Category Archives: laws

The right to own and carry weapons in England

The desire to  restrict the possession of weapons has always come from those who wished to not  only monopolise power but to do so on their own terms. When the crossbow was
invented, the medieval nobility attempted to ban it because it reduced the  effectiveness of the armoured and mounted knight. Failing in that, they  attempted to restrict, with some success, its ownership to people they could  control. The Samurai in Japan enforced ruthlessly their rule that only Samurai should  carry swords. When the demobbed conscripts of British Army returned to Britain after  the First World War, the British government passed the first serious laws  regulating gun ownership not because they feared that the British would begin  to murder one another in great numbers but because they feared Red revolution.

As things stand in  Britain, legal gun ownership has become so onerous, that many long-time licence  holders have given up. The effort in obtaining a licence and in maintaining it is  considerable, because of both the draconian storage conditions required by the police
and their eagerness to engineer the revocation and denial of licences. Even if  you legally own a gun, woe betide you if you are spotted openly carrying it in  a public place. Assuming you are not gunned down by over-excited policemen, you will not merely have your licence revoked but probably end up in court as well. As for other  weapons, if the police want to pick you up for possessing an offensive weapon  there is a fair chance they can do so even if you do not mean to carry one.

Forget about knives or coshes, which are complete no, nos, you are conceivably
committing an offence if you have an aerosol of hairspray about your person or
a hammer, for the 1953 Prevention of Crime Act creates a general offence of
possessing an offensive weapon in a public place, an offensive weapon being
anything from a gun to a piece of wood or stone or a kitchen knife which is made,
adapted or intended to cause physical injury to a person.

Is there an historical basis for private weapon ownership in England?

This is an impossible  question to answer categorically. It is undeniably true that weapons were held  widely by private individuals. Feudal military obligation was in fact built on  the private provision not merely of men but of arms and equipment. In late  medieval times statutes were enacted to encourage long bow practice. The Spanish  Armada which attempted to invade England in 1588 was repulsed by a mixed  English fleet of private and Royal ships. Yet although  weapons were commonly held by private individuals for many centuries, the right  of the individual to hold weapons, especially guns, was far from being absolute  or accepted by authority. The Bill of Rights passed after William of Orange
came to the throne in 1689 stated:

By causing  several good subjects, being Protestants, to be disarmed, at the same time when  papists were both armed and employed, contrary to law. (Clause 6 of the Bill of
Rights 1690)

That the subjects  which are Protestants, may have arms for their defence suitable to their
conditions, and as allowed by law. (Clause 7 of the Bill of Rights 1690)

There are four points  to note. First, Catholics were not thought to have the right to have arms.  Second, the clear implication is that Protestants were to be armed to defend themselves Catholics. Third, the very fact  that such a clause was included means that the right to weapons was not so much  of English life that it was taken for granted. Fourth, it uses the phrase  ”suitable to their conditions”. This must mean that the right to  weapons was limited and not limited merely in the sense that a private  individual might not have a cannon but might have a musket. It is also  illuminating that when the US Bill of Rights was created a century later it  ran:

“A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of
the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”  (American Constitution Second Amendment)

The American Bill  of Rights was based on firmly on English tradition, the founding fathers of the  USA considering themselves to be preserving English liberty after  it had fallen  into corruption in England. Yet they did not say that a man has the right to bear
and keep arms full stop. They say he has it because of the need to maintain a  militia.

Nonetheless the 1690  Bill of Rights does grant a right to bear arms of some sort. Leaving aside the  question of what arms are permitted, does the Bill of Rights have any force
today? The problem for those who would say it has is that the Bill of Rights is  simply an Act of Parliament. It has no special constitutional status, any more  than does any other British law with constitutional implications. As such it is  difficult to see how it can not have been amended by the subsequent passing of  laws restricting the ownership of weapons. It is true that none of those laws  specifically nullifies the Bill of Rights, but it is a long established practice in English law that the passing of a new Act which contradicts a
previous law is treated as automatically nullifying the earlier law (the concept of implied repeal).  Whether  this practice is entirely sound in law is perhaps debatable, but I cannot
imagine any English court overturning the de facto principle retrospectively simply
because of the immense implications of doing so.

It is also argued  by some people that a Common Law right to bear and own weapons exists because  in the past men were permitted to own and bear arms and a Common Law right developed  accordingly. Whether this is true or not is irrelevant. A Common Law right can
be removed by statute and indeed the vast majority of our law today is Statute law.  Our present gun laws are all statute based.

What the position should be in a free society

In my perfect world  a man would be able to purchase a gun and ammunition in England as easily as he  might buy a pound of potatoes. Similarly, a man should be able to carry any
other weapon or implement he chooses. He should have the right to keep and carry weapons not merely for self-defence, but because otherwise arms are left in the  hands of governments and criminals and denied to the ordinarily law-abiding  citizen. Not only should a man be able to own a gun (or any other weapon) he should be able to do so without accounting for it to the police. What, you say, anyone  able to own a gun and no licences to boot? Would not that result in Britain  being turned into the Wild West? The answer is no. Consider this, at present  there are plenty of guns in private hands in Britain, whether held illegally or  legally, yet gun crime remains  rare  in – 39 in England and Wales in 2009 (http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jan/21/murders-drop-home-office-figures).  Much more of a problem were knife and other sharp instrument (for example, broken bottle) murders which totalled 255 for the same year.

Even if all guns  were made illegal, there would still be a large and by all accounts increasing  number of illegally held guns in private hands. Now comes the clincher. The
vast majority of gun crime is committed with illegally held guns. In other words
the present wearisome system of licensing and the penal conditions of security under
which guns must be stored on private premises have next to no effect on solving
gun crime.

If guns were  allowed to everyone without restriction, the situation would be essentially the
same as it is today. Gun crime would be committed with weapons which were registered. But would not more guns mean more gun crime? That presumes there  would be a massive increase in gun ownership. This is far from being certain. Before  serious legal restrictions on gun ownership in Britain were enacted, gun ownership  was not the norm. Nor does the ownership of a gun mean the owner will habitually  carry it any more than the near universal ownership of lethal knives has meant  that most people carry such knives. It is also worth reflecting on the fact  that even criminals in Britain rarely use guns, despite their widespread  availability in our larger cities. If criminals do not routinely use them to  kill and wound, why should we believe the law abiding citizen will?

Generally, it  does not matter if people are not policed because, Man being a social animal, will  not normally act in a fatally harmful way to others. Moreover, in a very law  abiding society such as ours, there is less chance of seriously socially  disruptive behaviour than in most, perhaps all, other societies. The English have  a remarkably low murder rate generally (about 800 a year in a population of 60  million) and always have done. Some  years ago, the Canadian  criminologist Elliott Leyton published a study of murder in England entitled Men  of Blood. This analysed English murders from mediaeval times to the present. Leyton  found that the murder rate at any time was abnormally low. The paucity of English  murder is not the result of a careful control of weapons through the ages, especially  guns, for as mentioned above for much of our history weapons were available. The only rational explanation for it is that there is something in the English
character and society, that has made extreme personal violence rare. If any people
can be trusted to own weapons the English can.

That guns do not  equal mass homicide can also be seen from the example of Canada where seven  million guns are owned legally in a population of 30 million. They have a   higher rate of gun killing than England, but it is still very low. Switzerland  with its citizen army with all males of military age having a gun at home is  another example of widespread ownership with a low gun crime rate. If you want a  lethal weapon you can always get one quite legitimately because there are so  many things which will do. The Government bans commando style knives? No  problem, you just go to your local hardware store and buy a decent 6″ blade  cook’s knife. Or why not make yourself an old-fashioned cheese cutter out of  cheesewire with a couple of pieces of wood to act as grips and Bob’s your uncle  once you have the wire wound around someone’s neck. The state trying to outlaw lethal   weapons is like the state trying to outlaw pornography in the age of the  internet.

What to do if you become involved with the criminal law

Robert Henderson (30 March 2011)

Contents

Paras

1-2        What this guide is for

3-8        General tactics

9-13      Choosing a lawyer

14-22   The Arrest

23         Your mental state if under arrest or seemingly under arrest

24-29  How you will be treated after arrest

30-32  How to behave after arrest

33-35  Stop and Search

36-38  Searches with warrants

39-41  Searches without warrants

49-51  The caution

52-58  What to do when cautioned

45-51  The right to silence

59-65  Interrogation

66        The planting of evidence

67         If you are charged

68-71   Detention

72-74  The police

75-78  The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)

79-81   The government law officers

82-86   What to do if you get to court

87-89   Should you go into the witness box?

90-98   Expert witnesses

99-100 Other paths to explore

101-102 Formal police caution or court?

103-105 When should you plead guilty?

What this guide is for

1. Over the past twenty-five years fundamental safeguards have been removed or are in danger of being removed from our legal system through measures such as the Serious Crime and Disorder Act, various anti-terrorism laws, the retention of the fingerprints and DNA of those not found guilty of a crime and the breach of the convention that no one is placed in “double jeopardy” by being tried twice for the same offence. At the same time, the whole thrust of government policy and behaviour is ever more authoritarian, vide the neutering of Parliament, the series of gratuitous and aggressive wars and the increasingly intolerant treatment of protestors. In such circumstances the chances of becoming involved with the criminal law are increasing even for the law abiding. That being so it pays to be prepared to deal with the police, lawyers and the courts.  This what the guide is designed to do.

2. The guide does not tell you what the law is with regard to a particular crime. Rather, it tells the reader what to expect from the police, lawyers and courts, what can and cannot be legally done by the police and associated agencies such as the security services and how you can best defend yourself whilst keeping within the law.  The law most useful to know in this context is that related to these Acts:

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984

Public Order Act 1986

Criminal Justice and Public Order Act

Terrorism Act 2000

Serious and Organised Crime Act 2005

The full text of these acts can be found http://www.legislation.gov.uk/

General Tactics

3. Your general tactics should be three. First, give the authorities particularly the police) as little cooperation as possible within the law, whilst remaining formally polite and reasonable. Second, lay down markers all the way along the line if official misconduct occurs. This covers everything from complaints by you about the failure to observe legal procedures, such as advising a suspect that he is under arrest, to complaints about physical violence. Such markers will provide you with powerful weapons to dissuade the police and the Crown Prosecution Service from mounting a prosecution against you (from embarrassment if nothing else), provide you at your trial with ammunition to taint the prosecution evidence and conceivably give grounds for appeal.  Third, ensure that those in authority know that you will fight to the limit any attempt to prosecute. Such behaviour will both give the police or the prosecuting authority (The Crown Prosecution Service) little to go on and be quietly intimidating to both.

4. Whenever you are abused, whenever you feel that your legal rights have not been observed, whenever you believe that police procedures have not been followed, do the following: (1) make it clear immediately to the nearest police officer that you will be making a formal complaint and (2) make a written note, as soon as possible, of what has happened and sign and date that note. If you have a solicitor, pass the note to them as soon as you physically can so that he or she may certify the date that they received it. Ensure that a copy of your notes exists.

5. If you have a means of recording conversations, use this to record any conversations relating to you by police officers after you are arrested. These may be conversations in which you are a participant or conversations about you but not involving you, by police officers. Make it clear on the recording who you are, when and where the recording was made and the people recorded. Hand this recording to your solicitor as soon as possible. Ensure a copy of any recordings is made. Nothing but nothing is as effective a check on official misbehaviour as their knowledge that they are being recorded.

6. If you have one on you, use your mobile phone to tell others about your arrest if you can. If you have the means of connecting to the Internet put out details of your plight through the Internet.

7. If the police stops you from doing (6) and (7), ask the reason why, the rank of the officer and the name of the officer. Make a written note of it as soon as you can. Include the time the refusal was made, where it was made, the time and date of when the note was made and your signature. 

8. If you threaten to make a complaint, always do so. Never cry wolf.

Choosing a lawyer

9. You will need a solicitor experienced in criminal law. Solicitors often appear in the magistrates courts, although they may also instruct a barrister to act for you. The solicitor will normally instruct a barrister if you get as far as the higher court. Specially licensed solicitors can also appear in the place of barristers in the higher courts(Crown Court, High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court), but I would not recommend trusting your fortunes to one, especially if it is a very serious charge. 

10. If a barrister is instructed, make sure that he is experienced in the area of criminal law with which you are involved. Make certain that the person who turns up to represent you if you are taken to a police station is a qualified solicitor and not a legal executive. Refuse to say anything if a solicitor is not available.  

11. Wherever possible give your instructions to your solicitor and barrister in writing. Keep a copy. This will prevent them going their own sweet way. Barristers in particular always believe that they know best and often disregard or bend their clients’ instructions out of all recognition.

12. Written instructions can be useful if your lawyers let you down. If you feel your solicitor or barrister is incompetent or dishonest, you can sue them and/or make a complaint to their governing bodies, the Law Society (solicitors) and Bar Council (Barristers).  Moreover, if your barrister or solicitor does not follow your instructions, that could be grounds for appeal under the more liberal appeal rules which now apply.  Written instructions are also useful if you want to dismiss your barrister during a trial. The court will look on your request more kindly if you can show that your instructions have not been carried out. They could also provide grounds for an appeal or retrial.

13. The quality of lawyers you will get is largely governed by the amount of money you have. If you are on legal aid, you will probably have to take what you are given by way of a barrister. Your choice of solicitor will also be restricted to those willing to take legal aid work. The already unfair situation is about to become worse.  New rules governing legal aid are shortly to come into force. These will restrict legal aid to lawyers licensed by the government. This will greatly reduce the number of solicitors available for criminal work  and in many parts of the country it will be difficult to find a lawyer able and willing to take a case. In addition, legal Aid is no longer automatically available for criminal cases (since 2010) and you may have to pay all or part of the defence costs (http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/criminal/criminal_legal_aid_eligibility.asp). However, if you are arrested you will get free legal advice at a police station.  If you are charged with a really serious offence, you should end up with competent lawyers and most probably get your full costs met from public funds.  

The Arrest

14. An arrest can be made with or without a warrant being issued. Until the Serious and Organised Crime Act 2005 (SOCA) there were significant restrictions on the power of arrest without a warrant, most notably the restriction of an automatic right arrest to  an arrestable offence. An arrestable offence was any offence which has a fixed mandatory penalty (e.g.  murder) or which carries a sentence of at least five years’ imprisonment. Inciting, attempting, or conspiring to commit, or being an accessory to, an arrestable offence was also an arrestable offence.  There were also a few other offences, such as taking and driving, which are arrestable offences even though they carry a sentence of less than five years.

 15. Prior to SOCA a police officer could also make an arrest for a non-arrestable offence if he reasonably suspected that a non-arrestable offence has been or is being committed and (1) he thought that  “a general arrest condition” is satisfied (for example, he reasonably believed that an arrest was necessary to prevent a suspect causing injury) or (2) he had the statutory power to  make the arrest (for example, for drunken driving) or the common-law power to arrest (e.g. for a breach of the peace).  SOCA has made the power of arrest so broad that it in practice an arrest can be made for any suspected offence. Here is the relevant section from the Act:

(1)For section 24 of PACE (arrest without warrant for arrestable offences) substitute—

24 Arrest without warrant: constables

(1)A constable may arrest without a warrant—

(a)anyone who is about to commit an offence;

(b)anyone who is in the act of committing an offence;

(c)anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be about to commit an offence;

(d)anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be committing an offence.

(2)If a constable has reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence has been committed, he may arrest without a warrant anyone whom he has reasonable grounds to suspect of being guilty of it.

(3)If an offence has been committed, a constable may arrest without a warrant—

(a)anyone who is guilty of the offence;

(b)anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be guilty of it.

(4)But the power of summary arrest conferred by subsection (1), (2) or (3) is exercisable only if the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that for any of the reasons mentioned in subsection (5) it is necessary to arrest the person in question.

(5)The reasons are—

 (a)to enable the name of the person in question to be ascertained (in the case where the constable does not know, and cannot readily ascertain, the person’s name, or has reasonable grounds for doubting whether a name given by the person as his name is his real name);

 (b)correspondingly as regards the person’s address;

 (c)to prevent the person in question—

 (i)causing physical injury to himself or any other person;

 (ii)suffering physical injury;

 (iii)causing loss of or damage to property;

 (iv)committing an offence against public decency (subject to subsection (6)); or

 (v)causing an unlawful obstruction of the highway;

 (d)to protect a child or other vulnerable person from the person in question;

 (e)to allow the prompt and effective investigation of the offence or of the conduct of the person in question;

 (f)to prevent any prosecution for the offence from being hindered by the disappearance of the person in question.

 (6)Subsection (5)(c)(iv) applies only where members of the public going about their normal business cannot reasonably be expected to avoid the person in question. (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/15/part/3/crossheading/powers-of-arrest)

 16. There is one great exception to this arrest regime.  The Terrorism Act 2000 (sections 40-43 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/40) allows an arrest without reasonable suspicion for any suspected breach of the Act. In all other circumstances to make an arrest without a warrant the arresting officer must have a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been  committed, is being committed or is about to be committed. Offences include not leaving a designated area when ordered to do so or holding a demonstration without a licence in a designated area – an area designated by the government  (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/15/section/128)

If an officer cannot show that he had such reasonable suspicion, he has prima facie wrongfully arrested and falsely imprisoned. The officer might also be guilty of an assault if force was used.

17. In principle anyone may make an arrest, the popularly called “citizen’s arrest”. Such arrests are in practice fraught with difficulty for the arrester, because of the potential for disputes over the circumstances of the arrest and what constitutes reasonable force. Someone effecting what they thought to be a “citizen’s arrest” might well end up on charges of assault, the use of an offensive weapon and false imprisonment.  If you wish to chance your arm here are the situations which justify such an arrest:

24 Arrest without warrant: other persons

(1)A person other than a constable may arrest without a warrant—

(a)anyone who is in the act of committing an indictable offence;

(b)anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be committing an indictable offence.

(2)Where an indictable offence has been committed, a person other than a constable may arrest without a warrant—

(a)anyone who is guilty of the offence;

(b)anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be guilty of it.

(3)But the power of summary arrest conferred by subsection (1) or (2) is exercisable only if—

(a)the person making the arrest has reasonable grounds for believing that for any of the reasons mentioned in subsection (4) it is necessary to arrest the person in question; and

(b)it appears to the person making the arrest that it is not reasonably practicable for a constable to make it instead.

(4)The reasons are to prevent the person in question—

(a)causing physical injury to himself or any other person;

(b)suffering physical injury;

(c)causing loss of or damage to property; or

(d)making off before a constable can assume responsibility for him.”

(http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/15/part/3/crossheading/powers-of-arrest)

18. For most practical purposes only the various police forces and Customs and Excise (now amalgamated with the Inland Revenue as Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs) have an exercisable power of arrest. Members of the security forces (M15 and M16) have no powers of arrest beyond those of the ordinary citizen. However, a “citizen’s arrest” by the security services would almost certainly carry fewer dangers for the arrester than it would for the ordinary citizen. This is because the state authorities will generally protect the arrester through their de facto control of prosecutions. (Politicians and the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) will deny vehemently that such control is exercised. The facts are heavily against them.  Our justice system is controlled by law officers who are part of the government. The DPP is appointed by the government. One of the reasons the DPP may give for a failure to prosecute is that “prosecution is not in the public interest,” which can easily cover security service illegality. It is also doubtful whether any security officer, that is, an officer formally employed by the security services, has ever been prosecuted for offences committed during the course of his or her work.)  It should be borne in mind that Special Branch – which is often mistakenly thought of as part of the security forces – is part of the Police and its members consequently can effect an arrest as easily and safely as any other police officer.

19. If a warrant is sought for someone’s arrest, the officer applying to the magistrate (or judge) must satisfy the granting authority that there are sufficient grounds for an arrest, that is, there are grounds for a reasonable suspicion that an offence has been committed.

20. When making an arrest with a warrant the arresting officer must show the person arrested the warrant, but he need not do so at the time of the arrest. Always attempt to obtain a copy of the warrant, the name of the person who has granted it and the reasons given by the applying officer for its granting. If possible ask to photostat or photograph the warrant.  If this is not possible, ask for time to make notes about the detail of the warrant. If this is denied, note the officer who denies the request and the words in which the denial is given. Make a written note as soon as possible. Ask the person(s) engaged in the denial to sign the note you have made certifying it to be a true record.  As soon as possible either you or your solicitor should write to the magistrates (or judge) who granted the warrant asking them to confirm the reasons for granting the warrant. If necessary, call the magistrate (or judge) to your trial to justify the granting of a warrant.

21. When an arrest is made, the officer must tell the suspect why he or she is being arrested and give the grounds for the  arrest. The officer will probably do the former but may well  omit to do the latter. If you are arrested, and the officer  fails to give the grounds for your arrest, always ask  immediately what his reasonable grounds are and the crime of  which he suspects you. Note any failure to give the grounds. Never resist arrest. That in itself constitutes a criminal offence if the arrest is deemed legitimate. Moreover, it is very easy to end up on a charge alleging some form of assault.

22. The police’s favourite time to arrest is in the early hours of the morning. They do this because they believe – quite rightly – that the suspect will be at their most susceptible at that time. However, such arrests tend to be for serious crimes and more often than not crimes involving career criminals. Most arrests are made on the spur of the moment.

Your mental state if under arrest or seemingly under arrest

23 The bad news is that you will almost certainly panic if you have no previous experience of such circumstances. That is nothing to be ashamed of, it is just the way human beings are made. The good news is that panic can be controlled. Visualise now the circumstances under which you will be arrested before you are arrested. Do this regularly. When you are arrested, use deep breathing to control the panic, preferably with your eyes closed. It should calm you down. Then cling on tightly to the idea that if you follow my instructions, you have a very good chance of never being convicted of anything provided the evidence against you is not overwhelming.

How will you be treated after arrest?

24. The physical circumstances you will experience after arrest will vary greatly. At the police station, you will probably be held either in an interview room or a cell. The cell experience may be simply a question of being locked in a small room or, particularly in the inner cities, resemble something rather more demonic, with a rich stew of the mentally ill, the drugged and the drunk either in your cell or ensconced nearby. Ignore them as best you can. Even if you have someone seemingly threatening in your cell, it is unlikely they will be violent without provocation.

25. If you are unlucky enough to be remanded in custody, obey the golden rule of giving no provocation. If you do not go looking for trouble there is a fair chance you will not find it. If you are educated, offer your help to other prisoners with letter writing and such forth. Try to get yourself remanded to the hospital wing. If all else fails, ask to be put in solitary confinement for your own safety – you have legal right to this.  Time served in custody counts as time served if you receive a prison sentence.

26. With the restrictions created by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE), especially the requirement to record interviews, it is unlikely that you will be physically assaulted by the police. However, it is just possible that you may be. Your chances of being assaulted – other than in a resisted  arrest – are virtually nil if you are a woman, although you might be subjected to some form of indecent assault. If you are old, it is unlikely you will be assaulted.  If you are a middle class man they are small, unless you are extremely provocative or unlucky. If you are working class the odds of assault improve somewhat. If you are a career criminal they go up sharply. You also have to bear in mind the crime which is being investigated. If it is (1) serious, 2) causing public outrage and (3) intrinsically sick making, such as the rape and murder of a young child, your chances of being assaulted to gain a conviction will decidedly improve.

27. If you are physically assaulted your best means of resistance is to go inside yourself mentally. Exclude the outside world, make everything seems far off and unimportant. Remember also that the human body can take an immense amount of physical abuse without you dying or being permanently crippled. If you are young, you are practically indestructible if you  receive a routine beating. Moreover, the type of physical abuse you are likely to be subjected to is unlikely to be more than beating on non-vital parts. If you are attacked and free to move, go down on the floor and roll yourself into the foetal position.  Just try to hang in there. Unless you are arrested under the Terrorism Act 2000,  They can only keep you in custody without charge for 24 hours normally and 36 hours at most unless there are exceptional circumstances. If you are charged, you must go before a magistrate’s court as soon as possible. Make any complaint you have to the court. The Terrorism Act 2000 allows a person to held for 28 days without charge.

28. The police have the right to take from someone under arrest fingerprints, DNA samples  and shoeprints from anyone arrested for a  a recordable offence . This covers the overwhelming majority of arrests – see  http://gizmonaut.net/blog/uk/recordable_offences.html . At present these details are retained routinely on the police database in England and Wales (only convicted offenders samples are kept in Scotland)  even if no charge is brought or if a charge is brought but the defendant is found not guilty. The European Court of Human Rights ruled in 2009 that this was a breach of the Convention on Human Rights and any records held of those not convicted of a crime should be deleted. The UK  Government promised to bring forward a scheme but has not done so to date. (http://www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/commons/lib/research/briefings/snha-04049.pdf).

29. Being arrested is no longer a small matter. The retention of details of an arrest, especially your DNA, on a searchable database means that you are a potential object of suspicion even if you have never been charged with a crime. It would increase your chances of being investigated for other crimes significantly, not least because with a database contained thousands of DNA samples there is a reasonable chance of false positives, that is, another person’s DNA being identified as yours or vice versa. There is also a growing tendency of the police to go after close matches whereby the DNA of a close relative may lead to you being drawn into an investigation. Finally, planting another person’s DNA at a scene is easily done, a fag-end or used tissue will do the trick. 

How to behave after arrest

30. Use a polite but firm manner. Many people imagine that they can gain an advantage by showing the police that they are subordinate, normally by being ingratiating. This is an unqualified mistake.  The police will interpret such behaviour as weakness. On the other side, aggressive or abusive behaviour merely alienates those in authority and those who will judge you, magistrates, judges or juries.  Avoid it.

31. It is important that you maintain a psychological distance between the police and yourself  at all times. You may think that by becoming on ostensibly friendly terms with the police you will get better treatment. The reverse is the case. The police will identify your wanting to be liked as weakness and will use a surface amiability to lull you into a false sense of security. You are then more likely to volunteer information.  This may either be directly incriminating or prompt a line of questioning which either incriminates you or leads to a situation where you have to suddenly refuse to answer. That will not look good in court.

32. If you encounter behaviour from the police which you judge to be unacceptable, for example physical threats or serious verbal abuse, make it clear instantly that you will be making a formal complaint. Having issued the threat, you must always carry it out. Ask to see the most senior officer present to make the complaint. Such complaints can of themselves be useful in discrediting in court police evidence or defusing any suggestion that by keeping quiet you had something to hide. They can also ward off any further attempts at abuse. 

Stop and Search Laws

33. There is no general power of stop and search but there are a number of  laws which allows it in specific circumstances. Most of these can only be exercised where the officer has ‘reasonable suspicion’ that a particular crime has been committed, for example, the power to search a person for illegal drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and the power to search for stolen or prohibited items under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). Two Acts provide for stop and search without reasonable suspicion, Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.

33. Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 allows a Chief Constable or the Metropolitan Police Commissioner to designate an area as stop and search areas. Within these the police can use stop and search powers without the need for any reasonable suspicion. In the past section 44 has been used within peaceful public protests. At the moment the whole of London is a designated area for stop and search under section 44. (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/44)

34. Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, empowers  a police officer of the rank of inspector or above to issue a written authorisation for additional search powers on the basis of a reasonable belief that incidents involving serious violence may take place or that people are carrying dangerous instruments or offensive weapons in the area without good reason. The powers relate to pedestrians and vehicles in a specified locality, for a specified period, not exceeding 48 hours at a time. (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1994/33/section/60)

35. Where an authorisation has been issued, any constable in uniform may stop and search any pedestrian or anything carried by the pedestrian, or any vehicle or anyone in it, for offensive weapons and dangerous instruments and may seize any such items which are found. In addition, the police may require you to remove any item which they reasonably believe you are wearing wholly or mainly for the purpose of concealing your identity.

Searches with warrants

36. Search warrants are authorised by magistrates or occasionally judges. When the police come knocking on your door you will not have time to scrutinise the document closely but check the warrant for the address and the magistrate or a judge’s signature.  If the first is wrong or the second  missing, point this out to the police and make it clear you consider the warrant to be invalid.  The police may well ignore what you say, but you have laid down a marker for the future. If the warrant was not valid the police will be unable to claim they did not know it was invalid and acted in good faith. If the police do ignore your complaint and search, record or make a written note of their response. If you can make a video or audio recording from the moment you realise what they have come for. If you refuse to let the police in, be prepared for them to make a forced entry. As with the arrest, it is better to allow the police to do what they will then argue the toss afterwards.  

37. If it is  an all premises warrant “no premises which are not specified in it may be entered or searched unless a police officer of at least the rank of inspector has in writing authorised them to be entered.” http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/15/section/113

38. To obtain a warrant for offences under the Terrorism Act 2000, all the applying officer is required to do is show that the person falls within the very broad definitions offered in section 1 of the Act (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1)

Searches without warrants

39. Under section 18 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, where a person is under arrest because of a reasonable belief that an offence has been committed, a police officer of the rank of inspector or above may authorise a search of premises which they have reasonable grounds for believing contain evidence of the suspected offence. Such a search should be restricted to looking for such evidence, but in the nature of things if other evidence of unrelated offences is uncovered the police will act on it.

40. A search can also be made of premises without authorisation by an inspector or more senior officer if “the presence of the person at a place (other than a police station) is necessary for the effective investigation of the offence.]” (http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1984/60/section/180. This would apply if someone is arrested and the arresting officer has reasonable grounds for believing that a search of premises before taking a suspect to a police station will provide evidence of a suspected offence. If such a search is made, the officer conducting the search must advise an inspector or more senior officer of the search at the first opportunity.

41. Whether a search is made with or without a warrant, there is a reasonable chance that the police will leave the place searched in a mess and/or with damage. If this happens, make a complaint at the time, take photographs and follow it up with a formal letter of complaint to the Chief Constable or in London the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. Depending on the circumstances, there may be grounds for either criminal charges or civil action against the police.

The caution

42. The present caution is this syntactical abortion:

“You do not have to say anything. But it may harm your defence if you do not mention when questioned something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence”

43. The police, Customs and Excise and certain Inland Revenue officers (Customs and Excise and the Revenue are now amalgamated with Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs or HMRC for short) can administer the caution, question under the caution and take statements under the caution.

44. The caution must be administered in accordance with a code of practice issued under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). It can only be administered where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a criminal offence has been committed. It must be administered as soon as is practically possible after the officer reaches the conclusion that such reasonable grounds exists. For example, if you are being questioned without caution, the questioning officer cannot continue questioning you without administering the caution if it becomes apparent from your answers that a reasonable ground for suspecting that you have committed an offence exists. An example of when a caution could not be immediately administered would be during an arrest involving violent resistance where the person being arrested was saying things which indicated guilt, for example, “Take your hands off me or I’ll do you like I did X”, X being someone injured in a brawl. 

45. Anything you say after the caution is administered is admissible in evidence unless you can show that the statements were obtained incorrectly.  Anything you say before the caution is given is not normally admissible in evidence. However, there are exceptions where pertinent statements are made in circumstances where the officer cannot  reasonably be  expected  to issue  a  caution.  Such circumstances are most commonly found where a resisted arrest occurs – see above. These statements, even though not after a caution, may or may not be admitted in evidence depending on the court’s judgement of the circumstances. However, in any circumstances, the officer must, as previously mentioned, administer the caution at the earliest possible opportunity.  It is unlikely but not impossible, that words uttered before the caution was given to a person peaceably under arrest would be admitted as evidence. However, bear in mind that statements you make to anyone else other than the police could be given in evidence. For example, if you are on remand, a cell mate might decide to give evidence against you based on conversations you have had.

46. When the caution is given, the officer must make clear whether or not the person to whom it was administered is under arrest. If he is not under arrest, the officer must make it clear that the person is free to go about his business. In any circumstances, the officer administering the caution must remind the suspect of his right to legal representation.

47. The officer administering the caution must note the fact in his notebook or interview record as appropriate.

48. After a caution has been administered, an officer continuing an interrogation after an interval or an officer beginning a new interrogation must remind a previously cautioned suspect that he or she is still under caution.

What to do when cautioned

49. If the officer giving the caution states that you are not under arrest you may leave immediately. Do so after asking what his reasonable grounds are for suspecting that you have committed a crime.  Say nothing in response to any further questions.

50. If the officer fails to advise you whether or not you are under arrest, ask whether you are under arrest. If you are not, make a note of the officer’s name and the failure to advise you of your arrestable status. Then ask what his reasonable grounds are for suspecting you of a crime. Then leave without saying anything further. The police cannot detain

51. If you are under arrest, try to obtain the officer’s identification whether it be a name, number or office or station from which he or she works. Make a formal complaint about any failure to advise you whether you are under arrest.  This is important because it may give grounds for invalidating the caution and thus affect the admissibility of evidence, in this cased your failure to respond. Ask what his reasonable grounds are for suspecting that you have committed a criminal offence.

 The Right to Silence

52. Contrary to popular opinion, the Right to Silence has not been abolished. All the present caution does is provide an opportunity for the court to draw to the attention of the jury (or magistrates), the fact that the accused refused or failed to give information, at some pre-trial moment, on which they base their defence partly or wholly. The change in the rules has not resulted in a significant change in the general conviction rate which suggests that it makes little if any difference. 

 53. If I had to give one piece of advice to anyone cautioned, arrested or charged with an offence it would be this: “Say absolutely nothing”.  That advice would apply whether or not the person had a solicitor in attendance during police questioning. Those who doubt that it is good advice should ask themselves two questions: (1) why do smart career criminals do it as a matter of course? and (2) why did the  last government circumscribe the right to silence? The answer is that it is generally the most successful tactic in both avoiding prosecution and if brought to court, conviction.  Always go with the professionals – in this case smart career criminals – is a good piece of advice in any circumstances.

54. The reason for the tactic’s success is that many criminal prosecutions involve some self-incrimination from the accused. This does not necessarily mean that the accused has admitted to anything which directly implicates them in a crime. It may often simply mean that they have told a lie which is discovered or have inadvertently contradicted themselves when speaking of circumstances not directly linked to a crime. The trouble with that is that it casts doubt about their general truthfulness, which is an important consideration, particularly in a jury trial.

55. Information given in writing is a different matter. A letter to the police is obviously controlled by the writer. A formal statement is also controlled by the suspect. The police will almost always try to write statements for you. They will say it will be better because they know what the courts want. Resist these blandishments. Always write your own statement.

56. But written information should only be given where there is (1) a pressing reason such as the provision of an alibi and (2) where you are absolutely certain that the story you tell is not merely true but the whole truth. Where possible avoid giving any written information.

 57. If you do refuse to answer questions, one question only needs to be addressed by the jury or magistrate:  was it reasonable for the accused not to have given information at an earlier time. Obviously there are particular reasons for a failure or refusal particular to a case, such as the information not having been available to the accused at an earlier time.  However, there are also general reasons.

 58. It would be reasonable to refuse to speak without a legal advisor being present. It would be reasonable to refuse to speak if recording facilities were unavailable. It would be reasonable to refuse to speak if you had just been arrested in an unexpected and/or violent manner. It would be reasonable to refuse to speak if you had been abused by the police. It would be reasonable for you to refuse to speak if you believed that police procedures had not been observed. It would be reasonable to refuse to speak if you feel ill. It would be reasonable to refuse to speak if you have been kept in circumstances in which you might reasonably be judged to be exhausted.  It is always reasonable to refuse to speak if your legal adviser tells you not to. 

 Interrogation

 59. The good old bad old days when people could be simply “verballed” by the police into prison or onto the gallows are happily gone, although many an old copper doubtless still sheds a tear for their passing and old, unreconstructed members of  the Met’s Sweeney doubtless moisten their pillows nightly.  The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 changed all that. The onus is now on the police to video record – interviews wherever possible. The police must show that recording was not possible. 

60.  Once you have been cautioned, a simple statement that you do not wish to say anything should be enough to prevent further questioning. However, the police will most likely keep pressing you to say something. The best tactic is simply to refuse to say anything. 

61. If you do decide to be interviewed, insist that your legal representative is present. Insist also that the interview is videoed. Insist further that a copy of the tape is given to the legal representative immediately the interview is completed. Get your legal representative to record the interview. Apart from obvious reason of ensuring the police do not doctor the interviews, such behaviour will be intimidating for the police.

62. Once the interview begins, refuse to answer any questions until the interviewing officer has answered some questions of your own. Ask first, do you have reasonable grounds for suspecting that I have committed an offence? If he answers no, get up and walk out. The police have no right to detain you and you have a prima facie case of wrongful arrest and false imprisonment. If the officer answers yes, ask: what are your reasonable grounds for suspecting that I have committed an offence? Let your legal representative judge whether the answer he gives meets the criteria for arrest. If it does not, seek to leave immediately. If prevented, do not answer any questions.

63. Doing interrogation, the police must make it clear within the recorded and written records when breaks are taken. Do not relax your guard if a break is taken. Reasonable refreshment must be provided to the suspect. The suspect must be given reasonable opportunity for rest. Bullying, in the form of a question being frequently repeated might well disqualify the interview from being admitted in evidence.

64. The police may still try to play their age old tricks on you – “tough cop, soft cop”, “You play ball with us son, and we’ll make sure the judge goes easy on you”, “Your mate’s coughed” etc. (Yes, policemen do actually speak like this. I blame this on them watching too many TV police series).  Do not believe a word they say. The police have no interest in  you beyond obtaining a conviction. They will lie to their hearts content in pursuit of that end.

65. If you are unlucky enough to be the subject of physical violence in an attempt to obtain a confession, what should you do? Resist signing if  you can. If you cannot, I suggest that you pretend to agree to sign a statement, but then write on it “I have been physically abused in an attempt to get me to sign this statement.” Then initial your words. Remember, initial not sign. Your action will present the police with a straight choice: do they leave the document intact (in which case it is evidence of sundry criminal behaviour on their part) or do they destroy it and commit the criminal act of perverting the course of justice? Alternatively, sign your name in a way it would not normally be signed. If your normal signature is John Smith, sign J.Smith. If you are right handed, sign left handed. This abnormal behaviour would provide evidence that you signed under duress.

The planting of evidence

66. Although “verballing”,is now a largely past black art, the police can still plant evidence. This can be extremely difficult to disprove. The main means of disproving it are circumstantial. If, for example, you have no history of drug abuse, it might seem implausible to a jury if the police claim that they have found a gramme of heroin in your possession. In your favour is the fact that modern juries are far less trusting of the police than they were even twenty years ago.

If you are charged

67. Being charged does not necessarily mean that you will be prosecuted. However it is a formal accusation of a crime. It indicates that the police (or other authority such as the Customs and Excise branch of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs)think that there is evidence which may lead to a prosecution. The charge should be entered in the charge sheet at the relevant station and a copy should be supplied to the accused.

Detention

68. You may be detained by an authorised officer, normally the police, only after arrest, You may be detained without charge. However, such detention may only occur when it is necessary to secure or preserve evidence or to obtain it by questioning. If detained without charge, always ask the detaining officer for justification of your detention.  Normally such detention should cease after 24 hours unless it is in connection with a serious charge such as rape, kidnapping, causing death by dangerous driving etc. Then a superintendent or more senior officer – chief superintendent, assistant chief constable, deputy chief constable and chief constable in all cases except the Metropolitan Police – may authorise an extension to 36 hours. Magistrate’s courts may authorise a extension of detention without charge for a further 36 hours. With exception of those held under terrorist laws who made be held for 28 days, a suspect held without charge may thus be kept for 72 hours at most.

69. If a suspect is charged with an offence, he or she must be granted police bail or brought before a court as soon as is reasonable. If the delay in bringing a suspect before court seems unreasonable, a writ of habeas corpus may be sought by the person detained. This will force the police to bring you before a court.

70. An arrested person held in custody may have one person told of this, although if a serious offence is concerned and a senior police officer reasonably believes that this would interfere with an investigation, this advice to the person can be delayed for up to 36 hours. If you are refused a chance to tell one person that you have been arrested, ask for the reason, the name of the person making the decision and the name and rank of the person making the decision.

The police

71. The police do not decide whether a prosecution is to be undertaken. Their responsibility is to gather evidence and then  prepare the evidence (with a covering submission) for forwarding to the Crown Prosecution Service.

72. The police may seek the advice of the Crown Prosecution Service at any point in an investigation, whether or not charges have been brought.

73. Many policemen are neither very bright nor well-educated. The minimum educational qualifications for most forces are still dire: 4 GCSE’s is par for the course. This means that they are not too hot on the paperwork side, either in its actual preparation or in their desire to undertake it. This natural reluctance has been built on in recent years by an immense increase in the paperwork required for a submission to the Crown Prosecution Service. Thus it is in your interest to make a case as unattractive to them as possible. Keeping silent does this. Occasionally, it may be expedient to flood the police with entirely legitimate paperwork, for example in the case of company fraud.

74. Bear in mind that policemen are only too human. If they make a serious mistake, they will wish to cover it up even if it means killing a strong case against a subject. It is in your interest to see they make mistakes if you possibly can.

The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)

75. The CPS is headed by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). The DPP is appointed by the government. The present DPP is Keir Starmer QC who was appointed in 2008. The DPP reports to the attorney-general, who is a member of the Government.

76. The CPS is the public body which determines whether most criminal prosecutions are to be brought – the DPP has the formal responsibility for these decisions.

77. At the decision making level, the CPS is staffed by qualified lawyers. Apart from the most senior, these tend to come in two sizes: the young and inexperienced and the older and incompetent. This is because it is rare for competent, experienced lawyer to work for the CPS as a case worker because(1) they can earn far  more in private practice and (2) he is not his own master.

78. The incompetence of the CPS lawyers can be exploited. As with the police, they do not like either difficult or complicated cases. The action you take to dissuade police officers from submitting a case to the CPS will also work at the level of the CPS lawyer. In addition, as with policemen, bear in mind that CPS lawyers are human. If they make a serious mistake, they will also wish to cover it up even if it means illegally dropping a strong case.

The government law officers

79. These are the Justice Secretary/Lord Chancellor (the two offices are held by the same person), the attorney general and the solicitor general. They are all politicians of the ruling party. The formal position is that they act only as impartial law officers when concerned with legal matters. This is of course utter tosh. Their existence is the main means by which government of the day manipulates the justice system.

80. The few criminal prosecutions not left to the DPP to decide are matters such as treason, offences under the Corruption Acts and offences under the Race Relations Act. The decision on such prosecutions is made by a member of the government, the Attorney-General, the second most senior political law officer after the Lord Chancellor. In the Attorney-General’s absence, the decision is made by the Solicitor-General, the third most senior law officer.

81. The Attorney-General (or the Solicitor-General) also has the right to intervene in criminal prosecutions. He or she may enter a plea of nolle prosequi (Latin: to be unwilling to prosecute) to terminate criminal proceedings. In the case of criminal proceedings on indictment, that is those tried by jury and thus generally the most serious, the proceedings are automatically ended. In the case of summary proceedings –  those in magistrate’s courts – the leave of the court is required. This leave would normally be automatic. Pleas of nolle  prosequi  are  not appealable.  Nor does the attorney-general (or the solicitor-general) have to give a reason for their plea, although normally a reason will be given such as “not in the public interest” or “unfit to plead”.

What to do if you get to court

82. Tempting as it may be to represent yourself, there is a good deal of truth in the adage that a man who represents himself has a fool for a client.

83. Most people have little experience in speaking in public. That alone will make them very nervous. The court atmosphere will be intimidating even if the court is a modern one. Then there is the problem of court procedure which the novice will find bewildering. Above all, there will be the need to question witnesses. This might seem simple but it is not. The average person will not be able to keep the flow of questioning going or construct sequences of questions which logically build up to a “killer” question. The average person will also put questions to witnesses which are irrelevant or inadmissible (which tries the patience of the court), questions which allow the witness to embroider their reply (which slow proceedings and may influence the jury in ways you do not want) and questions to which no certain answer can be expected. Good barristers ask only questions to which they know the reply, which is ideally yes or no.

84. However, having said all that there are cases where it may be necessary to defend yourself. This is where you cannot reasonably have any confidence in any barrister (or these days, solicitor) presenting your defence, honestly, ably or energetically in court. Such cases are very rare and are likely to arise only where the charge being answered is essentially political. Charges under Section 70 of the Race Relations Act might fall into this category.

85. The only other occasion when you should consider presenting your  own case is when you come to the conclusion during your trial that your counsel is making such a hash of your defence that to take it over yourself could not make matters worse.

86. If you do end up defending yourself, you may make use of advice in court from someone who is not your appointed counsel (a Mckenzie’s Friend – http://www.mckenzie-friends.co.uk/), for example a friend with some legal knowledge such as a solicitor’s clerk. However, the person does not need any legal knowledge. The judge should also extend a good deal of latitude to you when it comes to questioning of witnesses. He may even question witnesses on your behalf if he feels that you are failing to do the job adequately.

Should you go into the witness box?

87. Generally I would say no for the same reasons that I hold to the belief that keeping silent is on balance the best tactic. Give the court as little to go on as possible. It also hamstrings the judge, for “summing ups” frequently revolve around evidence given by the accused in the box. Such advantages will more than counterbalance any disadvantage you may incur by the magistrate or jury questioning why you have not taken the stand. But there are other reasons as well.

88. If you go into the witness box you will probably be very nervous. Prosecuting counsel will hold all the cards. He determines what questions will be put. You will be restricted more often than not to yes or no answers. Even if you are completely innocent, you may well come out of the box seeming dishonest. Moreover, if you do not go into the box, the jury or magistrate do not get a glimpse of your personality. They have to go entirely on the facts of the case. That is generally an advantage, particularly where a jury is concerned, because most people who give evidence come across as either frightened (which tends to make the jury despise them) or bombastic (which makes the jury dislike them.

89. The one occasion you probably should go into the witness box is if you are engaged in a political trial for that will give you the chance to expose the nature of the charge against you.

Expert witnesses

90. If you want an “expert” opinion to support your case you can usually find one. Moreover, certain types of evidence are either intellectually worthless or so questionable that they should, rationally, immediately create a “reasonable doubt”, the evidential test for a criminal conviction. It is up to you and your lawyers to make sure the questionable nature of the evidence is brought out emphatically during your trial. Even the most famous of forensic evidence, fingerprints, are not as secure a piece of evidence as the courts make out. A few years ago an historian of science, Simon Cole, published Suspect Identities:  a history of fingerprinting and criminal identification (Harvard University Press) which demolishes their infallibility and attacks the science which underlies fingerprint evidence.

 91. Such things as handwriting comparisons and voice prints are inconclusive – try getting a so-called handwriting expert to identify correctly fifty pieces of handwriting when he does not know how many were written by the same person. If you are faced with such an expert, get your counsel to set him such a test. If an audio recording is produced purporting to contain your voice, have it tested to see if it is edited and the recording is an original not a copy. Different recording machines of even the same model may produce different “electronic footprints”. Ditto video recordings. If you are faced with an audio alone, simply claim the person is not you. It is damned difficult to prove otherwise. Much video evidence is inconclusive because of camera angles and image quality. If all else fails, rest you claim on the fact that digital recordings can be manipulated in very sophisticated fashion and even what seems to be a cast iron recording of you doing whatever the prosecution says you were doing is no real proof.

 92. Psychiatry is no better than institutionalised quackery. As the psychologist Hans Eysenck never tired of pointing out, people suffering from mental illness who receive treatment from psychiatrists show no greater rates of recovery than those who receive no treatment. Incredible but true.

 93. You can refuse to be seen by a psychiatrist unless you have been sectioned under the Mental Health Act. If you agree to be seen by a prosecution psychiatrist before your trial, insist on (1) your solicitor being present and (2) the interview(s) being recorded by your solicitor. Then say that you will not answer any questions unless the psychiatrist can provide objective evidence that his understanding of the human mind is any better than the next man’s as a result of his psychiatric training. There being no objective evidence, the psychiatrist will be unable to provide it. He may or may not admit so much. However, he can be forced in court to make the admission when he is under oath. Moreover, you can enter the recording of your meeting with him before the trial as evidence of quackery and your willingness to cooperate if it could be shown that such cooperation would have any worth.

94. You may be faced in court with psychiatric evidence which has not involved your cooperation, for example “Cracker” type speculation. Again, get your counsel to ask the psychiatrist to show objectively that he has special expertise. If he cannot show that he has special expertise, then he should be disqualified as an expert. At the worst you will have demonstrated to the jury or magistrate that there are solid grounds for doubting the evidence.

95. Eye witness evidence is so suspect that it is a wonder it is allowed. Academic study after academic study has shown the same thing: eye witnesses are monumentally unreliable. Get a psychologist who specialises in the field to give evidence on your behalf. Pay special attention to the time lapse between the crime and the first time the eye-witness makes a statement – the longer the time, the more suspect the evidence.

96. If you require expert advice for your defence, you have two main problems: (1) finding and paying the expert and (2) getting counsel who can understand the expert. (If you want to see counsel making an idiot of themselves, go and see a case involving serious forensic evidence. Second favourite for this sport is a case where counsel has to deal with a company fraud case involving arcane accountancy practices.) A further problem is that much of the forensic expertise readily available in this country is to be found in government controlled laboratories.

97. If you cannot get your own forensic tests done, you could be convicted simply because of incompetence by the laboratory used by the prosecution. Quite a few instances have come to light in recent years. Moreover, there have been a number of cases where there has been a deliberate attempt to cover up mistakes. So do try to get your own forensic tests done.

98. There is also the question of forensic evidence being planted by the police. Take DNA. It is a simple matter to obtain DNA evidence from a suspect. Get them to touch something. Get them to eat something like an apple. Take a hair from them without their knowledge. Pick up a used tissue. I think a defence could reasonably be mounted against DNA evidence on the grounds that it was planted. Similar objections could be made against other forensic evidence. Juries are much more susceptible to claims of the planting of evidence than they once were.

Other paths to explore

99. Try putting prosecuting counsel into the witness box on the grounds that he is being dishonest and that cross-examination will reveal that dishonesty. (For example, why has counsel asked about Y when he also knew about Z and Z discounts Y?) I do not think that this has ever been done, but it would be interesting to see what the judge’s response would be. A refusal might also provide grounds for an appeal.

100. Similarly call the Crown Prosecution case worker who dealt with your case. It is a fair bet that cross examination will reveal him or her to be incompetent. This could cause a prosecution case to simply collapse.  Again whether you will be allowed to call this witness is dubious. But is worth trying.

Formal police caution or court?

101. The police are increasingly using formal cautions as alternative to taking a case to court. The caution has nothing to do with caution issued to warn you that anything you say may be used in evidence against you. It is a procedure whereby the person accepts their guilt and receives what amounts to a form of administrative justice by being formally advised of his offence, the acceptance of the crime and the consequences of accepting a caution, namely, that the caution and all the details of the crime  will go on the Police Computer together with their DNA and fingerprints (as things stand) for all time.  

102. There is a strong temptation to accept a caution even if you are innocent because it takes away the stress of a trial with the possibility of a significant punishment if convicted, the expense of defending yourself if you cannot get legal Aid, gets the matter ended rapidly, avoids publicity and does not leave you with as criminal conviction. However, a caution will be taken into account by a judge if you are sentenced for a future offence and may cause you difficulty with employers especially those needing a Criminal Records Bureau check. You need to take legal advice before accepting a caution. It could also cause problems if you want to go to countries which require a declaration of criminal offences – they may consider a caution a conviction even though it is not considered so in this country.

When should you plead guilty?

103. Discounts on sentences are available for those who plead guilty. An admission of guilt at the earliest opportunity could earn a one third discount on sentence although that would depend on the circumstances of an admission. Being caught red-handed during a burglary would count for less than the man who went to the police and gave himself up because he was troubled by a bad conscience.  Pleading guilty at a later stage will get smaller discounts.

104. The question of whether you should plead guilty is obviously dependant on circumstances. Listen to your lawyer. However, if you confess to your lawyer(s) that you are guilty then they cannot continue to represent you if you insist on a not guilty plea.   

105. A special circumstance is when plea bargaining comes into play. There is no official plea bargaining, but the prosecution may informally make it clear to the defence that they will drop a more serious charge if a guilty plea is entered on a lesser charge. There is a strong temptation to accept such a deal even if the defendant believes themselves to be innocent. If you find yourself in such a position,  you will have to decide whether conviction even though you are innocent is the lesser of two evils.

England and the rejection of violence

Why was England so different from other countries in its political, social and economic  development?  How was it that only in England did parliamentary government evolve and the one and only bootstrapped industrial revolution arise?  Perhaps much of the  answer  lies  in the fact that the English, in comparison with any other large nation, have long been wonderfully  adept  in dealing  with the central  problem  of human  life –  how  to live together  peaceably.  A  Canadian  academic, Elliott Leyton,  has  made  a study of English  murder through  the centuries in his book Men of Blood. Leyton finds that the rate of English  (as  opposed  to  British murder) is phenomenally  low  for a country of her size  and industrial development,  both now  and for centuries past.  This strikes Elliott  as  so singular that he said  in  a recent interview “The English  have  an antipathy to murder  which borders  on eccentricity; it is one  of the great  cultural oddities of the modern age.” (Sunday Telegraph  4 12 1994).

 This  restraint  extends to warfare and social disorder. That is not to say England has been  without violence,  but rather that  at any point in her history the level of  violence  was  substantially lower than in any other comparable society. For example,  the  English Civil War  in the  17th  Century  was, apart from the odd inhumane blemish,  startlingly free of the gross  violence common on the continent of  the  time  during the 30 Years War,  where the sacking and pillage of towns and cities  was  the norm. A particularly notable thing,  for civil wars are notorious for their brutality. 

The  way  that  England  responded  to the  Reformation  is instructive. She  did not suffer the savage  wars of religion which  traumatised  the  continent  and  brought  human calamities  such as the  St Bartholomew Day’s  Massacre  in  France  in 1572,  when thousands of French  protestants  were   massacred at the instigation of the French king. 

It  was not that the English did not care deeply about  their  religion,  rather that they have been, when left to their own  devices,  generally loth to fight their  fellow  countrymen  over  anything.  English  civil  wars  have  always  been essentially  political affairs  in which the ordinary  person has little say, for the struggles  were either dynastic or  a clash  between Parliamentary  ambition and  the  monarch.  Even the  persecution of  the  Lollards  in  the late fourteenth  and fifteenth centuries and the persecution  of Protestants  under Mary I had a highly political aspect.  The former  was a vastly disturbing challenge to the  established social  order  with men being told,  in so many  words,  that   they could find their own way to salvation and the latter  an  attempt  to  re-establish not merely  the Catholic  order  in  England,  which had been overturned since the time  of  Henry  VIII’s  breach  with Rome,  but also what amounted to  a  new  royal dynasty with Mary’s marriage to Philip of Spain.

Even the prohibitions on Catholics and non-Conformists  after the  Reformation had a fundamental political basis  to  them, namely, they were predicated on the question of whether  such people be trusted to give their first loyalty to the crown.

The treatment of foreigners

Compared with  other  peoples,  the  English  have been noticeably restrained  in their treatment of other  peoples residing  within their country.  A few massacres of  Jews  occurred before their expulsion from England in 1290,  but from that  time  there has not  been  great slaughter of a minority living within  England. Since  1290  there  have been occasional outbreaks of anti-foreigner violence. During the Peasants’  Revolt  London-based Flemings  were  murdered.  In later times an anti-Spanish “No Popery”  mob was  frequently  got up in London and he influx of Jews and Huguenots in  the 17th and 18th centuries caused riots,  one so serious in 1753 that  it  caused the repeal of a law naturalising  Jews  and Huguenots.  But  these riots did not result in great  numbers of dead, let alone in systematic genocidal  persecutions of any  particular group.  Most notably,  the English  fonts  of authority,  whether  the crown, church  or  parliament,  have   not incited let alone ordered the persecution of a particular  racial or ethnic group since the expulsion of the Jews.  They  have persecuted Christian groups, but that was a matter  of  religion  not  ethnicity, the  Christians  persecuted  being  English  in the main. The only discrimination  the  English  elite  have formally sanctioned against an ethnic group for  more than half a millennium was the inclusion of Jews within  the  general  prohibitions passed in the half century  or  so after  the Restoration in 1660 which banned  those  who  were  not members  of the Church of England from holding  a  crown  appointment such as an MP or election to public offices  such  as that of MP.

This comparative  lack of  violence  can plausibly be seen as the ground for England’s maintenance and unique development of a Parliament and  the development of the rule of law a  consequence  of England’s political  arrangements. From that sprung the gradual erosion of monarchical authority. Put those three developments together and there is arguably the ground upon which first a great commercial edeifice was built followed by industrialisation.  

But even if that is the immediate cause of English development it does not explain why  the English become  exceptionally peaceable within their own territory.  One could argue that being an island helped, not least because England has not been subject to a forced foreign conquest  from the continent  for the better part of a millennium. However,  England has suffered a good deal of inter-nation warfare within the British Isles, especially with Scotland. She has also fought many a campaign around the world, both as England and later under the banner of Great Britain. It is not that the English are or have been naturally timid.  

Perhaps the fundamental answer to English peaceableness  lies in the fact  that the English enjoyed a level  of  racial and cultural  homogeneity  from very early on.  Long  before  the English kingdom existed Bede wrote of the English as a single people.  The  English have never killed one another  in  any great  quantity  simply  because one part of  the population  thought  another  part was in some way not English.  That is the best possible starting point  for  the establishment of a coherent community. 

The  favoured  liberal  view of England is  that  it  is  the mongrel nation par excellence.  In fact,  this is the  exact opposite of the truth.  The general facts of immigration into England are these. The English and England were of  course created  by  the  immigration of Germanic  peoples.  The British  monk, Gildas,  writing  in  the  sixth  century, attributed  the  bulk  of  the  Saxon  settlement  to the practice  of  British leaders employing  Saxons  to protect   the Britons from Barbarian attacks after Rome withdrew around   410  A.D.  The English monk Bede (who was born in  A.D.  673)   attributed  the origins of the English to the Angles,  Saxons   and  Jutes who came to England in the century  following  the   withdrawal  of  the  Romans at the  request of  British  war leaders.

Archaeological  evidence suggests that  substantial  Germanic settlement in England had a longer history and  dated  from  the  Roman  centuries, perhaps from as early  as  the  third  century.  What is certain is that in her formative  centuries  following  the  exit  of  Rome, the  various invaders  and  settlers  were drawn from peoples with much in  common.

They  were  the  same  physical type, there  was  a  considerable similarity of general culture, their languages  flowed from a common linguistic well. When the Norsemen came they too brought a Teutonic  mentality and origin. Even the Normans were Vikings at one remove who, if  frenchified,  were not  physically  different  from  the English  nor  one imagines utterly without  vestiges  of  the  Norse mentality.  Moreover, the number of Normans who settled  in England immediately after the Conquest was small, perhaps as few as 5000.

After  the Conquest,  the only significant  immigration  into England for many centuries were the Jews.  They were expelled  from England in 1290. There was then no really large  scale  and  sudden immigration from outside the British Isles  until  the flight of the Huguenots after the revocation of the Edict  of Nantes (which granted limited toleration to the  Huguenots within France) in 1684 by Louis X1V.

There was other immigration in the period 1066-1650, but it was  small and highly selective. Craftsmen of  talent  were  encouraged particularly in the Tudor period. Italian families  with  trading and banking expertise (such as it was in  those days) appeared  after the expulsion of  the  Jews.  Foreign  merchants  were  permitted,  but for much of  the  period  on sufferance  and  subject  to  restrictions  such  as forced  residence within specially designated  foreign quarters. 

The  upshot of all this is that for six centuries  after the Conquest  England was an unusually homogeneous country,  both racially  and culturally. This is reflected in the  absence since  the  Norman Conquest of  any serious regional separatist  movement within the  heart of English  territory. There  has been meaningful resistance  at  the periphery  – Cornwall,  the Welsh marches and the  far north,  but  even that  has  been  effectively dead since the sixteenth century. Englishmen have fought but not to create separate nations.

The unusual restraint of the English  is also shown in their dealings with foreigners  abroad. England did not routinely go in for sack and pillage as was common on the continent and occasional massacres  often occurred in special circumstances,  for example,  Cromwell’s in Ireland happened in   aftermath of a  massacre of Protestants in Ulster in 1641 and the fear that Ireland would be used as a springboard for a Royalist invasion of England.

Nowhere was the restraint seen more emphatically than in the Empire. If  a people were forced to become part of an empire, the British Empire was indubitably the one to join. There were of course outrages committed in the Empire’s name,  but there was no general policy of  cruelty and, for the final century of the Empire’s existence, official British policy towards the colonies was that the interests of the natives should come first.  

If  the  theory that a homogeneous population long occupying a territory without suffering foreign conquest results in greater social restraint  is correct,  this may have  a profound implication.  Assuming that personality is substantially innate, natural selection will act upon the type of personality which is best suited to the environment. It could be that the native English are, on average,  genetically better suited to live in a society in which politics are decided by peaceful transfer of power and business and personal disputes are mediated through the law.   On top of any genetic propensity is added the culture of restraint which has developed from the genetic propensity over the centuries.

Should it be true that the English have a unique genetic national shape and  a culture which uniquely plays to that genetic national shape, then mass immigration will weaken both by introducing both different genetic types an competing cultures.

The beginnings of England’s political success

If  England’s  unique political success lies in the  general tenor of  her  society, the institutions  through which it was achieved were cultivated  from the thirteenth  century onwards.  The  start  of the  long climb towards representative government  and the neutering of monarchy  may reasonably be  set in the reign of John.  In  1215  he  was  forced  by many  of his barons  to sign a charter which granted rights to  all  the  free men of the kingdom. This  charter,  the Magna Carta, was  of  immense  significance  because it formally  restricted the  power  of  the king in an unprecedented  way. The pope of  the  day  thought it  such an  abomination  he  granted John absolution for its repudiation. Perhaps for the first  time  since the end of the classical  world,  a king  had  been  forced  to acknowledge  unequivocally that there could be  legal  limits to his power. 

Long regarded as a revolutionary document by historians,  the fashion amongst  them in recent times has been  to treat  the  charter as little more than as an attempt  to preserve  and enhance  the  position of the barons or to  restate  existing English  law and custom. Of course it did that but  it  did much more.  Had it done nothing beyond  circumscribing  the  power  of the king it would have been revolutionary,  but  it went  far beyond that by explicitly extending rights that  we  consider  fundamental  to  a free society to  all  free  men. Perhaps its  two most famous  clauses  show  its importance in the development of the future sharing of political power:

Clause  39 No free  man  shall be  seized  or imprisoned,  or  stripped of  his  rights  or possessions, or  outlawed  or exiled  or  deprived of the standing  in any other way ,  nor  will  we  proceed with force against  him or send others  to do so, except  by  judgement  of his equals or by  the  law of the land.

Clause  40  To no one will we sell,  to no  one  will  we deny or delay right or justice.

Until  the  security of a man and his property  are  secured, there can be no sustained spreading of power,  for if a  king may  imprison  and dispossess  at will no man  is  safe.  All merely  live at the will of the monarch.  By providing  both, Magna  Carta  created  the necessary  legal  and  ideological  infrastructure for the  political development which culminated in parliamentary government.  

Perhaps the  most intriguing clause of Magna Carta was  the one,  clause 61,  which gave a committee of 25  Barons  legal authority  and practical power  over the  king.  It  is  long  clause but worth quoting in full:

Clause 61. Since,  moreover,  for God and the amendment  of  our  kingdom and for the  better  allaying  of  the  discord  that has arisen between  us  and our  barons  we  have granted all these things aforesaid, wishing them to  enjoy  the use of them unimpaired and unshaken for  ever, we  give and  grant  them  the  underwritten  security,  namely, that the barons  shall choose  any  twenty-five  barons  of  the kingdom  they wish, who must  with  all  their might observe,  hold and cause to be observed,  the  peace and liberties which we have granted and confirmed  to them by this  present charter of ours,  so that if we,  or our justiciar, or our bailiffs  or any  one  of  our    servants  offend  in any  way  against any one or  transgress any  of  the articles of the  peace  or  the  security and  the offence be notified to  four  of  the  aforesaid  twenty-five barons,  those four  barons  shall  come  to us, or to our justiciar if we are out  of  the  kingdom, and,  laying the transgression before us,  shall  petition  us  to  have that transgression corrected  without  delay.  And  if  we do not  correct  the  transgression,  or if we are out of the kingdom,  if  our  justiciar  does  not  correct  it, within  forty  days,   reckoning  from  the time  it  was brought to our  notice  or  to  that  of our justiciar  if  we were  out  of  the    kingdom, the  aforesaid four barons shall  refer that  case  to  the rest of the twenty-five  barons  and  those  twenty-five barons  together  with  the  Community of the  whole land  shall  distrain  and distress us  in  every   way  they  can,  namely,  by  seizing  castles,  lands,  possessions,  and in such other ways as they can,  saving  our  person and  the  persons  of  our  queen  and  our  children, until, in  their  opinion, amends have been  made; and when amends have been made,  they shall obey us  as they did before. And let anyone in the  country  who  wishes  to do so  take an oath to obey the orders of  the  said  twenty-five  barons  for the execution of  all  the  aforesaid  matters,  and with them to distress us as much  as he can, and we publicly and freely give anyone leave   to take the oath who wishes to  take it and we will never  prohibit  anyone from  taking it.  Indeed, all those in  the  land who are  unwilling  of themselves and of  their   own accord to take an oath to the  twenty-five barons  to  help  them to distrain and distress us, we  will make   them  take the  oath  as aforesaid  at  our  command.   And  if  any  of  the twenty-five  barons dies or  leaves  the  country  or is in any  other way  prevented from   carrying  out the things  aforesaid, the remainder of  the  aforesaid  twenty-five barons shall choose  as  they  think fit another one  in  his place, and he shall take  the oath like the rest.  In  all matters  the execution   of  which is  committed  to  these twenty-five  barons, if  it should happen that these twenty-five are present yet disagree among themselves about anything,  or if some of  those summoned will  not  or  cannot be  present, that  shall be  held  as  fixed  and  established which the  majority of those  present  ordained  or  commanded, exactly  as if all the twenty-five had consented  to  it; and  the  said  twenty-five shall swear  that  they  will faithfully  observe all the things aforesaid and will  do  all they can to get them observed. And we will  procure  nothing  from anyone,  either  personally or through  any  one else,  whereby any of these concessions and liberties  might be revoked or  diminished;  and if any such thing be procured let it be void  and null, and we will never use it either personally or through  another, And we have fully  remitted  and  pardoned  to  everyone  all the ill-will,  anger and rancour that have arisen between  us and our men,  clergy  and laity, from  the  time of the quarrel. Furthermore,  we  have  fully remitted to all, clergy  and laity, and as far as pertains to  us have  completely  forgiven  all  trespasses occasioned by the  same  quarrel between Easter in the sixteenth year of our reign  and the restoration of  peace. And, besides, we  have caused to be made for  them  letten  testimonial patent of the lord Stephen archbishop of  Canterbury, the  lord Henry archbishop of Dublin and of the aforementioned bishops.

The extreme nature of the concessions the king made – he gave  permission for his subjects to act  with force to remedy  any  Royal failure to observe the  charter – is a graphic  example  of  the inherent weakness of the mediaeval monarch.  King  he  might  be,  but  not a tyrant because he  did  not  have  the  resources to dominate utterly.

This  committee was never actually  formed,  but  the  clause has  great  interest.  Once such a  council  of  nobles  to restrict the  behaviour  of  the  king is accepted as reasonable and possible,  it  is not such a great leap to the idea of a  larger  assembly  which  might do  the same. That  idea  was realised  before the century was out  in  a Parliament.

Magna  Carta  is  not as is commonly said  the  first  formal restriction on the powers of a monarch.  The coronation oaths of  mediaeval kings regularly contained promises  to  observe the laws and customary freedoms of England,  but there was no means of enforcing the oaths other than rebellion.  There was  even  a previous  occasion  when  Ethelred  was  forced  to  agree to  formal  restrictions on his powers in  1014,  but that  had no practical effect because of his  death  and  the  Danish  conquest  in 1016. Magna Carta unlike  coronation  oaths  was both  specific enough to usefully form  the  basis   of law and in 1215 England did not  fall under  foreign rule.   Instead,  in modified form, it  quickly became part of  the   statute  books which developed in the  thirteenth  century.  More  importantly it acquired a  mythological  quality which lasts to  this  day. Every important  English  rebellion  and  political  movement  from  1215 until the  Chartists  in  the  1840s  has  cited Magna  Carta  in  their  defence and derived their programme from it. The  Levellers  in the 1640s  made  constantly cited it. It was a benchmark  which  allowed  the  powers  of the king to be progressively  whittled away.  Never again could  an  English king convincingly claim that  such  restrictions  on the prerogative were unthinkable or unprecedented.

If England was a sovereign state again

For  England  it  is difficult to  envisage  any  insuperable disadvantage  in  the break up of the UK,  but  easy  to  see definite and  substantial  advantages. Most importantly,  England would be able to act wholeheartedly in her own interests. Her  considerable population,  wealth and general sophistication  would  ensure that   she could maintain without any real   difficulty   the present levels of government provision from the welfare state to  the  military.  The powers vital to a sovereign state – the ability to control immigration, trade and the laws of the land – would be once again in English hands.  Acting within the confines of the nation would allow  meaningful democratic control to once again be exercised over parliament as politicians could no longer act as Quislings in the service of globalism because they would have to account .  

England would  no longer  pay subsidies to  the Celtic Fringe. These  currently total  around £16 billion as there are around 10 million Celts and each receives from the Treasury  approximately £1,600 per head more than  the English receive. In addition, the tax take in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales is less per capita than in England and the take-up of benefits higher (benefits are not devolved).  Consequently, England has to pay disproportionately more of the UK benefits cost than her share of the UK population.   The same applies to other non-devolved areas such as defence and foreign policy.

England’s removal from the EU  would save around £5-6 billions just on the net difference between what is paid to Brussels and what  Britain gets back.   Much, probably most,  of the remaining money is ill-spent because it can only be used in ways sanctioned by the EU. Most of the Dangeld paid to Brussels  is paid by England.  That burden would be removed  from the English taxpayer.   Further savings would come from removing the dead hand of EU directives from  Britain, the  cost of which is overwhelming borne by England.

Billions more can be saved by ending foreign Aid. This is currently around £9 billion pa. It will rise in the next few years to between £11-12 billion because of Gordon Brown’s committment to donating the UN’s  target figure of 0.7 per cent of GDP by 2014.  Most of this money is paid by the English taxpayer.

The only important disadvantages for England could be balance of payments deficits (primarily from the loss of oil, gas and whiskey  production)  and  ructions  in  the   international institutional  sphere.  Happily,  adverse  balances of  trade are  (eventually) self-correcting even if the correction,  as is the case with America,  can seem an age coming.  Moreover, with the free global currency market and a floating pound, an          adverse  balance of trade does not hold the horrors  it  once did, for international borrowing is infinitely easier than it was  and   devaluation of the currency is not  viewed  as  a  national  humiliation.    England   might   be   temporarily embarrassed  by a substantially increased trade deficit,  but there  is no reason to believe that it would be prolonged  or seriously affect the English economy.

As  for  international  upheaval,  it  is  conceivable that England  would  be unable to sustain  a  claim  to  Britain’s  privileged  position on international bodies such as  the  UN Security  Council  and  the board of IMF.  However,  this  is  unlikely for a number of reasons. To begin with there is  the precedent  of Russia which assumed all of the Soviet  Union’s international  entitlements.   Britain  is  also  the  United States’   only  halfway  reliable  ally  on  most  of   these       international  boards.    To  this  may  be  added  Britain’s position  as one of the larger international  paymasters  and providers  of reliable military muscle.  None of these  facts need essentially change with the substitution of England  for Britain.  Perhaps most importantly,  the denial to England of any of Britain’s institutional places  would pose the awkward question of who was to take any vacant position.  This  could (and almost certainly would) in turn raise the whole question of  whether  the  constitutions  of  most  world  bodies  are equitable or suited to the modern world.  (The  constitutions were after all created approximately fifty years ago and  are in  no  sense  equitable).  To deny England  would  mean  the opening of a can of worms.

Conversely, it could be plausibly  argued  that membership of such international bodies represents a liability rather  than   an advantage and England would be well shot of them.

The roots of English democracy

The beginnings of English democratic thought

 Contents

INTRODUCTION

THE FRANCHISE BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR

THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

PHILOSOPHICAL AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

SERVANTS AND ALMSTAKERS

CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTRODUCTION

The Civil War changed English politics utterly. It brought the end of claims by the English crown to Divine Right and absolute monarchy. It promoted the political interests of the aristocracy and gentry as a class. It forced those on the Parliamentary side to effectively exercise power on their own responsibility. It created a political class which saw politics as something they could control rather than merely be part of as a adjunct to the crown. It began the constitutional process which resulted in cabinet government. It laid the foundations for the formation of political parties. In short, it sowed seeds of modern representative government.

But something else occurred which was to be even more momentous in the long run. It was during the 1640s that the belief that men should only be ruled by those they had themselves elected first became a serious political idea, not merely in England but anywhere. Amazing as it may seem now, the idea that every man (but not woman) should have an active voice in choosing those who would represent and govern them was a novel concept in the middle of the 17th  century. A form of male-only democracy existed in the ancient world, but it was never inclusive because the citizens were always greatly outnumbered by the unfree and other non-citizens.

Why was the idea of every man being an elector so revolutionary? The enfranchisement of a wide electorate is perhaps the most fundamental political change a society can undergo. It forces the elite to take note of the masses in a way that no other system does. Even the humblest man must be considered as a man in his own right, a person with a vote and needs and wishes. Those needs and wishes may be heeded and met to varying degrees, but what the majority needs and wants cannot be ignored completely when each man has a vote.

The democratic spirit was surprisingly widespread in the 1640s. By this I do not mean that men were commonly calling for full manhood suffrage, much less the emancipation of women. Rather there was a sense that the social order had been rearranged by the war, that men were on some new ground of equality and had a right to a public voice. In particular, there was a feeling that those who had fought for Parliament had won the right to enfranchisement. There was also a more widespread feeling which penetrated all social classes that the existing franchises (which varied greatly) were frequently too narrow and that the towns, particularly those most recently grown to a decent size, were grossly under-represented.

The group which gave representation to democratic feelings most successfully was the Levellers. They were a disparate and ever shifting crew, drawing their support primarily from the ranks of the Parliamentary armed forces (especially after the New Model Army was formed), small tradesmen, journeymen and apprentices. However, they also included  those from higher social classes, their most famous leader, John Lilburne, being the child of minor gentry.

To call them a political party in the modern sense would be misleading. Yet they were the closest thing to it both then and arguably for several centuries. Their tactics and organisation were modern – the use of pamphletering and newspapers, the ability to get large number of supporters onto the streets (especially in London) at the drop of a hat, the creation of local associations. They also developed an increasingly sophisticated political programme in a series of documents known as The Agreements of the People. These Agreements dealt extensively with political representation and structure. The levellers were also very successful in creating an enemy and sense of grievance. They did this by portraying 1640s England as having declined from a golden age of freedom under the heel of the Normans and their French successors.

Led for the most part by a man of preternatural obstinacy, courage and unreasonableness, John Lilburne (“freeborn Jack”), the Levellers frightened the Parliamentary leaders sufficiently to force various negotiations and discussions. These culminated in the Putney Debates in 1647 when Parliamentary and Army leaders including, Cromwell and his son-in-law Henry Ireton, met with a variety of people on what might broadly be called the democratic side.  Unfortunately Lilburne was not able to attend. Nonetheless,the Leveller position was strongly represented. Most importantly, much of the debate was taken down in shorthand. It is a most intriguing document. The sheer range of political ideas it displays is impressive. It shows clearly that in the 1640s there was a very high degree of sophistication amongst the politically interested class. The ideas run from the monarchical to the unreservedly democratic. This document together with the Leveller pamphlets provide ample evidence of Leveller thinking.

How far did the Levellers reach in their search for political inclusion? Did they go the whole hog and seek a full manhood franchise or were they much more cautious? That is the question which I shall now examine with the aid of Prof C.B. Macpherson.

Macpherson contends in his ‘Theory of Possessive Individualism’ that the Levellers were  never advocates of universal manhood suffrage, but, rather, sought a  restricted franchise which excluded servants (to be equated with wage-earners) and almstakers (or beggars).

He is extremely emphatic in his conclusions. As we shall see, there are substantial reasons for doubting his certainty, both on the question of universal manhood suffrage and on the extent to which a more restricted suffrage was accepted by the Levellers.

To answer the question I shall begin by describing the  attitude  taken towards the franchise before the  Levellers.

I will then cover, in much the same order as  Macpherson, the documentary evidence he puts before us.

Having done this, I shall examine the philosophy he attributes to the Levellers in order to explain their  motivations and to bring forth  any  further evidence and observations.  

Lastly, I will deal with the definition of servants and almstakers,  plus the  nature of Macpherson’s statistics.

 Chapter 1

 THE FRANCHISE BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR

Discontent with electoral qualifications, provisions and practices was not an infant of the Civil War and  its aftermath, although it was greatly increased by those events,  Rather it was the end of a trail which began in Elizabeth’s reign and reached  its highest pitch, prior to the 1640s, during the years 1621 to 1623.

The discontent was provoked primarily by the situation in the boroughs rather than the counties, Since 1430, the county electorate had been restricted to the forty shilling freeholder, which qualification had become almost sacrosanct by the end of the sixteenth century –  only one proposal outside the ‘Great Rebellion’ (1621) was made to raise or lower it.  Tudor inflation had  greatly lowered the barrier it represented (40 shillings in 1600 was worth perhaps 15 shillings at 1430 values) and it is reasonable  to suppose this considerably increased the rural electorate. Also, there is evidence to suggest that the qualification was not always enforced1 and some county electorates may have had a very broad manhood franchise indeed prior to 1640.

Borough franchises were anything but uniform. In some the whole ‘commonalty’  (all householders) or  even all ‘potwallers’ (men with their own  hearths) voted. In others the vote was restricted to all taxpayers (‘scot and lot’), freemen of the town, or those in possession of burgage property. In extreme cases the vote might be restricted to the ruling corporation. Such discrepancies of representation were aggravated by a distribution of borough seats which took insufficient  account of the demographic changes of the past two centuries, during which time England’s population increased very substantially, perhaps by as much as a third. All this meant that there was fertile soil for agitation for more equal borough representation, both in terms of the breadth of the franchise and in the number of seats.

Tudor monarchs, not unnaturally, did not favour larger electorates2. The existence of ‘rotten boroughs’ was a source of patronage and, if the monarch could control the oligarchies who returned the MP, a means of reducing opposition to the Crown. As there was a significant number of such boroughs, this was no small advantage to the monarch.

The attitude of Parliament to the franchise was mixed. The Lords had a similar interest to the Crown in distrusting broad franchises. The peers often effectively controlled seats in the Commons. They also had a natural inclination to deny the ‘commonality’ any voice in the affairs of the kingdom. Conversely, it was obviously in the Commons’ interest to increase electorates, where such increases reduced the Monarch’s’ and the Lord’s opportunities for patronage.

There is particular evidence that the Puritans favoured larger electorates, at least in so far as it suited their own purposes. At Warwick in 1586 Job Throckmorton was  elected after he threatened to invoke the right of the ‘commonality to vote. In 1587 John Field remarked to  colleague ‘seeing we cannot compass these things by suit or dispute, it is the multitude and people that must  bring the discipline to pass which we desire.’3 As Puritans displaced many court nominees and the creatures of aristocrats, this is significant in view of  the attitude of the Commons towards electoral qualifications  between 1621 and 1628.

By 1621, the Commons had gained the right to decide disputed elections and to revive lapsed borough seats and  even make new creations, The tendency until 1628 was to  ecide in favour of wider franchise and to allow  all the ‘commonality’ to vote. At Bletchingly (1624) and Lewes (1628) ‘all the inhabitants ,’ were to be  electors’, and at Cirencester (1624) all ‘resients:’.  n the case of Pontefract in 1624 a general principle was formulated:

‘There being no certain custom nor prescription, who should be the electors and who not, we  must have recourse to common right which, to this purpose was held to be, that more than the  freeholders only ought to  have  voices  in the election, namely all men,  inhabitants,  householders resient within the borough.’4

Further, in the case of Boston (1628) it was asserted that the election of burgesses belonged by common right to the   commoners and only prescription or ‘a constant usage  beyond all memory’ could rob them of this.5

It is true that when the Commons revived or created borough  seats, they concentrated, as the Tudors had done, on small towns to promote their own advantage. But,  even so,  they granted ‘scot and lot’ franchises in every case (except Weobley) which meant  that even small towns such as Great Marlow or Hilbourne Port had electorate of around 200.

Bills  were  introduced to  regulate  elections and standardise, the franchise in 1621, 1623, 1625, 1628  and 1640, The 1621 Bill is of particular interest because it proposed that the 40/- freeholder qualification be increased to œ4 and to admit œ10 copyholders by  inheritance. The borough proposals add no more than the various decisions on individual cases (in fact even less), for electors were to be freemen except where they numbered less than twenty-four, in which case all  inhabitants  not in receipt of alms were to be included,

In 1640 the franchise was raised again by Sir Simonds D’Ewes. It was he who first uttered the idea later made famous by Thomas Rainsborough ‘that the poorest man in England ought to have a voice, that it was the birthright of the subjects of England and all had voices in the election of Knights etc. previously.’6

In 1641 a bill had reached second reading but was then lost. D’Ewes favoured its contents except that he ‘desired that whereas it was provided in the bill that none that took alms should have voices in elections, which I well allowed, we would  likewise provide that no more monopolizing elections might be in cities and boroughs, that all men resients might have voices.’7

It is also noteworthy, both for its own sake and the part it played in Leveller literature, that many believed that the Statute of 1430 had disenfranchised  people. William May, in 1621, said ‘Anciently, all thecommonality had voice, but because such a multitude made the election tumultuous, it was after reduced to freeholders’.  William Prynne put it even more plainly, ‘Before this  Petition and Act every inhabitant and commoner in each county had voice in the election of Knights, whether he were a freeholder or not, or had a freehold only of one penny, six pence or twelve pence by the year as they now claim of late in most cities and boroughs where popular elections are admitted’8. It is a sobering thought that if the Statute of 1430 did disenfranchise large numbers of county electors, the county franchise may have been wider in medieval England than it was to be again before the end of the nineteenth century and conceivably wider than the Franchise before the 1918 Representation of the People Act.

What  of the position of servants,  wage-earners and almstakers in all this? Resident household servants were generally considered beyond the pale, although  ‘servants’ were said to have voted in the Worcestershire county election of 1604. Wage-earners certainly did so, for those in the ‘potwaller’ and ‘scot and lot’ constituencies were granted the right to vote. Almstakers were excluded in the 1621 and 1640 bills, yet at Great Marlow in 1604 77 of the 245 voters were said to be almstakers, nine of  them inmates of the almshouse. In 1640 the right of the Bember inmates to vote was said to have been sustained  and in 1662 the St. Albans almsmen were said to have ‘had voices time out of mind’.

It is clear from all this, that the Levellers did not enter untilled ground when they broached the question of the franchise. There are also, for our purposes, three points of particular interest. First, the Commons,  or at least an influential  part of it,  was not unduly disturbed by the prospect of an enlarged electorate. Second, people whom Macpherson claims the Levellers would have excluded – servants and almstakers – were ncluded in the franchise long before the Civil War. Third, that there existed even gentlemen (such as Sir Simonds D’Ewes) who had an active and unambiguous democratic spirit. The latter point is particularly pertinent because the chief Leveller, John Lilburne, was also of gentle-birth, a fact he never ceased to emphasise. Democratic ideas were not thus foreign bodies suddenly introduced by the Levellers.

 Notes

 I. K. Thomas. The Levellers and the Franchise answer p.62

 2. J.H, Plunb. The Growth of the electorate 1600-1715

 3. Ibid

 4. Ibid

 5 K. Thomas, The Levellers and the Franchise p.62

 6. Ibid p.63

 7. Ibid p.64

 8 Ibid p.64

Chapter 2

THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

The roots of Macpherson’s conclusions lie in the Putney Debates. Prior to Putney, the franchise received relatively little attention in Leveller writings, Those statements which do exist do not explicitly exclude servants and almstakers, and have the appearance of demands for universal  manhood suffrage.  Post  Putney  statements on the other hand consistently advocate, for whatever reason, the exclusion of servants and almstakers. The evidence  of  the Putney  debates provides  Macpherson  with his main means of resolving, at least to his mind, this apparent inconsistency.

The question of the franchise occupied most of the second day’s debate at Putney. The first article of the (First) Agreement demanded ‘That the People of England,.,. ought to be more indifferently proportioned according to the number of inhabitants.’ This provoked Cromwell’s son-in-law, Henry Ireton to say:

‘The exception that lies in it is this. It is said, they are to be distributed according to the number of  inhabitants, ‘The People of England’ etc. And this  doth make me think that the meaning is that every man that is an inhabitant is to be equally considered, and to have an equal voice in the election of those representors, the persons that are for the general representative…’2

Thus Ireton, whatever his motives, charges the Levellers atthe earliest possible opportunity, with seeking universal suffrage. Petty is the first Leveller to answer: ‘We judge that all inhabitants that have not lost their birthright should have an equal voice in elections’,3

Macpherson thinks it significant that Petty does not state in plain words whether he is for or against universal suffrage. Yet why should he have felt obliged to do so? Ireton has asked a plain question and Petty’s reply, no matter what construction is put upon the phrase ‘all inhabitants that have not lost their birthright’, is an adequate and reasonable answer. Surely more significant is the fact that those with Leveller sympathies did not recoil from the suggestion with horror. However, there is a note of ambiguity in Petty’s answer and it is possible, as A.L.Morton suggests4, that Rainsborough’s famous speech which follows immediately (the poorest he that is in England etc.)5 was intended to clarify the situation.

But by far the most significant passage for Macpherson occurs when the debate has turned to considering the particulars rather than the general issue of the franchise, Cromwell in what appears to be a state of some impatience suddenly says:

‘If we should go about to alter these things, I do not think we are bound to fight  for every  particular  proposition. Servants while servants, are not included. Then you agree that  he that receive alms is to be excluded?’

The first to reply is Lt. Col. Thomas Reade, who, although more progressive in spirit than Cromwell, was no Leveller:

 ’I  suppose it’s concluded by all,  that  the  choosing of representatives is a privilege: now I see no reason why any man that is a native ought to be excluded that privilege, unless  from  voluntary  servitude.’ ‘

 Then follow the critical words of Petty:

 ’I  conceive  the reason why we would exclude  apprentices or servants, or those who take alms,  because they depend upon the will of other  men and should be afraid to displease (them). For servants and apprentices, they are included in their master, and so for those  that receive alms from door to door’6

This passage is remarkable for a number of reasons. First, Cromwell assumes general agreement  that servants were to be excluded, although, up to this point in the debate, there appears little, if any, justification for doing so. This may indeed support  Macpherson’s contention that all parties, including, the Levellers were strong for exclusion. But there  are  alternative explanations. Cromwell’s impatience may have got the better of him  and he could have made such a statement in order to  browbeat any opposition. It is after all a common debating trick, and we have ample evidence from Putney and elsewhere that Cromwell was prone to behaving in a domineering and high-handed manner.

Second, what of Petty’s reply? In the first place it may merely be as J.C. Davis7 suggests, a statement of what Petty considered the grounds on which Cromwell would advocate exclusion, rather than an endorsement of them. Alternatively, if we accept that Petty was in agreement with Cromwell, which might be suggested by the alacrity of his reply, other considerations  rise. Macpherson considers Petty to have been the main Leveller spokesman at Putney and by implication, fully representative of Leveller opinion.

This is a dangerous road to travel. Petty, apart from his appearance  at Putney  and on a number of Leveller-Independent committees, was a somewhat obscure figure in the Leveller camp, Perhaps significantly, he was involved in the drafting of the compromise Second Agreement and in later years became a member of Harrington’s aristocratic-republican Rota Club.8 None of this of course does more than suggest that Petty may have been less than representative of Leveller thought, particularly that of Overton and Lilburne.

Petty may have been an opportunist willing to support a movement whose aims and ideals he did not necessarily consider sacrosanct but merely convenient. Or he may have turned his coat  when the movement  failed.  Whatever the truth of the matter, we may join with A.L. Morton in wishing that if Lilburne had been at Putney and in thinking that the position might well be clearer if he had been able to do so.

Then there is the position of Rainsborough at Putney, where he unambiguously embraced adult manhood suffrage. It is true that Rainsborough had, as far as is known, no direct connection with the Levellers prior to Putney, but his sympathies were clearly with the Levellers and he enjoyed a considerable reputation in the Party after Putney, His contribution to the franchise debate was by far the most forceful  on the Leveller side (in the sense that Rainsborough agreed with the Leveller arguments rather than those of Cromwell et al) and greatly outweighed that of Petty. If Rainsborough’s ideas were so acceptable to Levellers after Putney, why not before and during Putney?

Macpherson uses Petty’s reply to Cromwell as a springboard to launch his theory. He  admits that  further sustaining evidence to support his proposition is necessary. The says quite correctly, that Levellers did believe that the right to elect could be forfeited by (freeborn) men. Up until Putney, delinquency was commonly cited as being sufficient reason, However, it must be remembered that the Levellers were in favour of reconciliation with the royalists (delinquents). The fact that they proposed to exclude them for a relatively short period of time from the franchise, (provided their behaviour was satisfactory)is scarcely surprising, for the situation was exceptional. It is reasonable to see such exclusion as simply an extraordinary measure to settle the country after a civil war. One would be very rash to assume that this attitude was indicative of Leveller opinion in general on the loss of birthright.

Macpherson  continues by quoting the  franchise  clause (section ll) of the Petition of January 1648:

‘Whereas  it hath been the ancient liberty of this  nation, that all the  freeborn  people have freely elected their representers  in Parliament,  and their sheriffs and Justices of the Peace, etc. and they were abridged of that their native liberty by a statute of the 8.H.6,7. That, therefore, the birthright of all English  men be forthwith restored to all which are not,  or shall not be legally disenfranchised for some  criminal  cause,  or are under 21 years of age, or servants or beggars .’9

Of this Macpherson says there could scarcely be a clearer indication that the Levellers assumed that those who became servants or beggars thereby forfeited their birthright to a voice in elections (p.124). We may well agree that at this time the Levellers were willing to do so, but as the whole point of Macpherson’s task is to establish a consistency in Leveller thinking, we are really no further down the path of enlightenment. If the Levellers from Putney onward did compromise at various points, it does not prove that they wished for anything other than a full manhood suffrage. More probably, such compromises are simply reluctant adjustments to the political realities of the time.

The  seems to be on firmer ground when he turns to a letter sent from several Agitators of the Army to their respective Regiments (llth November, 1647) concerning the franchise debate at Putney. This tells us that ‘it was concluded by vote in the affirmative:  viz, that all soldiers and others, if they be not servants or beggars, ought to have voices in electing those which shall represent them in Parliament, although they have not forty shillings per annum in freehold land And there were but three voices against this your native freedon’lO.

It does at first glance seem strange that the exclusion of servants and beggars should be linked with the phrase ‘this your native freedom’. However, it must be remembered that the Agitators’ prime concern was for  the soldiers  they represented. If it is accepted that the leading  Independents were willing to include all  soldiers, regardless of their status, in the franchise, it  then  becomes possible that the phrase ‘this your native freedom’ applied to the soldiers rather than the whole  population.

‘The Grand Designe’ of John Harris (the agitators’ pointer) which appeared in December, 1647, and the Third  Agreement of May, 1649, present similar problems. In the former, Harris explained that the intent of the First Article (which provoked the franchise debate at Putney) was that the electors should be:

  ’all  men that are not servants or  beggars, it being pure  equity, that as all  persons are bound to yield obedience to the decrees of the  Representative or Parliament, so they should have a  voice in  the  electing their Representatives or Members of Parliament’ 11,

While the franchise clause of the latter stated that the electors would be:

‘(according to natural right) all men of the age of one and twenty years and upwards (not being servants or receiving alms, or having served the late King in arms or voluntary contributions) l2.

The equating of ‘all persons’, and ‘all men that are not servants or beggars’ in the former and ‘the according to naturall right’ in the latter seem to lend weight to Macpherson’s argument. Yet in both the authors were using well tried phrases and need not have considered the full implications of them. Also, in the latter case, as A.L. Morton says, the statement of general principle occurred before any of the exceptions were detailed.

Having come this far, Macpherson feels he is in a position to interpret, as he puts it, the apparent claims of the Levellers for an ‘unqualified manhood franchise’ and their opponent’s attribution of this to them at Putney, and  the lack  of  any explicit exclusion of servants prior  to Putney.  Thus, when the Levellers used phrases such as ‘every inhabitant’, ‘every person in England’ or ‘the poorest man in England’, Macpherson believes that we must assume that they really meant ‘all freeborn men who have not lost their birthright’, a loss of birthright toinclude servants and beggars. This is a great deal to read into the evidence.

Ireton and Cromwell, on the other hand, were so concerned to defend the existing franchise qualifications, Macpherson says, that for the purpose of debate they were indifferent to whether the Levellers sought an unqualified franchise  or merely a broader but still restricted one. When Ireton referred to ‘all persons’, ‘any man that hath a breath and being’ , ‘all inhabitants’, or Cromwell ‘men that have no interest but the interest  of breathing’13,  this  thinks  Macpherson was hyperbole by Cromwell and Ireton to sharpen the issue, Yet if it were hyperbole, why was it not resisted more vigorously and unambiguously by Petty et al?

Macpherson fastens on to the fact that, as he puts it, “even after Cromwell had explicitly recognized that the Levellers’ proposal excludedservants and almstakers, he still spoke of it as tending to anarchy because it would give a vote to ‘all those who are in the Kingdom’”14. Now, as we have seen, it is by no means certain that Cromwell’s statement was accepted by the Levellers (p above). The fact that he continued to impute to the Levellers this position may reasonably be taken as an indication that the Levellers had not accepted it, that it was an agreed position and Cromwell words thus exaggeration. The same reasoning may be applied to the fact that the Levellers did not bother to refute these ‘apparent’ imputations of manhood suffrage. Indeed, it would seem more significant that they did not do so.

The reason why they refrained from answering such claims directly, says Macpherson, was because it would not have helped their case to have done so, being more concerned to refute the charge that their proposals would destroy property. This is conceivable yet unlikely, unless we accept that the Levellers were only concerned with a limited franchise along  Macpherson’s lines. Moreover, one cannot divide the questions of the franchise and the feared destruction of property, for one stems from the other.

Neither do I find the fact that only Colonel Rich mentioned the Levellers’ ‘supposed ‘ intention to include servants necessarily indicative of a general consensus of opinion. It is surely significant that he mentioned it at all in the light of Macpherson’s position. Nor do I think he was contradicted by Rainsborough as Macpherson believes. Rich said:

 ’If the master and servant shall be  equal electors, then clearly those that have no interest in the Kingdom will make  it their interest to choose those that have no interest. It may happen, that the majority may by law,  not in confusion, destroy property;  there may be a law enacted,  that there shall be an equality of goods and estate’

He then proceeds to point out the danger that the poor night, as in Rome, set up a dictator15. Rainsborough replies:

‘I think it is a fine gilded pill. But there is much danger,  and it may seen to some that there is some kind of remedy [possible]. I think we  are better as we are [if it can be really proved] that the poor should choose many [and] still the people be in the some case, be over voted still,  But of this and much else, I am unsatisfied… and the[first] thing that I am unsatisfied in is how it comes about that  there is such propriety in some freeborn Englishmen and not [in] others.’16

Now this is, to say the least, a messy passage, but its meaning, if we accept Woodhouse’s additions, is surely plain enough. Rainsborough is rejecting  Rich’s suggestion and when he speaks of ‘being better as we are’ he is merely saying that if he was certain this would be the result of an unqualified franchise, he would reject it, but that, in fact, he does not believe this would be the result. He sees it in other words as a red herring. Indeed, if we were to accept that he did not take this position, we are forced to conclude that Rainsborough was in favour of no change at all, which would be a howling nonsense in view of his explicitly democratic ideas.

There is another passage from Putney which suggests that servants were not automatically excluded by all present. Captain Rolfe appeals for greater moderation, saying, ‘I shall desire that a medium or some thoughts of composure, [may be had] in relation to servants or to foreigners, or such others shall be agreed upon.’ Captain Clarke , who possessed Leveller sympathies, replied first, stating that he too ‘shall desire [that] before the question be stated it may be moderated as for foreigners’17. It is noteworthy that  Clarke,  although  agreeing  that foreigners should  be excluded, does not mention servants and that Rolfe believes too much heat is being generated by the subject, scarcely an indication that all concerned agreed that servants were beyond the pale.

The pre-Putney documents receive similar treatment from Macpherson. The case of ‘the Army truely stated’(15th October, 1647), which ha originally accepted as a demand for full manhood suffrage18, asked that:

‘all  the freeborn at the age of  twenty-one years and upwards,  be the electors,  excepting those that have or shall deprive themselves of that their freedom either for some  years or wholly by delinquency.19

This the  sees as excluding servants  and almstakers. This seems a most peculiar conclusion. Why on earth should servants or almstakers be described as delinquent? Delinquency in the seventeenth century meant much what it does today, namely antisocial acts(particularly criminal ones). Being a servant or almstaker could not denote delinquency, for the former was in useful employment and the latter more often than not had to prove that they were of good character before being in receipt of alms (This particularly applied to those in almshouse). Moreover, the common objection to granting the vote to servants and almstakers was one of dependency. Yet it is not mentioned here.

It is just possible that the temporary exclusion referred to apprentices. This  Macpherson rejects as most of such would be under 21, but K. Thomas is favourable to the idea on the grounds that the legal age for the end of apprenticeship was 24. Again, the question arises: why should apprentices be described generally as delinquents?

For my own part, I think it probable that the exclusion of delinquents referred solely to royalists, or just possibly to civilian delinquents, that is, common-criminals. The term delinquent has a special and technical meaning in the context of the civil war, namely a royalist who was considered to be both recalcitrant and to have been a serious and persistent supporter of the King (the practical application of this definition was inconsistent, but that was the theory).

It is true that permanent exclusion seems to run contrary to the Leveller desire for reconciliation with royalists, but it is not necessarily certain  that the authors of ‘The Case’ shared such sentiments. They may for instance  have believed that certain royalists were so responsible for the troubles of the war, that no leniency could be extended. Such an argument could also be advanced in the case of common criminals.

Of the other documents, Lilburne’s ’England’s Birth-right Justified’ (October 1645), ‘London’s Liberty In Chains Discovered’ (October 1646), ‘The Charters of London’; or,  ‘The  Second Part  of  London’s  Chains  discovered’ (December,  1646), and ‘Rash Oaths Unwarrantable’ (May, 1647)20, all fall foul of Macpherson because  they contain such terms as ‘freeborn’, and ‘freemen ‘, in connection with the franchise. This is another case when we must beware of reading too much into regular Leveller phraseology, which would be more suitably viewed as rhetoric, an affirmation in this case that all men were born possessed of the same birthright, and should enjoy the same, There are many instances where such phrases were used in connection with other matters, such a religion or civil liberties, which Macpherson  claims  the Levellers believed were inalienable, and he presumably would not wish to argue that the use of ‘freeborn’ in these contexts did not mean all men, (and indeed women).

 ’London’s Liberty in Chains’ is of particular  interest to ship Macpherson because it bases  its  claim for a broader franchise on the fact that the statute of 1430 (8′H’6’7) had disenfranchised many who  had previously had the vote.  This, says Macpherson, cannot be a claim for manhood suffrage for it is merely a claim to remove the forty shilling qualification which does not necessarily mean servants and almstakers would be included. This is correct, but neither does it mean that it was only a plea for tenant farmers and non-corporate traders and craftsmen, if we bear in mind the evidence of the previous chapter, particularly Poynnes’ words (see above ).

The other two documents that Macpherson examines are ‘The Remonstrance of Many Thousand Citizens, and Other Freeborn People of England’ (July, 1646), and ‘Jonah’s Cry out of the Whale’s Belly’ (July 1647). The former requests that every year in November elections should take place and that ‘all men that have a right to be there, not to fail upon a great penalty, but no summons to be  expected’21. This Macpherson this significant for it states that voting would be by ‘all men that have a right’, not simply all men. Yet, in view of the circumstances of 1646 when the position of  royalists had to be considered, should we expect that no exclusions would be thought reasonable then? The answer is surely no.

The latter document is concerned with the right of soldiers to vote. It states that ‘according to the principles of safety, flowing from Nature, Reason and Justice…  every individual private soldier, whether Horse or Foot, aut freely to have their vote, to chuse the transactors of their affairs.’ This does not necessarily imply that the soldiers desired the same for civilians. However, we know that documents which either originated from or involved the Army, expressed concern for the population as a whole.

The documentary evidence is, to put it politely, less than conclusive. In the absence of even one unassailable statement, Macpherson is forced to rely on building up his argument  by interpretation.  The disadvantage of this is that in so many instances an equally plausible interpretation can be made to prove the contrary. This is not, however, to suggest that  Macpherson has been proven completely mistaken, for we must not fall into the trap, which he himself falls into, of insisting on consistency to the extent where  every statement must be interpreted  in a certain fashion.

 Notes

 1 D. H ‘Wolfe, Leveller .Manifestoes .226

 2 A,S.P Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty , p.52

 3 Ibid, p.55

 4. A,L. Morton, Leveller Democracy p.205.

 5 A,S.P. Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty p.53

 6. Ibid, pp. 82-3

 7. J. Davis, The Levellers and Democracy ,

 8. K. Thomas, The Levellers and the Franchise p.67,

 9 D.H. Wolfe, Leveller Manifestoes P,269.

 10. ASP Woodhouse, p.452.

 11. C .B, Macpherson, p125

 12. D.H. Wolfe, p.403

 13. A.S.P. Woodhouse, pp, 57, 70, 63, 77.

 14. C.B. Macpherson, p.126.

 15. A,S.P. Woodhouse, pp.63, 64.

 16. Ibid, p,64.

 17.A.S.P. Woodhouse, p,30.

 18.K.Thomas, p. 212

 19. D.H. Wolfe, p.212.

 20. England Birthright Justified’ is printed in Haller  ’Tracts on Liberty in  the  Puritan Revolution’, ‘London in Chains’, ‘The Second Part of London  Chains  discovered’ and  ’Rash  Oaths  Unwarrantable’, are not readily available. See Macpherson  pp. 131-135.

 21. ‘The Remonstrance’ is printed in H.H. Wolfe , p.129, but ‘Jonah’s Cry’ is not readily available. See Macpherson,  p.135,

 Chapter 3

PHILOSOPHICAL AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

The philosophy which Macpherson  attributes to the Levellers to explain why they proposed  to exclude servant and almstakers derived from the view of a man’s capacities (i.e.  his own labour) as a commodity which  could be sold, This Macpherson believes was the dominant ideology in 17th Century England. Thus, although the Levellers believed that all Englishmen were born with the same  birthright, certain parts of this birthright could be forfeited. Religious, civil and even  possibly economic rights could not be alienated justly, and as such should be protected constitutionally.  The  right  to elect, however, could be forfeited by entering into a condition of dependence, either by taking wages or alms. In such  cases, a just dependence resulted and the  subservient individual’s voice was deemed to be included in that of his master or benefactor, as far as a voice in elections was concerned, jut as that of a wife was deemed to be included in that of her husband.

That this could be  considered just  is further explained by what Macpherson deems to be the general contemporary opinion of what the functions of government should be. The primary function of 17th Century government, Macpherson informs us, was ‘to make and enforce the rules within which men could make the most of their own energies and cpacities’ and the secondary function, derived from the first, was ‘the protection of property in goods and estate’ (p.144). Servants and almstakers had lost the ‘property in their own had labour’ and, therefore, had presumably no land or capital, and as such could have no interest in either function of government,

At first glance this line of argument is both plausible and attractive. We are dealing with an openly acquisitive society which judged a man in large part on the basis of his material estate, and which was still pronouncedly hierarchical. Add in Man’s natural tribal inclinations, and it would not have been  unreasonable for the Levellers in such a situation to be  concerned with advancing those with whom they had most sympathy, the small men, while neglecting the needs of other  groups. Also, the exposition is alluring because it  purports to provide us with a means of assessing all Leveller aims and of removing inconsistencies using a system which is logical and neat. Yet, like all intellectual schemes which purport to show Man as a consistent political animal, the cracks soon begin to appear when compared to the reality.

First let us examine parts of Overton’s ‘An Arrow against all Tyrants’ (19th October, 1646) and his ‘Appeale’ (July, 1547):

‘No man hath power over my rights and liberties, and I over no man’s….for by naturall birth all men are equally and alike borne to like propriety, liberty and freedom,  and as we are  delivered of  God by the hand of nature  into this world, everyone  with a naturall, innate freedom and propriety….even so are we to live, every one equally and alike to enjoy his birthright and privilege…. [no more of which may be alienated]  than is conducive to a better being, more  safety and freedome….[for] every man by nature being a King, Priest and Prophet in his own naturall circuit and compasse, whereof no second may partake,  but  by deputation,  commission and  free  consent from  him,  whose  naturall right and freedome it is.’1

In the ‘Appeale’ 0verton adds to this splendid statement of individual liberty, the duty of all men to protect themselves ‘from all things hurtful, destructive and obnoctious thereto to the utmost of [their] power’. It is difficult to accept that any man who could express such sentiments would willingly have allowed that large numbers of men be excluded from the franchise simply because of their position in life.

However, what concerns Macpherson is ‘the proprietorial quality of the Leveller individualism’. The essence of  Man to the Levellers was freedom which meant the proprietorship of one’s own person and capacities (P.142).

From this Macpherson deduces that certain rights were considered inalienable while the right to elect was not. Thus, ‘property in one’s own mental and spiritual  person required freedom of  speech, publication and religion’ (P.142). These rights, apart from their justification by natural law, were demanded for  all because in Lilburne’s words ‘what is done to any one, may be done to every one’3. Similarly, economic rights must be demanded for everyone or monopolists would return, arbitrary taxation and regulation, introduced, even though only those had retained the disposal of their own labour could benefit from them directly,

It is a pity that Macpherson does not extend this line of reasoning to the right to elect. For surely in this  case  as  well, provision against arbitrary disenfranchisement would be necessary and what better method, on Lilburne’s reasoning, than to extend it to all. To this, of course, Macpherson will reply that the functions of government did not concern ‘those who had lost their birthright’, Yet, neither apparently did economic rights  and there would be as much reason to claim the right to elect for all on expedient grounds as there was in the case of economic rights. Further, if we examine the extent to which the Third Agreement especially shackled Parliament, what possible harm, by way of anarchy, levelling of estates etc. could come of it,

The likely answer as to why the Levellers did exclude servants and almstakers after Putney is expediency, either for the reason Petty gave, that dependant men would be afraid to displease their masters, or because they were made aware of political realities.  Macpherson doubts whether the Levellers would have excluded nearly two-thirds of the adult male population on the grounds of expediency, because he believes that they were such committed idealists they could not have brought themselves to such a business.

This is a rather surprising conclusion for, as J.C. Davis4 points out, the Levellers did compromise on the tithes, an issue of principle if ever there was one for them. The March Petition of 1647 and the July Appeale demanded abolition of tithes without provision for compensation. It was not mentioned in the first Agreement5, and deliberately left out from the January Petition of 1643 so as not to ‘disengage any considerable party, and so continue our distractions’. It returned in the Humble Petition (September , 1648) and the Second Agreement, but now with provisions for satisfying all impropriations.

Also, we must remember that the Levellers compromised on the franchise,  even by Macpherson’s account,  in the Second  Agreement. Of course,  Macpherson would be quick to point out the difference between the ratepayer franchise  (adopted in the Agreement) of 375,300,  and the non-servant franchise he says the Levellers wanted (416,700), was so small to be scarcely worth mentioning,  In that case, why  should the matter have raised so much consternation  at Putney.  Macpherson  says the dispute at Putney arose because Ireton and Cromwell wanted nothing more than the freeholder franchise. Yet Cromwell at Putney admitted he was willing to allow that ‘perhaps  there are a very considerable part of copyholders, by inheritance, that ought to have a voice’6.

There is further evidence that the Levellers compromised. When all seemed lost after Burford, ‘The Remonstrance of Many Thousands of the Free-people of England’ offered  amongst other things votes to ‘all that come unto us’. The  tone of the ‘Remonstrance’ is savage, reflecting the bitter anger felt by the author at the betrayal of the people’s iberties.  That it offered votes to ‘all that come unto us’ may merely be, in part at least, a reflection of this bitterness and also of the fact that it was a call to armed rebellion, Yet it is surely significant that such a statement should be made so soon after the ‘Third Agreement’ which although a partial compromise designed to appeal to moderate opinion, is none the less often viewed as the final position  of  the  Levellers. It is also interesting to note that it demanded ‘that  every free-commoner shall be put into a way and enabled with means for his natural subsistence’7, surely in this context meaning all commoners and thus giving added strength to the belief that the use of the word ‘free’ was merely a rhetorical device.

 A further pamphlet which was Leveller in tone was ‘A Charge of High Treason exhibited  against Oliver Cromwell’ (1653), which summoned all the people of England to the polls ‘as well  masters, sons of servants’ which, if nothing else, reflects a radicalism that, whatever the truth of Macpherson’s  case, reminds us that we have every cause to assume that the seeds of manhood suffrage were always there.

 Notes

 1. C.B. Macpherson, pp. 140-1

 2. Ibid, p.141.

 3. Haller and Davies, The Leveller Tracts, p.455.

 4 J.C. Davis , The Levellers and Democracy .

 5 The  Agreement was  concerned with short-term

 measures which may well explain the exclusion.

 6. A.S.P. Woodhouse, P.7.

 7. Levellers and the Puritan Revolution, p.575

 Chapter 4

 SERVANTS AND ALMSTAKERS

Macpherson  has calculated  (using Gregory King’s estimate of 1688) that universal manhood suffrage in 1648 would have enfranchised 1,170,400 men. The exclusion  of  servants and almstakers (by Prof Macpherson’s definition, and accepting that all soldiers regardless of status were to be enfranchised) would have reduced this figure to 416,700. Thus, the Levellers on this reckoning  were  committed  to excluding nearly two-thirds of the adult male  population from the franchise. That I would suggest is a palpable nonsense.

Various criticisms may be made concerning the manner in which Macpherson has  treated  King’s figures.  These ‘statistics’ were at best informed guesses, and  King himself considerably varied his estimates of the size of social classes.1 In addition, Macpherson takes no account of a probably significant rise in wage-earners between 1648 and 1688, It may  even be, as A.L. Morton suggests,2 that King’s figures are misleading for  1693, because they do not differentiate adequately between the many graduations of employment to be found between a simple wage-earner and independent producer or artisan.

However, such criticisms do not go to the heart of the matter. The crux of the problem lies in the meaning given to the terms servant and almstaker (or beggar)by the Levellers within the context of  the franchise. To  read Macpherson is to gain the impression that servant in  common  contemporary  usage was given the usual meaning which he ascribes to it, i.e. wage-earner.

Yet it would appear that contemporaries used the term variously to accommodate the semantic confusion arising from an attempt to apply a social vocabulary inherited from a feudal and patriarchal past to the needs  of a society in which the relationship of master and servant was steadily yielding to that of employer and wage-earner.3

In fact, as K. Thomas points out, none of the three contemporary economic writers to whom Macpherson refers, Andrew Yarranton, John Carey and Thomas Firrin (p.282), equated ‘servants’ with day-labourers, the latter actually distinguishing between single persons who earned money by pinning with ‘servants’, that is, apprentices or domestics .

The Statute of Artificers also distinguished between ‘servants ‘ who contracted for a year or similar period and ‘artificers and  labourers being hired for wages by the day or week’. Richard Mayo, the author of ‘Present for Servants’ (1693),  considered the normal usage concerned those who ‘….have voluntarily submitted  themselves, by  contract, for a certain time to the disposal of others, according to the word of God, and the laws of the realm’ 4.

Now let us refer back to the statement of Petty during the Putney debates. (p. ). His reason for exclusion was ‘because they depend upon the will of other men and should be afraid to displease then’. In the light of this, there was obviously a  considerable difference between a man contracted to serve a year or so, who could only break his contract by mutual agreement with his employer or by order of a J.P on application by master or servant alone, and a wage-earner who was employed more or less casually, who, in theory at least, could change  employer  frequently  and also could be dismissed at   will. (It might appear that the contracted servant was in  a vastly more secure position, but it must  be remembered  that unilateral application would be infinitely more likely to be granted to an employer than a  servant).

There is further evidence that the Levellers were, at worst, concerned with excluding only those who were really bound to one man. The franchise clause of the  Second Agreement states that electors ‘shall be Natives, or Denizen of England, not persons receiving Alms .,. not servants to,  and receiving wages from any particular person’5 . It is even possible that this ‘wage from any particular person’  represents a compromise on the part of the Levellers. Only in the Second Agreement  do  we  find  wage-earners specifically excluded from the franchise. As this document was the result of bargaining between the Levellers and their opponents, the exclusion of those who received ‘wages from a particular person’ may not have been proposed by the Levellers. It may rather represent a reduction of a more extreme position by their opponents, i.e. that all wage-earners were to be excluded. In itself the distinction made between ‘servants’ and ‘wage-earners’ is evidence that the two were thought of as separate groups.

At best, it would  seen that Macpherson’s definition is too broad, and that the Levellers were thinking in terns of personal servants, employees living in the master’s house and apprentices. If this was so, then the disenfranchisement of the groups would have been, for the most part, temporary. Apprentices would become journeymen and eventually masters (or  at least the Levellers wished to create a situation where this could happen). Of the two other groups, there is evidence that many were below voting age,  and their period of employment relatively short. At Ealing in 1599, 60 per cent of the population aged 15 – 19) were servants. At Claworth in 1676, there were 67 servants of whom only one remained by 1638, and at Cogenhoe again only one out of total of 31 in 1618 was still employed in 1628.6 The most likely explanation for this apparent mobility of labour is that when a man married he set up his own household.

If we then consider evidence suggesting that to be head of household was the mark of a man capable of voting, the significance of this is obvious. Thomas Cartwright  wrote ‘All men understand that where the election is most freest and most general, yet only they have to do which  are head of families’, and, John Eliot in his ‘Christian Commonwealth’ (1659) ‘servants, or sons living with their parents are in the condition of servants…. may not explicitly , politically, personally, choose public  rulers…. But, if they marry or live in the state of allowed public freedmen, then are they capable of the choice of their public rulers’7. If we can accept such views as representative, then the disenfranchisement of  servants in our restricted sense becomes, for at least a great part of then, a temporary affair.

The  Leveller  position on almstakers  is, rather easier to resolve. Until the Second Agreement, only  beggars were mentioned. The Putney resolution, ‘The Grande Designe’ (John Harris) and the ‘Petition of January’ 1648, used the terms ‘beggars’ rather than ‘almstakers’. This in itself might not be significant, for it is conceivable that ‘beggar’ was a term which included persons who begged casually, probably in an  itinerant fashion, and men who were forced to seek parish relief temporarily or permanently.  However, there are indications that this was not so. William Petty alone of the Levellers at Putney spoke of ‘those that  receive alms’. That he used this phrase may be accounted for by the fact that Cromwell had just  posed a question in a fashion which prompted such an answer. In any event, Petty qualified his statement by explaining that he meant ‘those that receive alms from door to door’, surely not a reference to those who received official parish relief.

Cromwell himself, according to John Say’s parliamentary diary, informed the Commons on 23rd November 1647, that the agitators ‘would exclude children and servants, Yet such as received alms they insisted on as persons competent for electors’. It could be argued that Cromwell was slandering them in the hope of discrediting the Levellers, yet in that case why not go further and say they would include servants as well?

We know also of the concern the Levellers showed for those impoverished by the war. It would seem  most unlikely that they would willingly have excluded such persons simply because they were forced to take alms.  Nor do they appear to have regarded almstakers in general as irresponsible. One of the demands of the January Petition of 1643 was that ‘the poor be enabled to choose their trustees’.

The inclusion of ‘almstakers’ alone, even if we are mistaken about ‘servants’, would have increased the electorate considerably. According to Macpherson, in 1643 there were 309,700 ‘almstakers’ and only 9,000 ‘beggars,’9 If we are correct in our interpretation of the term ‘servant’ then a position approaching universal manhood suffrage is in view. (Statistics for ‘servants’ as we understand the term present problems, but Peter Laslett 10 has estimated that 10-15 per cent would fall into this category,  many of whom would be only temporarily disenfranchised or under age,)

There is one further point to consider, namely the Levellers’ own conception of their society and what they wished it to be. Although supporters of property, their main concern was to protect the rights of the small man. For this protection they looked, as was the habit of mind then,  much to the past for answers and justifications and had constantly in their minds some  ideal of a Golden Age, If the master-servant relationship was giving way to that of employer-wage-earner, this was not obvious to them. The type of society which they desired was that of the  small independent man, and they believed that the  safeguards  they sought against monopoly and other  unwarranted interference with the individual  would  produce such a society, and thus the electorate, even if exclusions were made in their own time, would increase over the years. Whether this was  impracticable  or not, is neither here nor there in assessing their intentions,

 Notes

 1. K. Thomas, p. 71.

 2 A.L, ‘Morton , p.213.

 3. K. Thomas , p.72.

 4 Ibid, 3 ,71.

 5. D.H. Wolfe, p.403

 6 A.L. Morton, p,214.

 7 P. 72-73.

 8. D.H. Wolfe, p,82 ,

 9. Beware of making the same mistake as Thomas does

 by taking 1613 figures for 1543.

 l0. P. Laslett, The World We Have Lost.

CONCLUSION

There would appear to be three possible explanations of the Levellers’ attitude to the franchise. Firstly, that Macpherson is correct, namely that the Levellers were always in favour of a restricted franchise,  excluding servants and beggars. Secondly, that they  were from the first in favour of a full manhood franchise, but were forced to compromise when faced with political realities.  Thirdly, that the Levellers were not originally overly concerned with the franchise, or at least their ideas were not clear-cut, but came, through the trials of 1647-9, to a desire for full manhood suffrage but were then thwarted by political realities.

I suspect that the last comes closest to the truth. It is difficult to imagine most of those who followed the Levellers being content with anything less than full enfranchisement for themselves or for others like them. That being so the broad membership of the Leveller cause leads to the logical conclusion that a very wide franchise indeed must have been desired if not attained.  

Macpherson claims too much for his evidence. Firstly, the consistency which he attributes to the Levellers may, I think, be safely discounted. That some men of Levelling colour did think as Macpherson believes is most probably true, indeed almost certainly so, for it would be a strange party or group which did not contain differences of opinion on such a contentious issue.

Secondly, his broad definition of servants is dubious to say the least, particularly when we bear in mind the apparent  readiness of the Commons before 1640 to grant wider franchises than he claims for the Levellers, and the fact that on his definition many who voted previously would have  been excluded.

The position of the almstakers  is, I think, even  more clear cut, remembering that Petty spoke of ‘those that receive alms from door to door’, the use of  ’beggars’ until the Second Agreement , and the entry in John Bay’s diary (a piece of  evidence, incidentally , not available to Macpherson ).

Thirdly, the philosophy which he attributes to the Levellers has logical flaws when examined closely, and the system he constructs makes one wonder, with Peter  Laslett, whether Macpherson has not developed his theory before examining  his   evidence  and consequently  falls, albeit  unconsciously, into the mistake of attempting to sustain his theory by arguing a priori that all must thus be so. 

After the Restoration, democratic ideas did not gain serious political currency in England for more than a century. However, they found ready supporters abroad, most dramatically in the person of Thomas Paine, who although English made his name in the American Revolution. The received academic opinion on the Revolution is that it was the offspring of John Locke. In fact, it had at least as much in common with the ideas of the Levellers. The  Constitution is a balance between Locke and Paine, granting a large degree of popular involvement in politics , whilst tempering it with restrictions such as electoral colleges.

Why did the idea of democracy based on the active consent of all men arise in England rather than elsewhere? There were good reasons why it did. In the early modern period, England was an oddity amongst European states. Representative assemblies were commonplace in the mediaeval world. By 1600 all but a few had fallen to the growing power of rulers and either ceased to exist or had been emasculated to the point of insignificance. In England alone Parliament had increased  its power and status in the 16th century. Not only that, but elections were held to appoint MPs. The membership of most European assemblies was, like the House of Lords, dependent on social position.

There was also a long tradition of liberty in England. In the minds of the Levellers these went back to long before Magna Carta. They also, as mentioned in the introduction, saw this tradition as having been stifled by the Normans and their continental successors. These were and are powerful engines for action.

England was also odd in other ways. Serfdom had withered away early. Enclosure had driven men off the land and into the towns. The dissolution of the monasteries had both removed the incubus of Rome and redistributed land and property, much of which ended up in the hands of “new men”. The population had risen dramatically since 1500 and high inflation (by pre-modern standards) had caused considerable social dislocation. At the same time, the wealth of the country had grown and the foundations laid for the commercial revolution which was to lay the foundation for the industrial revolution. Stuart society was a world on the physical, economic and intellectual move and waiting to move faster if the right engine appeared. The Civil War was the right transporter.

 Notes

 1. Market Society and Political Theory

  Bibliography

 C. B. Macpherson The theory of possessive individualism

 Primary Sources

 D.H. Wolfe, Leveller Manifestoes of the Puritan

 Revolution.

 A,S.P. Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty.

 W. Hall, Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan evolution, Vol. III.

 Secondary Sources

  C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism

 K. Thomas, The Levellers and the Franchise (Chapter in the Interregnum The Quest for Settlement, Ed. G.E. Aylmer).

A.L. Morton, Leveller Democracy (In he world of the Rantors).

J.C. Davis, The Levellers ad Democracy : P. & P.X1 1968.

R. Howell and D. Brewster Reconsidering the Levellers, P. & P, 1970.

J.H. Plumb, The Growth of the electorate 1600-1715, P. & P. 1969

V.F. Snow, Parliamentary Reapportionment Proposals in The Puritan Revolution, E.H.R. 1959.

G.F. Aylmer, Gentlemen Levellers, P, & P. 1970.

P. Laslett, The World We Have Lost.

P. Laslett, Market Society and Political Theory, H.J. VII (1964).

J. Frank – The Levellers.

N.H, Brailsford – The Levellers and the English Revolution.

M.A. Gibb – John Lilburne The Leveller.

English education in saner times

I was born in 1947. Never, perhaps, has England (and Britain) been more of a coherent community.  The dramatic recent experience of the Second World War  filled the minds of everyone  and that  shared experience  bound together even more tightly  a very racially and culturally homogenous country.  It was rare to see a black or brown face even in London, and any suggestion that someone from a racial or cultural minority should do anything but  their best to assimilate into English culture would have been generally thought to touch the confines of lunacy. It was a very English, very British world. 

It was a time when Britain made most of the manufactured goods that it consumed, including its own cars, aircraft, ships, and it would have been thought extraordinary for a British Government to fail to protect British industry.  Great industrial names such as Austin (cars) and  Fry’s (chocolate) were not only English-owned and English made but leaders in the English market.  The shops which people used were generally owned by the English and more often than not family enterprises.  Every day an inhabitant of England  was reminded that  they were members of an advanced technological society which could make or grow what it wanted and that most of what they consumed was made in England (or at least Britain) or came from the Empire. 

The idea of Empire was still important – just. The fifties were the very last moment when an English boy could grow up with an  imperial consciousness as part of everyday life. There was no assumption that the Empire would collapse. India might have gone in 1947, but the assumption amongst both the general population and the political elite was that Britain would have to bear “the white man’s burden”  for many  a long year yet.  That will seem extraordinary to the point of fantasy now, but  it is true. In the forties and fifties  the Foreign and Colonial Office continued to  recruit and train young men for careers  as imperial servants such as District Officers and white  emigration from Britain to places such as Kenya and Rhodesia was officially encouraged. 

Against this background English schools taught as a matter of course a curriculum that extolled English and British values, history and culture.  History for the English child was British and imperial history first with  European history a poor second. Geography was concerned primarily with the physical and demographic demography of Britain.  English literature concentrated on the classic English texts from Chaucer through to Trollope.

But it was not simply English history and culture which was imparted. Whole class teaching was the norm with the teacher firmly in charge. Children were expected to acquire the factual knowledge of a subject as well as its process. Because discipline was not generally a problem, schools were primarily institutions to teach people rather than being the child-minding depots we all too often see today.  There is a good case for saying that the general standard of English education was never higher than in the quarter century between 1945 and 1970. This was not only because of the good overall educational standard, but because  all pupils, unlike the pre-war system, now got a secondary education as of right.

That is not to say everything in the post-war educational garden was lovely.  Before comprehensive education began under the first  Wilson Government,  English state education was divided between grammar schools, secondary moderns and a small number of technical schools – the last were intended as training grounds for artisans, to use an old fashioned word.  The consequence was to lower, irrevocably in most instances,  the social horizons and aspirations of those who did not  pass the 11-plus and go to grammar schools, because it was very difficult to move to a grammar school after the age of 11.  It also created a sense of inferiority and resentment amongst many 11-plus failures.

Despite these shortcomings,  the system was unreservedly to be preferred to what we have today. The grammar schools not only produced a  genuinely educated class, but provided  an escape  route  to something better for clever children from even the poorest backgrounds.  That opportunity grew with the significant expansion of university and polytechnic places in the fifties and sixties. In 1950 approximately  2 per cent of English school-leavers went on to higher education: by 1970, following the implementation of the Robbins Report (1963), the figure was approximately  7 per cent (and this was the age of the post-war baby-boomer generation, so there were more pupils in the age group in 1970 than 1950).  Most tellingly, in the 1960s, before the destruction of the grammar schools,  workingclass children in higher education  formed a greater proportion of the whole student body than it does now – there are more workingclass students now, but that is simply a consequence of the vast increase in those in higher education to more than 40 per cent.

England and the only bootstrapped Industrial Revolution

Of  all the social changes  which have occurred in human history,  none has been  so  profound as the process of  industrialisation.  The  two previous  great general  amendments  to  human  life  –  farming   and urbanisation – pale into insignificance. Before industrialisation,  man lived  primarily  from  the  land and  animals  whether  from  farming, husbandry or hunter-gathering. In the most advanced civilisations,  the vast majority of populations lived outside large towns and cities. Even in  industrialising England a majority of the population derived  their living  directly  from the land as late as the 1830s.  France  did  not become a predominantly urban nation until the 1930s.  

With  industrialisation  came  not  merely a  change  in  the  material circumstances, but profound social alteration. There arose much greater opportunity  to move from the small world of the village.  The  massive increase  in wealth eventually made even the poor rich enough  to  have aspirations.  Sufficient numbers of the wealthier classes became guilty enough  about  abject  poverty existing beside great  wealth  that  the condition  of  the poor was further mitigated  by  greater  educational opportunity,  welfare provision and legislation regulating the abuse of workers  by  employers.    Political  horizons  were  expanded  by  the extension of the franchise.  

The  industrial revolution altered the balance of power throughout  the world.  David Landes “In the wealth and Poverty of  Nations”  describes the effect succinctly:  “The industrial revolution made some  countries richer,  others (relatively) poorer; or more accurately, some countries made an industrial revolution and became rich;  and others did not  and stayed  poor.”(p168).  Prior  to industrialisation,  the  disparity  in wealth  between  states,  regions and even  continents  was  relatively small.  Come the Industrial Revolution and massive disparities begin to appear.  For  Dr  Landes,  it  is  to  the  success  or  otherwise   in industrialising  which is the primary cause of present  disparities  in national wealth.

All  of this tremendous amendment to human existence occurred   because the  one  and  only bootstrapped Industrial Revolution  took  place  in England.  Why  England?  David Landes in the  “Wealth  and  Poverty  of Nations”  sees the  historical process of industrialisation as twofold. First,    comes     a  pre-industrial  preparatory  period   in   which  irrationality  of thought is  gradually replaced by scientific   method and what he calls “autonomy  of  intellectual inquiry”(p201),  that  is, thought    divorced   from   unquestioned   reliance   on    authority, irrationality,  especially superstition.   At the same  time  technology begins to be  something more than by-guess-and-by-God. This gives birth to industrialisation  by creating both the intellectual climate and the acquired knowledge,  both scientific and technological,  necessary  for the transformation from traditional to modern society. It is as good an explanation   as  any  and  fits  the  flow  of  England’s   historical development.

It is not utterly implausible to suggest that without England the world might have had no Industrial Revolution. Those who would scoff at  such a  proposition should consider the cold facts:  even with  England  and Britain’s   example to follow no other nation matched   her  industrial development until the 1870′s and  then the first  country to do so  was a  state  ultimately derived from  England,  namely the  USA.  Nor  did  England produce an industrial revolution only in England, they actively exported and financed it throughout the world, for example, most of the European  railway  building  of the years 1840-70  was  the  result  of British engineers and money.  

Some  may  point to scientific advance in Europe from 1600  onwards  as reason  to  believe  that industrialisation would  have  been  achieved without England. It is true that Europe advanced scientifically  in the seventeenth  and eighteenth centuries,  but scientific knowledge is  no guarantee  of  technological progress.  Moreover, a good deal  of  that scientific advance came from England.   Nor does  scientific  knowledge  have  any natural connection  with the severe social upheaval  required for  a transformation from the land-working  dominated   pre-industrial  state to capitalism.  Indeed,  the landowners of pre-industrial  Europe had  a vested interest in not promoting industrial advance.   Moreover, in many parts of Europe,  particularly the East,  feudal burdens became greater not less after 1500.  This was so even in as advanced a country as  France.   Consequently,  the   widespread  social  mobility   which historians  have generally thought necessary to promote a  bootstrapped  industrial revolution simply did not exist in  Europe at the  beginning of  the  British  Industrial revolution. Even  the  country  most  like England in its commercial  development, the Netherlands, became socially and politically  ossified in the Eighteenth century,  with a bourgeoisie developing  into an aristocracy and representative government  narrowed to what was in effect a parliament of nobles. 

There will be those – Scots in particular – who will chafe at the  idea that  the industrial revolution was dependent upon England.  The  facts are against them.

Scotland  before  the union with England (1707) was a  remarkably  poor state.  Nor,  despite its much vaunted educational system –  supposedly much   the  superior  of  England  –  had  it  produced  many  men   of international importance. Read a general  history of Europe, either old or  modern,   and you will  find precious few Scots mentioned on  their own account before the Union.    The names John Eringa and Duns  Scotus with  perhaps a nod to John Knox are the best the reader may hope  for, and  the former two had to leave Scotland to make their names.  If  any other  Scotsman who lived before the Union  is mentioned,  he  will  be noticed  only  because  of his connection with  another  country,  most commonly England.   It required the union with England to give Scots  a larger stage to act upon.  Without the union,  the likes of David Hume, Adam  Smith  and James Watt would in all probability  have  been  roses which  bloomed  unseen in the desert air.   That is not  to  decry  the talents and  contributions  of Scots, which are considerable, merely to describe a necessary sociological condition  for their realisation.

Let  me  demonstrate how much of an English enterprise  the  Industrial Revolution was by using the example of the development of steam  power. Contrary  to many a schoolboy’s imagining,  James  Watt did not  invent the steam engine. That was the province of Englishmen.  The Marquess of Worcester  may have produced a working steam engine on his  estates  in 1663;  James Savery certainly did in 1698. This was improved by another Englishman,  Thomas Newcomen.  Their machines were crude beam  engines, but the technological  Rubicon had been crossed.

It is true that the Scotsman Watt’s  improvements to the steam engine – the  conversion of linear to rotary action and  the introduction  of  a separate condenser – were profoundly important and provided the   means to  extend the use of steam engines from their limited applications  in pumping water from mines. But it should be noted that he had to come to England  to achieve his improvements through his association  with   an English  entrepreneur of genius,  Mathew Boulton,    who at  his   Soho works  in Birmingham had probably the best engineering facilities  then in  the  world.  It was also Boulton who pressed Watt  to  develop  the conversion  of linear to rotary action.  It is worth adding  that  Watt was  a timid,  retiring personality who left to his own  devices  would probably  have  achieved  little of practical  consequence.   Moreover, within  a  generation  of Watt’s improvements,  the  English  engineer, Richard Trevithick had greatly improved on Watt’s engine  by  producing a high pressure steam engine, arguably a more important advance than Watt’s innovations because without it steam engines would have remained large and seriously underpowered.. static installations unable to drive vehicles such as trains and ships..

But before steam could play its full role there had to be a  revolution in  iron  production.  This was accomplished  by   Englishmen.    Until Abraham Darby began smelting iron with coke made from coal in the early 1700s,  iron making was an expensive and uncertain business carried  on in small foundries using charcoal to fire the kilns (an ironmaker named Dudley claimed to have used coal successfully for smelting as early  as  1619  but died without establishing a business to carry the  work  on).  Compared with coal,  charcoal was in short supply.  Worse, it did  not produce  the same intensity of heat as coal converted into coke.  Darby and  his son solved the basic problem of smelting with coke  made  from coal. Henry Cort’s puddling process  allowed cast-iron to be refined to remove the brittleness. A little later Benjamin Huntsman improved steel making. In the middle of the next century the  Bessemer  revolutionised steel  production  to such a degree that its  price  fell  dramatically enough  to  make steel no longer a luxury but the  common  material  of construction.  All these advances were made by Englishmen.

Large scale organisation is also intellectually demanding.  If a  ready and cheaper supply of iron was a necessary condition for the industrial revolution,  so  was the very idea of large scale  manufactories  using machines.  Undertakings employing hundreds of men on one site were  not unknown before the 18th Century – a clothier named Jack of Newbury had  a factory employing 500 in Tudor times –   but  they were very rare.   In 18th  Century England  such enterprises became if not  commonplace,  at least   not  extraordinary.  By the next century they  were  the  norm.  Industry  became for the first time geared to a mass market.   Nor  was  this  new  method  of  manufacturing confined to  the  necessities  and banalities of life.   Factories such as  Josiah Wedgewood’s at  Etruria  manufactured  high quality and imaginative china directed  deliberately at  the growing middle classes.  All the most successful  18th  century machines for mass production were  developed by Englishmen. Arkwright’s water frame, Crompton’s mule, James Hargreaves spinning jenny. 

Once  the  first  blast of the industrial revolution  had  passed,  the fundamental fine tuning was undertaken by Englishmen,  with men such as Whitworth  leading  the  way with machine tools and  new  standards  of exactness in measurement and industrial cutting and finishing. All very boring to the ordinary man, but utterly essential for the foundation of a successful industrial society.

Many   vital industries since have originated in  England.  To  take  a few,  George  Stephenson  produced the  first  practical  railway  (the railway  probably  did  more  than anything  to  drive  the  Industrial Revolution because it allowed a true national market to operate  within England);   Brunel  issued in the age of the  ocean  going   steamship;   William  Perkins laid the foundation for the modern  chemical  industry by discovering the first  synthetic dye;  the first electronic computer was  designed  in  Britain,   after the  theoretical  foundations had been laid  by   the Englishman,  Alan Turing.  (In the previous century another Englishman, Charles  Babbage,  designed  but did not finished  building  the  first programmable machine.) 

Alongside the development of manufacturing ran that of agriculture. The enclosure movement was already well advanced by 1700. By the  middle of the   nineteenth  century  it  was  effectively  finished.  Not  merely feudalism but the peasantry were gone. The old,  inefficient open-field system was a dead letter. With enclosure came agricultural  innovation. In  the  eighteenth  century we have  Jethro  Tull,  whose  seed  drill greatly reduced the amount of seed needed for sowing,   Robert Bakewell  whose selective breeding greatly increased the size of sheep and cattle and “Turnip”  Townsend who greatly increased crop efficiency by various mean  such  as  the  marling of sandy soil.   The  importance  of  such developments cannot be overestimated because the population of  Britain rose so dramatically  in the next century. 

The  technological inventions and discoveries made by the English   are legion. The list below gives  some idea of their importance and range.

Thomas Savery (1650-1715). Invented the first commercial steam engine -a steam pump. 

Thomas  Newcomen (1663-1729).  Improved Savery’s engine by  introducing the piston.  

Richard  Trevithick  (1771 – 1833). Invented the  high  pressure  steam engine. Built the first steam locomotive.

George Stephenson (1781-1848). Made the railway a practical reality. 

Abraham Darby (1678-1717). Developed the process of smelting iron using coke.

Sir Henry Bessemer,  1813-1898. Devised a process for making steel on a large scale.

James Hargreaves (1722-1778). Invented the spinning jenny.

John Kay  (1733-1764). Invented the  flying shuttle.

Samuel Crompton  (1753-1827). Invented  the spinning mule.

Richard Arkwright (1732-1792) Invented the waterframe.

Edmund Cartwright (1743-1823). Invented the power loom.

John  Harrison  (1693-1776) First to build watches accurate  enough  to solve the longitude measurement problem.

Edward Jenner (1743-1823). Developed vaccination.

Joseph Lister (1827-1912). Developed  antisepsis.

Sir Joseph Whitworth (1803-1887) standardised  screw threads,  produced first true  plane surfaces in metal, developed ductile steel.

Henry Maudslay (1771-1831).   Invented the screw-cutting lathe and  the first  bench  micrometer  that  was capable of  measuring  to  one  ten thousandth of an inch. 

Joseph Bramah (1748-1814). Invented the hydraulic press.

John Walker (1781- 1859).  Invented the first friction matches.

John  Smeaton  (1724-1792) made the first  modern  concrete  (hydraulic cement).

Joseph  Aspdin  (1788-1855) invented Portland Cement,  the  first  true artificial cement.

Humphrey Davy (1778-1829).  Invented the first electric light,  the arc lamp.

Michael Faraday (1791-1867). Invented the electric motor.

Isambard  Kingdom  Brunel (1806-1859).   Built the first  really  large  steam ships – the  Great Britain, Great Western, Great Eastern.

Sir  Isaac  Pitman (1813-1897).  Devised the most  widely  used  modern shorthand.

Sir Charles Wheatstone (1802 – 1875).  Developed an electric telegraph at the same time as Samuel Morse.

Rowland Hill (1795-1879). Invented adhesive postage stamps.

John Herschel (1792-1871). Invented the blueprint.

William  Henry Fox Talbot (1800-1877)  Invented the   negative-positive photography and latent image shorter exposure time.

Sir  Joseph  William Swan (1828-1914).  Invented the  dry  photographic plate.  Invented, concurrently with Edison, the  light bulb.

Sir William Henry Perkin (1838-1907). Created the first artificial  dye –  aniline  purple  or  mauveine – and  the  first   artificial  scent, coumarin.  

Alexander  Parkes  (1813-90).  Created the  first  artificial  plastic, Parkensine.

Sir   George  Cayley  (1773-1857).   Worked  out  the   principles   of aerodynamics,  his  “On  Ariel Navigation” showed  that  a  fixed  wing aircraft  with a power system for propulsion,  and a tail to assist  in the control of the airplane, would be the best way to allow man to fly. Also invented the caterpillar track.

Sir  Frank  Whittle  (1907-1996).  Took out the  first  patents  for  a Turbojet.

Sir Christopher Cockerell (1910-1999). Invented the hovercraft.

Charles  Babbage (1792-1871).  Worked out the basic principles  of  the computer. 

Alan Turin (1912-1954). Widely considered the father of modern computer science – worked out the principles of the digital computer. 

Tim  Berners-Lee  (1955-).  Invented the World Wide Web  defining  HTML (hypertextmarkup language), HTTP (HyperText Transfer Protocol) and URLs (Universal Resource Locators).

England and the Enlightenment

 In his book “Enlightenment:  Britain and the creation of the modern  world”, the  historian Roy Porter remarks how peculiar it is  “that  historians have  so  little  to say about the role of  English  thinkers   in  the European  Enlightenment  as a whole” (p3).  Peculiar  indeed  when  one considers  the  English  intellectual personnel of the  17th  and  18th centuries and the  high  reputation  English institutions and ideas had amongst    the  leading  lights  of  the   continental   Enlightenment, especially  in  the  country  which is  generally  represented  as  the powerhouse of Enlightenment thinking,  France.   Here is the philosophe of philosophes,  Voltaire,  at full Anglophile admire: “The English are the only people on earth who have been able to prescribe the limits  of Kings by resisting them;  and who,  by a series of struggles,  have  at last  established  that  wise  Government,  where  the  prince  is  all powerful  to  do  good,  and  at the  same  time   is  restrain’d  from committing evil;   where the Nobles are great without insolence,   tho’ there  are no vassals;  and where the People  share in  the  government  without confusion.”  Lettres philosophiques on Lettres Anglais (1775).

 A  strong argument can be made for the English Enlightenment  not  only existing  but  occurring  a century or so  before  that  of  any  other nation  and subsequently providing much of the  basis  for the  general Enlightenment movement.  

Consider these figures from  the seventeenth century:   William Gilbert (science,   especially  magnetism),   Francis  Bacon  (philosophy   and science),  Thomas Hobbes (philosophy), John Locke (philosophy),  Thomas Harrington     (nascent economics     and    sociology),   William  Harvey (biology/medicine),    Robert   Hooke   (polymathic    scientist    and technologist),  John Rae (biologist), Edmund Halley (astronomy),  Isaac Newton  (mathematics and physics).  What did they have in common  other than  intellectual distinction?   They were all driven by the  idea  of reason,  by the belief that the world could be  understood  rationally. That  is  the  real  essence  of  the  Enlightenment,   the  belief  in rationality,  in particular,  the belief that the world is  subject  to  physical laws, that God does not intervene capriciously, that the world is not governed by magic.  Such ideas did not preclude a God or prevent an intense relationship with the putatively divine, but they did encase God   within  a  rational system of thought in which  His   action  was limited, voluntarily or otherwise. Newton may have been utterly fixated with the numerology of the Bible but he believed the world was  ordered according to physical laws.    From  the belief that the universe is organised  rationally  comes  the corollary  that it can be understood,  that everything is  governed  by laws which can be discovered by men. This idea pre-dated Newton, but it was his ideas,  most notably his laws of motion and theory of  gravity, that elevated the idea to almost a secular religion.   During  the next century   intellectuals   took  the  example  of   Newton’s   inanimate mechanistic physical world and extrapolated the idea to every aspect of existence, from biology to philosophy  to social policy. If only enough was known,  if only enough effort was made,  then everything,  of  this world  at least,   could be understood and controlled  and   everything could be the subject of rational decision making.      

The 18th  century Enlightenment  had another aspect,  an  association with the  democratic or at least a wish that the power of kings  should be greatly curtailed – the Voltaire quote given above is a good example of the mentality.  This also  has its roots in England.  The ferment of the  English  Civil war  not only produced  proto-democratic  political movements  such as the Levellers, it also started  Parliament along the road  of being more than a subordinate constitutional player by forcing it to act as not only  a legislature but as an executive.  Stir  in  the experience  of  the Protectorate,  simmer for  30 years or so   of  the restored  Stuart kings,  mix in  the Glorious Revolution of 1689  which resulted  in  the Bill of Rights and established the English  crown  as being in the gift of Parliament  and  season with half a century of the German  Georges  and   you have the British (in  reality  the  English) constitution   which was so admired by Voltaire,  who  thought it quite perfect,  and  which  gave the American colonists the  inspiration  for their   own political arrangements (president = king,  Senate =  Lords, House  of Representatives = Commons,  with a  Constitution and Bill  of Rights  heavily influenced by the English Bill of Rights.)

Important English constitutional documents

The text of each of these important constitutional documents has been posted as pages on England Calling.  The links can be found at the top of the blog.

1. The development of Parliamentary Government

These documents show the gradual reduction of the power of the  monarch and the eventual development from this of Parliament and eventually the shift of the executive power from the monarch to the House of Commons.

1100 The charter of liberties of Henry (also known as the Coronation Charter)

This concerned primarily the relationship between the King and his nobles and foreshadows that part of  Magna Carta  which deals with things such as inheritance and the treatment of widows.

1215 Magna Carta

Apart from the  stating of rights and restrictions on what King John might do in certain situations, this was the first formal attempt to impose a council with powers to not merely advise the King but to restrain him (article 61).  This article was never implemented.

1258 The Provisions of Oxford and  1259 The Provisions of Westminster

These attempted to do what article 61 of Magna Carta  intended,  impose on Henry III a council with power to restrain the King.

1311 The Ordinances of the Lords Ordainers

These  vigorously  reiterated Magna Carta, bound Royal officials to obey the Ordinances and   in article 40 introduced a panel to have power to interfere with the king’s ministers, viz:  “ Item, we ordain that in each parliament one bishop, two earls, and two barons shall be assigned to hear and determine all plaints of those wishing to complain of the king’s ministers, whichever they may be, who have contravened the ordinances aforesaid.”

1628 The Petition of Right

This was a direct challenge to the attempt of Charles I to extend the Royal Prerogative, or more unkindly, to simply assume that he could do anything, in the early years of his reign. The primary complaint  was Charles’  raising of money without Parliamentary approval.  It set in train the events which led eventually to the proroguing of Parliament for 11 years(1629-1640).  The Petition relies heavily on citing documents such as Magna Carta and the Charter of the Forest, as well as the usual insistence of the restitution of English liberties.

1641 The Grand Remonstrance

This was another attempt to persuade  Charles I to do Parliament’s will by what had the form of a traditional petition to the King but the content of demands with unspoken menaces .  The King was not blamed personally – the failings were ascribed to a Papist conspiracy – but the tone of the petition was much more robust than the Petition of Right and left no doubt that Parliament was not pleading for Royal indulgence but insisting that Charles did their bidding.

It listed 204 separate points of objection, including a call for the expulsion of all bishops from Parliament and a  Parliamentary veto over Crown appointments. Charles refused to agree to all Parliament’s demands  in December 1641 and the first Civil War began a few months later.

1653 The Instrument of Government

This document  is in content if not formal description a written constitution. It created Oliver Cromwell as Lord Protector, stipulated that the office of Lord Protector was not to be hereditary, required regular Parliaments,  and  laid down a mesh of obligations and restrictions on government.

1689 The Bill of Rights

Further formal restrictions on the monarch, a list of rights to protect the liberty of all English men and women, the protection of MPs, regular Parliaments  and the assumption of the English crown to be in practice dependent upon the support of Parliament, thus driving the final nail into the coffin of the  doctrine of the divine right of kings.    This opened the way for the development of the executive in Parliament.

1789 The American Constitution and Bill of Rights

The influence of English constitutional development can be clearly seen in the Constitution and Bill of Rights (the first  ten amendments).  The short lived US Articles of Confederation is  placed below the Constitution and Bill of Rights to allow comparison between the documents.

2. The unification of Britain

1535 The unification of England and Wales

There was no formal Act of Union between England and Wales but the 1535 Act   – “An Acte for Lawes & Justice to be ministred in Wales in like fourme as it is in this Realme” –  was the most important  piece of legislation in the piecemeal process of  administrative incorporation of Wales into England which took place  in the latter years of Henry XIII. The text of  this Act  is in England Calling.