Category Archives: independence

Theresa  May’s   “clarification” of Brexit means Brexit

Robert Henderson

May’s speech  of 17 January 2017   was  a classic Theresa May performance , mixing  statements somewhere between a  boast and a threat to give the idea that the UK would be looking to its own interests first, second and last with  suggestions  which undermined the Britain First message.   Contrary to the many media  reports welcoming it as giving clarity it is, with the exception of the Single Market, a speech with  a great deal  of wriggle room not least over her acceptance of a transitional period and suggestion that the UK should remain attached to some  unspecified   EU projects. Here is some of the Britain First rhetoric:

 “Not partial membership of the European Union, associate membership of the European Union, or anything that leaves us half-in, half-out. We do not seek to adopt a model already enjoyed by other countries. We do not seek to hold on to bits of membership as we leave.

“That means taking control of our own affairs, as those who voted in their millions to leave the European Union demanded we must.

“So we will take back control of our laws and bring an end to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in Britain.

Leaving the European Union will mean that our laws will be made in Westminster, Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast. And those laws will be interpreted by judges not in Luxembourg but in courts across this country.

“Because we will not have truly left the European Union if we are not in control of our own laws.”

“But I must be clear. Britain wants to remain a good friend and neighbour to Europe.  Yet I know there are some voices calling for a punitive deal that punishes Britain and discourages other countries from taking the same path.

“That would be an act of calamitous self-harm for the countries of Europe. And it would not be the act of a friend.

“Britain would not – indeed we could not – accept such an approach. And while I am confident that this scenario need never arise – while I am sure a positive agreement can be reached – I am equally clear that no deal for Britain is better than a bad deal for Britain.”

Balanced against the Britain First rhetoric were statements which directly or by implication undermined  the idea that the UK would be truly sovereign.  Around a miasma of waffle the details May gave allowed for a large amount of wriggle room.    Her  “I am equally clear that no deal for Britain is better than a bad deal for Britain”  is meaningless because she has never properly defined what a “bad deal” would be.  The only thing which could be said to be certain (in the sense that it was not  covered with overt  qualifications)  is that the UK  will not be joining  the Single Market.  However, even with that seemingly unequivocal statement  it  is important to understand that  the ground which the Single Market covers including freedom of movement  could be brought back in part by whatever agreement , if any,  is concluded between the UK and the EU.

Remaining attached to the EU 

A good example of the lack of clarity is May’s  rejection  membership of the Customs Union, but leaves  the way open for the UK to become a semi detached member:  viz:

“…I  do not want Britain to be part of the Common Commercial Policy and I do not want us to be bound by the Common External Tariff.  These are the elements of the Customs Union that prevent us from striking our own comprehensive trade agreements with other countries.  But I do want us to have a customs agreement with the EU.

Whether that means we must reach a completely new customs agreement, become an associate member of the Customs Union in some way, or remain a signatory to some elements of it, I hold no preconceived position. I have an open mind on how we do it. It is not the means that matter, but the ends.

And those ends are clear: I want to remove as many barriers to trade as possible. And I want Britain to be free to establish our own tariff schedules at the World Trade Organisation, meaning we can reach new trade agreements not just with the European Union but with old friends and new allies from outside Europe too.”

May also wants the UK to keep open the possibility of the UK continuing to contribute  money to EU programmes, viz:

“…because we will no longer be members of the Single Market, we will not be required to contribute huge sums to the EU budget. There may be some specific European programmes in which we might want to participate. If so, and this will be for us to decide, it is reasonable that we should make an appropriate contribution. But the principle is clear: the days of Britain making vast contributions to the European Union every year will end.

“…we will also welcome agreement to continue to collaborate with our European partners on major science, research, and technology initiatives.”

“With the threats to our common security becoming more serious, our response cannot be to cooperate with one another less, but to work together more. I therefore want our future relationship with the European Union to include practical arrangements on matters of law enforcement and the sharing of intelligence material with our EU allies.

Britain is an open and tolerant country. We will always want immigration, especially high-skilled immigration, we will always want immigration from Europe, and we will always welcome individual migrants as friends.  But the message from the public before and during the referendum campaign was clear: Brexit must mean control of the number of people who come to Britain from Europe. And that is what we will deliver.

Then there is  immigration, viz:

“Britain is an open and tolerant country. We will always want immigration, especially high-skilled immigration, we will always want immigration from Europe, and we will always welcome individual migrants as friends.  But the message from the public before and during the referendum campaign was clear: Brexit must mean control of the number of people who come to Britain from Europe. And that is what we will deliver.

“Fairness demands that we deal with another issue as soon as possible too. We want to guarantee the rights of EU citizens who are already living in Britain, and the rights of British nationals in other member states, as early as we can.

“I have told other EU leaders that we could give people the certainty they want straight away, and reach such a deal now.  “

There is a woolly commitment which could mean virtually anything as to how many EEA migrants could come to the UK, both skilled and unskilled.  Large numbers of skilled people will give British employers no incentive to train our own people and the fact May does not rule out unskilled or low skilled workers suggests there will be large numbers of these.

As for the position of UK nationals living in the EU and EU citizens living in  the UK , if an agreement is made to simply guarantee the rights of UK nationals and EU citizens in the countries which they are living,  then the UK will be losers because  the benefits which most countries  within the EU offer are much less generous than those offered in the UK to EU citizens.   Health service provision is  the outstanding example of this.  There is also the question of how honest each EU country will be when it comes to  allowing UK  nationals access to their  benefits after Brexit.   For some years there have been reports of the Spanish making access to their  health services  by UK nationals difficult and since the vote to leave the EU Spain has been trying to get the UK to pay the medical costs of UK nationals living in Spain. .

Perhaps most immediately  disturbing is May’s commitment to a  transmission period with  different  periods of transition, vz:.

“I want us to have reached an agreement about our future partnership by the time the two-year Article Fifty process has concluded. From that point onwards, we believe a phased process of implementation, in which both Britain and the EU institutions and member states prepare for the new arrangements that will exist between us will be in our mutual self-interest. This will give businesses enough time to plan and prepare for those new arrangements.

This might be about our immigration controls, customs systems or the way in which we cooperate on criminal justice matters. Or it might be about the future legal and regulatory framework for financial services. For each issue, the time we need to phase-in the new arrangements may differ. Some might be introduced very quickly, some might take longer. And the interim arrangements we rely upon are likely to be a matter of negotiation.

But the purpose is clear: we will seek to avoid a disruptive cliff-edge, and we will do everything we can to phase in the new arrangements we require as Britain and the EU move towards our new partnership.”

Any of  the items mention under the heading of Remaining attached to the EU  might have a specious rationality about them,  but they all offer considerable opportunities to prevent a genuine Brexit simply  by  their multiplicity.

Devolved powers

May made this commitment:

“I look forward to working with the administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to deliver a Brexit that works for the whole of the United Kingdom.

Part of that will mean working very carefully to ensure that – as powers are repatriated from Brussels back to Britain – the right powers are returned to Westminster, and the right powers are passed to the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

So we will work to deliver a practical solution that allows the maintenance of the Common Travel Area with the Republic, while protecting the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system.

Nobody wants to return to the borders of the past, so we will make it a priority to deliver a practical solution as soon as we can.”

This could be an excuse for substantial new powers to be given to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in an attempt to stifle opposition to the UK withdrawal from the EU.  But every time new powers are granted to the devolved administrations this edges them nearer to independence because it prepares them for independence.

The Common Travel Area with the  Republic of Ireland 

Independence is a medium to long term problem. The border with the Republic of Ireland (RoI) is an immediate and  very  serious problem .    If the Common Travel Area is retained then the UK will not have control of her borders because anyone wishing to settle in  the UK can do so via the ROI.

May will doubtless come up with claims that new surveillance techniques  based on computer systems to identify and track migrants working  or drawing benefits,  but does anyone have any real faith that the British state will have either the resources or the will to identify those working illegally (many will simply work in the black economy) and deport them?

The lack of a hard border between the RoI and Northern Ireland  would also mean that EU goods could be smuggled into the UK if a tariff wall  exists between  the UK and the EU.

Our Europhile Parliament

But whatever  agreement is finally  made between the government and the EU it will not be a done deal.  Why? Because May revealed that she could  “confirm today that the Government will put the final deal that is agreed between the UK and the EU to a vote in both Houses of Parliament, before it comes into force.”

That unequivocal commitment has more to it than might appear at first glance. By committing to allowing both the Lords and Commons to vote  on whatever is agreed she has greatly increased the opportunity for Parliament  to either delay or even thwart Brexit altogether.    Whether the vote is on a motion or on a  Bill either can be amended,  so matters could be delayed or sent back to square one not only by a vote against the motion or Bill, but also by amending the motion or Bill to overthrow the terms of the agreement between the Government and the EU .

As the Prime Minister has committed the Government to  allowing the Lords and Commons a vote,  it would be impossible to meaningfully accuse those in Parliament who voted against  terms of the agreement between the Government and the EU of acting against the will of the people because by agreeing to allowing the Lords and Commons  a vote they  have  accepted that Parliament has the right to refuse or amend  the terms agree with the EU. Not only that  it would be politically hideously difficult going on  impossible to ensure the Lords voted for whatever terms were put before them by arranging to have hundreds of new peers created who could be trusted to vote for the terms.  Not only that,  but by agreeing to a vote by the Lords May has given the peers  who want to remain in the EU a respectable excuse for going against the  referendum result and, if the Commons did vote to agree the terms,  of thwarting the Commons as well by delaying matters. The Government could use the Parliament Act  to force a  Bill through after a  year or so but has no power over a defeated motion,  so if a motion was rejected a Bill would have to brought forward which would mean further delay.  Because of this a Bill is more likely than a motion of both Houses.

There is the further complication of  legislation  to  give legal post-Brexit status  to all the EU law which the UK is already committed to – “as we repeal the European Communities Act, we will convert the “acquis” – the body of existing EU law – into British law.”

Presumably this would be  legislation separate from any  legislation brought forward to allow the Lords and Commons to vote on the terms agreed with the EU. If so that would allow further opportunities for substantial delay.  Moreover, if the UK leaves after  two years (the period stipulated in Article 50 if the EU does not agree to an extension)  without any agreement having been reached between the UK and the EU, the need to pass  a Bill making EU  derived law UK  law would still exist and  the opportunities for delay or rejection by one or both of  the Houses of Parliament would still be there,  arguably  in an enhanced form.

As things stand the earliest the UK can escape from the EU will be March 2019. The next General Election is due on 7  May 2020 according to the Fixed Term Parliaments Act 2011.  The only ways  an election could be called earlier is either two thirds of the House of Commons (that is two thirds of the total number of Commons seats not two thirds of those who vote – 417 seats out  of 650) vote for an earlier election or the Government loses a vote of No Confidence.  With the present balance of the Commons the first option is very unlikely and the second would require the absurdity of Theresa May somehow engineering a vote of confidence against her own government.  Hence, either is very unlikely.  That would mean that when Parliament gets to vote on whatever agreement is reached by the Government and the EU , even the Lords alone would have the power to delay matters either into the general election or shortly after it.

The political weather might  change radically by 2020. It could be that the EU deliberately gives the UK the run around for two years or more and no agreement is reached  before March 2019 or one or more of the 27 remaining EU members refuses to ratify the proposed agreement.  The UK would then be forced either to leave the EU without an agreement  and trade under WTO rules or the UK government  under the pressure of time  would have to cave in and agreed to  very disadvantageous terms  for the UK.  It could even be that the  Government, their backbenchers or the entire Parliament of both Houses will secretly be delighted if  the latter happens because it would probably re-attach the  UK to the EU it is a way to enable future UK Governments  to be  able to use to embed the UK ever more firmly into the EU.  Improbable?  Well, remember this, the Government , the Commons and the Lords are strongly in favour of the UK remaining in the EU. The Prime Minister,  Chancellor and Home Secretary are all remainers at heart and the Foreign Secretary of a shameless opportunist who would come out for remain at the drop of a hat if he thought it would aid his political career.  Not only that but the Civil Service at least  at senior levels  are also very wedded to the idea of the  UK being in  the EU.

The idea of leaving and trading  under WTO rules until if and when new trade arrangements can be made with the EU is not  an unattractive one.  The problem is that  if it happens in 2019 that will have cost the UK a great deal . If it was done now it  would have a number of great advantages.  It would immediately bring certainty whereas delaying the UK’s departure until March 2019 or even later will involve a great deal of uncertainty. In addition The UK could stop paying the huge subsidy the EU extracts  from the UK each year soon, decide where the money the EU  currently returns to the UK with strings attached  may be spent, be  immediately removed from the reach of the European Court of Justice, be  free to make new trade deals with the rest of the world, control immigration from the European Economic Area (EEA)  and repeal or amend any of  the  EU inspired legislation which is on the Statue Book.

If the UK remains entwined within the EU until March 2019,  regardless of whether any agreement is reached between the UK and the EU ,  will have since the vote to leave on 23rd June  last year  have paid 33 months of  the huge  annual subsidy to the  EU   (33 months  worth would be  around  £26 billion),  have had to spend the money which the EU currently returns to the UK  on  what the EU directs it shall be spent on, accept any new  EU laws and regulations which cannot be vetoed, remain under the European Court of Justice’s jurisdiction and,  most importantly , be unable to control immigration from EEA, which if it remains at the level of last year  (net EEA  immigration to the UK is estimated to be  189,000 in the  Year Ending  June 2016) would mean  around  half a million more immigrants by the time  the UK leaves the EU  (and it could easily be higher as would-be immigrants scramble to get in before the UK’s departs the EU).

The long and the short of the speech  is that  despite its range of topic  May’s speech provided  precious little clarity overall about either what the Government will be seeking or what will happen once an agreement is made between the UK and the EU  or no  agreement is made.

Killing two political birds with one stone

Resolving the UK’s unfinished devolution and the Irish border  questions

Robert Henderson

Brexit provides a wonderful opportunity to  deal simultaneously with  two major political difficulties.  These  are  the  unbalanced devolution arrangements  in the UK and   what is to be done  about the

Relationship   between  the Republic of Ireland (RoI)  and the UK after Brexit.  Both  problems  could be solved by the RoI leaving the EU at the same time as the  UK and forming a federation with the UK.

The unfinished business of  UK  devolution

Three of the four home countries – Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland  – have  each been granted elected assemblies or parliaments . From these are formed devolved governments which administer increasingly significant powers such as the control of policing, education and the NHS.  The  personnel of the devolved governments and assemblies/parliaments  have by their words and actions made it clear that  do not think of the national interest of the UK but  of what is best for  their  particular home country.

The fourth home country England has neither an assembly nor a government and consequently no body of politicians to speak for England and to look after her interests.   A procedure to have only  MPs sitting for  English seats  voting on English only legislation  (English votes for English laws or EVEL for short)  began a trial in 2015,  but  it  has few teeth because  it is difficult to disentangle what is English only  legislation, not least  because  MPs  for seats outside of England argue  that any Bill dealing solely with English matters has financial implications for the rest of the UK and , consequently, is not an England only Bill. Nor does EVEL allow English MPs to initiate English only legislation. Most importantly  England , unlike Scotland,  Wales and Northern Ireland, is left without any national political representatives   to concentrate on purely English domestic matters.

  The House of Lords review of its first year  in operation makes EVEL’s  limitations clear:

The EVEL procedures introduced by the Government address, to some extent, the West Lothian Question. They provide a double-veto, meaning that legislation or provisions in bills affecting only England (or in some cases, England and Wales, or England and Wales and Northern Ireland), can only be passed by the House of Commons with the support of both a majority of MPs overall, and of MPs from the nations directly affected by the legislation.

Yet English MPs’ ability to enact and amend legislation does not mirror their capacity, under EVEL, to resist legislative changes. The capacity of English MPs to pursue a distinct legislative agenda for England in respect of matters that are devolved elsewhere does not equate to the broader capacity of devolved legislatures to pursue a distinct agenda on matters that are devolved to them

Not content with denying England a parliament and government of her own the UK government  has made strenuous efforts to Balkanise England by forcing elected mayors on cities and  the devolution of considerable  powers  to local authority areas built around cities  with Manchester in the vanguard of this development.   The ostensible  idea of this Balkanisation is to pretend that an English parliament and government is not necessary because devolution is being delivered on a regional basis to England: its covert intention is to ensure that  England cannot act as a political entity in its own right and have its representatives  asking  awkward questions such as why are Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland  receiving so much more  per capita from the  Treasury each year than England receives.( The latest figures are: Scotland £10,536 per person,  Northern Ireland, £10,983  per person,  Wales £9,996  per person, England  £8,816 per person).

To balance the devolution settlement in the UK England needs a parliament and a government, not just to give her parity  with the other home countries, but to prevent the Balkanisation of England.  This could be done simply and without great expense by  returning   the Westminster Parliament to what it was originally, the English Parliament.   It could also function as the federal Parliament when that was required  to convene .  Hence, no new  parliament building would be required. Members of the Federal Parliament would be the elected representatives of the devolved assemblies of the four Home Countries and what is now the RoI.

The Republic of Ireland

Should the RoI decide to remain as a member of the EU she risks a hard border this  would  potentially mean an end to the free movement between the UK and the RoI and   the RoI having to deal with EU imposed tariffs on imports from the UK and UK reciprocal tariffs on goods exported by the RoI to the UK. It is important to understand that a “hard” border would  not just be that between the RoI and Northern Ireland,  but between the RoI and the whole of the UK.

The land border between the RoI and Northern Ireland   creates  two potential  dangers for the UK.   It could operate as a back door for illegal  immigrants to enter  the UK  and promote  the smuggling of goods.   At present the  UK government is attempting to foist onto the British public a nonsense which says that there  will be no need of a  “hard” border between  the RoI and Northern Ireland to prevent illegal immigration. Two lines of argument are employed to justify this.  First, that   it can be controlled by greater technological surveillance and   stricter  checks on employers, foreign benefit claimants  and landlords. Second, it is claimed that  the  fact that the UK is no longer an EU member   will mean  that the UK will be much less attractive to  people in the EU as a place to migrate to because they will not be able to get jobs or benefits.

This shows either a shocking  naivety or cynicism of a high order. The idea that people would not be able to gain employment simply because they are EU citizens ignores the fact that many illegal migrants from outside the European Economic Area  (EEA)  already do this.   Moreover, even  immigrants here legally have an incentive to work in the black market  because they  can avoid tax.

As for not paying benefits, how  would the authorities distinguish between the millions from the EU already in the UK who are almost certain to have the right to remain, and any new EU migrants?  It would be nigh on impossible.  It is remarkably easy to get a National Insurance number issued  in the UK and even if employers had stricter duties placed upon them not to employ EU citizens without a work permit or visa, there are plenty of employers who would be willing to employ those they knew were illegal because they are cheaper and more easily controlled and sacked  than British workers or theillegal  employer (this is a common thing with gangmasters)  is an immigrant  and makes a point of only employing  other immigrants from his or her  own country.  Once employed and with a National Insurance number they could claim in work benefits readily enough and probably out of work benefits too  because there is not the massive resources of manpower which would be  required to do the necessary checks on whether they  were eligible.

Whatever is said now there could not  in practice  be an open border  with the UK.   Even if  in the immediate  post-Brexit  period there  continued the present agreement between the UK and the RoI of free movement,  and this is what Theresa May is proposing, huge numbers of immigrants to the UK coming via the the RoI would create uproar amongst a British public who felt cheated that a hard border between the RoI and Northern Ireland would have to be created.

But even without the migrant question the idea that no “hard” border will be necessary  could be sunk if the EU or the UK imposes tariffs or quotas  on goods.  The ex-EU Commissioner Peter Sutherland has  pointed this out forcefully:

“We have been told by a number of Conservative Party spokespeople that Britain will leave the common customs area of the EU.

“If this is true, the customs union, which relates to sharing a common external tariff of the EU, will have to be maintained by all other EU countries with the UK following its withdrawal. Goods will have to be checked at borders.”

While the RoI Foreign Secretary Charlie Flanagan has said a hard Brexit would be unworkable for Ireland.

The RoI would  have the worry that if they remained in the EU they could find themselves suddenly saddled with tariffs. If a genuine Brexit is achieved by the UK then it is possible that either the EU will place tariffs or quotas on UK goods  and the UK responds in kind or that this will happen because no agreement can be reached and the UK leaves the EU and trades under WTO rules.  This would be more than an inconvenience for the RoI because she has  very substantial economic ties to the  UK.

All these difficulties with devolution and the RoI border  would dissolve  with the creation of  a truly federal state comprised of  England,  Scotland, Wales Northern Ireland and what is now  the RoI. Such a federation would need to have  full home rule. The issues which would be left to the federal level would be important but few:  defence, foreign affairs,  control of coastal waters, customs, management of the currency  and  immigration.  This would not mean  that the policy areas reserved to the constituent countries’ parliaments  would not be brought to the federal level  without   the agreement of  the constituent countries. Large infrastructure projects such as roads and railways  covering two or more devolved jurisdictions would be a good example of the type of issue  which might be dealt with at the federal level.

Such a federation would have a good start for  England, Scotland,  Wales are all undisputed territories with no border disputes or awkward enclaves stuck in the middle of another  nation’s  territory.  The Irish  situation is more complicated,  but if the entirety of Ireland was in the new federation that would probably take much of the sting  which is left out of  the sectarian divide .  Moreover, the RoI  and Northern Ireland would still each have a separate identity and a devolved  political  class and institutions directly responsible to their respective populations.  One of the reasons for the great stability  of Great Britain (that is, England, Scotland and Wales) over the  centuries is the fact that each nation had its own territory.  That would continue under the federation I propose.

Why would the RoI join such a federation?

Why would the RoI wish to give up her independence?   They reality is that while she is part of the EU the RoI is not independent. To begin withshe  has no control of her currency  because the RoI  is part of the Eurozone. To that can be added the huge amount of control through EU regulations and directives., interferences  with national sovereignty  which a small state such as the RoI has little influence over because of the EU’s  qualified majority voting. Moreover,    the way the EU is going member states are likely to have less and less national autonomy as the federalist project proceeds.   (An alternative plausible and damaging scenario is that the EU collapses  within the next ten years , most probably through the other states wanting to follow the UK’s example and leave the EU or simply because the Euro crashes.  This would leave the RoI on her own.  )

For a long time the RoI benefitted greatly from being a net beneficiary  with more money coming to the RoI than the RoI sent to Brussels.  That is changing rapidly.  The  net payment the ROI receives from the EU no  longer huge in relation to the size of her economy  (GDP  €214.623 billion in 2015). The ROI’s  financial delings  with the EU in 2015 were:

Total EU spending in Ireland: € 2.009 billion

Total EU spending as % of Irish gross national income (GNI): 1.10 %

Total Irish contribution to the EU budget: € 1.558 billion

Irish contribution to the EU budget as % of its GNI: 0.86 %

It is probable that within the next few years the RoI will become a regular net contributor to the EU budget.

As for RoI  exports , those to  the EU have   declined by over the past year while  RoI exports to countries outside the EU grew.

Set against a  background of declining monetary benefit, weakening exports to the EU  and  increasing uncertainty  as to where the EU is going the  considerable advantages  the RoI would gain in addition to  removing the problems  a  border  between the RoI and Northern Ireland  create  begin to look decidedly attractive.

The RoI would be part of a political unit which was a significant military power,  was a permanent member of the UN Security Council and held high positions in powerful international bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank.

The fact that the RoI is part of the Eurozone  need not be a great  problem,   because  the RoI  could immediately switch to the Pound Sterling as their currency.  This would  entail  far less upheaval than the RoI would experience if they remained in the EU and had to either leave the Euro of their own accord because it was too damaging or simply  find themselves without a currency because the Euro had collapsed.

Nonetheless I can see what an emotional wrench such a course would be  for any country which thinks of itself as a sovereign state.  That this is largely a sham whilst the RoI is within the EU  (the same applies to the UK until Brexit is achieved) is neither here nor there  if people think of a country as sovereign. Moreover, Ireland as a whole has a long and fraught history with the British mainland. Nonetheless , the RoI would have full control of her domestic matters and would actually have more control in many areas because there is so much that the EU now controls which would be left to each part of the federation.

There is also the greater question of what  the world will  be like in ten or twenty years.  Western Europe including the British Isles has enjoyed a remarkably long period of peace. That may  well not last. The threat may not come from European powers but new superpowers such as China and India.   This is not fanciful. There are approximately 7 billion people in the world at present  of whom at a most generous estimate only one billion live in the West.  It is overly sanguine to imagine that  such huge blocks of humanity  living outside the West will remain  forever without expansionist tendencies, tendencies  which could extend to Europe or even North America.  China in particular is engaged in quasi-empire building throughout the developing world.  In addition, there are strong signs that the world is casting globalisation aside with protectionist sympathies growing.   That makes the RoI’s substantial trade with the UK potentially even more important than it is now for we are likely to enter a world in which countries look to their own advantage. . Finally, there is the still largely ignored by politicians threat  of catastrophic unemployment which is almost certain to come in the next decade or two  from  the huge advances in robotics and Artificial Intelligence which will allow most existing jobs and,  most importantly,  most  new jobs which arise, to be done without human involvement .

In such an uncertain  world being part of a serious military, diplomatic and economic power could be much to the RoI’s  4.5 million population’s  advantage

EU Referendum – England voted 53.37% to leave

England voted 53.37% to leave and 46.63% to remain

How do is the figure derived?

 

Total vote 33,551,983

Comprised of

Leave:     17,410,742 (51.9%)

Remain:  16,141,241 (48.1%)

 

Scot Leave:              1,018,322

NI    Leave:                 349,442

Wales Leave:              854,572

Celts Leave  Total    2,222,336

 

Scot Remain:               1,661,191

NI  Remain                     440,707

Wales Remain:              772,347

Celts  Remain Total    2,874,145

 

Subtract the Celts totals for Leave and  Remain and subtract those from the overall Leave and Remain votes, viz:

England Leave:    17,410,742 – 2,222,336 = 15,188,406 = 87.23% of the leave vote

England Remain: 16,141,241 –  2,874,145 =13,267,096 =  82.19% of the remain vote

Total England vote 28,455,502

 

Finally calculate the percentage of the England vote for Leave and Remain

This is  gives  53.37% to Leave and 46.63% to  Remain

Brexit: The threat from  the Remainers…and how to refute and defeat them

Robert Henderson

The anti-democratic behaviour of the remainers over the EU referendum vote  is not a surprise but the brazenness and crudity of their attempts  is still shocking  and deeply  worrying  because  a majority of those with power and public influence   in the UK – politicians, academics, mediafolk or the hodge podge of those working for think tanks and charities – are remainers at heart.   That applies to the people at the very head of the government for  none of the holders of the four great offices of state  is a sincere Brexiteer.  We have a  PM (Theresa May) , Chancellor (Philip Hammond)  and Home Secretary(Amber Rudd) who are by temperament,  conviction and public statement  Europhiles and a foreign Secretary (Boris Johnson)  who is a slippery careerist liable to change his position back to remainer anytime he thinks it will benefit him.  In addition,  Theresa May is the worst sort of remainer, namely, a cowardly one, whose taste for duplicity was shown during the Referendum  campaign when she  wanted to have her  political cake and eat it by saying she was for remaining in the EU whilst doing precious little campaigning for a remain vote.

It is true that  May has appointed two ministers( David Davies and Liam Fox )who are solid supporters of Brexit to oversee the day-to-day progress of Brexit,  but they   could well turn out to be window dressing to enable May to allay the  suspicions  of those who want Brexit that she is working towards arranging a deal with the EU for the UK  to remain stitched into the fabric of the EU. Once  Article 50 is triggered May could decide to dump them or adopt such an obstructive stance  prompt them to resign.  Once Article 50  goes live that  gives her two years breathing space to subvert the aims of Brexit and provides ample opportunity to claim that concessions  on things such as  free movement  or paying a fee for access to the single market will have to be made.   We already have hints of this in the priming of the media  with stories about how all existing EU immigrants to the UK  – all 3,.6 million of them – will be allowed to stay.

UKip’s immediate purpose

The potential grip the remainers have on the Brexit process means that is essential  for  May and Co  to be  kept under the tightest scrutiny until the  UK is out of  the EU .  That is Ukip’s  immediate purpose.  To this end everything possible should be done to try to  persuade Nigel Farage to stay on until Brexit is secured.

The Government must be pressed whenever it fails to commit itself to these lines in the sand:  no   free movement  or any other restriction by the EU on the UK’s ability to control her borders;    an end to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice over the UK;  no payment by the UK of money to the EU  for any reason and an end to the European Arrest Warrant . In addition, whenever, politicians, especially those on the government side,  try to water down the idea of Brexit through vague and ambiguous wording,  this should be made a matter of public comment and record.   Those who seek to subvert  the will of the British people should be forced to  live in a mental world in which they know that any attempt to deliver less than the Brexit promised by the referendum question will be exposed for what it is, profoundly anti-democratic behaviour which  not so long ago would have been called treason.

Lines in the sand

The idea that lines in the sand make for a weak bargaining position does not stand up. Giving away your hand before negotiating is only weakness if  one side of a negotiation gives up important ground before negotiations begin. . David Cameron did that with his “negotiation” with the EU  before the referendum.  Cameron  not only failed to have any lines in the sand he signalled his weakness by not asking for a radical deal on free movement. The lines in the sand listed above are signs of strength which say this is what we cannot concede. Such a stance would either drive the rest of the EU to decide that the best thing would be to get the UK out of the EU as quickly as possible  by rapidly  agreeing to a reasonable  deal  or prompt  the rest of the EU hierarchy  to show their true colours of being  utterly hostile to the UK . This should force the UK government to see the only way forward is to simply leave and trade under WTO rules as John Redwood amongst others has advocated.

Within  the general  scrutiny there is the  task of rigorously  rebutting the  particular claims of the remainers as to why the referendum should not be accepted.  This can be readily done by sticking to the facts and following the logic of what a referendum implies for Parliament.   Let me demonstrate.

The lie at the heart of the remainers argument

Contrary to what the  remainers are now  claiming voters knew precisely what they were voting for. The clue is in the ballot paper question (which was put forward by the Electoral Commission) :

“Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?”

The ballot question  did not ask should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or seek whether she should seek another status such as that of Norway or Switzerland.  It does not say that there should be another referendum on whatever terms are agreed.  There is no equivocation whatsoever; the choice  was  out or in.   If the UK had  left the EU the day  after the vote and  traded under WTO rules or even simply  declared UDI either behaviour would have been in accord with the referendum question.

In addition, the European Union Referendum Act makes no provision for a second  referendum on the terms of withdrawal.  There is good reason for this, the question on the ballot paper was crystal clear: leave means leave.

The electors did not understand

The idea that those who voted to leave were largely   ignorant and poorly educated white working class  people who did not  know any better is absurd.   I can vouch from my own experience of talking to many people from a workingclass background that they had absolutely no difficulty in understanding what the vote was about, namely, regaining sovereignty, being masters in our own house, controlling our own affairs, saying who should be allowed to come into this country – these are ideas which are, for the politically correct, all too well understood by electors in general.

But  let us for the sake of argument allow that it was  the  less educated  who disproportionately voted for   Leave.  Would that have been a bad thing?  In 1984 Orwell put these words into the head of Winston Smith: “If there is hope it lies with the proles.” The reason for that was the proles had not been seriously infected by the doctrines of  IngSoc, the only political party in Britain in 1984. So it is with the  Britain today. The white working class  has  not been seriously infected with the totalitarian  creed that is political correctness.  They have a deep well of unforced unselfconscious patriotism and readily understand that mass immigration is invasion and that membership of any international political  body results in the theft of sovereignty which allows  a quisling political class to deform democracy.  In reality they were the type of people most suited to vote leave for they were the people who experienced most directly the effects of mass immigration from  Europe, the lowered wages, the creation of a cruel housing shortage, the transformation of the areas in which they lived  caused by large immigrant inflows..

The claim that the referendum vote was narrowly won  

The overall vote on a 73% turnout  was Remain 16,141,241 Leave: 17,410,742. That gave a leave  majority of  1,269,501. In percentage terms 51.90 voted to Leave and 48.1 to stay. England voted by nearly 54% to leave.  It was a decisive if not utterly overwhelming victory.  Had such a result been for remaining you may be sure  the remainers would be calling it a comprehensive result.  Indeed,  had there been a very narrow vote to  remain can anyone doubt from their behaviour since the result  that the remainers would be saying “one vote more is enough? “

On the legal front it should be noted that there is  no stipulation in the  European Union Referendum Act that either  a certain  percentage of all qualified electors or a certain percentage of those voting  must vote to  leave to activate a  Brexit .

The referendum was only advisory

Perhaps the most popular fraudulent claim by remainers  is that the referendum was only  advisory. Nothing in the European Union  Referendum Act states that it is simply advisory. The only arguments  which could be put forward to support the  claim  are (1)  to claim that the absence of a clause placing Parliament under an obligation to act on the result should be taken to mean that it was only advisory or (2) that  Parliament is the final font of authority in the UK and, consequently, any referendum is automatically only advisory unless it is made clear in an Act of Parliament authorising a referendum that Parliament  and the government must act on the result of the referendum. The word Jesuitical comes to mind.

These arguments if taken seriously  would mean that anything which is not specifically  sanctioned or banned in the European Union Referendum Act  can be read into the Act.  This goes against English law in  which things that are not specifically banned or made compulsory are taken to be legal.   In European systems of law what one may legally do has to be stated. It is the difference between negative and positive  law. As the European Union Referendum Act  is English law the absence of a clause stating the referendum was merely advisory  means it is  binding on Parliament  and the government.

It is also true that during the referendum campaign  none of the official  leave and remain campaign groups made any play with the idea that the referendum was only advisory.

The claim that the prerogative should  not be used to trigger Article 50 or sanction  the terms of leaving  the EU

The referendum was a manifesto commitment of the Conservatives in the general election of 2015. Parliament voted for the  European Union  Referendum Act  in 2015 by 316 for and 53 against.

Once the holding of a referendum has been agreed by Parliament  the rules of the game change for Parliament.  Unless provision is made in the Act authorising a referendum for it to be only advisory or  a clause inserted stating that Parliament shall vote on what action should be taken after the outcome of the referendum,   MPs and Lords cannot claim that it is Parliament’s role to vote on the outcome of the referendum .  The holding of a referendum whose outcome is not   just advisory trumps the authority of Parliament because  if  it did not the reason for the referendum would vanish.

There is also amply  precedent for the use of the prerogative by  UK governments  in connection with treaties relating to what is now the EU. The UK’s admission to what was then the European Economic Community in 1973 was done without a referendum through the use of the prerogative by Edward Heath  and every  treaty emanating from what is now the European Union has also not been presented to Parliament for their approval but given legal status by the use of the prerogative.

The position on who makes the decision on the renegotiation terms is also straightforward: it is a treaty matter  and the negotiation of and acceptance of treaties are a  prerogative power. End of story. Parliament does not have to come into it, although either House could pass motions asking the government to take note of whatever those wanting the new relationship with the EU to be less than Brexit .

The practical consequences of  May’ schedule for leaving the EU

If Theresa May’s schedule for leaving the EU is followed the UK will have had 33 months of remaining in the EU subject to all the rules, regulations and obligations which existed on 23rd  June plus any new EU laws passed between the 23Rd June and March 2019.   During those 33 months the UK will be suffering  this:

  1. Be paying its contributions to the EU in full. The net amount (the sum  the UK does not get back from their gross  contribution)  for 33 months would be around £24 billion.   Moreover, the money that is returned to the UK by  the EU in the 33 months (££12 billion approx.)  has to be spent not as the British government decides but as the EU decrees.
  2. Have to allow citizens of the European Economic Area  to continue to  freely enter and work in the UK.   Half a million or even a million new EU immigrants could plausibly come in before the UK formally leaves because of reports suggesting that an amnesty for all EEA citizens will apply at the point where the UK finally leaves.
  3. Be forced to put any new EU directives into law  unless  it is one of the rare instances where a national veto still applies.

4 Be expected to enforce any existing EU laws including things such as the European Arrest Warrant.

  1. Still be liable to be taken before the European Court of Justice.

5 Be unable to make any bilateral trade treaties  or any other form a treaty which conflicts with treaties  made by the EU.

  1. Be paying in work and out of work benefits to many EEA citizens in the UK.
  2. Be funding the children of EEA citizens in the UK through the provision of school places and healthcare.
  3. Be accepting citizens from the EEA for free NHS treatment.
  4. Be funding students from the EEA through subsidized fees and  student loans
  5. Be unable to give preference to UK companies when putting public contracts out  to tender.

The great enemy of  a true Brexit is time.

The remainers can, like Mr Micawber,  wait for something to turn up  and unlike Mr Micawber they  have every reason to believe that something might  indeed save them in the two years provided by Article 50; perhaps another  world depression or simply the UK being economically  destabilised by the uncertainty of the long  delay.  That being so, what   we need is an end to equivocation by those controlling the Brexit process and the fastest possible removal of the UK from the EU.

Could a really  quick exit be achieved legally?  That is debatable purely in  terms of international law. It is true that   The Vienna Convention on Treaties  in  Article  62 allows for the voiding of a treaty in a matter of months if there is a “fundamental change of circumstances” but that does not apply where the change of circumstances has been caused by the country wishing to leave.

But in the end leaving the EU is a political not a legal matter and the fact that the EU have provided a mechanism to depart   in Article 50 shows that flawed as that means of leaving  is,  the EU acknowledges that a member state may leave.  The UK is s not the position that the Confederacy found themselves in in mid 19th century USA where there was no legal route out.

The  matter comes down to this,  do you  honestly believe that the EU would wish to be seriously at odds  with a  country with the sixth  largest economy in the world ,  a massive trade deficit with the EU, a country which  is a permanent  member of the UN Security Council and which  holds major positions on most of the important international organisations such as the IMF.    Moreover,  at the purely  practical level the UK is a partner in cross border European enterprises such as Airbus and  the consortium producing the Eurofighter.

All that being so, surely the odds are  that  if the UK plays sticks to its Brexit guns the EU will, after a good deal of huffing and puffing,  let the UK  go on reasonable terms.    Truth to tell, the real danger comes from those in Britain in positions of power and influence who covertly or overtly wish to sabotage Brexit.

 

Lord Palmerston sums up all that Brexit is about

Lord Palmerston:  “I hold with respect to alliances, that England is a Power sufficiently strong, sufficiently powerful, to steer her own course, and not to tie herself as an unnecessary appendage to the policy of any other Government. I hold that the real policy of England—apart from questions which involve her own particular interests, political or commercial—is to be the champion of justice and right; pursuing that course with moderation and prudence, not becoming the Quixote of the world, but giving the weight of her moral sanction and support wherever she thinks that justice is, and wherever she thinks that wrong has been done…I say that it is a narrow policy to suppose that this country or that is to be marked out as the eternal ally or the perpetual enemy of England. We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow… And if I might be allowed to express in one sentence the principle which I think ought to guide an English Minister, I would adopt the expression of Canning, and say that with every British Minister the interests of England ought to be the shibboleth of his policy.”

  • Speech to the House of Commons (1 March 1848).

Don’t be fooled: EU enthusiast Teresa May is intent on subverting Brexit

Robert Henderson

In office for less than 48 hours,  Teresa May   showed her true colours and intentions for Brexit when she made the remarkable promise that Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty will not be activated until there is agreement between Westminster and the devolved governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.   This has the effect of allowing the UK’s departure indefinitely. In a separate statement  SNP leader Nicola Sturgeon  has supported this idea.  May has also  visited Wales and said she wanted the Welsh government to be “’involved and engaged’ in Brexit negotiations.”

The fact that May’s first act after choosing a cabinet was to go running off to Scotland  to meet the  SNP’s Nicola Sturgeon before embracing  the patently absurd idea that both Scotland’s  wishes to remain in the EU and the majority UK wish to leave  the EU  could be reconciled shows this was planned before she became PM . Her visit to Wales, doubtless to be followed by one to Northern Ireland, reinforced the suspicion, if it needed reinforcing, that she is intent on sabotaging Brexit.

There is plenty of other  evidence of May’s duplicitous  intentions . At her first cabinet meeting she  said “we will not allow the country to be defined by Brexit”.  This is nonsensical if May is committed to Brexit.  Regaining sovereignty is what Brexit is about and sovereignty defines what a country is.

What is May’s motivation for this behaviour? Like a majority of Tory MPs  she does not want to leave the EU and is intent on finding a way of subverting  Brexit.  She can do this in two ways:

(1) May will  use the excuse of accommodating  the wishes of Scotland and, Wales and NI to   delay the UK’s exit as long as possible in the hope that  unforeseen events, for example,    the UK economy goes into  prolonged recession,   will  give her an excuse to hold another  referendum.

(2) May will agree terms with the EU which stitch us back into the EU with things such as free movement and she will justify  such an agreement  on the grounds that Scotland and NI and possibly Wales will not agree to anything less.

All of this would go against what the British voted for on 23rd June.  You might say neither this government nor Parliament  would tolerate such a rejection of popular will.  The problem is that despite the clear majority to leave  most MPs, including Tory MP s,  wish to remain inside the EU and two thirds of May’s cabinet are remainers.  The House of Lords is also solidly for remaining in the EU.  In principle Parliament could accept whatever deal is reached with the EU. If  it is several years down the line, as it almost certainly will be if Article 50 is activated,  this could mean that the voters will have been exhausted and confused by the whole process and fail to protest  effectively enough to prevent the stitch up happening.

There is also the possibility that May could distract or  “buy” the acquiescence of Tory Brexiteers  to a sell-out of the Brexit vote by giving them some red meat such as increasing defence spending and the permitting of new grammar schools.

But even if the British voter is outraged by such a betrayal  what exactly could they do to stop it happening?  At the next general  they could vote against any MP who voted to accept what might be called a Quisling agreement.  But who exactly  could they vote for? Ukip is the obvious party and there is now  a real opportunity for it to gain a serious Commons presence. But it is unlikely to form a government in the near future because history shows it takes a great deal to shift voters en masse to a new party and even in the event of Ukip potentially  holding the balance of power in a hung parliament,   if a coalition of Labour and the Tories was formed  UKip  would be left out on a limb.

It is true that May has appointed three leading Breiteers   to posts which will either directly or indirectly impinge on the Brexit negotiations. David Davis (Minister for Brexit) ,  Boris Johnson (Foreign Secretary), and  Liam Fox  (Minister for Trade Deals) to her cabinet .   Davis and Fox are long term Brexiters; Johnson is a Johnny come lately Brexiteer whose steadfastness on the issue is highly questionable.     But whatever they wish to do  these three will  probably be no  more than window dressing.

May has given Johnson a deputy  Alan Duncan who is a remainer and a close associate of May and has been known to refer to Johnson as ‘Silvio Borisconi’ .  Fox cannot agree any trade deals until the UK has left the EU and  David Davis is already at odds with May over her promise that Article 50 will not be activated until the devolved home countries have agreed to the terms of the deal agreed with the EU.

David Davis wants article 50  to be activated by the end of the year  while May has left the date uncertain because of her promise to Scotland, Wales and Norther Ireland to agree what is to be sought from the EU before entering negotiations . This puts her directly at odds with Davis and probably Liam Fox and Johnson. There is also dissention in cabinet over when Article 50 will be activated.

Another sign  of May’s insincerity can be  found in her appointment of  Amber Rudd as home secretary. Immigration is issue which won matters most to the public. It is what won the election for the leave side. Yet May’s Home Secretary is soft on immigration . In addition, Rudd and Boris Johnson have suggested  that there should be no net immigration target since it cannot be met. Unless Brexit permits full sovereign control of our borders it will not be Brexit as the voters understood it.

With all this going against a clean and honest Brexit it is not too difficult to imagine Davis resigning or  being sacked long before the negotiations with the EU are concluded. Fox could follow him out. Johnson is such a slippery individual anything is possible including a Pauline conversion to EU membership.  It is possible that the negotiations could end up in the hands of remainers.

I am against using Article 50 because it allows the EU to control matters and leaves  the UK as an EU member for at least two years after  the Article is activated, but  Davis,   Johnson, and  Fox are all signed up to its use so at present  it seems   unlikely that an alternative  way of leaving  will be used.  However, it is possible that could change once the public realises that for several years the UK would not be able to control EU immigration and that EU directives including new ones have to be followed.  The only thing which can be said for Article 50 is that it in theory means there is no going back. Once activated the UK is irrevocably on the way out. Of course the EU has a record of breaking laws when it suits them it is not out of the question that  a combination of EU power brokers and Europhile MPs could simply cancel the UK activation of Article 50 and leave the UK in the EU.

There are two possible alternative means of leaving the EU .  Clause 62 of  the Vienna Convention on Treaties  might allow a much quicker departure (3 months) on the grounds of a fundamental and unforeseeable change of circumstances  but only if all the member states of the EU agree to it . I suspect that would end  either in denying the UK to depart because on the grounds of such a change of circumstances  or embroiling the UK in some form of long-winded arbitration.

The other option would be for  Parliament to  do what long term campaigner for the UK to leave the EU Lord Stoddart has proposed, namely, repeal of the 1972 European Communities Act  and amendments to start the ball rolling. I would support this  followed by legislation to  both assert the Sovereignty of Parliament (not strictly needed but a belt and braces approach is just as well bearing in mind our Europhile judges) and  give a certain legal status to existing EU inspired UK law which can then be kept, amended or repealed as Parliament decides.

The future is more than ordinarily uncertain but one thing is certain. We  know  May’s  “Brexit means Brexit” is in all probability  a  bouncing political cheque which she cynically issued knowing it would not be honoured.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

After the EU referendum

The battle has been won but not the war

Robert Henderson

The Europhiles threw a great deal at the EU referendum campaign.  There was the shameless   use of government resources especially those of the Treasury to propagandise for the Remain side. The governor of the Bank of England  enthusiastically supported the remain side.  EU panjandrums directed  dire threats  of what the EU would do to  Britain. A gigantic cast of the “great and the good” from finance, trade, industry, the media and politics (drawn from both Britain and abroad ) were daily paraded in front of the public like ancient  oracles forecasting  unalloyed disaster if Britain voted to leave the EU.  Leading Tories in the Remain camp cast aspersions on the character of those supporting Leave –  David Cameron even claimed that voting leave was immoral. Accusations of racism  were routinely levelled  against any leave supporter with a public voice  who addressed  the subject of immigration and the leave voters were labelled as xenophobes, bigots and racists.   Most contemptibly when the Labour MP Jo Cox was murdered   Remain supporters, including  MPs, attempted by implication or direct accusation to link the killing with the Leave side’s position on immigration.  So desperate were  the government  and Remain politicians generally  to ensure a vote to remain  that when the government web site which allowed people to register for a vote crashed two hours before the deadline  for registering,  Parliament did not hesitate to extend the deadline the next day  (by 24 hours not two) in the belief that it would mean many more young voters (who generally favoured remaining in the EU) would vote.

It says much for the strength of character of  the British that they refused to be cowed by this onslaught of propaganda and threats.  The Remain camp started with Project Lie, moved to Project Fear and ended with Project Slander as their accusations of racism became ever more shrill as polling day approached.  None of it worked.  Their  prophecies of doom were so frequent and so overblown that their hysterical warnings  ended up looking like caricatures produced by the Leave  side .  The only thing which stopped the Leave campaign’s momentum was the death of Jo Cox which stopped campaigning for three days just as the polls were consistently  showing increasing support for Leave.  This break in momentum probably cost Leave several percentage points in the final poll as for a few days the polls swung back towards Remain.

There was also a strong tendency for the Remainers  to patronise the leavers by implying or saying directly that only a bigoted blockhead who did not know better could vote to leave.   Nowhere was this mentality  shown  more strongly than over the subject of immigration.  The Remainers’  favoured tactics were simply to ignore the issue or, if forced to address it, to chant the mantras such as  “Immigrants have brought so much to our country” or  “Immigrants do the jobs which Britons won’t do”  or “The shortage of housing, school places and GPs  etc  is not down to immigration but the failure of government to provide the money to build more houses, schools  and GPs etc”.  As immigration was the issue  which troubled voters most  and especially troubled the white working class,  this was madness on the part of the Remain campaign. Clearly nothing has been learnt by the politically correct from Gordon Brown’s abuse of a working class  English pensioner Gillian Duffy  during the 2010  General Election when she complained  about the effects of mass immigration and Brown  was caught describing her as a bigot.

But it was not only the Remainers who wanted to  ignore or explain away the problems mass immigration brings. Many on the Leave side were just as squeamish when it came to immigration.  If it had not been for Nigel Farage having the courage to keep banging the immigration drum in all probability the referendum would have been lost.  The question of regaining sovereignty was a very strong and positive message, but on its own it is doubtful if it would have gained sufficient traction to lead to a win. What made it really  potent was when it was allied to controlling our own borders and stemming immigration.   The least politically sophisticated person could readily understand the message.

The battle but not the war is won

Gratifying as the referendum result is,  it was only  the first battle in the war to recover Britain’s sovereignty.

As things stand we are still subject to EU law until either we leave without an  agreement with the EU or fight our way through the provisions of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, something which would almost certainly take two years from its activation and which could be extended indefinitely in principle with the agreement of the European Parliament.  It is even conceivable that new members could be enrolled before Britain’s departure who would then have a say in what the terms for Britain would be. That is just one of the drawbacks to using Article 50. There are others which mean that  Article 50 is a poisoned chalice and should be avoided.   Let me quote it in full as it is short:

  1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.
  2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.
  3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.
  4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it.

A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

  1. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.

Before I get to the practical difficulties of using Article 50 let me stamp on an idea floating within the disgruntled Europhile camp  that Britain could remain in the EU if no agreement was reached on the terms of leaving. This is not so.  Paragraph 3 of the Article runs” The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.”  If there is no agreement and no extension of the negotiating time, Britain would simply leave and EU laws would cease to have effect.

The   drawbacks to using Article 50 are extensive.  To begin with it allows the EU to set the agenda and the pace of the negotiations. Until an agreement is reached or the leaving state simply leaves after two years of fruitless negotiation, Britain would  remain subject to   EU law. This  would mean, amongst other things, that Britain would have to continue to pay the £8  billion odd   to the EU that  they keep and the £6 bn odd  which the EU takes from us and then returns it to Britain with instructions  on how it is to be spent, Britain could not negotiate any treaties with countries outside of the EU and  British businesses would have to continue to implement EU imposed standards in areas such  as the  workplace  for example, the   hours worked. It would logically also mean that Britain was subject to any new EU laws passed during the negotiating period, for example, the EU might push through a transaction tax which would be utterly against Britain’s wishes.  Most importantly Britain would have to continue accept  migrants from the rest of the EU and probably other territories which  have free movement with the EU such as Norway or Switzerland .  Moreover,  the idea that Britain  would be leaving the EU  after two years  could provoke a massive upsurge in EU migration to these shores.

Europhile MPs

The other problem is the nature of Britain’s MPs. Most are Europhiles, as are a majority of the House of Lords. In principle the result of the referendum could be ignored – it is merely advisory not legally binding – by the Europhile majority in Parliament. That should  be politically impossible but there would be ample opportunity for the Europhiles to subvert the wishes of the British public more stealthily  by extending the length of time for  negotiation or by making agreements with the EU which would  stitch Britain back into the EU, for example, making immigration from the EU very easy.

If an agreement  which firmly attaches Britain to the EU once again is concluded one of two things could happen: either Parliament could accept in on a vote or a further referendum be held on the terms of the agreement with all the bullying associated with the EU when the public of a member makes the “wrong” choice the first time around.  The first would be overtly undemocratic and the second covertly undemocratic.

An alternative to an agreement between British politicians and EU politicians would be for  a major  party to campaign at a general election  for Britain to  withdraw from the leaving process and by doing so to remain in the EU. Whether  such a cancellation of Britain’s withdrawal would be legal is debatable, especially if Article 50 is activated because there is no procedure in the Article  for cancelling the article’s activation.  However, legal or not, the rest of the EU might be willing to accept the cancellation because this is really  about politics not law.

None of this is fanciful because there have already been suggestions from MPs, the most prominent being David Lammy of Labour , an ex-cabinet minister, has suggested that the Commons refuse to accept the result of the referendum   and Tim Farron, the leader of the LibDems has committed his party to standing on a platform to get Britain back into the EU.  There is also a petition on the government web site which is already in the millions demanding that the referendum result be deemed invalid (there is some doubt over the authenticity of large numbers of the signatures).

The next general election.

The question of when the next General Election is to be held looms over the post-referendum political world.    It could be soon, although because of the Fixed Term Parliaments Act two thirds of the House of Commons would have to pass a motion permitting an election less than five years after the last General Election. As this Tory government has a working  majority of only sixteen such a motion would need  to be supported by Labour. Whether that would suit Labour at present is extremely  dubious because the present chaos within the Party would almost certainly lose them many seats. But the other parties, including the Tories,  would probably  have many MPs against an early general election because there is a good chance that they could be punished by the voters either because they were for or against being  a member in the EU.  There are also many MPs with small majorities who would not welcome an election  because an MP with a small majority is always vulnerable to defeat. With nearly 4 years of this Parliament to run such MPs might well vote against an early election.  More generally, having run a general election campaign little more than a year ago parties may be short of money to run another.

If  there was sufficient support for an early election there would be  a halfway plausible  reason for having one. As  Cameron has resigned and a new Tory PM  is to be appointed by the Autumn,   a new election could represented as giving the new Tory regime electoral legitimacy.   But   it would be a rather weak argument because there is no  recent precedent for  governments calling a general election when prime ministers  are changed during the course of a Parliament. It did not happen when Gordon Brown took over from Blair, Major  succeeded  Thatcher  or when  Callaghan replaced Wilson. It would also be wholly exceptional for a general election to be called  so early in a Parliament (this one runs until 2020) for the purpose of validating a new PM.   Alternatively, a new General Election might be called because if defections, resignations or death   robbed the   Tory Party of a majority at some time in this Parliament..

But if an early election is not  called it is not inconceivable that the negotiation period could stretch deep into this Parliament or even past the 2020 date prescribed by the Fixed Term Parliaments  Act.  Implausible? Well, the first two years are almost certainly  accounted for if Article 50 is activated and it would not be that difficult to envisage Europhile British politicians colluding with EU politicians to string the matter out in the hope that time would change the political atmosphere in Britain sufficiently  to allow another referendum on whether Britain should leave the EU to be held and won by the Europhile side.

Other possibilities  would be  the election of a government comprised of one or more parties which  stood on a platform of  accepting  a  draft agreement  on offer from the EU  which would effectively  re-make Britain a member of the EU or of Britain withdrawing its application to leave  or  Britain re-applying to join the EU after leaving  it.

Because parties would have campaigned at an election for such policies any of these options could be implemented without a referendum.

What should happen?

Britain should not activate Article 50. Instead the  1972 Communities Act (the Act which gave legal force to  Britain’s membership of what became the EU)  should be repealed .  That would make the British Parliament sovereign again. Just to make sure there is no legal confusion  it would probably be advisable to enact a British sovereignty act to ensure that British judges cannot attempt to subvert Parliament’s intentions.  If  the Europhile majority in Commons refused to do this there would be a most serious constitutional crisis, the sort of crisis over which civil wars  are fought.  I doubt whether the Commons would risk that.  At  best such behaviour might well fracture parties and would sour the relationship between the electors and politicians for a long time.

The House of Lords is more problematical. They could  delay any legislation for around two years before the Parliament Act could  be used to force the legislation through. That would be a very dangerous path to go down for the Lords because it would probably result in their abolition. However, many peers might consider that a price worth paying and quite a few  both inside and outside of the Lords might see it as a solution to the anomaly of an unelected chamber  within the British political system.

Having repealed the 1972 Act and put any other necessary legislation  on the Statute Book, Britain would then be in the position of any other country outside the EU. They would negotiate with the EU on an equal basis without the EU controlling the agenda.  If the EU refuses to play ball Britain should simply trade under the WTO rules and conclude trade treaties as and when they are available and  advantageous to Britain.   Would the EU be obstructive?  I doubt it because  (1)  they have a massive trade surplus with the  Britain, (2) Britain is a partner in many  a pan-Europe enterprise ( for example, Airbus,  the European Space Agency) ,  (3) Britain is a very useful partner to have on the world stage because of her senior position in many international  bodies  (permanent member of the security council,  important member of the IMF, World Bank, Nato, G7, G20), (4) there are many  more  people from the other EU states in Britain  than there are Britons in the other EU countries and (5) the Republic of Ireland would be ruined if any serious protectionist measures aimed at Britain were enacted by the EU.  Most WTO tariffs  are low but where they are more substantial such as those attached to cars (around 10%) the odds are that the EU would rapidly make adjustments to those WTO tariffs  because they export so many cars to the UK.  The idea that nothing can be done quickly in terms of deciding the level of tariffs or their absence is obvious nonsense if  both sides want an agreement.

Britain’s negotiators, whether politicians or public servants, must be willing to play hardball. What is all too often not mentioned when tariffs being imposed by the EU  are discussed is that  Britain can impose reciprocal tariffs which would (1) bring in substantial amounts of tax and (2)  result in more British production going to the domestic British market.  The argument that Britain’s export  trade to the EU represent s  a much larger part of the British GDP than the other  EU states’ exports to the UK and consequently the EU would  not be damaged as much as the UK through a tariff war  does not hold water . This is because British exports to the EU are not spread uniformly throughout  the EU or  throughout individual members states’ economies.  Hence, the impact of  putting up barriers  to British exports would be very damaging to particular industries and areas  of EU member states. Think of the blow it would send to the German motor industry.

The repealing of the 1972 Act and what flows from it would have the great advantage of simplicity and above all speed.  Delay is the enemy of   those who want the wishes of the British people as expressed in the referendum to be honoured and the servant of those who wish to prevent Britain truly leaving the EU.  The longer the delay the more opportunity for fudge  and manipulation  by those with power.   Do not be misled by  politicians like Boris Johnson who led the Leave campaign and who will almost certainly  be at or near  the head of the government . Their embracing of the  Leave campaign  does not mean they will deal honestly with the British who voted to leave because they thought  that Britain would become truly sovereign again and above all be able  to control immigration.

Already there have been  British politicians who supported leaving the EU  who are saying that immigration will not be massively changed. For example,  Daniel Hannon a Conservative MEP and prominent Leave campaigner   told presenter Evan Davis on the BBC’s Newsnight programme: “Frankly, if people watching think that they have voted and there is now going to be zero immigration from the EU, they are going to be disappointed.” and admitted that  the price for remaining in a common market with the EU would be free movement of labour.  Boris Johnson himself has written a piece in the Telegraph saying that access to the single market would be available to the  UK after Brexit. That implies he would accept free movement of Labour for it is doubtful that EU would grant free access without mobility of Labour.

It is also noteworthy that the  line on immigration most pushed by Leave campaigners during the referendum campaign was not that immigration would be reduced dramatically  per se, but that an Australian-style points system would be introduced. If such a system was used  without a cap on numbers coming each year,   immigration could soar. Imagine that 100,000 foreign  nurses  a year meet the criteria for nurses in the UK  and want to come to Britain,  a points-system without restrictions on numbers would potentially allow all  100,000 to come in.

One thing is certain amongst the current political upheaval in Britain, the Europhiles (who can come in Eurosceptic clothing)  will not lie down and accept the verdict of the referendum.  Those who want Britain to be an a sovereign state again must be ever vigilant as to what is being done by politicians both  here in Britain and abroad. There is a real danger of the Leave victory being stolen from us.

 

Film review – Brexit: the movie

Director  and narrator Martin Durkin

Running time 71 minutes

As an instrument   to rally the leave vote  Brexit: the movie is severely flawed .  It starts promisingly by stressing the loss of sovereignty , the lack of democracy in the EU and the corrupt greed of its servants (my favourite abuse was a shopping mall for EU politicians and bureaucrats only – eat your heart out Soviet Union) and the ways in which  Brussels spends British taxpayers money and sabotages industries such as fishing.  Then  it all begins to go sour.

The film’s audience should have been the British electorate  as a whole.  That means making a film which appeals to all who might vote to leave using arguments which are not nakedly  politically  ideological. Sadly, that is precisely what has happened here because Brexit the movie  has as  a  director and narrator Martin Durkin, a card carrying disciple of the neo-liberal creed. Here are a couple of snatches from his website:

Capitalism is the free exchange of services voluntarily rendered and received. It is a relationship between people, characterized by freedom. Adding ‘global’ merely indicates that governments have been less than successful at hindering the free exchange of people’s services across national boundaries.

And

Well it’s time to think the unthinkable again, and to privatise the biggest State monopoly of all … the monopoly which is so ubiquitous it usually goes unnoticed, but which has impoverished us more than any other and is the cause of the current world banking and financial crisis.  It is time to privatise money.

Unsurprisingly Durkin has filled the film with people who with varying degrees of fervour share his ideological beliefs. These include John Redwood,  James Delingpole, Janet Daley, Matt Ridley, Mark Littlewood,  Daniel Hannon, Patrick Minford, Melanie Phillips Simon Heffer, Michael Howard, Douglas Carswell  all supporting the leave side but doing so in a way which would alienate those who have not bought into the free market free trade ideology. The only people interviewed in the film who were from the left of the political spectrum are Labour’s biggest donor John Wells and Labour MPs  Kate Hoey and Steve Baker.

There is also a hefty segment of the film  (20.50 minutes – 30 minutes)  devoted to a risibly false  description of Britain’s economic history from the beginnings of the industrial revolution to the  position of Britain in the 1970s.  In it Durkin claims that the nineteenth century was a time of a unregulated British economy, both domestically and  with regard to international trade, which allowed Britain to grow and flourish wondrously .  In fact, the first century and half or so of the Industrial Revolution  up to around 1860 was conducted under what was known as the Old Colonial System,  which was a very  wide-ranging form of protectionism. In addition, the nineteenth century saw the introduction of many Acts which regulated the employment of children and the conditions of work for employees in general and  for much of the century  the century  magistrates had much wider powers than they do today such as setting the price of basic foodstuffs and wages and enforcing apprenticeships.

Durkin then goes on to praise Britain’s continued economic expansion up until the Great War which he ascribes to Britain’s rejection of protectionism. The problem with this is that   Britain’s adherence to the nearest any country have ever go to free trade – the situation  is complicated by Britain’s huge Empire –  between 1860 and 1914 is a period of comparative industrial decline  with highly protectionist countries such as the USA and Germany making massive advances.

Durkin then paints a picture of a Britain regulated half to death in the Great War, regulation which often  continued into the peacetime inter-war years before a further dose of war in 1939  brought with it even more state control. The period of 1945 to the coming of Thatcher is then represented as a time of a British economy over-regulated and protected economy falling headlong  into an abyss of uncompetitive economic failure before  Thatcher rescued the country.

The reality is that Britain came out of the Great Depression faster than any other large economy aided by a mixture of removal from the Gold Bullion Standard, Keynsian pump priming and re-armament, all of these being state measures.  As for the period 1945 until the oil shock of 1973,   British economic growth was higher than it has been  overall in the forty years  since.

The legacy of Thatcher  is problematic.  Revered by true believers in  the neo-liberal  credom she is hated by  more for the re are still millions in the country who detest what she stood for and  for whom people spouting the same kind of rhetoric she used in support of Brexit  is  a complete turn off. To them can be  added  many others who instinctively feel that globalisation is wrong and threatening and talk of economics in which human beings are treated as pawns deeply repulsive. .

Even if the film had given a truthful account of Britain’s economic history over the past few centuries  there would have been a problem. Having speaker after speaker putting forward the laissez faire  position, saying that Britain would be so much more prosperous if they could trade more with the rest of the world by  having much less regulation, being open to unrestricted foreign investment   and, most devastatingly,  that it  would allow people to be recruited from around the world rather than just the EU or EEA (with the implication that it is racist to privilege Europeans over people from Africa and Asia) is not  the way  to win people to the leave side.

There is also a  truly  astonishing  omission in the film. At the most modest assessment immigration is one of the major concerns of  British electors  (and probably the greatest concern  when the fear of being called a racist if one opposes immigration is factored in), yet the film avoids the subject. There is a point  towards the end of the film (go in at  61 minutes) when it briefly  looks as though it might be raised when the commentary poses the question “Ah, what if the  EU proposes a trade deal which forces upon us open borders and other stuff  we don’t like?   But that leads to no discussion  about immigration but merely the  statement of  the pedantically  true claim that Britain  does not have to sign a treaty if its terms are not acceptable. This of course begs the question of who will decide what is acceptable. There a has been no suggestion that there are any lines in  the sand which will not be crossed in negotiations with the EU and there is no promise of a second referendum after terms have been negotiated with the EU or indeed any other part of the world. Consequently,   electors can have no confidence those who conduct  negotiations will not give away vital things such as control of our borders.

As immigration is such a core part of  what  British voters worry about most ,both in the EU context and immigration generally,  it is difficult to come up with a an explanation for this startling omission  which  is not pejorative. It can only have been done for one of two reasons:  either the maker of the film  did not want the issue addressed or many of those appearing in the film  would  not have appeared if the  immigration drum had been beaten.  In view of both Durkin’s ideological position and the general tenor of the film,  the most plausible reason is that Durkin did not want the subject discussed because the idea of free movement of labour is a central part of the neo-liberal  ideology. He will see labour as simply a factor of production along with land and capital. He even managed to include interviews conducted in Switzerland (go in at 52 minutes )which  painted the country as a land of milk and honey without  mentioning anything about the fact that the Swiss had a citizen initiated referendum on restricting immigration earlier in the year.

The point at issue is not whether neo-liberalism is a good or a bad thing,  but the fact that an argument for leaving the EU which is primarily based on the ideology is bound to alienate many who do not think kindly of the EU, but who do not share the neo-liberal’s enthusiasm for an  unregulated or under-regulated  economy   and  a commitment to globalism, which frequently means  jobs are either off-shored or taken by immigrants who undercut wages and place a great strain on public services and in practice results in mass immigration , which apart from competition for jobs, houses  and services,   fundamentally alters the  nature of the areas of  Britain in  which  immigrants settle and,  in the longer term, the  nature of Britain itself .

The excessive  concentration on economic matters is itself a major flaw because  most of the electorate  will  variously not be able to understand , be bored by the detail  and turn off or  simply disregard the claims made as being  by their  nature  unknowable in reality. The difficulty of incomprehension and boredom is  compounded by there being  far  too many talking heads, often  speaking for a matter of seconds at a time.  I also found the use of Monty Python-style graphics irritating shallow and  a sequence lampooning European workers compared with the Chinese downright silly (go in at  37 minutes).

What the film should have done was rest  the arguments for leaving on the question of  sovereignty.  That is what this vote is all about: do you want Britain to be a sovereign nation ? Everything flows from the question of sovereignty : can we control our borders?; can we make our own laws?  Once sovereignty is seen as the only real question, then what we may or may not do after regaining our sovereignty is in our hands. If the British people wish to have a  more regulated market they can vote for it. If they want a neo-liberal economy they can vote for it. The point is that at present we cannot vote for either . As I mentioned in my introduction the sovereignty issue is raised many times in the film.  The problem is that it was so often  tied into the idea of free trade and unregulated markets that the sovereignty message raises the question in many minds of what will those with power – who overwhelmingly have bought into globalism and neo-liberal economics –  do with sovereignty rather than the value of sovereignty itself.

Will the film help the leave cause? I think it is the toss of a coin whether it will persuade more people to vote leave than or alienate more with  its neo-liberal message.

 

 

Article 50 is a poisoned chalice – Don’t drink from it

Robert Henderson

Those who think that British Europhile politicians   will  play fair if Britain votes to leave the EU in June will be horribly disappointed. The public may think that if the British people have voted to leave the EU and that is an end of it regardless of the wishes of the Government.   Sadly, there is every reason to expect that Brexit will be anything but a clean break from the EU.

To begin with there has been no commitment by Cameron to stand down as PM if the vote goes against him.  Quite the opposite for he  has publicly stated several  times that  he will stay on and many  Tory MPs, including some of those in favour of leaving like Chris Grayling ,  have said that he must remain in No 10 whatever the outcome of the referendum .

If Cameron stay on as PM after a vote to leave Britain would be in the absurd position of having a man in charge of  Britain’s withdrawal who has shown his all too eager  commitment to the EU by the feebleness of   the demands he made during  his “renegotiation” and his regularly repeated statement before the conclusion of the “renegotiation”  that he was sure he would get new terms which would allow him to campaign for Britain to remain within the EU.   

A post-referendum   Cameron  government entrusted with negotiating Britain’s departure from the EU would mean that not only the  PM  but  the majority of his  cabinet and ministers below  cabinet  level  will  be  drawn from the same pro-EU personnel as he has today.  In those circumstances Cameron and his fellow Europhiles would almost certainly try to stitch Britain back into the EU with a deal such as that granted to  Norway and Switzerland. If that happened Britain could end up with the most important issue in the British  public’s mind –  free movement  of not only labour but free movement of anyone with the right to permanent residence in the EU – untouched .

But if Cameron leaves  of his own accord soon after a vote to leave Britain could still end up with a Europhile  Prime Minister and Cabinet.  Why? By  far the most likely person to succeed him  is Boris Johnson. If he  does become  PM there is every reason to believe that he will also do his level best to enmesh Britain back into  the EU.  Ever since Johnson  became the Telegraph’s  Brussels correspondent in the 1990s he has been deriding the EU, but until coming out as a supporter of voting to leave in the past week he has never advocated Britain’s withdrawal.  Johnson also gave a very strong hint  in the  Daily Telegraph article in which he announced his support for leaving the EU that his support for Britain leaving the EU was no more than  a ploy to persuade the EU to offer  more significant concessions than those offered to Cameron. Johnson has also been a regular advocate of the value of immigration.

The scenario of Cameron or Johnson deliberately subverting the intention of a referendum vote  to leave are all too plausible. There has been no public discussion let alone  agreement by leading  politicians over what the British government may or may not negotiate in the event of a vote to leave.   Nor has there been any suggestion by any British politician or party  that whatever the terms offered by the EU the British public will have the right to vote on them in a referendum.  Britain could be left  with  an agreement decided by the British Government and the EU which might do nothing of what  the British public most wants and  has voted for, namely, the return of sovereignty and  the control of Britain’s borders.

Then  there is Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty.  Both Cameron and Johnson are committed to doing so within the terms of the Lisbon Treaty of  2009.  Far from a vote to leave in the referendum putting Britain in the position of a  sovereign nation engaging in a negotiation for a treaty with the EU  it traps  Britain into an extended period of negotiation whose outcome is dependent on the agreement or non-agreement of  the 27 other EU member states and the  EU Parliament.  Let me quote  the Article in  full:

Article 50

  1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.
  2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.
  3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.
  4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it.

A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

  1. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49. (

Article 50  means that Britain could spend two years negotiating and get no treaty because the Council of Ministers could veto it through Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) or the European Parliament reject it. Britain would then have the option of either asking for an extension (which could be indefinite because there is no limit mentioned in the Article) or leaving without a treaty.  There is also the further complication that if a treaty was agreed by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament it would still have to be agreed by 27 EU member states,  either through Parliamentary vote or  in the case of a few including France, a referendum.  Moreover,  even if a treaty is agreed and accepted by all EU member states, this would leave  Britain up in the air for what could be a considerable time as each of the 27 members goes through the process of getting  the agreement of their Parliament or electorate.

The OUT camp must make it clear that  it would be both damaging and unnecessary for the UK to abide by this Treaty requirement. It  would allow the EU to inflict considerable damage on the UK both during the period prior to formally  leaving and afterwards if  the price of leaving with the EU’s agreement was  for  UK to sign up to various obligations, for example, to continue paying a large annual sum to the EU for ten years . It would also give  the Europhile UK political elite  ample opportunity to keep the UK attached to the EU in the manner that Norway and Switzerland are attached by arguing that it is the best deal Britain  can get.  If there was no second  referendum on the  terms  negotiated for Britain leaving the government of the day could simply pass the matter into law without the British voters having a say.

The Gordian knot of Article 50 can be cut simply repealing the European Communities Act and asserting the sovereignty of Parliament.   No major UK party could  object to this on principle because all three have, at one time or another,  declared that Parliament remains supreme and can repudiate anything the EU does if it so chooses.

If the stay-in camp argue that would be illegal because of the  treaty obligation, the OUT camp should simply emphasise  (1) that international law is no law because there is never any means of enforcing it within its jurisdiction is a state rejects it and (2) that treaties which do not allow for contracting parties to simply withdraw are profoundly undemocratic because they bind future governments. There is also the fact that the EU and its predecessor the EEC has constantly breached its own rules, spectacularly so in the case of the Eurozone.  Hence, for the EU treaties are anything but sacrosanct.

Book review – Displacement

The story of  a man resigned to being a victim because he does not realise he is a victim

Author Derek Turner

Obtainable from  Amazon

Review by Robert Henderson

In his last work Sea Changes Derek Turner offered a large canvas on which he painted both the predicament of the illegal  immigrant and a Britain afflicted with a paralysing political correctness with which traps both the British elite and the ignored and secretly despised  working-class into an ideological web far removed from reality.    With  Displacement, a novella rather than a novel,  we have a more intimate work which illustrates through Martin Hacket  a dismal deracinated England which has left the English with no sense of  national feeling or any sense of having a land they could call their own. It has even robbed them of any sense that their predicament is in some way wrong or even just plain odd .

Displacement is set in South London. Martin is young , blond and  a member of  the white working class, an endangered species in his London.  Like the rest of his class Martin has been robbed not only of his sense of historical and territorial  place  but  materially deprived. He  has a job as  courier on a bike and, because he knows no better,  he thinks himself lucky to have the menial job  because  such jobs normally go to graduates.

The world Martin inhabits is unreservedly  tawdry. Everything  that once gave the white working class a sense of belonging, worth and respect has been removed by the massive  postwar immigration. A  surreptitious colonisation of Britain has occurred. His family is one of the few white English faces left in the road in which he lives.  Their  few white English neighbours  are not of his class, merely  the advance guard of a possible gentrification.   Martin wishfully thinks of a life in the suburbs.  He used to dream of somehow finding the money to move there when he  had a girlfriend Kate,   but  allowed that dream to die after they broke up because he  knows  he could never  afford any sort of  property.

Martin  lives with his father and elder brother Mike.  His father is a vessel  adrift from its anchor. He worked on ships as a deckhand until the company  which employed him  went belly up. Since then he has been unemployed.  But it is not just his work which has gone. A natural Labour voter he no longer has a meaningful Labour Party to vote for or a union to which he can belong .   Mike is a drug addict and minor criminal.

Martin’s  release from the  dreariness of  a  London in which  the native English have been reduced to just one ethnic group is twofold. The first means of escape is  free running.  This frees him from the clutching mediocrity of his social and physical world, giving him not just a physical release but a sense that he is above the fray the society in which he  lives.  His second release is through  poetry which he both reads and writes.   Martin  is not academically inclined and never got much out of school, but he has  a desire to express himself  and free verse  can be like free running,  something which is not constricting,  something he can bend to his will rather than being bent by circumstances.

Against all the odds Martin becomes a sort of celebrity, or  at least he has his fifteen minutes of fame.  Whilst free running  Martin is seen by  people in the buildings he scales.  This causes alarm amongst some, because he  runs in a  white hoody which with his blondness  gives  him a ghost-like appearance.  Martin  is also seen on a building housing a senior politician, something  which attracts the notice of the police who fear he is a security risk. The media takes up the story without knowing who  is  the   person  responsible.  Martin’s ex-girlfriend  guesses that he is responsible .  She is excited by Martin’s sudden if so far anonymous celebrity, reconnects with him and  arranges for a public school educated journalist by the name of Seb to interview Martin about his free running.

Seb visits Martin and his family  in the spirit of  an anthropologist visiting  a tribe of hunter gatherers.   Except for Kate , whom he tries unsuccessfully to seduce , Seb  does not have any real interest in Martin and his family and friends; they are  merely props for an article which will validate his ideas about the white working-class, an out of date , redundant species, Morlocks robbed of their purpose,  with  Martin cast as the ugly duckling who is changed into a swan by his free running exploits, something celebrated in prose of excruciating pretension  such as ’From  his concrete eyrie he can discern the essential unity of humanity’.

The article is deeply offensive but  Seb diffuses the anger  of Martin and his friends and family  by introducing Martin to a publisher of poetry .  What Martin does not appreciate is that this is an act of heavy patronage, a re-enactment of that extended to working-class authors in the quarter century after the Second World War, which is a continuation of the offensive patronising  tone of Seb’s newspaper article.

The real  tragedy is not the mean circumstances in which Martin  finds himself, but the fact that he accepts his lot without questioning : he does not ask  why he  cannot set up home in decent circumstances because housing is beyond expensive; why he cannot get the sort of job his father’s generation could get,  manual most probably but paying well enough for a man to raise a family; why his father has been reduced to idleness through no fault of his own. Most   importantly he does not question how it is that where he lives is almost entirely  dominated by people who are not like him when only  a few decades before the place he lived in had been solidly white working class.

Martin is a man resigned to being a victim because he does not realise he is a victim. He  sees the mediocrity of the world he lives in but accepts it as just how things are. He does not even have what Winston Smith in 1984 had,  vague  memories  of what  was before the  dismal world  in which he lived.  Winston however ineptly had an urge to challenge the status quo; Martin has  no urge to change things  only to find a way to escape the grind of his daily existence with poetry and free running, which both gives him a focus on something  untainted by the rest of his life and literally lifts him above it.  Yet even that consolations will be fleeting enough because free running is for the  young.  It will not be too many years before Martin is too old to find his freedom there.