to non-postal voters. Campaign strategists have often deliberated on whether the two groups vote differently and should be given separate targeted messages.

Most places mixed boxes of postal and non-postal votes for counting, so generally it’s not possible to draw comparative conclusions. However there were a few exceptions which recorded them separately, or included a very small number of non-postal votes with the postals.

These figures indicate that postal voters were narrowly less likely to back Leave than voters in polling stations. Data covering five counting areas with about 260,000 votes shows that in these places the roughly one in five electors who voted by post backed Leave at 55.4%, one percentage point lower than the local non-postal support for Leave of 56.4%.

The counting areas involved are Amber Valley, East Cambridgeshire, Gwynedd, Hyndburn and North Warwickshire.

The data

Since the referendum the BBC has been trying to get the most detailed, localised voting data we could from each of the counting areas. This was a major data collection exercise carried out by my colleague George Greenwood.

We managed to obtain voting figures broken down into smaller geographical units for 178 of the 399 referendum counting areas (380 councils in England, Wales and Scotland, with a separate tally in Gibraltar, while in Northern Irelandresults were issued for the 18 constituencies).

This varied between data for individual local government wards, wards grouped into clusters, and constituency level data. In a few cases the results supplied were even more localised than ward level. Overall the extra data covers a wide range of different areas and kinds of councils across the UK.

Electoral returning officers are not covered by the Freedom of Information Act, so releasing the information was up to the discretion of councils. While some were very willing, in other cases it required a lot of persistence and persuasion.

Some councils could not supply any detailed data because they mixed all ballot boxes prior to counting; some did possess more local figures but simply refused to disclose them to us. Others did provide data, but the combinations in which ballot boxes were mixed before counting were too complex to fit ward boundaries neatly.

A few places such as Birmingham released their ward by ward data following the referendum on their own initiative, but in most cases the information had to be obtained by us requesting it directly, and sometimes repeatedly, from the authority.

(Here is the link to the original >>> http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-38762034)

MPs who voted against triggering Article 50

MP                                                Party                       June 23 referendum result

Tasmina Ahmed-Sheikh                 SNP                            60.7% Remain

Heidi Alexander                              Labour                       64.6% Remain

Rushanara Ali                                  Labour                        69.1% Remain

Graham Allen                                 Labour                         63.8% Leave

Rosena Allin-Khan                          Labour                       74.7% Remain

Richard Arkless                               SNP                            54.6% Remain

Hannah Bardell                               SNP                            56.2% Remain

Luciana Berger                                Labour                       64.2% Remain

Mhairi Black                                     SNP                           65.8% Remain

Ian Blackford                                   SNP                            56.6% Remain

Kirsty Blackman                              SNP                            56.9% Remain

Philip Boswell                                  SNP                            61.3% Remain

Ben Bradshaw                                 Labour                        55.3% Remain

Tom Brake                                        Lib Dem                     56.3% Leave

Kevin Brennan                                 Labour                       55.2% Remain

Deidre Brock                                    SNP                             78.2% Remain

Alan Brown                                       SNP                            60.4% Remain

Lyn Brown                                        Labour                        52.6% Remain

Chris Bryant                                     Labour                        61.2% Leave

Karen Buck                                       Labour                        67.0% Remain

Dawn Butler                                     Labour                         57.1% Remain

Ruth Cadbury                                   Labour                         60.5% Remain

Lisa Cameron                                    SNP                              62.0% Remain

Alistair Carmichael                          Lib Dem                       59.7% Remain

Douglas Chapman                            SNP                               60.0% Remain

Joanna Cherry                                   SNP                               72.1% Remain

Ken Clarke                                         Conservative                 58.7% Remain

Nick Clegg                                          Lib Dem                          64.1% Remain

Ann Clwyd                                          Labour                             57.0% Leave

Ann Coffey                                          Labour                            51.8% Remain

Ronnie Cowan                                    SNP                                  63.8% Remain

Neil Coyle                                              Labour                           73.0% Remain

Angela Crawley                                    SNP                                 64.5% Remain

Mary Creagh                                         Labour                            62.0% Leave

Stella Creasy                                         Labour                            63.6% Remain

Martyn Day                                            SNP                                58.4% Remain

Thangam Debbonaire                          Labour                           79.3% Remain

Martin Docherty-Hughes                     SNP                               62.0% Remain

Stuart Donaldson                                  SNP                                61.4% Remain

Stephen Doughty                                  Labour                           55.1% Remain

Jim Dowd                                               Labour                           65.5% Remain

Mark Durkan                                          SDLP

Maria Eagle                                            Labour                          52.1% Remain

Louise Ellman                                          Labour                         73.1% Remain

Paul Farrelly                                            Labour                          61.7% Leave

Tim Farron                                               Lib Dem                       52.5% Remain

Margaret Ferrier                                      SNP                              62.7% Remain

Vicky Foxcroft                                          Labour                          75.3% Remain

Mike Gapes                                              Labour                           56.1% Remain

Stephen Gethins                                      SNP                                61.9% Remain

Patricia Gibson                                         SNP                                57.7% Remain

Patrick Grady                                           SNP                                 78.4% Remain

Peter Grant                                              SNP                                  53.5% Remain

Neil Gray                                                   SNP                                  59.9% Remain

Lilian Greenwood                                  SDLP

elen Hayes                                              Labour                               77.9% Remain

Drew Hendry                                           SNP                                   58.6% Remain

Sylvia Hermon                                         SDLP

Meg Hillier                                                Labour                              77.8% Remain

Stewart Hosie                                           SNP                                    61.7% Remain

Rupa Huq                                                  Labour                               71.8% Remain

George Kerevan                                       SNP                                      64.6% Remain

Calum Kerr                                               SNP                                       56.8% Remain

Peter Kyle                                                Labour                                    66.1% Remain

David Lammy                                           Labour                                  66.6% Remain

Chris Law                                                  SNP                                        58.8% Remain

Caroline Lucas                                          Green                                    74.3% Remain

Angus MacNeil                                          SNP                                       55.2% Remain

Rachael Maskell                                       Labour                                   61.5% Remain

John McNally                                            SNP                                        58.0% Remain

Kerry McCarthy                                         Labour                                   53.2% Remain

Stewart McDonald                                   SNP                                          71.8% Remain

Stuart McDonald                                      SNP                                           62.1% Remain

Alasdair McDonnell                                 SDLP

Natalie McGarry                                       Independent                           56.2% Remain

Catherine McKinnell                                Labour                                    57.1% Leave

Anne McLaughlin                                      SNP                                        59.3% Remain

Carol Monaghan                                       SNP                                         68.5% Remain

Paul Monaghan                                        SNP                                          50.6% Remain

Madeleine Moon                                     Labour                                      50.3% Remain

Roger Mullin                                             SNP                                          58.3% Remain

Ian Murray                                                Labour                                     77.8% Remain

Gavin Newlands                                       SNP                                          63.9% Remain

John Nicolson                                           SNP                                          73.3% Remain

Brendan O’Hara                                       SNP                                          60.6% Remain

Sarah Olney                                            Lib Dem                                      72.3% Remain

Kirsten Oswald                                       SNP                                             74.3% Remain

Steven Paterson                                     SNP                                             67.7% Remain

Stephen Pound                                       Labour                                       51.2% Remain

John Pugh                                               Lib Dem                                     54.5% Remain

Margaret Ritchie                                     SDLP

Angus Robertson                                     SNP                                           50.1% Remain

Alex Salmond                                            SNP                                          55.4% Remain

Liz Saville Roberts                                    Plaid Cymru                           51.6% Remain

Virendra Sharma                                     Labour                                      55.7% Remain

Tommy Sheppard                                    SNP                                           72.4% Remain

Tulip Siddiq                                              Labour                                      76.5% Remain

Andy Slaughter                                        Labour                                      69.0% Remain

Jeff Smith                                                  Labour                                      73.7% Remain

Owen Smith                                              Labour                                      54.2% Remain

Chris Stephens                                         SNP                                           59.1% Remain

Jo Stevens                                                 Labour                                     69.6% Remain

Alison Thewliss                                         SNP                                          71.2% Remain

Michelle Thomson                                    Independent                          71.2% Remain

Stephen Timms                                         Labour                                     53.1% Remain

Mike Weir                                                    SNP                                         51.9% Remain

Catherine West                                          Labour                                     81.5% Remain

Eilidh Whiteford                                         SNP                                         54% Leave

Alan Whitehead                                         Labour                                     50.7% Leave

Philippa Whitford                                      SNP                                          57.3% Remain

Hywel Williams                                         Plaid Cymru                            65.1% Remain

Mark Williams                                           Lib Dem                                   54.6% Remain

Pete Wishart                                                 SNP                                         59.8% Remain

Daniel Zeichner                                            Labour                                   73.5% Remain

Theresa  May’s   “clarification” of Brexit means Brexit

Robert Henderson

May’s speech  of 17 January 2017   was  a classic Theresa May performance , mixing  statements somewhere between a  boast and a threat to give the idea that the UK would be looking to its own interests first, second and last with  suggestions  which undermined the Britain First message.   Contrary to the many media  reports welcoming it as giving clarity it is, with the exception of the Single Market, a speech with  a great deal  of wriggle room not least over her acceptance of a transitional period and suggestion that the UK should remain attached to some  unspecified   EU projects. Here is some of the Britain First rhetoric:

 “Not partial membership of the European Union, associate membership of the European Union, or anything that leaves us half-in, half-out. We do not seek to adopt a model already enjoyed by other countries. We do not seek to hold on to bits of membership as we leave.

“That means taking control of our own affairs, as those who voted in their millions to leave the European Union demanded we must.

“So we will take back control of our laws and bring an end to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in Britain.

Leaving the European Union will mean that our laws will be made in Westminster, Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast. And those laws will be interpreted by judges not in Luxembourg but in courts across this country.

“Because we will not have truly left the European Union if we are not in control of our own laws.”

“But I must be clear. Britain wants to remain a good friend and neighbour to Europe.  Yet I know there are some voices calling for a punitive deal that punishes Britain and discourages other countries from taking the same path.

“That would be an act of calamitous self-harm for the countries of Europe. And it would not be the act of a friend.

“Britain would not – indeed we could not – accept such an approach. And while I am confident that this scenario need never arise – while I am sure a positive agreement can be reached – I am equally clear that no deal for Britain is better than a bad deal for Britain.”

Balanced against the Britain First rhetoric were statements which directly or by implication undermined  the idea that the UK would be truly sovereign.  Around a miasma of waffle the details May gave allowed for a large amount of wriggle room.    Her  “I am equally clear that no deal for Britain is better than a bad deal for Britain”  is meaningless because she has never properly defined what a “bad deal” would be.  The only thing which could be said to be certain (in the sense that it was not  covered with overt  qualifications)  is that the UK  will not be joining  the Single Market.  However, even with that seemingly unequivocal statement  it  is important to understand that  the ground which the Single Market covers including freedom of movement  could be brought back in part by whatever agreement , if any,  is concluded between the UK and the EU.

Remaining attached to the EU 

A good example of the lack of clarity is May’s  rejection  membership of the Customs Union, but leaves  the way open for the UK to become a semi detached member:  viz:

“…I  do not want Britain to be part of the Common Commercial Policy and I do not want us to be bound by the Common External Tariff.  These are the elements of the Customs Union that prevent us from striking our own comprehensive trade agreements with other countries.  But I do want us to have a customs agreement with the EU.

Whether that means we must reach a completely new customs agreement, become an associate member of the Customs Union in some way, or remain a signatory to some elements of it, I hold no preconceived position. I have an open mind on how we do it. It is not the means that matter, but the ends.

And those ends are clear: I want to remove as many barriers to trade as possible. And I want Britain to be free to establish our own tariff schedules at the World Trade Organisation, meaning we can reach new trade agreements not just with the European Union but with old friends and new allies from outside Europe too.”

May also wants the UK to keep open the possibility of the UK continuing to contribute  money to EU programmes, viz:

“…because we will no longer be members of the Single Market, we will not be required to contribute huge sums to the EU budget. There may be some specific European programmes in which we might want to participate. If so, and this will be for us to decide, it is reasonable that we should make an appropriate contribution. But the principle is clear: the days of Britain making vast contributions to the European Union every year will end.

“…we will also welcome agreement to continue to collaborate with our European partners on major science, research, and technology initiatives.”

“With the threats to our common security becoming more serious, our response cannot be to cooperate with one another less, but to work together more. I therefore want our future relationship with the European Union to include practical arrangements on matters of law enforcement and the sharing of intelligence material with our EU allies.

Britain is an open and tolerant country. We will always want immigration, especially high-skilled immigration, we will always want immigration from Europe, and we will always welcome individual migrants as friends.  But the message from the public before and during the referendum campaign was clear: Brexit must mean control of the number of people who come to Britain from Europe. And that is what we will deliver.

Then there is  immigration, viz:

“Britain is an open and tolerant country. We will always want immigration, especially high-skilled immigration, we will always want immigration from Europe, and we will always welcome individual migrants as friends.  But the message from the public before and during the referendum campaign was clear: Brexit must mean control of the number of people who come to Britain from Europe. And that is what we will deliver.

“Fairness demands that we deal with another issue as soon as possible too. We want to guarantee the rights of EU citizens who are already living in Britain, and the rights of British nationals in other member states, as early as we can.

“I have told other EU leaders that we could give people the certainty they want straight away, and reach such a deal now.  “

There is a woolly commitment which could mean virtually anything as to how many EEA migrants could come to the UK, both skilled and unskilled.  Large numbers of skilled people will give British employers no incentive to train our own people and the fact May does not rule out unskilled or low skilled workers suggests there will be large numbers of these.

As for the position of UK nationals living in the EU and EU citizens living in  the UK , if an agreement is made to simply guarantee the rights of UK nationals and EU citizens in the countries which they are living,  then the UK will be losers because  the benefits which most countries  within the EU offer are much less generous than those offered in the UK to EU citizens.   Health service provision is  the outstanding example of this.  There is also the question of how honest each EU country will be when it comes to  allowing UK  nationals access to their  benefits after Brexit.   For some years there have been reports of the Spanish making access to their  health services  by UK nationals difficult and since the vote to leave the EU Spain has been trying to get the UK to pay the medical costs of UK nationals living in Spain. .

Perhaps most immediately  disturbing is May’s commitment to a  transmission period with  different  periods of transition, vz:.

“I want us to have reached an agreement about our future partnership by the time the two-year Article Fifty process has concluded. From that point onwards, we believe a phased process of implementation, in which both Britain and the EU institutions and member states prepare for the new arrangements that will exist between us will be in our mutual self-interest. This will give businesses enough time to plan and prepare for those new arrangements.

This might be about our immigration controls, customs systems or the way in which we cooperate on criminal justice matters. Or it might be about the future legal and regulatory framework for financial services. For each issue, the time we need to phase-in the new arrangements may differ. Some might be introduced very quickly, some might take longer. And the interim arrangements we rely upon are likely to be a matter of negotiation.

But the purpose is clear: we will seek to avoid a disruptive cliff-edge, and we will do everything we can to phase in the new arrangements we require as Britain and the EU move towards our new partnership.”

Any of  the items mention under the heading of Remaining attached to the EU  might have a specious rationality about them,  but they all offer considerable opportunities to prevent a genuine Brexit simply  by  their multiplicity.

Devolved powers

May made this commitment:

“I look forward to working with the administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to deliver a Brexit that works for the whole of the United Kingdom.

Part of that will mean working very carefully to ensure that – as powers are repatriated from Brussels back to Britain – the right powers are returned to Westminster, and the right powers are passed to the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

So we will work to deliver a practical solution that allows the maintenance of the Common Travel Area with the Republic, while protecting the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system.

Nobody wants to return to the borders of the past, so we will make it a priority to deliver a practical solution as soon as we can.”

This could be an excuse for substantial new powers to be given to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in an attempt to stifle opposition to the UK withdrawal from the EU.  But every time new powers are granted to the devolved administrations this edges them nearer to independence because it prepares them for independence.

The Common Travel Area with the  Republic of Ireland 

Independence is a medium to long term problem. The border with the Republic of Ireland (RoI) is an immediate and  very  serious problem .    If the Common Travel Area is retained then the UK will not have control of her borders because anyone wishing to settle in  the UK can do so via the ROI.

May will doubtless come up with claims that new surveillance techniques  based on computer systems to identify and track migrants working  or drawing benefits,  but does anyone have any real faith that the British state will have either the resources or the will to identify those working illegally (many will simply work in the black economy) and deport them?

The lack of a hard border between the RoI and Northern Ireland  would also mean that EU goods could be smuggled into the UK if a tariff wall  exists between  the UK and the EU.

Our Europhile Parliament

But whatever  agreement is finally  made between the government and the EU it will not be a done deal.  Why? Because May revealed that she could  “confirm today that the Government will put the final deal that is agreed between the UK and the EU to a vote in both Houses of Parliament, before it comes into force.”

That unequivocal commitment has more to it than might appear at first glance. By committing to allowing both the Lords and Commons to vote  on whatever is agreed she has greatly increased the opportunity for Parliament  to either delay or even thwart Brexit altogether.    Whether the vote is on a motion or on a  Bill either can be amended,  so matters could be delayed or sent back to square one not only by a vote against the motion or Bill, but also by amending the motion or Bill to overthrow the terms of the agreement between the Government and the EU .

As the Prime Minister has committed the Government to  allowing the Lords and Commons a vote,  it would be impossible to meaningfully accuse those in Parliament who voted against  terms of the agreement between the Government and the EU of acting against the will of the people because by agreeing to allowing the Lords and Commons  a vote they  have  accepted that Parliament has the right to refuse or amend  the terms agree with the EU. Not only that  it would be politically hideously difficult going on  impossible to ensure the Lords voted for whatever terms were put before them by arranging to have hundreds of new peers created who could be trusted to vote for the terms.  Not only that,  but by agreeing to a vote by the Lords May has given the peers  who want to remain in the EU a respectable excuse for going against the  referendum result and, if the Commons did vote to agree the terms,  of thwarting the Commons as well by delaying matters. The Government could use the Parliament Act  to force a  Bill through after a  year or so but has no power over a defeated motion,  so if a motion was rejected a Bill would have to brought forward which would mean further delay.  Because of this a Bill is more likely than a motion of both Houses.

There is the further complication of  legislation  to  give legal post-Brexit status  to all the EU law which the UK is already committed to – “as we repeal the European Communities Act, we will convert the “acquis” – the body of existing EU law – into British law.”

Presumably this would be  legislation separate from any  legislation brought forward to allow the Lords and Commons to vote on the terms agreed with the EU. If so that would allow further opportunities for substantial delay.  Moreover, if the UK leaves after  two years (the period stipulated in Article 50 if the EU does not agree to an extension)  without any agreement having been reached between the UK and the EU, the need to pass  a Bill making EU  derived law UK  law would still exist and  the opportunities for delay or rejection by one or both of  the Houses of Parliament would still be there,  arguably  in an enhanced form.

As things stand the earliest the UK can escape from the EU will be March 2019. The next General Election is due on 7  May 2020 according to the Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011.  The only ways  an election could be called earlier is either two thirds of the House of Commons (that is two thirds of the total number of Commons seats not two thirds of those who vote – 417 seats out  of 650) vote for an earlier election or the Government loses a vote of No Confidence.  With the present balance of the Commons the first option is very unlikely and the second would require the absurdity of Theresa May somehow engineering a vote of confidence against her own government.  Hence, either is very unlikely.  That would mean that when Parliament gets to vote on whatever agreement is reached by the Government and the EU , even the Lords alone would have the power to delay matters either into the general election or shortly after it.

The political weather might  change radically by 2020. It could be that the EU deliberately gives the UK the run around for two years or more and no agreement is reached  before March 2019 or one or more of the 27 remaining EU members refuses to ratify the proposed agreement.  The UK would then be forced either to leave the EU without an agreement  and trade under WTO rules or the UK government  under the pressure of time  would have to cave in and agreed to  very disadvantageous terms  for the UK.  It could even be that the  Government, their backbenchers or the entire Parliament of both Houses will secretly be delighted if  the latter happens because it would probably re-attach the  UK to the EU it is a way to enable future UK Governments  to be  able to use to embed the UK ever more firmly into the EU.  Improbable?  Well, remember this, the Government , the Commons and the Lords are strongly in favour of the UK remaining in the EU. The Prime Minister,  Chancellor and Home Secretary are all remainers at heart and the Foreign Secretary of a shameless opportunist who would come out for remain at the drop of a hat if he thought it would aid his political career.  Not only that but the Civil Service at least  at senior levels  are also very wedded to the idea of the  UK being in  the EU.

The idea of leaving and trading  under WTO rules until if and when new trade arrangements can be made with the EU is not  an unattractive one.  The problem is that  if it happens in 2019 that will have cost the UK a great deal . If it was done now it  would have a number of great advantages.  It would immediately bring certainty whereas delaying the UK’s departure until March 2019 or even later will involve a great deal of uncertainty. In addition The UK could stop paying the huge subsidy the EU extracts  from the UK each year soon, decide where the money the EU  currently returns to the UK with strings attached  may be spent, be  immediately removed from the reach of the European Court of Justice, be  free to make new trade deals with the rest of the world, control immigration from the European Economic Area (EEA)  and repeal or amend any of  the  EU inspired legislation which is on the Statue Book.

If the UK remains entwined within the EU until March 2019,  regardless of whether any agreement is reached between the UK and the EU ,  will have since the vote to leave on 23rd June  last year  have paid 33 months of  the huge  annual subsidy to the  EU   (33 months  worth would be  around  £26 billion),  have had to spend the money which the EU currently returns to the UK  on  what the EU directs it shall be spent on, accept any new  EU laws and regulations which cannot be vetoed, remain under the European Court of Justice’s jurisdiction and,  most importantly , be unable to control immigration from EEA, which if it remains at the level of last year  (net EEA  immigration to the UK is estimated to be  189,000 in the  Year Ending  June 2016) would mean  around  half a million more immigrants by the time  the UK leaves the EU  (and it could easily be higher as would-be immigrants scramble to get in before the UK’s departs the EU).

The long and the short of the speech  is that  despite its range of topic  May’s speech provided  precious little clarity overall about either what the Government will be seeking or what will happen once an agreement is made between the UK and the EU  or no  agreement is made.