Category Archives: parliament

England: the mother of modern politics

I was tempted to entitle this essay “England – the mother of modern democracy” because  the political structures of any state which calls itself democratic today owe their general shape to the English example. In addition, many modern dictatorships have considered it expedient to maintain the form of representative democracy without the content.

But democracy is a slippery word and what we call by that name is very far removed from what the Greeks knew as democracy. The Greeks would probably have described our system as oligarchy – rule by the few. Many modern academics would agree, for they tend to describe representative government as elective oligarchy, a system by which the electorate is permitted to select between competing parts of the political elite every few years, but which has little other direct say in how they are governed.  It is also true that England developed her political system not on the basis of democracy but on notions of who needed to be represented and by criteria such as property qualifications.

If democracy today is a debatable concept, the very widespread modern institution of elected representative government is an objective fact. Elected representative government is an institution of the first importance, for it is a truism that the more power is shared the less abusive the holders of the power will be. Imperfect as it may often be as a reflector of the will and interests of the masses, representative government is still by far the most efficient means of controlling the naturally abusive tendencies of elites and of advancing the interests of the ordinary man or woman, by imposing limits on what those with power may do, either through legal restraints in the form of constitutional law which is superior to that of the legislature, or through fear of losing office in an election. Indeed, no system of government other  than elected representative government manages that even in principle as they all fail to place meaningful restraints on an elite.

Whether democratic or not in the Greek sense, representative government is undoubtedly the only reliable and non-violent means by which the democratic will may gain at least some purchase on the behaviour of an elite. Yet however much utility it has an organising political idea, the fact that we have representative government today is something of a fluke for if  it had  not developed in England we should probably not have it all. In the non-European world nothing of its nature ever developed before the Western model was imported and in Europe the many nascent parliaments of the later Middle Ages either never went beyond the  embryonic form of assemblies which offered advice to and petitioned monarchs or were crushed or simply ignored by autocratic rulers,  for example the Estates-General of France were not called between 1614 and 1789.  By contrast, England has  had continuous parliamentary development for the better part of eight centuries.

The  distinction of the English parliament is not that it  is  the oldest such assembly in the  world (although it is one of  the  oldest),  nor that it was  unusual at its inception  for parliaments  were widespread in mediaeval Europe. The English parliament’s uniqueness lies in the fact that from the first it served roughly the area covered by England today  – no other mediaeval parliament corresponded to the territory of any national state existing today –  its longevity  and the nature of its development. No  other  parliament in a country of any size was meaningfully maintained by  regular  meeting through seven  or  eight  centuries, its only competitors for endurance  being the tiny Icelandic  assembly and the federal arrangements of the Swiss.  Most importantly, before  England  created  such an  institution to  act  as  a model,  no  other parliament in the world developed  into  an fully fledged executive – practising what we know today as cabinet government – as well as a legislature.

The  English  parliament  made a very gradual  progression to the  place  we know today. It  began  as an  advising and  petitioning  body in the 13th century  and  before the end of the  14th  century had come  to exercise  considerable  power  over  any taxation which was considered over and  above the king’s  normal  and  rightful  dues, such  as  the  excise. 

Gradually, this power  transmuted into what was effectively  veto  over  most taxation.  Parliament  also added the  power to propose  and pass  laws subject to their acceptance by the  monarch.  These  developments  meant  that executive  power  gradually  drained  from the King. From  this came cabinet government as the monarch was more and more forced to take  the advice of his ministers and by the end of the  18th century  the  struggle  between  Crown  and  Parliament for  supremacy had been emphatically decided.

As the  Parliament  gained  power, the  Lords gradually diminished in importance and  the Commons became by the  latter half of the 18th century, if not before, the  dominant House, although its power of obstructing Commons Bills other than money Bills lasted till 1911.   The  final  act in the play  was  a  century long extension of the  franchise culminating  in  a government dominated  by  an  assembly elected under full adult  suffrage from 1928 onwards.

By  1600 Parliament  had become important  enough  to  the governing  of  the country  for  Guy Fawkes and  his fellow plotters to think it necessary  to  blow up Parliament rather  than  simply killing the king and his  ministers. In  any  other  major  European  country of the time, the  idea of  destroying  Parliamentary  representatives  rather than  just  the  monarch and his more powerful friends would have  seemed rather odd,  either because a parliament did not exist or was  considered of little account because  European monarchs had by then  been  generally very successful in abolishing  or  curtailing  the  powers  of  mediaeval assemblies  and  preventing  their  political development.

A corrupted Parliament

Parliament,  although growing in power and ambition,  was suffering the ills of any ancient institution.  There  were accretions  of privilege and it had failed to keep pace  with the  changing  times. In 1600 it  neither  represented  the country  as  it was not  satisfied the  growing wish  of  its members,  especially the elected ones, to have a greater  say in the  management  of  England, or at least to restrict the power of the monarch considerably.   This dissatisfaction eventually escalated into the  English Civil War, an event which forced the Parliamentary side to assume  sole executive power  whilst continuing to govern through Parliament. This created the blueprint for Parliament to move from being a legislature to a legislature with an executive within it which was responsible to Parliament.  (The Civil War also gave birth to a short-lived but  powerful  proto-democratic movement  given the derogatory name of Levellers by their enemies.  Had the Levellers  succeeded – and for a couple of years they loomed large in  Parliamentary thoughts because of their wide support amongst the Roundhead Army – England might have had a Parliament far more representative than that  elected after the Great Reform Act of 1832.  But they failed and after   Cromwell’s  establishment  of  the  Protectorate,  democratic ideas  did not gain  serious political currency in  England for  more  than  a  century. )

The Restoration in 1660 did not result in serious legal  abridgements of  the  power  of the monarch, but  Charles  II  was  in practice  much  restricted  by  a  Parliament  unwilling to adequately open  the purse strings for a monarch  who,   ironically,  was expected to do more and more as the formal power of the state grew.  It was in this period that political parties in the modern sense have their beginnings, with the names of Tory and Whig emerging from their origins as derogatory epithets to become the names of the two parties who were to dominate English and from 1707 politics until the latter half of the 19th century.     

The “Glorious  Revolution” of  1689 produced a true constitutional sea-change.  From then on the English  monarch ascended  the throne only with the acceptance  of  Parliament and  the  Bill of Rights (1690) placed  restrictions  on  the monarch.  Amongst  the  long list of things  the  king  was forbidden to do were:

Dispense with and suspend of laws,  and the execution  of  laws, without consent of  parliament.

Levy money for and to the use of the crown,  by  pretence of prerogative,  for another time,  and in other  manner, than the  same was granted by parliament.

To raise and keep a standing army within England  in time of peace,  without consent of parliament,  and quartering soldiers contrary to 4.

To  violate the freedom  of election of members to  serve in parliament.

To  demand excessive  bail of  persons  committed  in criminal  cases,  “to elude the benefit of the laws  made for the  liberty of the subjects.”

To impose  excessive  fines and  illegal  and cruel  punishments.

The abuses of power by the crown listed in the Bill of Rights  are  described  as being ” utterly and directly  contrary  to  the  known  laws and statutes, and freedom  of  this  realm.”   That old reliance on the law and the traditional freedoms  of  the Englishman.

From 1689  began the century long decline of the monarchy  as an executive power.  Cabinet government  gradually emerged in the course of  the 18th century and although George III attempted to revive the executive power of the monarch, the American War of Independence  and the loss of the American colonies sealed the subordination  of  the monarchy to Parliament.

Americans  forged  a  new version  of  the  English  political  model,  with  a  formal separation  of powers and a written constitution to  restrict what governments and legislatures might do. For King, Lords and Commons, read President, Senate and   House of Representatives; for the English Bill of Rights of 1690 read the US constitution.   The novelties, compared to England, was the removal of the executive from the legislature,  the creation of constitutional law which was superior to ordinary law and a Supreme Court whose purpose was to ensure that the actions of President and Congress were compatible with the constitution.  

The received academic opinion on the  American constitutional settlement is that it was primarily the offspring of John Locke’s political philosophy. In fact, it had at least as much  affinity  with the  ideas  of the Levellers. There is no direct intellectual link,  but the most important popular propagandist on the American side, the Englishman  Tom Paine,  shared much of his ideology with  the  Levellers. The  Constitution is a balancing act between Locke  and Paine, granting  a large degree of popular  involvement  in politics,  whilst  tempering  it with  restrictions  such  as  electoral  colleges and granting through the Bill  of  Rights  (which was inspired by the English Bill of Rights of  1690) constitutional  protections  for the individual  against  the  state.

If the American  Revolution  owed its  shape  and inspiration  to England, the French Revolution was inspired by both English constitutional development and the  America revolutionary example. Most political  revolutions  resulting in  an  attempt at representative  government,  have been  touched,  consciously or not, by the legacy of the American and French revolutions. 

England through control of the British Empire, ensured that the Westminster  model of government was  transplanted  with widely differing success,  to approximately  a quarter of the   world’s population,  when the empire dissolved in the  twenty years after 1945. 

The astonishing  upshot of the English example,  the American and French Revolutions and the British Empire, is that  the political structures of most modern states are broadly  based on  the English constitution of King, Lords  and Commons, the  overwhelming majority having  a  head of state  plus two assemblies.  In addition,  the widespread practice of a  written  constitution derives from the example of the  United  States,  which of course drew its form and inspiration from   English  settlements in North America, English history  and  political practices. These political structures  apply as  readily to  dictatorships as they do to liberal democracies. 

Of course, the  balance  of  power between the  head of state and the  assemblies varies widely and there is  much difference between Parliamentary and Presidential government, but  they all  have  their ultimate origin in the example  of the English system of representative government.

One last thing.  Look around the world.  How many countries can be  said  even  today to have  accepted elected representative  government  and  the rule of law as  a  banal fact of life, the norm of their society?  Britain,  the  USA, Australia, Canada, New Zealand  certainly,  Switzerland and Scandinavia  possibly.  But where else?  Not France which  as  recently  as  1958 overthrew the  Fourth  Republic. Not Germany which embraced Hitler  nor Italy  the  land  of Mussollini.  Not  Spain  so  recently loosed from Franco.  As for the rest of the world, that tells a sorry tale of  elites who  generally have  such  a  lack  of respect  for the individual and a  contempt  for the masses that the  idea  of shared power  with and for the people  is simply  alien  to them.

The  fact  that the only really  stable examples  of  elected representative  government  in countries of any size  are  in  those countries  which  have their  origins  in English colonisation  strongly suggests that  it was no accident that it was in England that the institution evolved. There  must be something highly unusual about English society for it both to  develop in a manner so different from any other  country and to export this rare and valuable  difference to those  colonies which were firmly rooted in English manners and customs.

If England was a sovereign state again

For  England  it  is difficult to  envisage  any  insuperable disadvantage  in  the break up of the UK,  but  easy  to  see definite and  substantial  advantages. Most importantly,  England would be able to act wholeheartedly in her own interests. Her  considerable population,  wealth and general sophistication  would  ensure that   she could maintain without any real   difficulty   the present levels of government provision from the welfare state to  the  military.  The powers vital to a sovereign state – the ability to control immigration, trade and the laws of the land – would be once again in English hands.  Acting within the confines of the nation would allow  meaningful democratic control to once again be exercised over parliament as politicians could no longer act as Quislings in the service of globalism because they would have to account .  

England would  no longer  pay subsidies to  the Celtic Fringe. These  currently total  around £16 billion as there are around 10 million Celts and each receives from the Treasury  approximately £1,600 per head more than  the English receive. In addition, the tax take in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales is less per capita than in England and the take-up of benefits higher (benefits are not devolved).  Consequently, England has to pay disproportionately more of the UK benefits cost than her share of the UK population.   The same applies to other non-devolved areas such as defence and foreign policy.

England’s removal from the EU  would save around £5-6 billions just on the net difference between what is paid to Brussels and what  Britain gets back.   Much, probably most,  of the remaining money is ill-spent because it can only be used in ways sanctioned by the EU. Most of the Dangeld paid to Brussels  is paid by England.  That burden would be removed  from the English taxpayer.   Further savings would come from removing the dead hand of EU directives from  Britain, the  cost of which is overwhelming borne by England.

Billions more can be saved by ending foreign Aid. This is currently around £9 billion pa. It will rise in the next few years to between £11-12 billion because of Gordon Brown’s committment to donating the UN’s  target figure of 0.7 per cent of GDP by 2014.  Most of this money is paid by the English taxpayer.

The only important disadvantages for England could be balance of payments deficits (primarily from the loss of oil, gas and whiskey  production)  and  ructions  in  the   international institutional  sphere.  Happily,  adverse  balances of  trade are  (eventually) self-correcting even if the correction,  as is the case with America,  can seem an age coming.  Moreover, with the free global currency market and a floating pound, an          adverse  balance of trade does not hold the horrors  it  once did, for international borrowing is infinitely easier than it was  and   devaluation of the currency is not  viewed  as  a  national  humiliation.    England   might   be   temporarily embarrassed  by a substantially increased trade deficit,  but there  is no reason to believe that it would be prolonged  or seriously affect the English economy.

As  for  international  upheaval,  it  is  conceivable that England  would  be unable to sustain  a  claim  to  Britain’s  privileged  position on international bodies such as  the  UN Security  Council  and  the board of IMF.  However,  this  is  unlikely for a number of reasons. To begin with there is  the precedent  of Russia which assumed all of the Soviet  Union’s international  entitlements.   Britain  is  also  the  United States’   only  halfway  reliable  ally  on  most  of   these       international  boards.    To  this  may  be  added  Britain’s position  as one of the larger international  paymasters  and providers  of reliable military muscle.  None of these  facts need essentially change with the substitution of England  for Britain.  Perhaps most importantly,  the denial to England of any of Britain’s institutional places  would pose the awkward question of who was to take any vacant position.  This  could (and almost certainly would) in turn raise the whole question of  whether  the  constitutions  of  most  world  bodies  are equitable or suited to the modern world.  (The  constitutions were after all created approximately fifty years ago and  are in  no  sense  equitable).  To deny England  would  mean  the opening of a can of worms.

Conversely, it could be plausibly  argued  that membership of such international bodies represents a liability rather  than   an advantage and England would be well shot of them.

Don’t laugh; Labour are flying the English flag

Anglophobia has been around the Labour Party ever since Labour shifted focus from the white working class as their core support to the groups protected by political correctness – women, gays and most importantly ethnic minorities. This switch took place gradually in the 1980s.

At first the Anglophobia was muted, but as the party moved away from support for the unions,   embraced  the EU and gradually converted to the worship of the market and private enterprise  the anti-English bigotry grew. These changesl meant that support for the white working class became ever more implausible as anti-union laws were supported by Labour, the European single market effectively ended Britain’s immigration controls allowing hordes of foreign labour in to compete for jobs  and the acceptance of globalism laid waste much of Britain’s industry.  After Blair became Party leader in 1994 he completed the process of turning Labour into a Thatcherite party with political correctness grafted on.

All of this meant that Labour needed both a new creed to allow them to satisfy their natural instincts to control  lives of those they rule and to provide new electoral support to replace losses amongst the white working class.  To this end they embraced ever more fanatically  the totalitarian creed which became political correctness and pandered to the Celts, from whom a disproportionate proportion of their MPs came, with devolved powers and assemblies and  the continuation of huge English subsidies to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland (currently around £15 billion pa  – seehttp://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2010/11/12/celtic-hands-deep-in-english-taxpayers%e2%80%99-pockets/ ) .    Having done this, they were forced to prevent the English having a devolved Parliament and devolved powers because they knew that  if they  existed it was improbable that Labour would ever hold power in England (it is historically rare for Labour to get a majority of English seats in the Commons) and  exceedingly difficult for a  Labour government to be able to  continue sending truckloads of English taxpayers money to the Celts if they could only form a UK government with large numbers of non-English seats.

As these things  will, the need to keep English dissent under wraps made Labour politicians ever more strident in their Anglophobia.  Here is Jack Straw when Home Secretary:

“The English are potentially very aggressive, very violent. We have used this propensity to violence to subjugate Ireland, Wales and Scotland. Then we used it in Europe and with our empire, so I think what you have within the UK is three small nations…who’ve been over the centuries under the cosh of the English. Those small nations have inevitably sought expression by a very explicit idea of nationhood. You have this very dominant other nation, England, 10 times bigger than the others, which is self-confident and therefore has not needed to be so explicit about its expression. I think as we move into this new century, people’s sense of Englishness will become more articulated and that’s partly because of the mirror that devolution provides us with and because we are becoming more European at the same” (BBC Radio Four’s Brits  10 January 2000 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/596703.stm )

Or take a Labour backbencher ,  the German Gisela Stuart

“Yet it has only been in the last five years or so that I have heard people in my constituency telling me, “I am not British – I am English”. That worries me. British identity is based on and anchored in its political and legal institutions and this enables it to take in new entrants more easily than it would be if being a member of a nation were to be defined by blood. But a democratic polity will only work if citizens’ identification is with the community as a whole, or at least with the shared process, which overrides their loyalty to a segment.  (15 11 2005 http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-opening/trust_3030.jsp)

Having  lost the last election Labour are in a quandary.   They do not know whether to stick or twist on England and the English.   Their choice is either  to continue the policy of the last 25 years and hope that the electoral pendulum will swing  back to them or seek renewed support for Labour  from the English.  The first option has its attractions especially if the referendum on AV goes through for then they could envisage a perpetual  coalition with the Lib Dems.  The problem with that scenario is that the Lib Dems, or at least a substantial part of the party, may decide to prefer a coalition with the Tories or the  Lib Dems may lose a great deal of electoral support even under AV  and  represent a much less attractive proposition. Moreover, it is difficult to see the AV Bill being passed unless it  (1) has the provisions to equalise constituency sizes (which would favour the Tories)  and (2) can become law in time for the new constituency boundaries to be in position for the next General Election. The worst outcome for Labour would be for the AV referendum to be lost but the equalisation of constituencies made law This would put the party  at a considerable disadvantage.

All of this uncertainty is bad enough, but even if there was to be no electoral change Labour would still have considerable cause for concern.  Labour were in power a long time and electors since 1945  have been  reluctant to toss out  any party after a single Parliament.  The fact that we have a coalition probably strengthens this tendency.  Add to that the widespread dislike of NuLabour policies and loathing of Blair, and the economic mess Brown  left and Labour can have little confidence that they will form the next government even as part of a coalition. That means that some in the party are seeing the need to appeal to the English in general and the white working class in particular.  That is what the article by Jon Cruddas and Jonathan Rutherford addresses (see extract below).

As the party they represent has in the past 13 years done everything it could to enrage the English by the denial of  an English parliament, continuing subsidies to the Celts , the ruthless suppression of any display of English national feeling, the public insult of the English,  the export of English  jobs and industry and massive immigration to Britain which has overwhelming come to England, it might be thought that they have a hopeless task, at least in the short run.  However, this may be a false interpretation of present British politics.  The policy may succeed by default because no other British mainstream party  will take up the English baton and run with it. (Sadly, the Anglophobic  line has also become part of the NuTory  philosophy. Here is Willam Hague when Tory leader : “English nationalism is the most dangerous of all forms of nationalism that can arise within the United Kingdom, because England is five-sixths of the population of the UK.” ” (BBC Radio Four’s Brits  10 January 2000 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/596703.stm ).  That may drive the English to Labour out of desperation,  even though you can be sure that the version of Englishness and English interests will be one heavily tainted with political correctness.

Selling England by the pound

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Labour has come close to being destroyed as a national force in England. Jon Cruddas and Jonathan Rutherford believe it has lost the language and culture it grew out of

In Dover the port is up for sale and the people are campaigning to buy it and create a community asset. They don’t want a foreign-owned port, they want a people’s port that is ‘forever England’. Football supporters are building community-based organisations by share purchase – in Liverpool, for example – to save our clubs from foreign corporate power. In the Forest of Dean, thousands are rallying in protest at the plans by the government to sell England’s forests which are England’s ‘green beating heart’. In London, porters at Billingsgate fish market campaigned to stop the City of London abolishing their ancient English role and making them redundant. Where is Labour in the fight for an England which belongs to the English just as they belong to the land?

Labour is no longer sure who it represents. It champions humanity in general but no-one in particular. It favours multiculturalism but suspects the symbols and iconography of Englishness. For all the good Labour did in government, it presided over the leaching away of the common meanings that bind the English in society. It did not build a common good which is the basis of an ethical life. It chose liberal market freedoms for the price of our liberty and our sense of belonging.

The open economy is England’s historic legacy. Trade is in our national DNA. But the economy has become an engine of inequality, division and dispossession. A financialised model of capitalism has redistributed wealth on a massive scale from the country to the City, from the people to the financial elite, and from the common ownership of the public sector to private business. We do not own our utilities, nor do we have control of our vital energy market. The overseas supply chains of business located here are the chief beneficiaries of our economic upswings. A flexible employment market has stripped workers of rights and security. Our soft-touch approach on corporate tax has encouraged tax evasion and transfer pricing as business relocates its profits to tax havens. It is as if we do not live in a country so much as an economic system that is owned elsewhere and over which we have no control.

Labour lost England in the 2010 May election and the cause is about more than just ‘Southern Discomfort’. Labour shares a political crisis of social democracy with its sister parties across Europe. But in England something more fundamental has been lost, and that is a Labour language and culture which belongs to the society it grew out of and which enables its immersion in the ordinary everyday life of the people. It has lost the ability to renew its political hegemony within the class which gave birth to it. It was its apparent indifference to ‘what really matters’ that incited such rage and contempt amongst constituencies which had been traditional bastions of support.

Read more at http://www.progressonline.org.uk/articles/article.asp?a=7451

England was wealthy long before the Empire and the Slave Trade

Researchers at Warwick University led by  economist Professor Stephen Broadberry have concluded that Mediaeval England,  far from being a land of poverty-stricken peasants oppressed by a small aristocratic  elite,  was a prosperous land with a higher average per capita income more than double that of the poorest nations in the world today*  The results are published by the University of Warwick’s Centre on Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE)in  a paper entitled British Economic Growth 1270-1870. www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/academic/broadberry/wp/britishgdplongrun8a.pdf

The researchers  took as a benchmark an annual income of  $400 annually (as expressed in 1990 international dollars) , a measure often  used as a measure of “bare bones subsistence”.  They estimated  English per capita incomes in the late Middle Ages were around  $1,000 (again as expressed in 1990 dollars) and that even just before the Black Death, which first struck in 1348/49, they were  more than $800 using the same 1990 dollar measure.  This is significant because incomes rose significantly after the Black Death because of a dire shortage of labour.

In an interview with Science Daily  Professor  Broadberry,  said:

“Our work sheds new light on England’s economic past, revealing that per capita incomes in medieval England were substantially higher than the “bare bones subsistence” levels experienced by people living in poor countries in our modern world. The majority of the British population in medieval times could afford to consume what we call a “respectability basket” of consumer goods that allowed for occasional luxuries. By the late Middle Ages, the English people were in a position to afford a varied diet including meat, dairy produce and ale, as well as the less highly processed grain products that comprised the bulk of the “bare bones subsistence” diet.”

He also said: “Of course this paper focuses only on average per capita incomes. We also need to have a better understanding of the distribution of income in medieval England, as there will have been some people living at bare bones subsistence, and at times this proportion could have been quite substantial. We are now beginning research to construct social tables which will also reveal the distribution of income for some key benchmark years in that period”

“The research provides the first annual estimates of GDP for England between 1270 and 1700 and for Great Britain between 1700 and 1870. Far more data are available for the pre-1870 period than is widely realised. Britain after the Norman conquest was a literate and numerate society that generated substantial written records, many of which have survived. As a result, the research was aided by a wide variety of records — among them manorial records, tithes, farming records, and probate records.”

Professor Broadberry further said that: “Our research shows that the path to the Industrial Revolution began far earlier than commonly has been understood. A widely held view of economic history suggests that the Industrial Revolution of 1800 suddenly took off, in the wake of centuries without sustained economic growth or appreciable improvements in living standards in England from the days of the hunter-gatherer. By contrast, we find that the Industrial Revolution did not come out of the blue. Rather, it was the culmination of a long period of economic development stretching back as far as the late medieval period.”  (http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/12/101205234308.htm)

Broadly, there is nothing tremendously new here, although the research  includes interesting work on the quantification of wealth in England before the Industrial Revolution with for the first time annual estimates of English GDP between 1270-1700.  From the advent of printing,   it was common for travellers in England who wrote and published  their experiences there to comment on the wealth of England generally  and the good condition of the poorer classes in particular.  Middle English literary works such as the Canterbury Tales and Piers Ploughman  (both 14th Century) also paint a picture of an England far from poor. To those literary sources can be added the evidence of the many magnificent mediaeval cathedrals and the plentiful supply of mediaeval castles  which both speak of considerable national wealth.

As for the notion that the Industrial Revolution suddenly sprang into the world  newly minted around 1760, this has always been treated by serious historians as a nonsense. It was clearly the culmination of a long period of economic accretion and social, legal and political  evolution.  (see  http://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2010/12/17/england-and-the-only-bootstrapped-industrial-revolution-2/)

The estimates of mediaeval per capita income may even produce a false comparison between that time and place and the poorest countries today. Most would have had land to work on their own account, whether that be as a freeman or serf, and with that land would have come a place to live in. The same does not apply to the poorest countries today.

If there is nothing startlingly novel, the research is immensely valuable as an antidote to the idea constantly promoted in the mainstream media  that England only became rich because of the empire and slave trade and before those events was a poor and insignificant country.

*Poorest nations today per  capita income at 1990 dollar values – Zaire $249, Burundi $479, Niger $514, Central African Republic $536, Comoro Islands $549, Togo $606, Guinea Bissau $617, Guinea $628, Sierra Leone $686, Haiti at $686, Chad $706, Zimbabwe $779,  Afghanistan $869 

England and the Enlightenment

 In his book “Enlightenment:  Britain and the creation of the modern  world”, the  historian Roy Porter remarks how peculiar it is  “that  historians have  so  little  to say about the role of  English  thinkers   in  the European  Enlightenment  as a whole” (p3).  Peculiar  indeed  when  one considers  the  English  intellectual personnel of the  17th  and  18th centuries and the  high  reputation  English institutions and ideas had amongst    the  leading  lights  of  the   continental   Enlightenment, especially  in  the  country  which is  generally  represented  as  the powerhouse of Enlightenment thinking,  France.   Here is the philosophe of philosophes,  Voltaire,  at full Anglophile admire: “The English are the only people on earth who have been able to prescribe the limits  of Kings by resisting them;  and who,  by a series of struggles,  have  at last  established  that  wise  Government,  where  the  prince  is  all powerful  to  do  good,  and  at the  same  time   is  restrain’d  from committing evil;   where the Nobles are great without insolence,   tho’ there  are no vassals;  and where the People  share in  the  government  without confusion.”  Lettres philosophiques on Lettres Anglais (1775).

 A  strong argument can be made for the English Enlightenment  not  only existing  but  occurring  a century or so  before  that  of  any  other nation  and subsequently providing much of the  basis  for the  general Enlightenment movement.  

Consider these figures from  the seventeenth century:   William Gilbert (science,   especially  magnetism),   Francis  Bacon  (philosophy   and science),  Thomas Hobbes (philosophy), John Locke (philosophy),  Thomas Harrington     (nascent economics     and    sociology),   William  Harvey (biology/medicine),    Robert   Hooke   (polymathic    scientist    and technologist),  John Rae (biologist), Edmund Halley (astronomy),  Isaac Newton  (mathematics and physics).  What did they have in common  other than  intellectual distinction?   They were all driven by the  idea  of reason,  by the belief that the world could be  understood  rationally. That  is  the  real  essence  of  the  Enlightenment,   the  belief  in rationality,  in particular,  the belief that the world is  subject  to  physical laws, that God does not intervene capriciously, that the world is not governed by magic.  Such ideas did not preclude a God or prevent an intense relationship with the putatively divine, but they did encase God   within  a  rational system of thought in which  His   action  was limited, voluntarily or otherwise. Newton may have been utterly fixated with the numerology of the Bible but he believed the world was  ordered according to physical laws.    From  the belief that the universe is organised  rationally  comes  the corollary  that it can be understood,  that everything is  governed  by laws which can be discovered by men. This idea pre-dated Newton, but it was his ideas,  most notably his laws of motion and theory of  gravity, that elevated the idea to almost a secular religion.   During  the next century   intellectuals   took  the  example  of   Newton’s   inanimate mechanistic physical world and extrapolated the idea to every aspect of existence, from biology to philosophy  to social policy. If only enough was known,  if only enough effort was made,  then everything,  of  this world  at least,   could be understood and controlled  and   everything could be the subject of rational decision making.      

The 18th  century Enlightenment  had another aspect,  an  association with the  democratic or at least a wish that the power of kings  should be greatly curtailed – the Voltaire quote given above is a good example of the mentality.  This also  has its roots in England.  The ferment of the  English  Civil war  not only produced  proto-democratic  political movements  such as the Levellers, it also started  Parliament along the road  of being more than a subordinate constitutional player by forcing it to act as not only  a legislature but as an executive.  Stir  in  the experience  of  the Protectorate,  simmer for  30 years or so   of  the restored  Stuart kings,  mix in  the Glorious Revolution of 1689  which resulted  in  the Bill of Rights and established the English  crown  as being in the gift of Parliament  and  season with half a century of the German  Georges  and   you have the British (in  reality  the  English) constitution   which was so admired by Voltaire,  who  thought it quite perfect,  and  which  gave the American colonists the  inspiration  for their   own political arrangements (president = king,  Senate =  Lords, House  of Representatives = Commons,  with a  Constitution and Bill  of Rights  heavily influenced by the English Bill of Rights.)

The British elite express their hatred and fear of England

John Prescott’s office in the Department of Nations and Regions (sic) in response to a question as to why we could not tick English in the nationality box on our census forms – “there is no such nationality as English.”

The official answer to the West Lothian Question has always been not to ask it. Once England enters the mix as an acknowledged grievance, stand back!

— Anthony Barnett

New Statesman, The Staggers, 19 May 2010

There is no need for an English parliament because there is no England.

PETER ARNOLD

NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE

— Cllr Peter Arnold

Letter in the Independent, 17th March, 2006

 The average Englishman thinks that they have got a Parliament which is the Westminster Parliament and I think resentment could perfectly well be sorted out so long as we could tackle what I regard as this niggle that sometimes English matters are setlled against the majority of votes of the English MPs. This English Parliament would be quite a dangerous remedy to that because it will just take a little step further this sense of separate identity.

— Ken Clarke

House of Commons’ Justice Select Committee, 20th February, 2008

 You hear people yelling about some looming crisis. What do you do? You sit back, sip your cooling tea and don’t bother your fat backside. How else can we explain the utter lack of interest in the possibility of the breakup of Britain, at least as far as the English majority is concerned?

— Andrew Marr

Guardian, 18th April 1999

 Sometimes people say to me ‘You know, David, it would be easier to be Prime Minister if you wanted just to be Prime Minister of England’. And I say ‘I don’t want to be Prime Minister of England, I want to be Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, all of it, Scotland included’. I believe in the United Kingdom head, heart and soul. I would never do anything to put it at risk. People need to know that.

— David Cameron

Press Association, 14th May 2010

However much we disagree about issues, we should try to work together for the benefit of the whole of the United Kingdom and for the benefit of Scotland as well.

— David Cameron

Speech in the Scottish Parliament, BBC, 14 May 2010

I don’t care whether pandering to English Nationalism is a vote winner. The very fact that in my two years as leader I haven’t ripped open the Barnett Formula and wandered round England waving a banner shows you that I am a very convinced Unionist and I’m not going to play those games.

— David Cameron

Telegraph, 10 Dec 2007

English resentment of the Scots should never be underestimated as an emotional or indeed a political force. No home-grown Conservative descanting on the iniquities of the modern political system can last more than a minute without noting that Labour’s stranglehold over the Commons rests on its 50 or so Scottish MPs. The West Lothian question, whereby Scottish Labour MPs can intervene in English domestic affairs but not vice-versa, burns unappeasably on.

— DJ Taylor

Independent, 6 December 2009

Since devolution there has been a growing English consciousness and that has given credence to the unfinished business of devolution. The issue is not an English Parliament. It is how you reform the way in which the House of Commons operates so that on purely English business, as opposed to United Kingdom business, the wishes of English members cannot be denied.

— Malcolm Rifkind

Daily Mail, 28 October 2007

The creation of an English Parliament is likely to threaten the stability of the Union. For this reason an England-wide solution to governance of England is unsustainable.

— John Tomaney

Empowering the English Regions, 1999

Whether in the Labour Party, the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party or the Ulster Unionists—all of us who share the desire to preserve the Union, must insist that this House does not become an English Parliament. It must be a British Parliament as long as the Union exists, and for it to be a British Parliament it must have roughly comparable powers and responsibilities for the four countries of the Union.

— Malcolm Rifkind

Hansard, 14 November 1977

The average Englishman thinks that they have got a Parliament which is the Westminster Parliament and I think resentment could perfectly well be sorted out so long as we could tackle what I regard as this niggle that sometimes English matters are setlled against the majority of votes of the English MPs. This English Parliament would be quite a dangerous remedy to that because it will just take a little step further this sense of separate identity.

— Ken Clarke

House of Commons’ Justice Select Committee, 20th February, 2008

The re-emergence of Welsh, Scottish and indeed English nationalism . . . can be seen not just as the natural outcome of cultural diversity, but as a response to a broader loss of national, in the sense of British, identity.

— Linda Colley

Britons: Forging the Nation

Government has attempted to tackle the question of national identity before, most recently with efforts by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. These were expressions of nationhood concocted in Westminster against a benign economic backdrop. Now all our political parties must search for an animating, inclusive and optimistic definition of modern England to choke off what the EDL taps into.

— John Cruddas

Sunday Times, 24th October 2010

Everyone pays the same taxes so public expenditure should be on a fair basis. Scotland has done very well, so it shouldn’t be subsidised. There is a danger to the union if extremists in England start saying, why is Scotland getting all this money? The Barnett formula needs to be looked at again.

— Peter Bone

Sunday Times, 10 January, 2010

I was never a passionate devolutionist. It is a dangerous game to play. You can never be sure where nationalist sentiment ends and separatist sentiment begins… I supported the UK, distrusted nationalism as a concept and looked at the history books and worried whether we could get it through. However, though not passionate about it, I thought it inevitable. We didn’t want Scotland to feel the choice was status quo or separation.

— Tony Blair

My father’s side of the family by being Camerons are predominantly Scottish. On my mother’s side of the family, her mother was a Llewellyn, so Welsh.

— David Cameron

Telegraph, 10 Dec 2007

As the economies of Europe stutter and shrink, nationalism is on the rise almost everywhere. In Britain we have been blinded to it by our insularity and by the risible performance of the British National Party. But British nationalism is a red herring in this context. It’s the contest between Scottish nationalism and English nationalism that will do much to shape the future.

— David Runciman

London Review of Books, Vol. 32 No. 10, 27th May 2010

The establishment of a Scottish Assembly must be a top priority to ensure that more decisions are taken in Scotland by Scots.

— Margaret Thatcher

Edinburgh Rally, 1975

The danger is of a very virulent and unpleasant English nationalism arising after Scottish independence.

— Vernon Bogdanor

Dinner with Portillo – Why Should We Care About Scottish Independence? BBC4, 15th Sept 2009

So far as I know, no one has yet put forward a positive case for devolution to England, based on a moral vision of what England and the English stand for or might come to stand for. Sadly, this is not surprising.

— David Marquand

Our Kingdom, 7 January 2008

What moral vision does the revived English national consciousness embody? It’s pitifully inadequate to say that England should have a devolved government because that is what the Scots and Welsh now have, and leave it at that.

— David Marquand

Our Kingdom, 7 January 2008

I believe that devolution has made us stronger as a United Kingdom and given democratic accountability for decisions in Scotland and Wales that used to be made centrally. Across the country, we need to see whether there are further ways of devolving power. However, I do not see a new parliament for England as the answer. The vast majority of the UK parliament is comprised of English MPs, and so there is no reason to believe an English Parliament would enhance accountability.

— Ed Milliband

Labour Space

The break-up of the United Kingdom will give the best and the brightest of the English the decisive push which will take them off the fence in favour of the European Union, not because they love England so little but because they love England so much. For a nationalistic Little England will be a travesty of Britain’s former self, with all its vices bloated and all its virtues shrunken.

— Peregrine Worsthorne

England Don’t Arise!, The Spectator, 19th September, 1998

There is no need for an English parliament because there is no England.

Scotland, Wales and Ireland are fairly homogeneous nations, each with its own clearly defined character and culture. That is why devolution (or independence) has been quite successful in all three. In England, the picture is far more complex. There are millions of Scots, Welsh and Irish living in England. The overwhelming majority of non-white migrants also live in England, along with many hundreds of thousands of other Europeans and people from other parts of the world. England is the genuine mongrel nation, and I welcome that. This fact however, makes identity far more complex and difficult than in the other British nations.

For example, I regard myself first and foremost as a Northumbrian, then as British, and finally as European. Here in the north-east we only began to be part of the nation after 1603. Before that, the independent kingdoms of England and Scotland played havoc with the area, and used it (and abused us) for their own dynastic ends. I have no loyalty to England. For me, the British state has meaning and relevance precisely because it has little connection with a brutal past based on ignorance and exploitation.

The answer to the West Lothian question is the creation of a fully federal United Kingdom, based on Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and the regions of England. There would still be disparities of size, but these would be far less than a separate English parliament would create. The failure of the referendum in the North-east in 2004 doesn’t invalidate the concept. Devolution is working in Scotland and Wales; and independence has given most of Ireland a new lease of life. We just need to expand that successful formula to the rest of the United Kingdom.

PETER ARNOLD

NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE

— Cllr Peter Arnold

Letter in the Independent, 17th March, 2006

It is not the English people’s fault that they make up 80% of the population of the UK, but it does mean that England cannot sit happily alongside the other nations as a political unit. The only sustainable federations are ones where the constituent parts are more or less the same size. This means revitalising the case for democratic regional government in England (not dismissing it, as the Conservatives are doing).

— Richard Laming (Federal Union)

Letter to the Guardian, 19 February 2009

Let us not forget that in Scotland the Scottish Constitutional Convention had eight years to develop their proposals for the Scottish Parliament. Then those proposals were put to referendum. In England there needs to be an equally wide process of deliberation and consultation: the English deserve no less.

— Robert Hazell

Public Law; 2001, Summer, 268-280

Coalition Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg on  the 16th November 2010 stated, at the Hansard Society event, ‘that there is no evidence at all that devolution leads to inequalities.’ 

 Oliver Letwin’s  reply ‘that David Cameron is England’s First Minister’ when asked if England like Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland should have a first Minister? – stated at the conservative party conference, fringe event, 2010

Important English constitutional documents

The text of each of these important constitutional documents has been posted as pages on England Calling.  The links can be found at the top of the blog.

1. The development of Parliamentary Government

These documents show the gradual reduction of the power of the  monarch and the eventual development from this of Parliament and eventually the shift of the executive power from the monarch to the House of Commons.

1100 The charter of liberties of Henry (also known as the Coronation Charter)

This concerned primarily the relationship between the King and his nobles and foreshadows that part of  Magna Carta  which deals with things such as inheritance and the treatment of widows.

1215 Magna Carta

Apart from the  stating of rights and restrictions on what King John might do in certain situations, this was the first formal attempt to impose a council with powers to not merely advise the King but to restrain him (article 61).  This article was never implemented.

1258 The Provisions of Oxford and  1259 The Provisions of Westminster

These attempted to do what article 61 of Magna Carta  intended,  impose on Henry III a council with power to restrain the King.

1311 The Ordinances of the Lords Ordainers

These  vigorously  reiterated Magna Carta, bound Royal officials to obey the Ordinances and   in article 40 introduced a panel to have power to interfere with the king’s ministers, viz:  “ Item, we ordain that in each parliament one bishop, two earls, and two barons shall be assigned to hear and determine all plaints of those wishing to complain of the king’s ministers, whichever they may be, who have contravened the ordinances aforesaid.”

1628 The Petition of Right

This was a direct challenge to the attempt of Charles I to extend the Royal Prerogative, or more unkindly, to simply assume that he could do anything, in the early years of his reign. The primary complaint  was Charles’  raising of money without Parliamentary approval.  It set in train the events which led eventually to the proroguing of Parliament for 11 years(1629-1640).  The Petition relies heavily on citing documents such as Magna Carta and the Charter of the Forest, as well as the usual insistence of the restitution of English liberties.

1641 The Grand Remonstrance

This was another attempt to persuade  Charles I to do Parliament’s will by what had the form of a traditional petition to the King but the content of demands with unspoken menaces .  The King was not blamed personally – the failings were ascribed to a Papist conspiracy – but the tone of the petition was much more robust than the Petition of Right and left no doubt that Parliament was not pleading for Royal indulgence but insisting that Charles did their bidding.

It listed 204 separate points of objection, including a call for the expulsion of all bishops from Parliament and a  Parliamentary veto over Crown appointments. Charles refused to agree to all Parliament’s demands  in December 1641 and the first Civil War began a few months later.

1653 The Instrument of Government

This document  is in content if not formal description a written constitution. It created Oliver Cromwell as Lord Protector, stipulated that the office of Lord Protector was not to be hereditary, required regular Parliaments,  and  laid down a mesh of obligations and restrictions on government.

1689 The Bill of Rights

Further formal restrictions on the monarch, a list of rights to protect the liberty of all English men and women, the protection of MPs, regular Parliaments  and the assumption of the English crown to be in practice dependent upon the support of Parliament, thus driving the final nail into the coffin of the  doctrine of the divine right of kings.    This opened the way for the development of the executive in Parliament.

1789 The American Constitution and Bill of Rights

The influence of English constitutional development can be clearly seen in the Constitution and Bill of Rights (the first  ten amendments).  The short lived US Articles of Confederation is  placed below the Constitution and Bill of Rights to allow comparison between the documents.

2. The unification of Britain

1535 The unification of England and Wales

There was no formal Act of Union between England and Wales but the 1535 Act   – “An Acte for Lawes & Justice to be ministred in Wales in like fourme as it is in this Realme” –  was the most important  piece of legislation in the piecemeal process of  administrative incorporation of Wales into England which took place  in the latter years of Henry XIII. The text of  this Act  is in England Calling.

English Speaking Union debate: ‘This house believes that an English Parliament is the last hope for a United Kingdom’

 Report and commentary on the Campaign for an English Parliament  English Speaking Union debate  24 November  2010

Proposition: ‘This house believes that an English Parliament  is the last hope for a United Kingdom’

Chair: Louisa Preston (BBC Presenter)

For: Scilla Cullen (CEP), David Wildgoose ( (English Democrats)

Against:  Prof.  Hugo de Burgh (Ex-journalist and now a Director, China Media Studies at Westminster U, Eddie Bone (CEP)

NB Eddie Bone was playing devil’s advocate (see below) as he is a supporter of an English Parliament  

The proposition for  debate was lightly worn as  both the platform speakers and  comments and questions from the floor tended to circle around the questions of a federal UK and the practicality of an English parliament.  Nonetheless, it was an interesting evening with a healthy turnout.

Scilla Cullen

Mrs Cullen’s main thrust was directed at what she claimed were  breaches of the 1707 Act of Union. She illustrated this by pointing to the  fact that we now have at  two Parliaments – at Westminster and Edinburgh – in the UK ( four if the Welsh and Northern Irish Assemblies are treated as  parliaments)  whereas the Act says there will be but one Parliament for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and different tax and regulatory regimes for trade between the four home countries, something which she claimed was forbidden by the Act.

There are two objections to Mrs Cullen’s  argument.  The Act of Union is simply an ordinary Act of Parliament. It has no superior status as constitutional law. This means that it can be amended or repealed overtly by an Act of Parliament or by the  application of  the English legal doctrine of  implied repeal, viz:

“As a general rule, if an Act is partially or wholly inconsistent with a previous Act, then the previous Act is repealed to the extent of the inconsistency. It does not matter that the later Act contains no express words to affect the repeal or alteration. This is known as the doctrine of implied repeal. (page 3 –  http://cseng.aw.com/catalog/uploads/Carroll_C05.pdf – there is a good presentation  of the history and development of the doctrine at this url )”

There have been attempts since Britain’s entry into the EU (EEC at the time of entry) – most notably in the  ‘Metric Martyrs’ case –  to establish that some statutes have a de facto constitutional status and should not be subject to implied repeal – but no higher court has sustained the claim. (This failure to create a superior constitutional law status  underpins  David Cameron’s recent claim that Parliament is supreme and consequently Britain could leave the EU simply by an Act of Parliament. Cameron  is incorrect because of the Lisbon Treaty – see below under Wildgoose).  It is worth adding, that even if some ordinary Acts of Parliament were retrospectively given a superior constitutional law status and were not subject to implied repeal, the constitutional position would remain unclear because  the Acts with constitutional law status would  contradict one another. 

The existence of implied repeal means  that any complaint that the  original Act of Union has been breached by later law has no legal force.

As for the claim that the original  Act required equality of  tax and trade regulations throughout Great Britain, this is simply wrong because there are exceptions such those in clause  VI  (the full text of the Act can be found at  http://englandcalling.wordpress.com/the-act-of-union-1707/ ). Most notable is clause IX, viz:

“THAT whenever the sum of One million nine hundred ninety seven thousand seven hundred and sixty three pounds eight shillings and four pence half penny, shall be enacted by the Parliament of Great Britain to be raised in that part of the United Kingdom now called England, on Land and other Things usually charged in Acts of Parliament there, for granting an Aid to the Crown by a Land Tax; that part of the United Kingdom now called Scotland, shall be charged by the same Act, with a further Sum of forty-eight thousand Pounds, free of all Charges, as the Quota of Scotland, to such Tax, and to proportionably for any greater or lesser Sum raised in England by any Tax on Land, and other Things usually charged together with the Land; and that such Quota for Scotland, in the Cases aforesaid, be raised and collected in the same Manner as the Cess now is in Scotland, but subject to such Regulations in the manner of collecting, as shall be made by the Parliament of Great Britain.”

At the time of Union England  had a population in the region of 5 million and Scotland a population of approximately 1 million.  If Scotland had been taxed at the same rate as England under that clause they would have been paying not £48,000 but nearer to £400,000. Hence, from the very beginning Scotland was treated much more favourably than England when it came to taxation.

Mrs Cullen was on firmer ground when she pressed the fact that we had a de facto federal system which could only be equitable by the creation of an English Parliament .  She illustrated the point by mentioning that we currently have the absurdity  of  the  SNP’s Richard Lochhead,  a domestic Scottish politician without any electoral base  in UK politics,  negotiating on behalf of the UK with the EU over fishing policy. 

David Wildgoose

Mr Wildgoose wanted a federal UK but it would not have been one which I think most English men and women would welcome. His idea of a federal government was one in which 55 seats at Westminster were taken from the Celts and given to the English, with “English votes for English laws”  and the federal issues decided by the entire Parliament. The problem was he was not envisaging a situation  in which the English subsidy to the Celts ended, for example, he assumed   welfare benefits would continue to be  funded from Westminster .  This sat uncomfortably  with his claim that he wanted “The English to be equal citizens with equal rights”.

During the Q and A session afterwards I detailed what a stable and long lasting  federal UK should involve –  four national parliaments with home rule including fiscal responsibility and one assembly to deal with federal matters such as foreign affairs, defence and the servicing of the national debt.  Oddly, Mr Wildgoose claimed this was not a federation but a confederation. I pointed out, sadly  without success, that  a confederation is a loose league of states without any overarching government, for example, the confederation which arose immediately after the end of the American  War of Independence , while a federation has an overarching government such as that which was formed when the United States was established.   Clearly what I was proposing was a  federal system while Mr Wildgoose was suggesting no more than  a procedurally  amended House of Commons.

Mr Wildgoose also recited the oft made claim that because Parliament is supreme Britain can leave the EU simply by passing an Act of Parliament repealing all the Treaties which enshrine our EU membership in law. This is no longer true. The Lisbon Treaty  contains for the first time a mechanism for any EU state wishing to withdraw from the Union, viz:

“Article 50 of the Treaty runs:

“1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.

2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.

3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.

4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it. A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.”

Apart from requiring a qualified majority of the other EU states (QMV means in practice the support of most of the large EU nations), the state which wishes to withdraw would be excluded from any discussions on the conditions for withdrawal. Then there is the delay before withdrawal can be effected. It is probable that the minimum period of waiting before secession would be two years, because it would be extraordinary if the EU did not try to make withdrawal as difficult as possible, while the provision in paragraph 2 that departure must be by negotiation “setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union” means that it will necessarily be a protracted process.

During the time before Britain left she would be bound by EU laws and the EU could adopt directives which could do Britain a good deal of damage, for example, directives which severely interfered with the City. These would not even have to be directives deliberately designed to harm Britain, but simply decisions advantageous to the remaining members which would  take no account of any damage that might be done to Britain. Britain would take no part in discussions or votes on EU legislation introduced during the period between asking to withdraw and actually withdrawing. There would almost certainly be significant conditions for withdrawal which impinged upon British sovereignty including agreement to ‘voluntarily’ adopt much EU legislation, both existing and future. With the Treaty unsigned Britain could have simply stated that it was withdrawing. Such a declaration would raise the question of whether Article 56(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties, to which our political elite have also promiscuously bound Britain, would sanction withdrawal. The Article runs:

“1. A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless:

a) it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or

b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.”

Whether the various treaties which encumber the EU before the Lisbon Treaty is in force could be said to imply a right of withdrawal is a matter of legal debate, although the fact that the Lisbon Treaty itself makes provision for withdrawal is a tacit admission that withdrawal was always implied. But legal or not, a situation where the right of withdrawal was claimed where no treaty sanctioned, forbade or laid down conditions for withdrawal would be a vastly more fluid and, consequently, Britain would be in a much stronger bargaining situation than that which would exist after the Lisbon Treaty becomes law. After implementation of the Treaty, Article 54 of the Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties would apply to the EU. That Article runs:

“The termination of a treaty or the withdrawal of a party may

take place:

(a) in conformity with the provisions of the treaty; or

(b) at any time by consent of all the parties after consultation with the other contracting States.”

This is in conformity with the withdrawal Article in the Lisbon Treaty and the EU’s legal position would be greatly strengthened by the Treaty‘s implementation. That is one of the reasons why the EU is so desperate to get the Treaty ratified before the next British general election.

But legality in international matters is not the same as legality within a nation state. This is both because there is no democratic legitimacy for international law and for the entirely practical reason that there is no means of enforcing such law, short of blockade or war. Hence, international law is all too often observed in its breach by powerful nations and enforced by the powerful on the weak. Its unreality is shown in Article 42 of the Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties:

“Validity and continuance in force of treaties

1. The validity of a treaty or of the consent of a State or an international organization to be bound by a treaty may be impeached only through the application of the present Convention.

2. The termination of a treaty, its denunciation or the withdrawal of a party, may take place only as a result of the application of the provisions of the treaty or of the present Convention. The same rule applies to suspension of the operation of a treaty.”

This means that for Britain to legally withdraw from the Vienna Convention all Britain’s co-signatories would have to agree to the withdrawal, a  truly fantastic hope.” (Extract from my recent Quarterly Review article Life after Lisbon: freedom or servitude?)

 Hugo de Burgh

Prof de Burgh served up a very rum political dish. On the one hand he was wont to make comments such as the EU is  “Germany’s Fourth Reich” and  a claim that the best governments in the world were all to be found in the Anglosphere as well as constantly extolling the culture and traditions of England. He was also roundly contemptuous of modern politicians,  whom he sees as largely corrupt and self serving, and the centralising tendencies of recent British governments. On the other hand  he was adamant that that there should be no English Parliament. 

There are two contradictions here. First, if  English culture and traditions are so valuable,   it follows that they are worth preserving and like everything else worth preserving this is best done by those with the most direct interest, in this instance the England.  Second,  if Prof de Burgh wants less centralisation, what could be a better place to start than by removing English spending from the bonds of UK policy? It was noticeable that while advocating a devolution of powers generally to the local levels, the Professor did not feel it necessary to suggest that the Celtic Fringe assemblies be abolished.  Astute readers will see that Prof de Burgh’s ideal UK is not a million miles from that of the Blair government with England balkanised and the Celts left politically intact.

How did Prof de Burgh justify his opposition to an English parliament? Apart from his localism argument,  he conjured up a vision of a new world dominated by China with the Anglosphere  replaced as top political world dog by the Asiansphere  and argued from this that it made no sense for England to assert her nationhood because England would be too small and insignificant to have a significant voice.  Why this would be a significantly smaller or significant voice than that of the UK – England having five sixths of UK population – he did not attempt to explain.

The Professor eventually  let the cat out of the bag by saying that England (and the rest of the Anglosphere) should exercise its influence by simply continuing as before  which would set an example to nations without a tradition of the type of values he most admired in the Anglosphere such as representative democracy (note: England  invented representative government not democracy)  and equality before the law.  This is the modern liberal internationalist version of the late imperial ideal of bringing  civilisation to “lesser breeds without the law”.

Prof de Burgh told a fascinating story about a recent encounter he had with a rising member of the Chinese elite who was already an important administrator.  Most Chinese the professor meets love to show off their English. Not this one. In fact, he did not speak at all and was proud of the fact.  The Chinese official explained  that he had made a conscious decision not to learn English because he wanted to remain untouched by foreign culture as this would allow him to fully understand and appreciate the people he would be effectively governing.  That is precisely the mentality which Lord Macartney encountered on the first official British embassy to China in 1794 (His journal is available from the Folio Society in their publication An Embassy to China. ) The liberal idea that China will become a model of Liberal democracy rigid with political correctness is so far removed from the Chinese mentality as to be comical were it not for the threat China potentially pose to the West. (Those who wish to understand the immense ambition of the Chinese should read Parag Khanna’s “The second world”.)

Prof de Burgh disavowed this mentality but clearly admired it. In fact, it is a classic expression of  the natural human desire to guard the security of the tribe.  I applaud that, but seek the same privilege for the English and any other nation.

Eddie Bone

Mr Bone’s contribution  I found unreservedly  fascinating. He has amassed a positive treasury of quotes of Anglophobic politicians from all the major parties and used these to put the anti-English Parliament government case.  There was Jack Straw claiming the English were dangerous because they were violent, David Cameron recoiling with horror at the idea of being Prime Minister of  merely  England , George Robertson rubbing his hands at the idea of regional governments in England, John Prescott bizarrely  claiming he is a “proud Welshman”  and William Hague insisting he is a Briton first and foremost.

Mr Bone has promised to send me a copy of his quotes which  I shall post on the England calling blog (he has agreed to this). 

Questions and comments from the floor

There was a good array of questions including important issues which had gone largely or wholly unmentioned by the speakers such as the complication of the EU and the dire economic situation of the Celtic Fringe. 

The  mood of the meeting was overwhelmingly one of anger at the way England was being treated.

The vote on the proposition was carried overwhelmingly.

My general observations

Those who want an English Parliament must  ensure they:

1. understand the legal position before making claims. It is not enough to think that something is so or to rely on a quote. It is imperative to go and look at the full Act or Treaty to properly understand the situation and quite probably to read an expert commentary on the Act or Treaty.

2. realise the importance of economics to this debate because the Celtic Fringe countries  are all economic basket cases, for example, the public service proportion of their GDP is approximately 70% Northern Ireland, 65% Wales and 58% Scotland. They survive at their present level of expenditure simply because of the English subsidy which is probably in the region of £25 billion a year once the higher per capita Treasury funding  to the Celtic Fringe (£15 billion), the lower tax take in the Celtic Fringe than in England and the higher per capita benefits bill (which is paid by Westminster)  in the  Celtic Fringe than England . None of the speakers raised the issue and I was the only one to do so in the Q and A.  

3. understand that unless each home nation has full autonomy for domestic issues and has to raise all the tax they use to fund domestic and their share of federal funding, the odds are that England would still end up subsidizing the Celts.

What if there is no English Parliament?

English resentment will inevitably grow and have nowhere to go within the political system. The danger will be that people will turn to violence because they have no democratic means  of gaining national representation.  Suppose  no mainstream party takes up the cause. Suppose that English majorities committed to an English parliament were elected to Westminster,  yet were  never able to form a government because an English minority allied to the Celts  formed a Commons majority. Suppose that Proportional Representation was  introduced  and practically removed  forever  the opportunity for a single party to form a government. All this and a media dedicated to preventing honest public discussion of the subject.  Some would think that no  meaningful constitutional or nonviolent opportunity was left?

The most obviously inflammatory  constitutional position would be where  an English party advocating an English parliament gains a majority of English seats in the Commons but did not  gain an overall Commons majority.  Using  parliamentary procedures and keeping their behaviour within customary bounds, they could inconvenience the business of  government but little more. They might boycott Parliament but that would be an impotent ruse unless linked to massive demonstrations. They might set up a self-declared English parliament but it would have no power. The best tactics in such a situation would be for the party with the English majority to take the lead in organising civil disobedience and to announce before the election that they would do so if an English parliament was denied.

Then there is Europe. Our enmeshment in the EU may become so advanced that we could not legally set up an English parliament. Fanciful? Suppose that the EU at some future date insists on Regional Assemblies throughout the EU and this is accepted by a British government. Such Assemblies might then be set up in England without referenda. Suppose further that  the EU insists that the only representation for domestic matters rests with the Regional Assemblies. Add to that entry into EMU the ever diminishing control over policy in foreign relations and  plans for an EU defence force and tax harmonisation, and it would be constitutionally impossible for England to set up a meaningful parliament for it could  decide nothing.  The only nonviolent answer to such a situation would be to elect a UK or an English parliament to declare independence from the EU. 

The English should not be afraid of national feeling. Let them ask themselves why should all peoples except the English  be encouraged to celebrate and defend their ethnicity? The oft cited dichotomy between patriotism and nationalism is contrived. Both words have at their core a pride of nation and a desire to protect and celebrate the nation and culture. Nationalism is a synonym for patriotism. The true difference is between non-aggressive and aggressive patriotism; between those who wish to celebrate and protect their nation within their existing territory and those who wish to invade and compromise the culture and territories of others. The modern English of all peoples can be trusted to remain within  the limits of non-aggressive nationalism.

Devolution and our membership of the EU raise the most profound of political questions: who governs? Those who would deny England a parliament do so because for one reason or another they wish to destroy England as a nation. The English  must  work unceasingly for an parliament both for their self-respect and to prevent the political murder of Albion.

The demand for an English parliament

What demand is there for an English parliament? The British political elite backed up by their stooges in the media like to  pretend that there is no desire amongst the English for a parliament, a proposition which they are strangely unwilling to put to a ballot despite the fact that opinion polls show strong and growing support for the idea, for example,  the ICM for Power April 2010 poll gave this result

Question: England should have its own parliament with similar powers to those of the Scottish Parliament.

Strongly agree: 43%

Slightly agree: 25%

Neither agree nor disagree: 10%

Slightly disagree: 8%

Strongly disagree: 12%

http://riselikelions.co.uk/english-parliament-opinion-polls

The reality is that British  fear the English would welcome a Parliament. That explains the fervour with which the proposition is publicly attacked. No one expends much energy belittling something which does not exist or which is not feared.

There is not of course any great public clamour at present. It would be amazing if there was, because no mainstream political party advocates such a parliament and the national media makes a positive fetish of screaming nationalism or racism whenever one is publicly mooted. The media are also most assiduous in censoring and abusing those in favour of  a parliament. Without mainstream political leadership and access to the mass media, it is next to impossible for a political idea to make headway. Come the rise of a credible political movement  with English interests at heart and things will look very different. The media will not then be able to censor so effectively and there will be a focus for  dissent.

Once political leadership is given, it would be extraordinary if the English did not favour control over their own affairs. The mere fact of granting devolution to Scotland and Wales must heighten and clarify English feelings for an English parliament. The natural outcome of such a splitting of political  responsibilities  will be the growth  of  a resentment by the English of the subsidies currently given to the Celts. From such a resentment will come a desire within England for each country within Britain to finance both the cost of home rule and a proportionate share of general charges  such as defence and the servicing of the national debt.  What the Celts cannot reasonably expect to have for very long is home rule financed by England, for that would be having your political cake and eating it. At present we are in easy economic times. Come a depression  such as we have now and English resentment of money being exported to the Celts will be fuelled. Already there is dissatisfaction with the proposed  cuts in welfare.

There is also the increasingly mean-spirited attitude of the Celts to the English. The extent to which the Scots, the Welsh and Northern Irish Catholics actively wish to leave the UK is debatable. Their widespread resentment of England and all things English is sadly not.  To be English in any part of the UK other than England is to risk utterly gratuitous insult. Those who blithely dismiss anti-English Celtic feeling as being either the product of a small minority of political activists whose importance is unduly inflated by media attention or simply sporting chauvinism – implausible even by the dismal standards of liberal apologia  – are either dullards or wilfully dishonest.

The unpalatable truth is that Celts too often  jealously nurse  an ancestral  resentment of the  English.  This resentment expresses itself from the outright terrorism of the Fenian Irish through a belligerent rudeness found most commonly amongst the working class to a snide middleclass dog-in-the-manger attitude. It is something which has grown  greatly in recent times. The comedian and actor, Billy Connolly,  put the matter succinctly when he said that Scottish antipathy towards the English had gone from  being a music hall joke akin to the rivalry between Yorkshire  and Lancashire to a truly vicious hatred of the English. 1 The English, like any other people, do not respond favourably to habitual, gratuitous and sustained abuse.

But even if the English had at present no great desire for a parliament,  circumstances  make one a  necessity.  If democratic politics means anything,  any responsible British mainstream political party would adopt an English parliament as  a matter of prime policy. They are meant above all to represent the interests of their constituents. In this case the  large majority of the constituents are  English. Manifestly, it is not to the advantage of the majority to subsidize those over whom they have no political control and to have no independent political representation.

As with complaints of English nationalism, the bogus nature of the claim that the English should not have a parliament because they do not clamour for one publicly can be shown by the treatment of the rest of the UK. Support for a Welsh Assembly was muted in the extreme: approximately 25% 2 of the total electorate voted for it and 50% bothered to vote. This did not prevent the government from hastily granting such an assembly. Even in Scotland, only 60% of the electorate voted and a parliament was granted on a YES vote of only 45% of the total electorate. Scarcely rampant enthusiasm.