Category Archives: Culture

Article 50 is a poisoned chalice – Don’t drink from it

Robert Henderson

Those who think that British Europhile politicians   will  play fair if Britain votes to leave the EU in June will be horribly disappointed. The public may think that if the British people have voted to leave the EU and that is an end of it regardless of the wishes of the Government.   Sadly, there is every reason to expect that Brexit will be anything but a clean break from the EU.

To begin with there has been no commitment by Cameron to stand down as PM if the vote goes against him.  Quite the opposite for he  has publicly stated several  times that  he will stay on and many  Tory MPs, including some of those in favour of leaving like Chris Grayling ,  have said that he must remain in No 10 whatever the outcome of the referendum .

If Cameron stay on as PM after a vote to leave Britain would be in the absurd position of having a man in charge of  Britain’s withdrawal who has shown his all too eager  commitment to the EU by the feebleness of   the demands he made during  his “renegotiation” and his regularly repeated statement before the conclusion of the “renegotiation”  that he was sure he would get new terms which would allow him to campaign for Britain to remain within the EU.   

A post-referendum   Cameron  government entrusted with negotiating Britain’s departure from the EU would mean that not only the  PM  but  the majority of his  cabinet and ministers below  cabinet  level  will  be  drawn from the same pro-EU personnel as he has today.  In those circumstances Cameron and his fellow Europhiles would almost certainly try to stitch Britain back into the EU with a deal such as that granted to  Norway and Switzerland. If that happened Britain could end up with the most important issue in the British  public’s mind –  free movement  of not only labour but free movement of anyone with the right to permanent residence in the EU – untouched .

But if Cameron leaves  of his own accord soon after a vote to leave Britain could still end up with a Europhile  Prime Minister and Cabinet.  Why? By  far the most likely person to succeed him  is Boris Johnson. If he  does become  PM there is every reason to believe that he will also do his level best to enmesh Britain back into  the EU.  Ever since Johnson  became the Telegraph’s  Brussels correspondent in the 1990s he has been deriding the EU, but until coming out as a supporter of voting to leave in the past week he has never advocated Britain’s withdrawal.  Johnson also gave a very strong hint  in the  Daily Telegraph article in which he announced his support for leaving the EU that his support for Britain leaving the EU was no more than  a ploy to persuade the EU to offer  more significant concessions than those offered to Cameron. Johnson has also been a regular advocate of the value of immigration.

The scenario of Cameron or Johnson deliberately subverting the intention of a referendum vote  to leave are all too plausible. There has been no public discussion let alone  agreement by leading  politicians over what the British government may or may not negotiate in the event of a vote to leave.   Nor has there been any suggestion by any British politician or party  that whatever the terms offered by the EU the British public will have the right to vote on them in a referendum.  Britain could be left  with  an agreement decided by the British Government and the EU which might do nothing of what  the British public most wants and  has voted for, namely, the return of sovereignty and  the control of Britain’s borders.

Then  there is Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty.  Both Cameron and Johnson are committed to doing so within the terms of the Lisbon Treaty of  2009.  Far from a vote to leave in the referendum putting Britain in the position of a  sovereign nation engaging in a negotiation for a treaty with the EU  it traps  Britain into an extended period of negotiation whose outcome is dependent on the agreement or non-agreement of  the 27 other EU member states and the  EU Parliament.  Let me quote  the Article in  full:

Article 50

  1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.
  2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.
  3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.
  4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it.

A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

  1. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49. (

Article 50  means that Britain could spend two years negotiating and get no treaty because the Council of Ministers could veto it through Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) or the European Parliament reject it. Britain would then have the option of either asking for an extension (which could be indefinite because there is no limit mentioned in the Article) or leaving without a treaty.  There is also the further complication that if a treaty was agreed by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament it would still have to be agreed by 27 EU member states,  either through Parliamentary vote or  in the case of a few including France, a referendum.  Moreover,  even if a treaty is agreed and accepted by all EU member states, this would leave  Britain up in the air for what could be a considerable time as each of the 27 members goes through the process of getting  the agreement of their Parliament or electorate.

The OUT camp must make it clear that  it would be both damaging and unnecessary for the UK to abide by this Treaty requirement. It  would allow the EU to inflict considerable damage on the UK both during the period prior to formally  leaving and afterwards if  the price of leaving with the EU’s agreement was  for  UK to sign up to various obligations, for example, to continue paying a large annual sum to the EU for ten years . It would also give  the Europhile UK political elite  ample opportunity to keep the UK attached to the EU in the manner that Norway and Switzerland are attached by arguing that it is the best deal Britain  can get.  If there was no second  referendum on the  terms  negotiated for Britain leaving the government of the day could simply pass the matter into law without the British voters having a say.

The Gordian knot of Article 50 can be cut simply repealing the European Communities Act and asserting the sovereignty of Parliament.   No major UK party could  object to this on principle because all three have, at one time or another,  declared that Parliament remains supreme and can repudiate anything the EU does if it so chooses.

If the stay-in camp argue that would be illegal because of the  treaty obligation, the OUT camp should simply emphasise  (1) that international law is no law because there is never any means of enforcing it within its jurisdiction is a state rejects it and (2) that treaties which do not allow for contracting parties to simply withdraw are profoundly undemocratic because they bind future governments. There is also the fact that the EU and its predecessor the EEC has constantly breached its own rules, spectacularly so in the case of the Eurozone.  Hence, for the EU treaties are anything but sacrosanct.

 How England became the mother of modern politics

Robert Henderson

I was tempted to entitle this essay “England – the mother of modern democracy”, for the political structures of any  state which calls itself democratic today owe their general  shape to the English example. In addition, many modern dictatorships have considered it expedient to maintain the  form of representative democracy without the content.

But democracy is a slippery word and what we call by that  name is very far removed from what the Greeks knew as  democracy. The Greeks would probably have described our system as oligarchy – rule by the few. Many modern academics   would agree, for they tend to describe representative  government as elective oligarchy, a system by which the  electorate is permitted to select between competing parts of the political elite every few years, but which has little other direct say in how they are governed.

If democracy today is a debatable concept, the very  widespread modern institution of elected representative government is an objective fact. It is the foundations and evolution of this institution that I shall examine here to the point at which modern “democratic” politics emerged  during the English Civil Wars of the 1640s.

Elected representative government is an institution of the first importance, for it is a truism that the more power is shared the less abusive the holders of the power will be.  Imperfect as it may often be as a reflector of the will and interests of the masses, representative government is still by far the most efficient means of controlling the naturally abusive tendencies of elites and of advancing the interests of the ordinary man or woman, by imposing limits on what those with power may do, either through legal restraints in the form of constitutional law which is superior to that of the legislature, or through fear of losing office in an election. Indeed, no other system of government other than elected representative government manages that even in principle, for no other political arrangements place meaningful restraints on an elite. Whether democratic or not in the Greek sense, representative government is undoubtedly the only reliable and non-violent means by which the democratic will may gain at least some purchase on the behaviour of an elite.

Yet however much utility it has an organising political idea, the fact that we have representative government today  is something of a fluke, certainly a very long shot, for had it not developed in England we should probably not have it all. In the non-European world nothing of its nature ever developed before the Western model was imported. Elsewhere in Europe the many nascent parliaments of the later Middle Ages either never went beyond its embryonic form or were crushed by autocratic rulers. In England we have had continuous parliamentary development for the better part of eight centuries.

Why did the English alone developed such a political system? It was a mixture of such traits and circumstances  as the democratic spirit, egalitarianism, individualism and  royal weakness. But before examining the detail of those traits, consider first the utterly abnormal political success of the English.

The political success of the English

The first genius of the Anglo-Saxon may be reasonably said to be political. Above all peoples they have learned best to live without communal violence and tyranny. Set against any other country the political success of the English throughout history is simply astonishing. Compare England’s political history with that of any other country of any size and it is a miracle of restraint. No English government has been altered by unconstitutional means since 1688. No Englishman has killed an English politician for  domestic English political reasons since the  assassination of Spencer Percival in 1811, and that was an assassination born of a personal grudge, probably aggravated by mental illness, rather than political principle. (The assassin, John Bellingham, believed he had been unreasonably deserted by the British Government when imprisoned in Russia  and ruined by the economic circumstances of the war with  Napoleon. He killed Percival after unsuccessfully attempting  for a long time to get financial redress from the British Government).

Compare that with the experience of the other major states of the world. In the twentieth century Germany fell prey to  Nazism, Italy to Fascism, Russia to Communism. France, is on its fifth republic in a couple of centuries. The United States fought a dreadful civil war in the 1860s and assassinated a president as recently as 1963. China remains the cruel tyranny as it has always been and India, which advertises itself as the “largest democracy in the world”,  is home to regular outbreaks of serious ethnic violence, not least during elections which are palpably fraudulent in many parts of the country, especially the rural areas.

Why was England so different?

Why is England so different? Perhaps the immediate answer lies in the fact that she has been wonderfully adept in dealing with the central problem of human life – how to live together peaceably. A Canadian academic, Elliott Leyton, has made a study of English murder through the centuries in his book Men of Blood. Leyton finds that the rate of English (as opposed to British murder) is phenomenally low for a country of her size and industrial development, both now and for centuries past. This strikes Elliott as so singular that he said in a recent  interview “The English have an antipathy to murder which borders on eccentricity; it is one of the great cultural oddities of the modern age.” (Sunday Telegraph 4 12 1994).

This restraint extends to warfare and social disorder. That is not to say England has been without violence, but rather that at any point in her history the level of violence was substantially lower than in any other comparable society. For example, the English Civil War in the 17th Century was,  apart from the odd inhumane blemish, startlingly free of the gross violence common on the continent of the time during the 30 Years War, where the sacking and pillage of towns and cities was the norm. A particularly notable thing, for civil wars are notorious for their brutality.

The way that England responded to the Reformation is instructive. She did not suffer the savage wars of religion which traumatised the continent and brought human calamities such as the St Bartholomew Day’s Massacre in France in 1572, when thousands of French Protestants were massacred at the instigation of the French king.  It was not that the English did not care deeply about their religion, rather that they have been, when left to their own devices, generally loth to fight their fellow countrymen  over anything. English civil wars have always been essentially political affairs in which the ordinary person has little say, for the struggles were either dynastic or a clash between Parliamentary ambition and the monarch.

Even the persecution of the Lollards in the late  fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and the persecution of  Protestants under Mary I had a highly political aspect. The former was a vastly disturbing challenge to the established social order with men being told, in so many words, that  they could find their own way to salvation and the latter an attempt to re-establish not merely the Catholic order in England, which had been overturned since the time of Henry VIII’s breach with Rome, but also what amounted to a new royal dynasty with Mary’s marriage to Philip of Spain.

Even the prohibitions on Catholics and non-Conformists after the Reformation had a fundamental political basis to them, namely, they were predicated on the question of whether such people be trusted to give their first loyalty to the crown.

The treatment of foreigners

Compared with other peoples, the English have been noticeably restrained in their treatment of other peoples residing within England. A few massacres of Jews occurred  before their expulsion from England in 1290, but from that  time there has not been great slaughter of a minority living within England. Since 1290 there have been  occasional outbreaks of anti-foreigner violence. During the Peasants’ Revolt London-based Flemings were murdered. In  later times an anti-Spanish “No Popery” mob was frequently  got up in London and the influx of Jews and Huguenots in the 17th and 18th centuries caused riots, one so serious in 1753 that it caused the repeal of a law naturalising Jews and Huguenots. But these riots did not result in great numbers of dead, let alone in systematic genocidal persecutions of any particular group. Most notably, the English fonts of authority, whether the crown, church or parliament, have  not incited let alone ordered the persecution of a particular  racial or ethnic group since the expulsion of the Jews. They have persecuted Christian groups, but that was a matter of religion not ethnicity, the Christians persecuted being  English in the main. The only discrimination the English elite have formally sanctioned against an ethnic group for more than half a millennium was the inclusion of Jews within the general prohibitions passed in the half century or so after the Restoration in 1660 which banned those who were not members of the Church of England from holding a crown appointment such as an MP or election to public offices such as that of MP.

Peaceableness and constitutional development  Is this comparative lack of violence a consequence of England’s political arrangements, or are the political  arrangements the consequence of the comparative lack of  violence in the English character? Probably the answer is  that one fed the other. But there must have been an initial exceptional tendency towards reasonableness which started the  long climb towards settling disputes without violence.

Perhaps the fundamental answer to English peaceableness lies in the fact that the English enjoyed a level of racial cultural homogeneity from very early on. Long before the English kingdom existed Bede wrote of the English as a single people. The English have never killed one another in any great quantity simply because one part of the population thought another part was in some way not English. That is  the best possible starting point for the establishment of a coherent community.

The favoured liberal view of England is that it is the mongrel nation par excellence. In fact, this is the exact opposite of the truth. The general facts of immigration into England are these. The English and England were of course created by the immigration of Germanic peoples. The British monk, Gildas, writing in the sixth century,  attributed the bulk of the Saxon settlement to the  practice of British leaders employing Saxons to protect  the Britons from Barbarian attacks after Rome withdrew around  410 A.D. The English monk Bede (who was born in A.D. 673)  attributed the origins of the English to the Angles, Saxons  and Jutes who came to England in the century following the  withdrawal of the Romans at the request of British war  leaders.

Archaeological evidence suggests that substantial Germanic  settlement in England had a longer history and dated from  the Roman centuries, perhaps from as early as the third  century. What is certain is that in her formative centuries  following the exit of Rome, the various invaders and  settlers were drawn from peoples with much in common. They  were the same physical type, there was a considerable  similarity of general culture, their languages flowed from a  common linguistic well.

When the Norsemen came they too brought a Teutonic mentality  and origin. Even the Normans were Vikings at one remove who,  if frenchified, were not physically different from the  English nor one imagines utterly without vestiges of the  Norse mentality. Moreover, the number of Normans who settled  in England immediately after the Conquest was small, perhaps  as few as 5000.

After the Conquest, the only significant immigration into  England for many centuries were the Jews. They were expelled  from England in 1290. There was then no  large scale  and sudden immigration from outside the British Isles until  the flight of the Huguenots after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (which granted limited toleration to the Huguenots  within France) in 1684 by Louis X1V.

There was other immigration in the period 1066-1650, but it  was small and highly selective. Craftsmen of talent were  encouraged particularly in the Tudor period. Italian families  with trading and banking expertise (such as it was in those  days) appeared after the expulsion of the Jews. Foreign  merchants were permitted, but for much of the period on  sufferance and subject to restrictions such as forced  residence within specially designated foreign quarters.

The upshot of all this is that for six centuries after the Conquest England was an unusually homogeneous country, both racially and culturally. This is reflected in the absence  since the Norman Conquest of any serious regional separatist movement within the heart of English territory.

There has been meaningful resistance at the periphery – Cornwall, the Welsh marches and the far north, but even that has been effectively dead since the  sixteenth century. Englishmen have fought but not to create  separate nations.

The Free-Born Englishman

It may have taken until 1928 for full adult suffrage of English men and women to arrive, but the essential  sentiments which feed the idea of democracy – that human beings are morally equal and enjoy autonomy as individuals and a natural resentment of privilege and inequality – are ancient in England.

If there is one outstanding trait in English political history it is probably the desire for personal freedom. This might seem odd to the modern Englishman who sees the large majority of his country men and women consistently welcoming the idea of the most intrusive forms of ID cards and who stand by dumbly as many of the age-old and ineffably hard-won rights which protect the individual, such as the abridgement  of jury trial and the right to silence, being swept away by modern governments. But it was not always so and that “always so” was not so long ago. The great Austrian political and economic thinker Friedrich Hayek put it  forcefully during the Second World War:

 It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that only in  English society, and those societies deriving from it, is the notion of individual liberty built into the  social fabric. The English have been free not  primarily because of legal rights, but because it is  their evolved social nature. They accept liberty because it seems natural to them. (The road to Serfdom – chapter  Material conditions and ideal ends)

In short, individual liberty has been and is part of being  English and part of England. It would be going too far to  claim that the English masses have ever had any highly  developed sense of liberal with a small ‘l’ sentiments,  but throughout English history there has been both a widespread resentment of interference, either public or private, in the private life of English men and women and an acute awareness that privilege was more often than not unearned and frequently cruelly used to oppress the poor.

Most importantly, over the centuries the elite gradually adopted the ideal of personal freedom into their ideology.  Here is the elder Pitt speaking on the notion that the idea that an Englishman’s home:

The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to  all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail – its  roof may shake – the wind may blow though it – the  storm may enter – the rain may enter – but the King  of England cannot enter! – All his force dares not  cross the threshold of the ruined tenement! (Quoted in Lord Brougham’s Statesmen in the time of George III)

The desire for liberty and a freeman’s due is seen in the  constant demand by mediaeval towns for charters which would  free them from aspects of royal control, most particularly  taxation. In some respects it helped fuel the barons’ demand   for Magna Carta. It drove the Peasant’s Revolt. It  provided the emotional engine for the decline of serfdom  once circumstances were propitious after the Black Death.

The Levellers made it their ideological centrepiece in the 1640s, their leader, John Lilburne, revelling in the  name of “Freeborn John”. “Wilkes and Liberty” was the mob’s popular cry in that most aristocratic of centuries,   the eighteenth. The Chartists held tight to the ideal in  the nineteenth.

Equality and privilege

Intertwined with the desire for personal freedom was a  strain of those seeking material equality and opportunity. It also had its expression in the organisation of society, most notably in the widespread use of common fields which were a natural source of egalitarian feeling. These were a form of agricultural organisation whereby a group of farmers worked strips on a large common plot of land, with the strips being rotated regularly to ensure that no one had the best land permanently.

Prime examples of the egalitarian mentality are found in the Peasant’s Revolt of 1381 (which I shall deal with shortly in some detail), the sixteenth century has Thomas More’s Utopia, while the Digger Gerrard Winstanley writing in the  17th century spoke of “The cheat of men buying and selling” (The Law of Freedom 1652).

We also have the literary evidence. The English who people  the pages of Langland and Chaucer show a mediaeval England where commoners would not as a matter of course  willingly touch their forelock or allow their lives to be circumscribed by those with social status. Later,  Shakespeare’s lowlifes and the characters in Ben Johnson’s Bartholomew Fair often show a rumbustious lack of deference for their social betters. It is improbable in the extreme that the worlds depicted by these authors would not have reflected the societies in which they lived. Traits were exaggerated for dramatic effect doubtless, but the cultural story they told was fundamentally rooted in the England in which they wrote.

Langland’s Piers Ploughman is especially interesting because  the work begins with a catalogue of the people who  inhabited the world he knew (Prologue – The plain full of  people). Here are the worldly and the devout, the high and the low. The cleric and the noble jostle with minstrels, tramps, beggars, merchants, tradesmen, and the honest ploughman who tills “the soil for the common good”.

Langland’s clerics are often corrupt, the nobles capricious, the merchants avaricious, the workmen shoddy and cheating in their work, the beggars dishonest and the minstrels bawdy, but they are balanced by honest men in their various callings. In other words, it is a world not so different in terms of human personality to that we inhabit.

The mediaeval elite ideology

There was also in the mediaeval world the idea that although men were unequal in material wealth or social status, nonetheless society was a co-operative enterprise, that all had a place and that all were entitled to that place, which was what God had called them to. Not  egalitarianism but a recognition that men whatever their status had a right to life. The ideal was of course frequently breached but it nonetheless had a basis in both the attitude of the elite, especially in the Church, and in the organisation of society.

The ideas that men should just be left to buy and sell as they chose or that economic activity should be the lodestone of a man’s life was admirable or moral, were alien concepts. Usury was officially banned for many centuries and the example of the poverty of the early Christians was given fresh focus by the Friars of SS Francis and Dominic. More mundanely, there was also the concept of the just price, the price of staple foods such as bread, being fixed by magistrates. As a matter of social course it was accepted that the rich and great, and especially the Church, had moral and material obligations to the less fortunate. Noblesse  oblige was not an empty letter.

Turning men out of their homes and off the land for profit  crashed through this mediaeval moral standard. That was what  the grazing of sheep in particular accomplished, for it denuded the countryside of the need for agricultural workers. By the early years of the 16th century the problem

of landless men was becoming acute.

Some members of the elite rebelled against the cruelty of  leaving thousands of men and their families without a means  to live honestly and the alarming disruption of the  mediaeval social order. Thomas More addressed the question most famously in his satire Utopia (1516). More complained

that it was now thought moral to “buy abroad very cheap and  sell again exceeding dear”. He wrote of the mania for sheep  as that which “consume, destroy and devour whole fields,  houses and cities.” More also asked of those who turned men  and women off the land to feed sheep “What other thing do  you do than make thieves and punish them?” and castigated  the rich for a “strange and proud new fangleness in their  apparel and too much prodigal riot and sumptuous fare at  their table” while the poor starved or turned to crime or begging.

The Peasants’ Revolt

Nothing demonstrates the Englishman’s lack of deference and  desire to be his own man better than the Peasants’ Revolt in 1381. General resentment of privilege and particular  hostility to the imposition of a tax (the Poll Tax)  considered to be both unreasonable and illegitimate, was  given unambiguous voice. For a brief period the fog of  obscurity which ordinarily covers the masses in the mediaeval world clears. A remarkable scene meets the eye for we find not a cowed and servile people but a robust cast  of rebels who far from showing respect for their betters  display a mixture of contempt and hatred for everyone in authority bar the boy-king Richard II.

Perhaps most surprising to the modern reader is the extreme social radicalism of their demands which might, without too much exaggeration, be described as a demand for a classless society. The Revolt may have had its origins in the hated Poll Tax but it soon developed into a series of general political demands. One of the revolt’s leaders, the  hedge-priest John Ball, reputedly preached  “Things cannot go right in England and never will until goods are held in common and there are no more villeins and gentlefolk but we are all one and the same”, and the anonymous and revolutionary couplet “When Adam delved and Eve span/who was  then the gentleman?” was in men’s mouths.

The mediaeval  chronicler Jean Froissart has Ball preaching:  Are we not descended from the same parents, Adam and Eve? And what can they sow or what reason can they give why they should be more masters than ourselves? They are clothed in velvet and rich stuffs ornamented in ermine and other furs while we are forced to wear poor clothing. They have wines and fine bread while we have only rye and refuse of straw and when we drink it must be water. They have handsome manors…while we must have the wind and rain in our labours in the field and it is by our labours that they…support their pomp. We are called slaves and if we do perform our services we are beaten and we have no sovereign to whom we can complain…let us go to the King and remonstrate with him; he is young and from him we may obtain a favourable answer, and if not we must seek to amend our conditions ourselves. (Simon Schama A History of Britain p 248)

Whether or not these words bore any resemblance to Ball’s actual words, whether or not they were black propaganda (on behalf of the elite) by Froissart to show the dangers society faced from the Revolt, we may note that the sentiments are compatible with the demands made by the rebels in 1381.

When the Kentish men led by Wat Tyler, an Essex man, met the 14-year-old king Richard at Mile End on 14 June, they demanded an end to serfdom and a flat rent of 4 pence an acre. The king granted the plea. When the king met the  rebels a second time Tyler shook the king’s hand and called him “brother”. Tyler demanded a new Magna Carta for the common people which would have ended serfdom, pardoned all outlaws, liquidated all church property and declared that all men below the king were equal, in effect abolishing the peerage and gentry. Richard, much to the rebels’ surprise, accepted the demands, although cunningly qualifying the acceptance “saving only the regality of the crown”. A few minutes later Tyler was mortally wounded, supposedly  after he had attempted to attack a young esquire in the royal party who had called him a thief. His death signalled the beginning of the end of the revolt for without Tyler the Revolt lost direction and those who remained willing to resist were pacified in the next few weeks.

During the Revolt the rebels did not run riot, but acted in a controlled manner. There was no general riot but rather the , attacking the property of tax collectors, other important royal servants and any property belonging to the king’s uncle, John of Gaunt. Any identifiable Exchequer document was ripe for destruction.

The revolt began in Essex when the commissioners attempting to collect the Poll Tax were surrounded by a hostile crowd on 30 May 1381. Physical threats were made against one of the commissioners, and the commissioners  retreated from the immediate task of attempting to collect the tax. This brought in the Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas to restore order. He was captured by an even larger crowd and made to swear on oath that no further attempt would be made to collect the tax the area. The names of informers who had provided names to the commissioners was discovered and the culprits beheaded.

The spirit of rebellion soon spread. By 2 June a crowd in the village of Bocking had sworn that they would “have no law in England except only as they themselves moved to be ordained.” The rebellion had infected Kent by the end of the first week in June. By the time Wat Tyler, an Essex man by birth, had been elected to lead the Kentish men the demand was for the heads of the king’s uncle John of Gaunt, the Archbishop of Canterbury Simon Sudbury and the Treasurer Sir Robert Hales.  After Tyler’s first meeting with Richard, Sudbury and Hales were captured and beheaded by the rebels. No deference or want of ambition there.

The extent to which the Revolt frightened the crown and nobility can be seen in the violence of Richard’s words when he addressed another group of rebels at Walthamstow on 22 June, by which time the danger was felt to have largely passed:  You wretches, detestable on land and sea ; you who seek equality with lords are unworthy to live. Give this message to your colleagues. Rustics you were and rustics you are still: you will remain in bondage not as before  but incomparably harsher. For as long as we live we will strive to suppress you , and your misery will be an example in the eyes of posterity . How ever, we will spare your lives if you remain faithful. Choose now which you want to follow . (Simon Schama A History of Britain p 254 )

Anti clericism

There were two great sources of general authority in mediaeval England. The Crown was one, the other was the Church. Yet, before the Reformation the English were renowned throughout Europe for their anticlericism – a good example of this attitude was the response to Sudbury’s warning to Wat Tyler’s rebels that England would be put under an interdict by the Pope if he was harmed. This was met by hearty laughter followed by the grisly dispatch of the unfortunate cleric soon afterwards, whose head to did not part from his shoulders until a goodly number of blows had been struck.

The contempt in which many of the servants of the Church were held can be seen in both John Wycliffe’s complaints against clerical abuse in the latter half of the 14th century and in Geoffrey Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales and William Langland’s Piers Plowman, both written in the same century in which the Peasants’ Revolt took place. Both works are full of jibes at fat illiterate priests and cheating pardoners who peddled absolution from sins with their indulgences sold for money.

Wycliffe’s doctrine contained the fundamental ideas which  were later realised internationally in the Reformation. He questioned the reality of transubstantiation (the Catholic belief that the bread and wine at Communion turn literally into the body and blood of Christ), he attacked the authority of the pope, he railed against the abuses of simony and indulgences. He advocated a bible in English  and either he or his followers, the Lollards,  produced a complete translation before the end of  the fourteenth century.

Implicit within Wycliffe’s thought was the democratic spirit, because it is a short intellectual step from the  belief that each man could be his own mediator with God to the idea that he should have a say in his earthly life.

The Black Death

The Peasant’s Revolt  was  set in the context of the dramatic social changes wrought by the plague. When the Black Death came to England in 1349 it was a source of both immediate misery and future opportunity for those who survived. Estimates of the numbers who died range from a quarter to a half of the population, but whatever the true proportion it had the most dramatic effect on the organisation of society. The immediate result was a widespread transfer of property and consolidation of wealth  as the lucky survivors inherited. This consolidation aided people a long way down the social scale, for a man inheriting  no more than a couple of oxen and a plough was considerably better off than a man with none.

Most importantly, the country went from being one with an oversupply of labour – England prior to the Black Death was probably as well populated as it was in any time before 1700 – to a country where labour was scarce. Landowners were suddenly faced with a new economic world. They had either lost many of their workers through death or were faced with serfs who were no longer obedient and frequently  absconded, often lured to work as free men by other landowners, or drawn to the anonymity of the towns. Landowners had to employ free men who demanded what were considered extortionate wages. The Statute of Labourers of 1351 was a forlorn attempt to keep things as they had been before the Black Death by restricting wages but, like all attempts to buck fundamental economic forces, it failed.

It is probably not overly sanguine to see English society in the late medieval period after the Black Death as a golden age for the common man. Not only was labour scarce and land plentiful, but the great enclosure movement was still in the future and a very large proportion of the population were,  to a large extent, their own masters as they worked their  land. Even where labour services were still performed, they were not crushing, being commonly forty  days work in a year.  Moreover, agricultural work is seasonal, especially the arable, and for substantial parts of the year there is relatively little to do on a farm.

Beyond agriculture, many people had a large degree of control over their daily lives. This was the time before industrialisation, before the wage-slave and the factory.  Skilled craftsmen were often their own masters, and even those who worked for a master will have organised their own time because they worked from their homes. Indeed, most  English men and women today almost certainly have far less control of their time than the average mediaeval inhabitant of England.

The limits of state power

The hand of the state was also light by modern standards, especially so during the century long struggle of the  houses of Lancaster and York and partly because mediaeval kingship was of necessity very limited in what it could do administratively because of a lack of funds, the power of the peerage, primitive technology, poor communications, administrative naivety and a radically different view of what government and society should be – apart from looking after his own privileges and estates, kings were expected to  defend the land, put down rebellions, provide legal redress through the royal courts, maintain the position of the church and lead in war against other rulers. And that was about  it.

But there was also a further check on the monarch. Perhaps the most important practical adjunct of this desire  for freedom, has been that the English long hated and  mistrusted the idea of a standing army as the creature of  tyrants. The English were eventually content to have the strongest navy in the world because it could not be used against them, but a substantial army was not accepted as reasonable until the experiences of the Great War accustomed men to the idea. Soldiers were held in contempt before then. “Gone for a soldier” was little better than “taken for a thief”. The needs of Empire produced more ambivalence into the English view of soldiers as Kipling’s poem “Tommy” shows: “Oh, it’s Tommy this an’  Tommy that, and chuck him out the brute! But it’s ‘Saviour of ‘is country’ when the guns begin to shoot.” But the old resentment, fear and contempt remained until the stark democracy of experience in the trenches during the Great War  tempered the English mind to tolerance of the soldier.

Because of a lack of a large standing army, English kings  were ever been dependent on the will of others, be it their  nobles, parliament or the gentry. Even the most practically tyrannical of English kings, Henry VIII, was most careful to use Parliament to sanction his acts.

The consequences of this weakness was that power was localised. Incredible as it may see today, the practical governance of day-to-day life in England until well into the nineteenth century lay largely in the hands of  private gentlemen occupying the post of JP, whose powers were much greater than they are today. Indeed, the central state impinged very little on the ordinary Englishman before 1914. George Bowling, the hero of George Orwell’s “Coming up for air” reflecting on how the arms of the state touched an honest citizen before the Great War  could think only of the registration of births, deaths and marriages and the General Post Office.

By keeping the king dependent upon the will of others, the  English ensured that a despot such as Louis X1V could  not arise in England and in so doing underwrote their  general liberties. Without that, it is improbable that parliamentary government (as opposed to a parliament) would have arisen. England would almost certainly have been involved in many debilitating wars for the aggrandisement of the king. In those circumstances it is unlikely that England as a modern state would have arisen.

The mediaeval good times end

But the comparatively good times for the poor of the post-Black Death world did not last forever. The  enclosure movement began in earnest in the fifteenth century. Men were driven off the land and their place taken by graziers of sheep. The Tudors put an end to serious dynastic strife and expanded the power of the state.  Gradually the population recovered. Trade grew and towns thrived, but it was also, by mediaeval standards, a time of high inflation caused by a mixture of a debased currency under Henry VIII, the economic consequences of the Dissolution of the Monasteries, population growth and the influx of gold and silver from the recently discovered New World.

The way to political success

Whatever its cause, England’s political development is unparalleled. If political success lies in the general  tenor of English society, the institutions through which it was achieved were cultivated from the thirteenth century  The start of the long climb towards representative government and the neutering of monarchy may reasonably  be set in the reign of John. In 1215 he was forced by many of his barons to sign a charter which granted rights to all the free men of the kingdom. This charter, the  Magna Carta, was of immense significance because it  formally restricted the power of the king in an unprecedented way. The pope of the day thought it  such an abomination he granted John absolution for its repudiation. Perhaps for the first time since the  end of the classical world, a king had been forced to acknowledge unequivocally that there could be legal limits to his power.

Long regarded as a revolutionary document by historians, the fashion amongst them in recent times has been to treat the charter as little more than as an attempt to preserve and enhance the position of the barons or to restate existing English law and custom. Of course it did that but it did much more. Had it done nothing beyond circumscribing the power of the king it would have been revolutionary, but it went far beyond that by explicitly extending rights that we consider fundamental to a free society to all free men.  Perhaps its two most famous clauses show its importance in the development of the future sharing of political power:

 Clause 39 No free man shall be seized or  imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or  possessions, or outlawed or exiled or deprived of  his standing in any other way , nor will we proceed  with force against him or send others to do so,  except by judgement of his equals or by the law of  the land.

 Clause 40 To no one will we sell, to no one will we  deny or delay right or justice.

Until the security of a man and his property are secured, there can be no sustained spreading of power, for if a king may imprison and dispossess at will no man is safe. All merely live at the will of the monarch. By providing both, Magna Carta created the necessary legal and ideological infrastructure for the political development which culminated in parliamentary government.

Perhaps the most intriguing clause of Magna Carta was number  61, which gave a committee of 25 Barons legal authority and practical power over the king. It is long  clause but worth quoting in full:

Clause 61. Since, moreover, for God and the amendment  of our kingdom and for the better allaying of the discord that has arisen between us and our barons we have granted all these things aforesaid, wishing them to enjoy the use of them unimpaired and unshaken for ever, we give and grant them the underwritten security, namely, that the barons shall choose any twenty-five barons of the kingdom they wish, who must with all their might observe, hold and cause to be observed, the peace and liberties which we have granted and confirmed to them by this present charter of ours, so that if we, or our justiciar, or our bailiffs or any one of our  servants offend in any way against any one or transgress any of the articles of the peace or the security and the offence be notified to four of the aforesaid twenty-five barons, those four barons shall  come to us, or to our justiciar if we are out of the kingdom, and, laying the transgression before us, shall petition us to have that transgression corrected without delay. And if we do not correct the transgression, or if we are out of the kingdom, if our justiciar does not correct it, within forty days,  reckoning from the time it was brought to our notice or to that of our justiciar if we were out of the  kingdom, the aforesaid four barons shall refer that case to the rest of the twenty-five barons and those twenty-five barons together with the Community of the whole land shall distrain and distress us in every  way they can, namely, by seizing castles, lands, possessions, and in such other ways as they can, saving our person and the persons of our queen and our children, until, in their opinion, amends have been made; and when amends have been made, they shall obey us as they did before. And let anyone in the country who wishes to do so take an oath to obey the orders of the said twenty-five barons for the execution of all the aforesaid matters, and with them to distress us as much as he can, and we publicly and freely give anyone leave  to take the oath who wishes to take it and we will never prohibit anyone from taking it. Indeed, all those in the land who are unwilling of themselves and of their  own accord to take an oath to the twenty-five barons to help them to distrain and distress us, we will make  them take the oath as aforesaid at our command.  And if any of the twenty-five barons dies or leaves the country or is in any other way prevented from  carrying out the things aforesaid, the remainder of the aforesaid twenty-five barons shall choose as they think fit another one in his place, and he shall take the oath like the rest. In all matters the execution  of which is committed to these twenty-five barons,  if it should happen that these twenty-five are present  yet disagree among themselves about anything, or if some  of those summoned will not or cannot be present,  that shall be held as fixed and established which  the majority of those present ordained or commanded, exactly as if all the twenty-five had consented to it; and the said twenty-five shall swear that they will faithfully observe all the things aforesaid and will do all they can to get them observed. And we will procure nothing from anyone, either personally or through any one else, whereby any of these concessions and liberties might be revoked or diminished; and if any such thing be procured let it be void and null, and we will never use it either personally or through another, And we have fully remitted and pardoned to everyone all the  ill-will, anger and rancour that have arisen between us and our men, clergy and laity, from the time of the quarrel. Furthermore, we have fully remitted to all,  clergy and laity, and as far as pertains to us have completely forgiven all trespasses occasioned by the  same quarrel between Easter in the sixteenth year of our reign and the restoration of peace. And, besides,  we have caused to be made for them letten testimonial patent of the lord Stephen archbishop of Canterbury, the lord Henry archbishop of Dublin and of the aforementioned bishops.

The extreme nature of the concessions the king made – he gave permission for his subjects to act with force to remedy any Royal failure to observe the charter – is a graphic example of the inherent weakness of the mediaeval monarch. King he might be, but not a tyrant because he did not have the resources to dominate utterly.

This committee was never actually formed, but the clause has great interest. Once such a council of nobles to  restrict the behaviour of the king is accepted as  reasonable and possible, it is not such a great leap to the  idea of a larger assembly which might do the same.  That idea was realised before the century was out in a Parliament.

Magna Carta is not as is commonly said the first formal  restriction on the powers of a monarch. The coronation oaths  of mediaeval kings regularly contained promises to observe  the laws and customary freedoms of England, but there was no means of enforcing the oaths other than rebellion. There was even a previous occasion when Ethelred was forced to  agree to formal restrictions on his powers in 1014, but that had no practical effect because of his death and the Danish conquest in 1016.

Magna Carta unlike coronation oaths was both specific enough to usefully form the basis  of law and in 1215 England did not fall under foreign rule.  Instead, in modified form, it quickly became part of the  statute books which developed in the thirteenth  century. More importantly it acquired a mythological quality which lasts to this day. Every important English rebellion and political movement from 1215 until the Chartists in the 1840s has cited Magna Carta in their defence and derived their programme from it. The Levellers in the 1640s made constantly cited it. It was a benchmark which allowed the powers of the king to be progressively whittled away. Never again could an English king convincingly claim that such restrictions on the prerogative were unthinkable or unprecedented.

Parliament

The distinction of the English parliament is not that it is  the oldest such assembly in the world (although it is one of  the oldest), nor that it was unusual at its inception for  parliaments were widespread in mediaeval Europe. The English parliament’s distinction lies in its truly national nature – it was a national not federal assembly – its longevity  and the nature of its development. No other parliament in a country of any size was meaningfully maintained by regular meeting through seven or eight centuries, its only competitors for endurance being the tiny Icelandic assembly and the federal arrangements of the Swiss. Most importantly, before England created such an institution to act as a model, no other Parliament in the world developed into an fully fledged executive as well as a legislature. The English parliament made a very gradual progression to the place we know today. It began as an advising and  petitioning body in the 13th century and before the end of the 14th century had come to exercise considerable power over any taxation which was considered over and above the king’s normal and rightful dues, such as the excise. Gradually, this power transmuted into what was effectively a veto over most taxation. Parliament also added the power to propose and pass laws subject to their acceptance by the monarch. These developments meant that executive  power gradually drained from the King. From this came cabinet government as the monarch was more and more forced to take the advice of his ministers and by the end of the 18th century the struggle between Crown and Parliament for supremacy had been emphatically decided.

As the Parliament gained power, the Lords gradually  diminished in importance and the Commons became by the 19th century, if not before, the dominant House. The final act in the play was a century long extension of the franchise  culminating in a government dominated by an assembly elected under full adult suffrage from 1928 onwards.

A corrupted Parliament

By 1600 Parliament had become important enough to the governing of the country for Guy Fawkes and his fellow plotters to think it necessary to blow up Parliament rather than simply killing the king and his ministers. In any other major European country of the time, the idea of destroying Parliamentary representatives rather than just the monarch and his more powerful friends would have seemed rather odd, either because a parliament did not exist or was considered of little account because European monarchs had been generally very successful in abolishing or curtailing the powers of mediaeval assemblies and preventing their political development.

But Parliament, although growing in power and ambition, was  suffering the ills of any ancient institution. There were accretions of privilege and it had failed to keep pace with the changing times. In 1600 it neither represented the country as it was nor satisfied the growing wish of its members, especially the elected ones, to have a greater say in the management of England. At the heart of the  dissatisfaction lay the unsatisfactory nature of the Commons’ franchise. I shall examine this question in some detail because it will demonstrate the historical political backdrop against which the democratic radicals of the 1640s  acted.

The question of the franchise

Serious disquiet with the Commons’ electoral  qualifications, provisions and practices began in Elizabeth’s reign and reached its highest pitch, prior to the 1640s, during the years 1621 to 1623. The discontent was provoked primarily by the situation in  the boroughs rather than the counties, Since 1430,  the county electorate had been restricted to the  forty shilling freeholder, which qualification had become  almost sacrosanct by the end of the sixteenth century –  only one proposal before the 1640s (in 1621) was  made to raise or lower it. Tudor inflation had  greatly lowered the barrier it represented (40 shillings in 1600 was worth perhaps 15 shillings at 1430 values) and it is reasonable to suppose this  considerably increased the rural electorate. Also,  there is evidence to suggest that the qualification was not always enforced and some county electorates may have had a very broad manhood franchise indeed prior to 1640.

Borough franchises were anything but uniform. In some  the whole ‘commonalty’ (all householders) or even  all ‘potwallers’ (men with their own hearths)  voted. In others the vote was restricted to all taxpayers  (‘scot and lot’), freemen of the town, or those  in possession of burgage property. In extreme cases the vote might be restricted to the ruling corporation. Such discrepancies of representation were aggravated by a distribution of borough seats which took insufficient  account of the demographic changes of the past two centuries, during which time England’s population increased very substantially, especially during the 16th century, perhaps by as much as a third. These facts prepared a well mulched  political soil for agitation for more equal borough representation, both in terms of the breadth of the franchise and in the number of seats.

Tudor monarchs, not unnaturally, did not favour larger electorates. The existence of ‘rotten boroughs’ was a  source of patronage and, if the monarch could control  the oligarchies who returned the MP, a means of reducing  opposition to the Crown. As there was a significant number of such boroughs, this was no small advantage to the monarch.  The attitude of Parliament to the franchise was mixed. The Lords had a similar interest to the Crown in distrusting broad franchises. The peers often effectively controlled seats in the Commons. They also had a natural inclination to deny the ‘commonality’ any voice in the affairs of the kingdom. Conversely, it was obviously in the Commons’  interest to increase electorates, where such increases reduced the Monarch’s’ and the Lord’s opportunities for patronage.

There is particular evidence that the Puritans favoured larger electorates, at least in so far as it suited their own purposes. At Warwick in 1586 Job Throckmorton was elected after he threatened to invoke the right of the ‘commonality to vote. In 1587 John Field remarked to  colleague ‘seeing we cannot compass these things by suit or dispute, it is the multitude and people that must  bring the discipline to pass which we desire.’ (J.H, Plumb. The Growth of the electorate 1600-1715). As Puritans displaced many court nominees and the creatures of  aristocrats, this is significant in view of the attitude of the Commons towards electoral qualifications  between 1621 and 1628.

By 1621, the Commons had gained the right to decide  disputed elections and to revive lapsed borough seats and  even make new creations, The tendency until 1628 was to  decide in favour of wider franchise and to allow  all the ‘commonality’ to vote. At Bletchingly (1624)  and Lewes (1628) ‘all the inhabitants ,’ were to be  electors’, and at Cirencester (1624) all ‘resients:’.

In the case of Pontefract in 1624 a general principle  was formulated: ‘There being no certain custom nor prescription, who  should be the electors and who not, we must have  recourse to common right which, to this purpose was held to be, that more than the freeholders only ought  to have voices in the election, namely all  men, inhabitants, householders resient within the borough.’ (J.H, Plunb. The Growth of the electorate 1600-1715).

Further, in the case of Boston (1628) it was asserted that  the election of burgesses belonged by common right to the  commoners and only prescription or ‘a constant usage  beyond all memory’ could rob them of this. (K. Thomas, The Levellers and the Franchise p.62).

It is true that when the Commons revived or created  borough seats, they concentrated, as the Tudors had done, on small towns to promote their own advantage.  But, even so, they granted ‘scot and lot’  franchises in every case (except Weobley) which meant  that even small towns such as Great Marlow or Hilbourne Port had electorate of around 200.

Bills were introduced to regulate elections  and standardise,the franchise in 1621, 1623, 1625, 1628 and 1640, The 1621 Bill is of particular interest  because it proposed that the 40/- freeholder qualification  be increased to œ4 and to admit œ10 copyholders by  inheritance. The borough proposals add no more than the various decisions on individual cases (in fact even less), for electors were to be freemen except where they  numbered less than twenty-four, in which case all  inhabitants not in receipt of alms were to be included,

In 1640 the franchise was raised again by Sir Simonds  D’Ewes. It was he who first uttered the idea later made famous by Rainsborough ‘that the poorest man in England ought to have a voice, that it was the birthright of  the subjects of England and all had voices in the  election of Knights etc. previously.’ (K. Thomas, The Levellers and the Franchise p.63).

In 1641 a bill had reached second reading but was then  lost. D’Ewes favoured its contents except that he  ‘desired that whereas it was provided in the bill that  none that took alms should have voices in elections, which I well allowed, we would likewise provide  that no more monopolizing elections might be in cities and boroughs, that all men resients might have voices.’  (K. Thomas, The Levellers and the Franchise p.64)

It is also noteworthy, both for its own sake and  the part it played in Leveller literature, that many  believed that the Statute of 1430 had disenfranchised  people. William May, in 1621, said ‘Anciently, all the  commonality had voice, but because such a multitude made the  election tumultuous, it was after reduced to freeholders’.  The religious radical William Prynne put it even more plainly, ‘Before this Petition and Act every  inhabitant and commoner in each county had voice in the election of Knights, whether he were a freeholder or  not, or had a freehold only of one penny, six pence or twelve pence by the year as they now claim of  late in most cities and boroughs where popular  elections are admitted’ (K. Thomas, The Levellers and the Franchise p.64). It is a sobering thought that if the Statute of 1430 did disenfranchise large numbers of county electors, the county franchise may have been wider in medieval England than it was to be again before the end of the nineteenth century and conceivably wider than the Franchise before the 1918 Representation of the People Act.

What of the position of those deemed to be dependents:  the servants, wage-earners and almstakers? Resident  household servants were generally considered beyond  the electoral pale, although ‘servants’ were said to  have voted in the Worcestershire county election of 1604.

Wage-earners certainly did so, for those in the ‘potwaller’  and ‘scot and lot’ constituencies were granted the  right to vote. Almstakers were excluded in the 1621  and 1640 bills, yet at Great Marlow in 1604 77 of the 245 voters were said to be almstakers, nine of them  inmates of the almshouse. In 1640 the right of the  Bember inmates to vote was said to have been sustained  and in 1662 the St. Albans almsmen were said to have ‘had  voices time out of mind’.

It is clear from all this that those who promoted theradical or democratic cause in the 1640s, most particularly the Levellers, did not enter untilled ground. There are also three points of particular interest. First, the Commons, or at least an influential part of it,  was not unduly disturbed by the prospect of an  enlarged electorate. Second, those deemed to be dependent such as servants and almstakers – were included on occasion in the franchise long before the Civil War. Third, that there existed even gentlemen (such as Sir Simonds D’Ewes) who had an active and unambiguous democratic spirit.

The latter point is particularly pertinent because the chief Leveller, John Lilburne, was also of gentle-birth, albeit “small gentry”, a fact he never ceased to emphasise. Clearly, democratic ideas and feeling were not foreign political bodies suddenly introduced by the Levellers and others in the 1640s.

The English civil war, Commonwealth and Protectorate

Stuart society was a world on the physical, economic and intellectual move and waiting to move faster if the right engine appeared. The civil wars of the 1640s was that machine.

Representative government is one thing, democracy quite another. That did not come to England in its formal form of a full adult franchise until the twentieth century. But for a brief period in the 1640s a franchise for the House of Commons broader than any used before the late nineteenth century was more than a pipe dream.

The Civil War and its republican aftermath, the Commonwealth and Protectorate, changed English politics  utterly. It brought the end of claims by the English crown

to Divine Right and absolute monarchy. It promoted the political interests of the aristocracy and gentry as a class. It forced those on the Parliamentary side to exercise power on their own responsibility. It created a political class which saw politics as something they could control rather than merely be part of as an adjunct to the crown. It raised the idea that there should be a law superior to that which even a parliament could pass. It began the constitutional process which resulted in cabinet government.  It laid the foundations for the formation of political parties as we know them. In short, it planted the seeds of  modern representative government.

Into this new world were cast men whose political philosophies ranged from acceptance of the divine right of kings to unyielding communists. In the middle were those, such as Cromwell, who though socially conservative, realised that power and political interest had shifted not merely  from the king to Parliament, but also in some sense to an appreciably broader circle of people than before. Such people were willing to extend the franchise to a degree, although still restricting it to those with property for fear that the poor would dispossess the haves if they had the power to elect and that those with no material stake in the country would have no sense of responsibility and duty.

But that was insufficient from many, especially those who fought on the Parliamentary side in the wars, and something else occurred which was to be even more momentous in the long run. The belief that men generally should only be ruled by those they had themselves elected became a serious political idea. That the idea should find expression as a serious political idea in the 1640s was, of course, partly a consequence of the disruption of society by civil war, but that was more an opportunity rather than a reason. Innumerable civil wars  all over the world have come and gone without the democratic spirit being given rein. What made the England of the time unusual was the long-existing ideal of individual freedom which had reached a high degree of sophistication, including the notion that free debate, the sine qua no of democracy,  was of value in itself. Here are two passages which give a taste of the way minds were working in the 1640s. First,

John Milton writing in the Areogapitica in the 1640s:

 And though all the winds of doctrine were let  loose upon the earth, so truth be in the field  [and] we do injuriously by licensing and  prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and  falsehood grapple; who ever knew truth put to the  worse, in a free and open encounter…

The second statement comes from the Leveller Richard Overton’s ‘An Arrow against all Tyrants’ (19th October, 1646). It contains as good a refutation of the power of authority without consent over the individual as you will find:

 No man hath power over my rights and liberties,  and I over no man’s….for by naturall birth all  men are equally and alike borne to like propriety, liberty and freedom, and as we are delivered  of God by the hand of nature into this  world, everyone with a naturall, innate freedom and propriety….even so are we to live, every one  equally and alike to enjoy his birthright and  privilege…. [no more of which may be alienated]  than is conducive to a better being, more safety  and freedome….[for] every man by nature being  a King, Priest and Prophet in his own naturall  circuit and compasse, whereof no second may  partake, but by deputation, commission  and free consent from him, whose  naturall right and freedome it is. [An Arrow against all tyrants].

These were not odd voices crying in the wilderness. The  democratic spirit was widespread in the 1640s. By this I do not mean that men were commonly calling for full manhood suffrage, much less the emancipation of women. Even the most democratically advanced of the important groups which evolved during the Civil War, the Levellers, were unclear as to whether those who were deemed dependent in the sense of not being their own masters – servants and almstakers –  should be given the vote or, indeed, who counted as a servant or almstaker.

Rather, there was a sense that the social order had been  rearranged by the war, that men were on some new ground of equality and had a right to a public voice. In particular, there was a belief that those who had fought for Parliament had won the right to enfranchisement. There was also a widespread feeling, which penetrated all social classes, that the existing franchises (which as we have seen varied greatly) were frequently too narrow and that the towns, particularly those most recently grown to substantial size,  were grossly under-represented.

Ideas of social and political equality had, as we have seen, existed long before the Civil War, but never before had large swathes of the masses and the elite seen anything approaching representative democracy as practical politics under any circumstances. The political and social elite of the period after 1640 may have been desperately afraid of a general representation of the English people, but they did not say it was impossible, merely feared its consequences.

They may have loathed the idea of every man his own political master but they were forced by circumstances to admit that a Parliament elected on a broad franchise was not a fantasy. The Putney Debates in 1647 provide a vivid record of the political fervour and mentality of the times. Parliamentary and Army leaders including Cromwell and his son-in-law Henry Ireton, met with a variety of people on what might broadly be called the democratic side. A substantial part of the debate was taken down in shorthand. It is a most intriguing and exciting document, despite its incompleteness and some confused passages. The sheer range of political ideas it displays is impressive. It shows clearly that the 1640s  experienced a high degree of sophistication amongst the politically interested class and that this class was drawn from a broad swathe of English society. The ideas run discussed from the monarchical to the unreservedly democratic, epitomised in Col Thomas Rainsborough’s famous words:

 … I think that the poorest he that is in England hath a life to lead, as the richest he; and therefore truly, sir, I think it’s clear, that every man that is to live under a government ought first by his own consent to put himself under that government; and I do not think  that the poorest man in England is not at all bound in a strict sense to that government that he has not had a voice to put himself under… (Col Thomas Rainsborough Puritanism and Liberty The Putney debates p 53).

Democracy, the revolutionary idea

Why was the idea of every man being an elector so revolutionary? There was of course the age-old traditional fear, known to the Greeks, that the masses would dispossess haves if they had control of who was to hold power. But the matter went much deeper than that. The enfranchisement of a  wide electorate is perhaps the most fundamental political change a society can undergo. It forces the elite to take note of the masses in a way that no other system does. Even the humblest man must be considered as a man in his own right, a person with a vote and needs and wishes. Those needs and wishes may be heeded and met to varying degrees according to the success an elite has in subverting the representative process through such tricks as international treaties and the development of disciplined political parties, but what the majority needs and wants cannot as a  matter of course be ignored completely when each man has a vote.

A form of male-only democracy existed in the ancient world, but it was never inclusive because the citizens were only a part of the population of a Greek civis and the large numbers of unfree men and free men who were not citizens were excluded. The Roman Republic had enjoyed in varying degrees at various times democratic expression through  plebeian institutions such as the concilium plebis and offices such as that of tribune. But that was a class based  representation which arose to oppose the Patrician class, not a self-conscious representation of individual men.

Received wisdom it may be now, the idea that every man (but not woman then) should have an active voice in choosing those who would represent and govern them was to most people, poor and rich, a truly novel and disturbing concept in the middle of the 17th century.

The Levellers

The group which gave the strongest voice and effect to democratic feelings in the 1640s was the Levellers. They  were a disparate and ever shifting crew, drawing their support primarily from the ranks of the Parliamentary armed forces (especially after the New Model Army was formed in 1645), small tradesmen, journeymen and apprentices.  However, they also included those from higher social classes, their most famous leader, John Lilburne, being the child of minor gentry.

The Levellers time was brief. They were a serious political  force for, at most, the years 1646 to 1649 and that is probably being a mite too generous. They failed utterly in the end, not least because they were unable to carry the army, especially the junior officers, with them. But they were important both for giving voice to the ideas and creating many of the practices on which modern politics is founded.

Their opponents attempted to portray the Levellers as social revolutionaries who would take the property of the rich, most particularly their land, and give it to the poor.  Hence the epithet of Leveller which originated as a term of abuse. But the Levellers consistently denied that they had any such programme and were staunch defenders of the right to property. They might best be characterised as radical democrats with a very strong libertarian streak. Indeed, so far were they from being proto-communists that they had an almost sacramental belief in the individual’s right to personal property.

 

Intellectually, they started from the view that all Englishmen had a birthright which entitled them to have a say in who should govern them, although at times they accepted that the birthright might be breached through dependence on a master or by receiving alms. More  importantly, their ideology contained the germ of the idea of a social contract between the people and those who held power, an idea which was to come to dominate English political thinking for the next century or so through the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.

The Levellers were, with one or two exceptions such as Richard Overton, who was a deist at best and an atheist at worst, or John Wildman, who was a libertine and chancer,  religious. But their belief had a strong vein of rationalism in it. They saw God not as the often cantakerous and domineering supernatural being of traditional Christianity, but as a rational intelligence who entered every man and allowed him to see what was naturally just and reasonable.

For the Levellers, it seemed a natural right – a rational right – for a man to have a say in who should hold power and what they should do with the power. They  were happy to use historical props such as  Magna Carta and the legend of Norman oppression when it suited them, but their rationality led them to question how men were governed from first principles. One of the Leveller leaders Richard Overton actually called Magna Carta a “beggarly thing” and went on to comment:

 Ye [Parliament] were chosen to work our deliverance, and to estate us in natural and just liberty, agreeable to reason and common equity, for whatever our forefathers were, we are the men of the present age, and ought to be absolutely free from all kinds of exorbitancies, molestations or arbitrary power. (A Remonstrance. Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan Revolution)

More balanced was his fellow Leveller William Walwyn:

Magna Carta (you must observe) is but a part of the people’s rights and liberties, being no more but what with much striving and fighting, was wrested from the paws of those kings , who by force had conquered the nation, changed the laws and by strong hand held them in bondage. (England’s Lamentable Slaverie, Tracts on  Liberty in the Puritan Revolution.)

To call the Levellers a political party in the modern sense would be misleading. Yet they were the closest thing to it both then and, arguably, for several centuries. Their tactics and organisation were modern – the use of pamphletering and newspapers, the ability to get large number of supporters onto the streets (especially in London) at the drop of a hat, the creation of local associations.

Much of this was the work of Lilburne, a man of preternatural obstinacy, courage and general unreasonableness. It says much for the restraint of the English elite of the day and respect for the law that he was not killed out of hand. It is difficult to imagine such behaviour being tolerated anywhere in Europe in the seventeenth century.

Lilburne by every account of him was a most difficult man – it was said that his nature was so combative that he would seek a quarrel with himself if he were alone – ‘Jack would fight with John’. Yet this man, who came from a very modest gentry background, remained alive  despite challenging the authority of first the king and then  during and after the civil war, Parliament, Cromwell and the Commonwealth. He thus carried on this mortally dangerous  behaviour for almost a generation. To the end of his life in  1657, he was thought dangerous enough to imprison.

Lilburne first came to notice for seditious speeches and  writings in the 1630s. For that he was whipped from the Fleet  to the Palace Yard where he was stood in the stocks. Whilst  in the stocks, he removed copies of the pamphlets which had  caused his punishment and threw them to the crowd. That  little episode will give a good idea of the Lilburne’s  general mentality. He was an extreme example one of those  necessary unreasonable men without whom nothing great gets  done.

From the time of his flogging onwards, Lilburne’s career was  one of studied defiance of authority. He was one of the most  potent pamphleteers England has ever seen. For more than a  decade, he produced a flood of writings guaranteed to inflame  virtually anyone in public authority in the land. He faced  down judges in the most powerful courts in the land. He  controlled the London mob consummately. He treated the  greatest men in the land as equals. In any other place on the planet at that time, he probably would have been dead meat before his  career as an agitator began. But not in England. He might be  flogged. He might be put in the stocks. He might be  imprisoned. He might be tried twice for his life. But what the elite of  17th century England would not do was unreservedly murder him.

The Levellers developed an increasingly sophisticated political programme in a series of documents known as The Agreements of the People. These Agreements dealt extensively with political representation and structure. They were also very successful in creating a sense of historic grievance and an enemy. They did this by portraying 1640s England as  having declined from a golden age of freedom to an oppressed land and people under the heel of the Normans and their French successors.

The Levellers and the franchise

The Levellers changed their position on the franchise throughout their existence, tending to compromise when they thought that some accommodation with the likes of Cromwell could be made and ever more radical as political power slipped away from them, although there were times and places throughout their existence when this general tendency did not hold true.

What the Levellers did retain always was a belief that all  Englishmen were born with the same birthright. However, they accepted more often than not that certain  parts of this birthright could be forfeited under certain conditions. Religious, civil and even possibly economic rights could not be alienated justly, and as such should be protected constitutionally. The  right to elect, however, could be forfeited by  entering into a condition of dependence, either by  taking wages or alms. In such cases, a just  dependence resulted and the subservient individual’s  voice was deemed to be included in that of his master or benefactor, as far as a voice in elections was concerned,  just as that of a wife was deemed to be included in that of her husband. An idea of how the Levellers’ position changed can be gained from these extracts from Leveller tracts:

‘That the People of England,… ought to be more  indifferently proportioned according to the number  of inhabitants.’ (The first article of the First  Agreement.)

 [electors] ‘shall be Natives, or Denizen of England,  not persons receiving Alms … not  servants to, and receiving wages from any  particular person’ (The Second Agreement – D.H. Wolfe,Leveller Manifestoes p.403)

 ‘Whereas it hath been the ancient liberty of this nation, that all the freeborn people  have freely elected their representers in  Parliament, and their sheriffs and Justices of the Peace, etc. and they were abridged of that  their native liberty by a statute of the 8.H.6,7. That, therefore, the birthright of all English men be forthwith restored to all which are not, or shall  not be legally disenfranchised for some  criminal cause, or are under 21 years of age,  or servants or beggars .’ (The franchise clause  (section ll) of the Petition of January 1648 -D.H. Wolfe, Leveller Manifestoes P,269.)

By the time political opportunity had long passed the Levellers by we find in 1653 a pamphlet Leveller in tone – ‘A Charge of High Treason exhibited against Oliver  Cromwell’ summoning all the people of England to the polls ‘as well masters, sons of servants’.

Constitutional restraint

The Levellers did one more thing which was to have great influence in the future: they created the idea of constitutional law acting as a restraint on a parliament.  The Agreements of the People placed restrictions on what Parliament might do, removing the power from Parliament to  repudiate debts it had incurred, interfere with the operation of justice, destroy the rights to property or diminish the liberty of the individual. The Levellers even included provision granting the electorate the right to  resist Parliament if they acted beyond their powers. They also called for annual parliaments, i.e., a general election every year, which would have been a great restriction in itself on what those with power might do.

In 1648 the Levellers attempted but failed to convene a Constitutional Convention of the type which more than a century later produced the American constitution. However, the idea of restraining Parliament by superior law was given form in the Instrument of Government which set up the Protectorate. The idea of such constitutional restraint disappeared in England after the Restoration and the novel doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy eventually won the day after the “Glorious Revolution” of 1689, when the monarch became king not by right of birth but by gift of Parliament.

Other radicals

The most uncompromising of the democratic and egalitarian forces in the 1640s were the so-called Diggers or, “True Levellers” led by William Everard but best known through the writings of Gerrard Winstanley. In many ways the Diggers,  probably unwittingly, reiterated the most extreme egalitarian sentiments of the Peasant’s Revolt, such as the reputed words of John Ball, and reached back to the mediaeval idea of society as a communal enterprise.  They believed that the land belonged to no one saying “None ought to be lords or landlords over another, but the earth is free for every son and daughter of mankind to live upon.” ( Works, ed by Sabine p289).

For the Diggers the “natural” state of man was one of common ownership and the root of  evil the egotistic desire for individual advantage including  the “cheating art of buying and selling” by which king’s live  (Winstanley’s Law of Freedom 1652).

In 1649 a small group of Diggers attempted to put their philosophy into practice camped on St Georges Hill near Walton on Thames in Surrey and attempted to cultivate common land. Further Digger attempts were made at Cobham in Surrey and at Cox Hall in Kent and at Wellingborough in Northamptonshire. All met with a mixture of legal and physical harassment by local landowners and even attracted the attention of the Council of State which sent troopers to repress them. The Diggers were brought twice to court.

Their numbers were small, probably amounting to no more than a hundred or so at most and they had no lasting direct legacy. Yet they are a reminder that many Englishmen have never have never accepted willingly the unearned privileges of social rank or vast differences in wealth while the masses struggled to feed themselves.

The Diggers are also significant for giving voice through Winstanley to the novel idea that the end of politics should be the well-being of the common man and for the clear recognition that liberty rests on the economic state of society.

Exporting Representative Government

After the Cromwell’s establishment of the Protectorate, democratic ideas did not gain serious political currency in England for more than a century, but the example of England’s continually evolving parliamentary government proved a potent one.

The Restoration did not result in serious legal abridgements of the power of the monarch, but Charles II was in practice much restricted by a Parliament unwilling to adequately open the purse strings for a monarch who was, ironically, expected to do more and more as the formal power

of the state grew.

The “Glorious Revolution” of 1689 produced a true constitutional sea-change. From then on the English monarch ascended the throne only with the acceptance of Parliament and the Bill of Rights (1690) placed restrictions on the monarch. Amongst the long list of things the king was forbidden to do were:

Dispense with and suspend of laws, and the execution of laws, without consent of parliament.

Levy money for and to the use of the crown, by pretence of prerogative, for another time, and in other manner, than the same was granted by parliament.

To raise and keep a standing army within England in time of peace, without consent of parliament, and quartering  soldiers contrary to 4.

To violate the freedom of election of members to serve in parliament.

To demand excessive bail of persons committed in criminal cases, “to elude the benefit of the laws made for the liberty of the subjects.”

To impose excessive fines and illegal and cruel punishments.

The abuses of power by the crown listed in the Bill of Rights  are described as being ” utterly and directly contrary to the known laws and statutes, and freedom of this realm.”

That old reliance on the law and the traditional freedoms of the Englishman.

From 1689 began the century long decline of the monarchy as an executive power. The American War of Independence sealed the fate of the monarch and the Americans forged a new version of the English political model, with a formal separation of powers and a written constitution to restrict what governments and legislatures might do.

 

The received academic opinion on the American constitutional settlement is that it was the offspring of John Locke. In fact, it had at least as much affinity with the ideas of the Levellers. There is no direct intellectual link, but arguably the most important popular propagandist on the American side, the Englishman Tom Paine, shared much of his ideology with the Levellers. The Constitution is a balancing act between Locke Paine, granting a large degree of popular involvement in politics, whilst tempering it with restrictions such as electoral colleges and granting through the Bill of Rights  (which was inspired by the English Bill of Rights of 1690) constitutional protections for the individual against the state.

If the American Revolution owed its shape and  inspiration to England, the French Revolution was inspired by both English constitutional development and the America revolutionary example. Most political revolutions resulting in an attempt at representative government, have been  touched, consciously or not, by the legacy of the American and French revolutions.

England through control of the British Empire, ensured that the Westminster model of government was transplanted with widely differing success, to approximately a quarter of the world’s population, when the empire dissolved in the twenty years after 1945.

The astonishing upshot of the English example, the American and French Revolutions and the British Empire, is that the  political structures of most modern states are broadly based on the English constitution of King, Lords and Commons, the overwhelming majority having a head of state plus two assemblies. In addition, the widespread practice of a written constitution derives from the example of the United States, which of course drew its form and inspiration from  English settlements in North America, English history and political practices. These political structures apply as readily to dictatorships as they do to liberal democracies.

Of course, the balance of power between the head of  state and the assemblies varies widely and there is much difference between Parliamentary and Presidential government, but they all have their ultimate origin in the example of the English system of representative government.

One last thing. Look around the world. How many countries  can be said even today to have accepted elected representative government and the rule of law as a banal fact of life, the norm of their society? Britain, the USA, Australia, Canada, New Zealand certainly, Switzerland  and Scandinavia possibly. But where else? Not France which  as recently as 1958 overthrew the Fourth Republic. Not  Germany which embraced Hitler nor Italy the land of Mussollini. Not Spain so recently loosed from Franco.

As for the rest of the world, that tells a sorry tale of elites who generally have such a lack of respect for the individual and a contempt for the masses that the idea of shared power with and for the people is simply alien to them.

The fact that the only really stable examples of elected representative government in countries of any size are in  those countries which have their ultimate  origins in English colonisation strongly suggests that it was no accident that it was in England that the institution evolved. There must be something highly unusual about English society for it both to develop in a manner so different from any other country and to export this rare and valuable difference to colonies.

The Archers: an everyday story of simple ever more absurd storylines folk

Robert Henderson

What a remarkable place is  Ambridge. In an England experiencing  normal  rather dry winter weather Ambridge is in currently in  the grip of what one can only imagine is a  monsoon  that  has escaped from the tropics and miraculously  arrived in a very small part of the  English midlands to produce the Great Ambridge Flood  as the latest in the  radio soap’s  increasingly improbable storylines .

In its long history The Archers has provided ready satirical fare amongst which has been frequent imaginings of an end to the world’s longest running radio serial  through some catastrophe  such as the village being wiped out by bubonic plague or the entire cast of characters being abducted  by Aliens.  The Great Ambridge Flood has much the same improbable flavour as that generated by such scenarios, with  central characters are placed in danger with reckless abandon.  As I write a great swathe of characters are now homeless.

The Great Ambridge Flood comes on top of a growing mountain  of wildly unconvincing plots,   the biscuit being taken when the  stronghold of the Archer family Brookfield farm was to be sold for no convincing reason and David and Ruth Archer plus their  children moved 200 miles away to the North East of England.  This was supposedly because of the  road which was scheduled to divide the farm in two and because Ruth’s mother  was becoming unable to fend for herself in Geordieland.    This was a  risibly insufficient  reason   for such a fundamental move, not least because the road going through the farm is still subject to appeal.

The sudden volte face  by David Archer who decides to go back on the sale of the farm to the property developer Justin Elliott for £7 million  after  he has a Damascene moment when he imagines  the ghost of his dead father is  talking to him was even more  improbable.   Suddenly the fact that the farm might have a road running through it does not seem so bad and the chance of stopping the development changes from hopeless to possible.  Nor is the fact that in real life the cancellation of the sale would have resulted in horrendous financial penalties  seemingly of any great consequence.

A much more plausible and satisfying plot about Brookfield would have been David and Ruth fighting the proposed  road to the end with its building  being thwarted when Justin Elliot and his cronies are  exposed as having  bribed council officials and councillors to agree to the route for the road to further their development plans.

In amongst this dramatic carnage earlier  story lines than the abortive sale of Ambridge have continued to make of Ambridge an ever  swirling kaleidoscope of  broken relationships, personal disaster  and antisocial incidents. Shula Archer has perjured herself by lying to the police about an assault committed by the exceptionally controlling sociopath from central casting Rob Titchener, Helen Archer is pathetically interpreting Titchener’s comically controlling ways as  just concern for her and her son, the Elizabeth Pargetter – Roy Tucker – Hayley Tucker triangle has reached the point of Hayley asking for a divorce from Roy and the politically correct flag has been waved  vigorously with the introduction of a gay sex  triangle as Adam  Macey is working up to dump Ian for Charlie Thomas.   Strangely, for such a monument to political correctness, there is yet to be some girl-on-girl action. Could it be that…no surely not…

Topping all the improbable stories is that of Lillian Bellamy and Matt Crawford. Crawford, whose last major appearance in the serial involved him getting involved with the Russian mafia in Russia, has suddenly done a runner with as much of Lillian’s fortune as he has been able to lay his hands on. This has occurred without any hint of trouble between the couple  before Crawford fled and absolutely no explanation since.

What next for the Archers? How about a Midwitch Cuckoos visitation with all  the females of  breeding age giving birth to  alien children? Well, that would be no more improbable than the tosh which has been served up for the past few years.

The BBC and “coloured  players“

Robert Henderson

Twice in the past few days  two  interviewees from the football world  on Radio 5 have used the word coloured in connection with  black players  when discussing the possible introduction of the Rooney Rule into English football. The so-called rule comes from America and  in the English context makes  compulsory the interviewing of at least one black candidate where a managerial  or head coach position in a professional football  team is to be filled.

The first occasion was by the Wigan FC owner Dave Wheelan  (3 Oct),  who repeatedly referred to “coloured players” .  Nothing was said during the interview, but immediately it was over the presenter  in best politically correct fashion said in the peculiarly noxious tones of a white liberal affecting outrage that they were apologising for language in the interview “which listeners may have found offensive”.  Interestingly, the BBC  written item which referred to Whelan’s appearance discussing the Rooney Rule subject did not mention that he had used the phrase “black footballers”.

On the Stephen Nolan programme (4 Oct) the very experienced English football manager Dave Bassett  and the black basketball player  John Amaechi   engaged in an extended row over the same phrase  coloured footballers,  plus variations on it (go into to the recording at 35 minutes) .  Amaechi  jumped in after the first two uses  of “coloured players” with ”This is 2014 and I’m listening to someone talk about  using coloured players. For the love of God are  you kidding me?”.

Judged by his  frequent  British media appearances Amaechi  is a naturally petulant and childishly abusive personality. He  proceeded to try  to patronise Bassett, a working-class man without much education, by referring to his (Amaechi’s)  academic qualification in psychology and saying  with heavy sarcasm that he might just have the edge over Bassett when it came to judging human behaviour. This merely made Amaechi look like an unpleasant boor at best and a deeply insecure man at worst.  Amaechi added to this bad impression by constantly insulting Bassett by objecting to any attempt by Bassett to get a word in edgeways by shrieking something along the lines of don’t interrupt me, it’s rude.

The presenter Nolan made precious little attempt to restrain Amaechi’s rudeness or give Bassett a fair chance to speak. In addition, he backed up  up Amaechi by several times saying to Bassett that the word coloured in this  context was “inappropriate” . So much for BBC staff not expressing opinions.

Greatly to his credit Bassett stuck to his guns and refused to apologise , during his time on air or, according to Nolan, afterwards – Nolan said that Bassett had stood by his use of the phrase after he left the airwaves.  Whilst on air he made the very good point that managers and coaches in English professional football frequently did not represent the percentage of the players involved from various groups such as the Northern Irish or Welsh. He also opposed the introduction of the Rooney Rule.

The attempt to stop the use of coloured is a prime example of how racial, ethnic and other minorities such as gays try to exert power generally over society .  This is both sinister  – control of language is the tool of dictators – and  unreasonable, because while  a group may call themselves whatever they choose , they  have no moral right to impose their chosen  term  upon those outside of the group. The moral abuse caused by imposition  becomes  especially  sharp where there is a different word used by the population in which they live which is not abusive.  That is the case with coloured.  The term was for more than a century  the polite term for blacks.   The National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People was founded in 1909 in the USA and continues with the title today.   There is little serious complaint about the use of coloured in the title of that  organisation, while the  mixed race (white/black mixture)  population of South Africa is still called coloured.  Ironically, the term black  occupied the same position as coloured does now fifty years ago.

On the Rooney Rule question, it would be just another granting of privilege to a racial minority. Nor is  it clear who would count as black in these circumstances. How black would you have to be? One half black, quarter black , one eighth black?  What of someone with one parent who has black ancestry who looks white? (genetics can produce some unexpected results). Would every racial and ethnic minority be  allowed  climb on the bandwagon?

On a purely practical level where would  the large number of black and Asian qualified managers and senior coaches required to meet the  interviewee quota come from? Would it be a very small group who went from interview to interview?  After all, if there are only two black managers in the top 92 English league clubs , who exactly could be meaningfully called for interview? By definition  these would all be inexperienced  so how on earth could many if any be considered for clubs in the  tope toe English divisions, the Premier  League and the Championship?   Even at the level of formal coaching qualifications there would be a problem because few black  or Asian footballers  are taking their advanced coaching badges.

The group which is scandalously under represented in football both as players and managers is of course the English, who have been relentlessly squeezed out since the formation of the Premier League in 1992 and foreign owners, managers and players flooded in as English League  football became ever more lucrative and prestigious.  The result is that the English have become second-class citizens in their own professional football. That is the  inequality which needs addressing.

NB If you want to catch the Nolan programme recording , do so quickly because it will only be available on IPlayer at  http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b04jj29l   fro another 4 days.

The Commonwealth Games:  England should have many  more medals against their name

Robert Henderson

Gratifying as the official success of the England team at the Commonwealth games –173 medals made up of 58 gold, 59 silver and 57 bronze medals – this underplays the scale of England’s dominance.

Of the 19 gold medals officially ascribed to Scotland and the five ascribed to Wales, no less were won by competitors born in England.

Scotland

Gold medallists born in England (Place of birth beside each) taking gold for Scotland are:

Dan Keating – Kettering – Gymnastics
Dan Purvis – Liverpool – Gymnastics
Sarah Addlington – Shrewsbury – Judo
Sarah Clark – South Shields – Judo
Libby Clegg – Stockport – Athletics
Chris Sherringham – Ormskirk – Judo
Hannah Miley Swindon – Swimming
Euan Burton Ascot – Judo

8 golds won

Scots born competitors taking gold for Scotland

Darren Burnett bowls
David Peacock bowls
Alex Marshall bowls
Paul Foster bowls
Neil Spiers bowls
Neil Fachie Cycling
Daniel Wallace Swimming
Ross Murdock swimming
Kimberley Renicks Judo
Louise Renwicks Judo
Josh Taylor boxing
Charlie Flynn boxing

11 golds won

The places of birth can be found at http://results.glasgow2014.com/nation/SCO/scotland.html

NB the Scots born winners include those in bowls who won playing as pairs. Hence, there are more than 19 names when the two groups are added together. The English born competitors all took individual golds.

Wales

The gold medallists born in England (Place of birth beside each) taking gold for Wales were:

Jazz Carlin Shrewsbury
Georgia Davies London
Francesca Jones Kettering
Welsh born competitors taking gold for Wales
Geraint Thomas cycling
Natalie Powell Judo

2 golds won

The places of birth can be found here : http://results.glasgow2014.com/nation/WAL/wales.html

The two Northern Ireland golds were won by Northern Irish born boxers, Michael Conlon and Paddy Barnes.

It is reasonable to assume that the use of competitors born in England by Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland will occur amongst those winning lesser medals or not winning medals at all. The percentage of Scots , Welsh and Northern Irish golds won by English-born competitors is 42% (11 out of 26). If this is repeated in the silver and bronze medals against the Scots, Welsh and N Irish names, that would mean 14 extra silver and 20 extra bronze for England. The English medal total overall would read:

69 gold – 73 silver – 77 bronze, a total of 219.

In addition to the skewing of the medal table by large numbers of English men and women sailing under Celtic flags, England also aids the Celtic Fringe born competitors in many sports because they are part of GB performance programmes which are largely funded by the English.

English sport and the alien invasion

Robert Henderson

In the past few weeks England have lost three times to the All Blacks at rugby and crashed out of the World Cup with only one point from their three pool games . This week  they lost for the first time ever a home  cricket series against Sri Lankra . During the winter the Ashes series was lost 5-0.

What is going wrong? The answer is beautifully simple. English top-flight team sport is suffering from the same sickness that England as a whole is carrying: it is the victim of immigration. Our three  most popular team sports , football, cricket and rugby union, have all opened their doors to any number of foreigners and foreign players, coaches and owners have flooded in.

Football

Of the three most popular teams sports, football is the most advanced in terms of denying places to young English players a, managers and coaches.  This is unsurprising because of the twenty Premiership clubs starting the 2014/15 season ten are foreigner owned,  as are  twelve of the  twenty two Championship clubs. Foreign owners will have no concern for the wellbeing of  English football,  merely a desire to be successful at all costs either from a  desire to make money or for the prestige footballing success brings on the world stage.

The practice  of excluding English players and managers can be found throughout the professional  English football pyramid, but is seen at its most blatant in the Premier League where less than a third of the players regularly starting are English.   This compares with an average of around a third of players being foreign in the top divisions throughout Europe.

The level below the Premier League, the Championship,  is also heavily infiltrated by foreigners and contains one team, Watford, which starkly demonstrates exactly how quickly English players can be squeezed out.   Watford were taken over by the Italian Pozzo  family who also own the Italian Udinese club and Spanish Grenada  club.  The English manager Sean Dyche – who has just led Burnley to the Premiership –  was quickly replaced with the Italian Gianfranco Zola. This was followed by the ridding of the club of most  of the established  English players and their replacement  with foreigners, most being on-loan Italians from Udinese

In addition, the very successful Watford Academy  was  downgraded from  category 1 to category 3 . This  means that Watford can no longer sign boys from nine onwards and can now do so only from the age of 12  and may no  longer compete in the U-21 League which gives experience against the likes of Man U and Arsenal.  This of itself will mean fewer English youngsters coming through the Watford system,  even assuming that young English players will now reach the Watford Academy for it could become a training ground for foreign  imports from Udinese  and Grenada.

Cricket

County cricket  is increasingly  staffed by foreign players and managers.  Foreign ownership does not really come into the picture because county clubs are private members clubs and as such cannot be purchased.  Nor is there the money or  public profile in county cricket to make any attempt to change this situation  worthwhile.

With cricket it is difficult to give an exact percentage for foreign players  because  so many flit in and out of the county game, as they arrive for particular competitions such as the T20 or contract for far less than a full season with a county because they want to play in other T20 leagues  or go away  with  their national sides.

An idea of  the scale of the foreign invasion into county cricket can be gleaned from the Playfair Cricket Annual,  which gives pen portraits of the players  registered for each county for the coming season. By my count the 2014 annual shows  thirty-seven players marked as not  qualified to play for England because they were born outside the UK and have either played for Test teams other than England or have not played for another country but have not lived long enough in England to qualify through residence . A further forty-five who were born outside the UK but have qualified through residence.  Many of the latter group are those who have had a substantial first class career, including in some cases, Test experience , outside of the UK . Few will want or have a realistic chance of playing for England.  They include the likes of the Australian Test player Phil Jacques and  the New Zealand Test player Hamish Marshall. The two groups produce  a  combined figure of eighty-two foreigners either disbarred from playing for England or very unlikely to do so at the beginning of the 2014 season.  Experience shows that additional  foreign players will be employed as the season progresses.  It would not be unreasonable to imagine the eighty-three foreigners at  the beginning of the 2014 season will swell to one hundred plus  by the end of the season.

There are  eighteen  first class county sides which gives 191 places in their first teams.  The vast majority of the foreigners, whether  qualified or not for England,  will be regulars in their county sides, not least because counties are very reluctant to drop a foreign player who has cost  them a good deal of money to hire .   On average there will be three or  four  foreigners in each county side for Championship matches, that is, about  40% of the total  places.   The percentage of foreign players in the limited over games, especially the T20, will probably be higher.

Rugby Union

Rugby Union is a Johnny-come-lately to the paid  sporting ranks, the game only turning professional  in 1995. But it is made up for lost time when it comes to the foreign player stakes , although not to the extent of the football influx, the percentage of foreigners into the Avia Premiership being around a third rather than the two thirds or more of  the Premier League.

Football, cricket and rugby are the main team sports but what has happened to them can be found to varying degrees in all teams sports which have any degree of popularity in Britain  and individual sports  where either there are occasional team events  organised on a national team basis such as the Davis Cup (tennis ) or Ryder Cup (golf) or the sport carries enough popularity and prestige for those controlling the sport to engineer  English or British representation at a high level, no matter how bogus that is. Think of Greg Rusedski  (tennis) or  Zola Budd (athletics).  In principle they should be treated as I suggest sports such as football and cricket should be  treated.

How  foreign players are distributed

The raw number of foreigners is not the only concern. In  any team  sport certain positions are considered to be the most important. In football those positions are the goalkeeper, centre-backs and strikers.  In rugby union it is the scrum half and fly half and full back, in cricket the opening batsmen and fast bowlers.   The foreign imports disproportionately fill those positions.   The consequence is that England teams are left with few players to choose from when selecting people to fill those positions, for example, the England  football team  has very few goalkeepers and strikers to choose from at present.

In the case of cricket, it is almost invariably the case that foreign players are given the plum places in the batting order and if pace bowlers use of the new ball.  That means  English batsmen get pushed down the batting order and English pace bowlers often do not get use of the new ball.

The demoralising effect on English players

English players will be subject to the  politically correct propaganda which the British political elite have institutionalised  within English society.  The mistreatment by the state, the mainstream media and employers of those label led as racist, homophobic or chauvinist  has created considerable fear amongst  the British public, who will often voice politically correct views which they do not subscribe to because they are afraid. The fear also creates a sense of  disconnection with the country which they come from, because they think, rightly, that  they cannot  praise England  without shrieks of racist hurtling in their direction To that can be added the deracination of English children through the emasculation of the English school curriculum so that it does not provide them with their culture history while incessantly promoting any culture and history other than that of the English.

The fact that as budding elite sportsmen they are of necessity forced to live in a world with a great deal of racial and ethnic  variety will reinforce the sense of disconnection and isolation from their own culture and history.  Even if English players did want the situation to change and see the foreigners kicked out  of their sport  there is little they could safely do.  If  they   did wish to protest against the denial of opportunity  to them because of foreign players,  every one of them will know that if they voice criticism of  the influx of foreigners their career will be at best damaged and at worst ended.  It is a toxic environment to work in, especially toxic in clubs where the playing personnel and often the management and coaching  staff are foreign.

In such an environment , the  focus of English players will almost certainly be  concentrated upon their own playing careers to the exclusion of any wider interest  social or national interest in what is happening to their sport.

The selection of English national sides

Pedantically the selection of players who were not English to play for England has been going on for a long time. That is particularly true of cricket where the Indian Ranjitsinji was first  selected in the 1890. But  foreigners in an England shirt were  rarities until the 1980s. Cricket led the way with a horde of  South Africans, Australians and West Indians and the odd New Zealander .   By the 1990s England were regularly putting out sides with four or five foreigners, people such as Alan Lamb, Robin Smith,  Graeme Hick,   Andy Caddick and  Devon Malcolm.  The selectors’ obsession with foreigners waned somewhat in the first half of the  2000s, but strengthened again from 2005 onwards.   Three of the four most recent England Test caps have been unambiguously foreign, that is,  they were both born abroad and spent the large majority of their childhoods in the country of their birth:   Robson (Australian), Jordan (West Indian),  Balance (Zimbabwean ) .  On the managerial side, the Zimbabweans Duncan Fletcher and Andy Flower  between them held the position of head coach for  all but two years of the period 1999-2014.

In the case of football most of the foreign input has occurred on the managerial front. Since 2001,   the England side has had  foreign managers  (Sven-Goran  Eriksson  and Fabio Capello)  for  a combined total of nine years.  Nonetheless, there are signs that the FA are now  willing to grab players from anywhere . Last season feelers were put out  to get the Belgium youngster Adnan Januzaj to play for England on the grounds of his residency in England.  Januzai rebuffed the approaches but the attempt demonstrates how the FA have thrown in the towel when it comes to not selecting foreigners.

Rugby Union began to be really promiscuous with the selection of  foreigners in the England side around the time the game  turned professional (1995).  The squad which toured New Zealand in 2014 contained South Sea Islanders  Manusamoa Tuilagiand  and Semesa Rokoduguni , the South African Brad Barritt and  the New Zealander Dylan Hartley.

What can be legally done?

While Britain remains within the EU only players from outside the EU can be excluded from English professional sport. Moreover,  this is weakened to some degree by the ability of players from outside the EU to gain EU state passports. Nonetheless a blanket ban  on non-EU imports would have considerable although varying effects, viz:

1. Football would probably  be least affected because all European states play professional football, most to a decent standard.  Nonetheless, the available talent pool would be massively reduced and make it much more difficult  for clubs to claim that  the players they were bringing were of exceptional talent.

2. Cricket would be the most affected for the simple reason that cricket is not played to a professional standard outside of England within the EU.

3. Rugby would come somewhere between cricket and football because only France and Italy play the game to international level, although there are a few talented individuals outside of those two countries.

What about foreign ownership of English  sporting clubs? This only seriously affects English football of the big three English team sports.  Even as things are foreigners  from outside the EU could be excluded  if the political will was there. Things would be more difficult  with foreigners from within the EU, but it is  debatable whether the free movement of capital rule throughout the  Single Market would be a bar to preventing the sale of English clubs to foreigners within the EU. Certainty the other large EU countries manage to prevent their top clubs falling into foreign hands.

All that is required to substantially restrict the number of foreigners coming into English professional sport  is for the British government to ban every  would-be owner from outside the EU and every manager, coach and player from outside the EU from working in Britain.  The only thing which has prevented this happening is the ghastly ideological commitment to free trade (including in practice the free movement of peoples) to which the British political elite has succumbed.

Apart from banning non-EU foreigners,  much might be done if  politicians, the media and fans  constantly challenged English sporting clubs over the number of foreigners they employ. Sponsors are sensitive to changes in public wants and might well shun clubs if the public atmosphere was strongly against the employment of foreigners. The same would be true of media outlets which earned their money from sales of their product and advertising.   If fans took up the issue they could bring pressure on clubs by not buying the club merchandise or  making it clear with chants and  banners that they wanted English players in their team. But  to be successful I this tactic does require the mainstream parties to take up the issue and start the ball rolling.  In these politically correct times the general public needs to be reassured that they will not find the police feeling their collars if they start chanting slogans  such as “English players for English teams.”

The perfect solution would be for Britain to leave  the EU. Then every foreign manager, coach and

National sides must be national to have a point

The claiming of people as natives of a country when they manifestly are anything but makes a mockery of the very idea of national sporting sides.   There really is no point in an English cricket side comprised of three or four Southern Africans , an Australian and a West Indian or an England football team managed by  a Swede or Italian.

To keep professional   team sports healthy in England what is  needed is a concentration on English owners, managers, coaches and players in our major team sports.  Only  by keeping the personnel English will there be a large enough pool of talent to draw on for the England  national teams, but also because it will mean the players are  living week by week in a thoroughly English atmosphere and that will accustom them to thinking not only of themselves but of the English national interest.

Such a change would also have a beneficial effect on the audiences for the sports. They would go to see English players playing, managed by English managers and clubs owned or controlled by those raised in the country.  Team sports such as football, cricket and rugby are not just games as liberals would have us believe, they are trials of strength, physical prowess and nerve. .  If England started winning consistently that also would boost national sentiment.

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See also

https://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2011/05/09/english-football-became-foreign-football-played-in-england/

https://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2011/02/15/is-it-in-the-blood-and-the-hypocrisy-of-the-media/

https://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2012/08/29/is-it-in-the-blood-peter-oborne-and-the-question-of-englishness/

 

Would a libertarian society deprive individuals of cultural roots and collective identity?

There are many rooms in the libertarian  ideological house.  That fact often derails rational discussion of libertarian issues, but it need not be a problem in this instance because the question being asked is most  efficiently  examined   by testing  it against  the flintiest wing of libertarian thought.   If  that pristine, uncompromising  form of libertarianism is incompatible with the maintenance of cultural roots and collective identity, then  all other shades of libertarianism will be incompatible to some degree. 

The pristine libertarian has no truck with  any form of government, believing that  personal relations  between individuals  will adequately order society no matter how large or complex the society,  and that such ordering will arise naturally if  only the artificially constraints on human behaviour such as governments and laws are removed.   Such a society  would supposedly  work along these lines.    If the society is threatened by an invader,  individuals will join together to defend it out of a sense of self-preservation.  To   those who cannot work for reasons of sickness, injury, age or innate infirmity,  compassion and a sense of duty will ensure that private charity is  extended  to relieve the need. If  public works such as roads and railways are required, self-interest and reason will drive individuals to join to together to build them.   Matters such as education may be safely  left to parents and such charitable provision as arises.   Above all the individual is king and personal choice is only circumscribed if a choice involves the imposition of one individual’s will on another.   You get the idea.  The consequence is a vision of a society not  a million miles away from  Rightist  forms of anarchism.

This concentration on the individual makes for a fissile society. If each person  is to follow his or her  own way  without any requirement to believe anything other than to respect the conditions necessary to realise libertarian ends , that in itself  would definitely weaken  collective identity and probably affect cultural unity.  Nonetheless in a truly homogeneous society, especially if it was small, the probability is that cultural weakening would not be great and the absence of a conscious collective identity would not present a difficulty provided the society was not subject to a serious threat from outside.

Serious problems  for the pristine libertarian  arise if the society is heterogeneous,  because  then there is a loss of collective unity. If the heterogeneity comes from class,  the cultural roots may  be largely untouched or at least develop in a way  which ensures that there is still much cultural  uniformity  and that uniformity is clearly an extension of  past cultural traits. It is also true that in a racially and ethnically homogeneous society, a sense of collective unity will be easily rekindled if the society comes under external threat.

The most difficult society for libertarians to deal with is one which is ethnically divided, especially if the ethnic divide includes racial difference. There a society becomes not so much a society but a series of competing racial and ethnic enclaves.   In such a situation,  it is inevitable that both  cultural unity and collective identity is undermined because there is no  shared general cultural experience and this plus racial difference makes a collective identity not merely impossible but absurd even in concept.

The brings us to the most obvious threat presented by pristine  libertarians to the maintenance of cultural roots and collective identity. That  is the idea that national boundaries  should be irrelevant with people travelling and settling wherever they choose.  This presumes human beings are essentially interchangeable and in this respect it echoes  multiculturalism.  The consequence of such a belief is to greatly increase the heterogeneity of a society through the mass immigration of those who are radically different from the native population.  We do not need to guess what the result of such immigration is because it  has happened throughout the western world in our own time. More specifically, it has happened in those  countries whose populations which are most naturally sympathetic  to libertarian ideas: those which may broadly be described as Anglo-Saxon; countries such as Britain, the USA and what used to be known as  the old white dominions.

The influx of millions of people who  see themselves as separate from the native populations of the countries to which they had migrated has resulted in the Anglo-Saxon states gradually destroying their tradition of freedom. Driven by a mixture of liberal internationalist ideology and fear, their  elites have severely restricted by laws and their control of the media  and public institutions  what may be said publicly about immigration and its consequences.  In Britain it is now possible to be brought to court simply for saying to someone from an ethnic minority “go home”, while any allegation of racist behaviour  – which may be no more than failing to invite someone from an ethnic minority  to an office party – against a public servant will result at best in a long inquiry and at worst with dismissal.  Nor, in practice, is application of the law or the  witch-hunts  directed equally against everyone for it is overwhelmingly native Britons who are targeted.

At the same time as native Britons are being silenced and intimidated, an incessant tide of pro-immigrant and multiculturalist  propaganda is pumped out by government, the public organisations they control such as the civil service and state schools and the mass media , which is overwhelmingly signed up to the liberal internationalist way of thinking.  The teaching of history has been made a non-compulsory subject in British schools after the age of 14 and such history as  is taught  is next to worthless in promoting a sense of collective unity,  both because it fails to give any chronological context to what is put before the pupils  because it concentrates on “themes”  rather than periods and because the amount of British history that is contained within  the syllabus is tiny, often consisting of the Tudors and little else.  The consequence is that the young of the native British population are left with both a sense that their own culture is in some strange way to be valued less than that of the various immigrant groups and the lack of any knowledge about their country’s past.

The most  and sinister  consequence of  post-war immigration and the British elite’s response to it  is the development within Britain of  a substantial number of Muslims who not only do not have any sense of belonging to the broader society in which they live, but who are actively hostile to  Britain and its values.  But if this is the most dramatic example of the fracturing  of British society, it is merely symptomatic of the separatist attitude of  ethnic minorities in Britain generally, especially those from radically alien cultures allied to racial difference.

All of these developments are antithetical to pristine  libertarian ideals,  both because they  undermine  shared values and because they  result in actions to control friction between competing racial and ethnic groups which in themselves undermine the conditions in which libertarian ideals  flourish.  That libertarians so often subscribe to the ideal of open borders despite the overwhelming evidence of  its counter-productive effects for libertarian ends is indicative of the blinkered nature of much libertarian thinking.

The fundamental weakness of pristine  libertarianism is its complete  failure to take  account of  human psychology  and the way humans behave as groups.  This is unsurprising  because of the central position given to the individual.  But by doing this pristine  libertarians  ignore the central fact of being human: we are a social animal. Being  a social animal entails two defining behaviours: all social animals  produce hierarchies  and   all social animals place limits to the group.  Homo sapiens is no exception.

Because hierarchies in the human context arise not only from the personal efforts, qualities and talents of each individual, as is the case with animals,  but from the  position  each individual occupies through the accident of birth, this raises two difficulties for libertarians.  The first is there is not a level playing field and without that the pristine  libertarian ideal of society organising itself through freely  entered into relationships is severely distorted because it is clearly absurd to say that a man born poor is freely entering into a master-servant relationship with a man born rich when the poor man needs money simply to feed himself.  The second difficulty is that the very existence of an hierarchy,  whether or not it is based on merit, undermines the notion of free choice because once it is established different power relationships exist.

The question of hierarchy becomes more complex as the heterogeneity of a society grows whether that be ever deeper division into classes or increasing ethnic and racial diversity . All social animals have to have boundaries  to  know where the group begins and ends.  This is  because a social animal must operate  within a hierarchy and a hierarchy can only exist where  there are  boundaries.   No boundaries,  no hierarchy, because  no  individual could  ever  know what the dominance/submission situation  was  within their species or at least within those members of the species with whom they interact.

The need to define the group is particularly important for libertarians.    Above all libertarianism requires  trust. In the pristine libertarian society this means each individual believing that other people will keep their word and generally behave honestly. But as we all know only too well  people cannot  be trusted to observe societal norms and a society which is fractured by class, race or  ethnicity  is the least likely of all to have a shared sense of what is right.  Therefore,  libertarians need to recognise that however much they would like to believe that each human being is an individual who may go where he or she pleases and do what he or she pleases, the sociological reality precludes  this and that the only sane ideological course for a libertarian is to advocate closed borders and the preservation of the homogeneity of  those societies which are most favourable to libertarian ideals not because the society  consciously espouses them,  but because the  society has evolved in a way which includes libertarian traits.

There will be libertarians who find it immensely difficult going on impossible to accept that the individual must in some respects be subordinated to the group.  They will imagine, as liberal internationalists do, that human nature can be changed, although in the case of libertarians the change will come not from re-education but the creation of circumstances propitious for libertarian behaviour to emerge.  Let me explain why this is impossible because of the innate differences between  human beings and the effects of cultural imprinting.

Because Man is differentiated profoundly by culture, the widely accepted definition  of a species – a population of freely interbreeding organisms sharing a common gene pool –   is  unsatisfactory,  for  clearly Man is  more  than  a brute   animal  responding   to   simple  biological   triggers.  When   behavioural differences  are perceived as belonging to a particular group  by  that group  as differentiating  members of the group from other  men,    they perform the same role as  organic differences for  they divide Man  into cultural species.

An analogy with computers can be made. As hardware,  a particular model of  computer is  practically identical to every other computer which  is classified  as  the same model.  But the  software available to every computer of the same model is not identical.   They may run  different operating systems, either completely different or different versions of the same program. The software which runs under the operating system is different  with different versions of the same program being used.  The data which is input to the computer varies and this in turn affects the capabilities of the computer.

It  clearly makes no sense to say every computer of the same  model  is the same even if the computer is loaded with the same software.   But of  course  not  all  computers  are  of  the  same  model.  They  vary tremendously  in  their  power.  The same software  will  run  at  very different  rates  because of this.  Storage and memory size  also  vary tremendously. Some computers cannot run programmes because the programmes  are too large.   We  may call all computers computers ,  but that is to say little more  than that  all  animals are animals,  for  computers  range  from  the immensely  powerful super computers – the homo sapiens  of  the computer  world  as it were – to the amoeba of the  simple  chip  which controls  lights  being put on or off in a room  depending  on whether someone is in it.

Are the circumstances of computers  not akin to those of  Man?  Do  not the racially based  differences in IQ correspond to the differences  in power  of  older  and  newer computers?  Do not different  languages  represent different operating systems? For example, think how different must be the mentality of  a native Chinese speaker (using  a language which  is entirely  monosyllabic)  to that of a native English speaker  (using  a polysyllabic language) simply because of the profound difference in the structure  of the language. A language will not merely impose limits on what  may  be  expressed it will affect the  entire  mentality  of  the individual,  from aesthetic appreciation to  social expression. Is not the experiential input analogous to the holding of different data?

But the most potent of human behavioural triggers are racial differences,  for they exercise the strongest control over the group in a territory where different racial groups exist. Race trumps ethnicity where the ethnic clash is one of people of the same race but different ethnicities.  Place a significant population of a different race into a territory where ethnicity rather than race is the cause of unrest and the ethnic factions of the same race will tend to unite against those of a different race.

To argue that racial difference is  not important to the choice of a mate is as absurd as arguing  that the attractiveness of a person is irrelevant to the choice of a  mate.

In  Freakonomics  Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner  cite a study made of a  US dating site (the full story is on pp 80-84).  The site is one  of the  largest  in  the US and the data examined  covered  30,000  people equally  divided  between San Diego and Boston.   Most were  white  but there was a substantial minority of non-white subjects.

The  questionnaire the  would-be  daters had to  fill  in  included  a question  choice on race as “same as mine”  and “doesn’t matter”.   The study  compared  the responses  by white would-be  daters  (those  from non-white were not analysed) to these  questions with the race of  the emails  actually  sent soliciting a date.   The result  in  Levitt  and Dubner’s words was:

“Roughly  half of the white women on the site  and  80  percent  of  the white men declared that  race  didn’t  matter to them. But the response data tell a different story  The white men who said that race didn’t  matter sent  90  percent of  their e-mail  queries  to  white women. The  white women who said race  didn’t  matter sent about 97 percent of their e-mail queries to white men.

“Is  it  possible that race really didn’t  matter  for  these  white women and men and that they simply  never  happened  to browse a non-white date  that  interested them?”

Or,  more likely, did they say that race didn’t matter  because they wanted to come across  especially  to potential mates of their own race as open-minded?” In short, around 99% of all the women and 94%  of all men in the sample were  not  willing  to  seek a  date of a  different  race.   How  much stronger  will  be  the tendency to refuse to breed with a  mate  of  a different race?

If sexual desire will not commonly override the natural disinclination to remain racially separate nothing will.

Because the tendency to mate with those of a similar race is so strong  and universal,  both in place and time, it is reasonable to conclude  that the  behaviour  is innate and that cultures  necessarily include  the requirement for a member of the society to be of a certain racial type. The  consequence of this is that someone of a different racial type  is effectively precluded from full integration because one of the criteria for  belonging has not been met.  That is not to say,  of course,  that many  of the habits of mind of an alien culture may not be  adopted  by someone  of  a  different race.  What is withheld  is  the  instinctive acceptance  of the alien and his or her descendants  as members of  the society. Just as no human being can decide for themselves that they are a member of this or that group, no individual can decide that they belong to this or that nation because it is a two-way process: the other members of the group they wish to join have to accept them as a true member of the group. (Stephen Frears the English  film director once wryly remarked that he had known the actor Daniel Day-Lewis “before he was Irish”).

Where does this leave us? In its present form libertarianism is a most efficient  dissolver of cultural roots and collective identity. It is this because it ignores the realities of  Man’s social nature.  This results in the  creation of the very circumstances which are least conducive to the realisation of libertarian ends.  If libertarians are to realise those ends, they must recognise that the society  most favourable to their beliefs  is one which is homogeneous in which the shared values create the platform of trust which must underlie libertarian behaviour.   Of course, that does not guarantee a society favourable to libertarians because  the shared values may be antithetical to them, but it is a necessary if not sufficient condition for libertarian ideals to flourish. To that libertarians must add a recognition that there are profound differences between ethnic and racial groups and identify those societies which are most worth protecting because they have the largest element of libertarian traits within them.

Written for entry to  the 2010  Chris Tame prize

Bruges Group meeting 23rd April 2013 – Immigration: Can we control it?

Robert Henderson

Speakers: Sir Andrew Green (MigrationWatch UK)

Philip Hollobone (Tory MP for Kettering)

Gerard Batten (UKIP MEP for London)

This was a meeting truly remarkable the vehemence and explicit nature of the anti-immigrant feeling which was put forward not only by members of the audience during questions but by the speakers.  Some made s show of a few token gestures towards fitting their complaints within the pc envelope but most were explicit in their recognition that what matters is the qualitative societal change mass immigration brings.

Sir Andrew Green

Green performed as he usually does, sticking in the main to statistics. Nonetheless he was more forthright than he used to be in his language and statistics alone can be very telling.  These quotes will give a flavour of his talk:

“I would suggest to you that the present scale of immigration represents the greatest threat to our social cohesion we have ever faced and I would further suggest that the failure of the political class to address this issue has undermined confidence in our entire political system. “

“ The public are not in the least convinced   by nonsense they are told about this being a country of immigration.  We are not and never have been.  The number of net migrants in 2010 exceeded the number between 1066 and 1950. “

(Green’s  assertion that more immigrants arrived in the UK  in  2010 than came between 1066 and 1950 is very plausible,  even if  the  figures have to be guesstimates because of the  lack of adequate  records before the 19th century. We can be pretty sure that there was little immigration because populations in Europe were very small by modern standards at the beginning of the period and were reduced dramatically by  the Black Death in the 14th Century which is generally reckoned by historians of the period to have  carried off a third to half of Europe’s inhabitants.  Tellingly, there was a lack of serious riots in England  against foreigners simply because they were  foreigners or against what would now be called ethnic minorities between the expulsion of the Jews in 1290 by Edward I and the arrival of  Protestant Huguenots,  who  arrived  from Catholic France after the revocation of the Edict of Nante in 1684 removed the limited toleration they had been given by the French monarchy.  Their  numbers were not great because they cannot have been great because the population of France was still overwhelmingly Catholic and was probably only 15-20 million during the period in question.  They were followed by an influx of  Jews in the 18th century and bursts of Jewish immigration in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as they fled first the pogroms of eastern Europe and then Hitler.  The numbers involved were very small compared with the vast numbers who have arrived since 1945 and particularly in the period since 1997 (tens of  thousands compared with millions in the modern period).

Green made these statistical points:

–          Most of the immigration to the UK comes from outside the EU. Therefore, the UK should be concentrating on reducing that while we remain within the EU.

–          If net immigration  continued to run  at 200,000 pa, the figure which it has averaged for the past ten years, the UK population  would reach 70 million by 2027.

–          The Coalition has managed to make significant progress towards  their target of reducing net immigration to tens of thousands by 2015. However, the right to free movement granted to Romania and Bulgaria from 1 January 2014 could easily undermine these efforts.

–          The Coalition may fudge things by not including the 2014 Bulgarian/ Romanian figures in the immigration statistics before the next general election.

–          Very large numbers of Bulgarians are already in Spain and Italy and may well move northwards to escape the difficult  economic circumstances in those countries.  Green also mentioned that there are 1.5m Roma in these countries.

–          The official immigration figures massively understate the true level of  EU immigration, perhaps by 2-3 times.

Green raised the question of leaving the EU but did not explore it, although he stated .  He suggested instead that when the proposed renegotiation with the EU  took place,   access to benefits by EU migrants should be one of the prime subjects for Britain to put on the agenda.

Although Green did not wholeheartedly go for the policies which would allow Britain to  really control her borders such as leaving the EU and repudiating any other treaty which restricts Britain’s ability to control her borders,  both he and MigrationWatch have  come a long way in the past ten years. There was a time when Green would have disregarded the EU dimension and spoken only about restricting immigration from outside the EU. Nor would you have heard him using such blunt language and sentiments as those contained in the two passages I have quoted above.  The movement of Green and MigrationWatch (most of it in the past five years) is emblematic of a general movement in the rhetoric if not the action of the mainstream British Parties and the British elite in general in recent years.

Philip Hollobone

For a Tory MP, indeed for any MP,  Holbone was startlingly frank.  He is a member of the “Better off Out” group  and maintains  that the demands of EU membership is “not a price the British people wish to pay”. This allowed him to embrace the idea that the UK could only regain control of its borders by leaving the EU.

While the UK remained within the  EU he advocated that the Government should (1) challenge the EU by refusing  to accept the lifting of the transitional rules  for Bulgarians and Romanians and (2) do what other countries in the EU such as Spain and officially register foreign workers and keep tabs on them.

Hollobone also railed against the pressure immigrants  brought on  infrastructure and  the crime they committed,  declared that the NHS was “ the National Health Service not the World Health Service” and stated  that UK  citizenship was granted far too  easily and should require 15 or 20 years  of well behaved residence in the country before someone was considered for citizenship.

All well and good, but sadly and pathetically Hollobone tried to excuse himself and other politicians from not speaking out until recently because it was only the advent of white immigration from the EU which had “given permission”  to the British to complain about immigration.  He needed to be “given permission” before speaking  out? That is the problem with mainstream British politicians in a nutshell: they have not got an ounce of courage.  When it comes to emotive and serious subjects, what counts is speaking when it is dangerous not when it is safe.

 Gerard Batten   

Batten was even franker than Hollobone. As a UKIP member, he is of course in favour of leaving the UK, (which he stressed was the only way to regain control over the UK’s borders), but he also favours withdrawing from the European Convention on Human Rights, repealing the Human Rights Act, making over-staying a visa a criminal offence and only allowing visitors into Britain if they either have health insurance or the UK has reciprocal medical arrangements with the visitor’s country.  Batten also suggested that immigrants  whose status could be illegal should be forced to  register with the government  if they wanted their cases  investigated.  Failure to register should, he said,  result in expulsion from the UK  without any chance of appeal.

Batten  slated the great increase in immigration from the Blair government onwards , an increase which he attributed to a deliberate Labour policy designed to change the ethnic make-up of the UK.  (The grounds for  this belief is the Evening Standard article by Andrew Neather in 2009 in which he claimed that “mass immigration was the way that the Government was going to make the UK truly multicultural”  (http://www.standard.co.uk/news/dont-listen-to-the-whingers–london-needs-immigrants-6786170.html).

Batten derided the British MEPs other than those from  UKIP who had recently voted  in the EU Parliament for the adoption of a report advocating the entry into the EU of Turkey, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo, countries with a combined population of 80 million.

The importance of breaking the liberal censorship

The vehemence of many of the audience was considerable. Not only were  very strong opinions against the politically correct  status quo expressed, the tones of voice and the  body language were both extremely animated.

Although there was no effing and blinding or crude racist language,  the ideas being put forward by both the speakers and the audience  were far more inflammatory in their implications  than many of those  who have been charged in recent times with  being “racist” because of what they have said or written in public.   Take  Green’s “the greatest threat to our social cohesion we have ever faced” or Batten’s belief that Blair had used immigration as an instrument of policy to fracture the ethnic solidarity of the UK.   Is that really different in sentiment from the white working class Englishwoman Emma West who is charged with a racially aggravated  public order offence for saying in a public place things like  “‘You ain’t English. No, you ain’t English either. You ain’t English. None of you’s ****ing English. Get back to your own ****ing… do you know what sort out your own countries, don’t come and do mine.”?  (http://englandcalling.wordpress.com/2011/12/01/emma-west-immigration-and-the-liberal-totalitarian-state/).

The audience questions were heartening because they  were based mainly on the social rather than the economic impact of immigration.  The competition for jobs, housing, medical treatment, education and welfare is of course important,  but the primary objection to mass immigration is the general change it brings to society. Mass immigration which results in numbers of particular nationalities, races and ethnicities arriving which are sufficient to permit the development of settlements with separate ways of living  from the host population is a covert form of conquest.  Mass immigration of the unassimilatable is an act of the most profound treason by those with political power who permit it, and, in the case of the Labour governments of  Blair and Brown, made doubly so by those who positively encourage it as a matter of policy.  It is treason  because the effect of such immigration is to effectively allow the unassimilatable to colonise territory by settlement.

I attempted without success to be called to put a question. Had I been called my question would have been “Before there can be proper public debate about immigration and its consequences the restrictions on free expression which result in people being charged with criminal offences, losing their jobs or being the subject of a media hate campaign when they speak honestly on the subject must be removed. What will the speakers be doing to remove those restrictions?” Unfortunately no one else asked the question so it went by default.

There is undoubtedly a changed and  changing public rhetoric on race and immigration, but it is still being controlled by those with power and influence. To get the change on immigration policy which is required – an end to mass immigration and the policy of multiculturalism – the general public must be able to express their views as they choose without fear of prosecution or other penalties such as the loss of employment.

This question also has serious implications for those who wish to leave the EU. Immigration is the prime driver of anti-EU sentiment in the UK. If the present straitjacket of fear  about expressing non-pc views on immigration remains,  the politically correct can stifle and manipulate debate on not only immigration  but also EU membership by  representing those who wish to leave the EU as xenophobes at best and racists at worst.

The Archers: an everyday story of simple feminists saying “Men!” folk

Robert Henderson

The white male characters in the Archers are invariably  either louts or cringing wimps who are treated as children by the female characters.  (Ethnic minority male characters are of course exempted from this rule, being invariably middleclass and if not always models of moral decorum never pathetic).

In recent weeks the dissatisfaction   with men of the crazed feminists who control the programme has reached new levels of intensity and scope.  Everywhere in the fictional village female characters are treating their menfolk with a disdain and lack of consideration unusual by the very high standards of contempt and condescension they normally display towards them. This feminine misbehaviour is of course not misbehaviour at all in feminist eyes but female “empowerment”.

Brenda Tucker has given her long-time live in boyfriend Tom Archer the old heave-ho for  the high-octane feminist reasons that (1) she wants to follow her own career and (2) is determined not to have children.   The announcement of this opened the way for the script writers to have Tom trying to blub his way to getting her back and sundry female characters saying how understandable it was that Brenda had decided to put her own feelings and career first.

Chris Carter, who was recently in intensive care after having an accident  after  being distracted at his work by his wife  Alice being selected  for a job in Canada and expecting  him to drop his own business as a farrier to join him there on spec.  Nothing daunted in the feminist selfishness stakes,  Alice  spent weeks during his recovery still thinking about going to Canada before eventually deciding against emigrating  – for the moment.

Lillian Bellamy’s excruciating geriatric affair with the overtly ineffably wet Paul has hit a rocky patch with Paul revealing more and more of his distinctly sinister side with  possessiveness  and pettishness alternating, while Lillian continues to show no remorse about betraying her live-in partner Matt Crawford.

Darrell Makepeace and his Albanian wife are at odds over Darrell’s inability to get regular work and is even more concerned over what he is doing to bring in the money he does bring in. Darrell being white, English and working-class  is fair game for misbehaviour to be allotted to him. He arrived in the series with a prison sentence behind him and has now been plonked into a storyline which has him caught up in a dog-fighting ring which is where he is getting his money from.

Pip Archer, arguably the most irritating female character ever to hit the airwaves, is permanently in a rage with her father David for daring to expect her to help about the family farm whilst she is living there rent and board free during her time at university.

But it has not quite been all feminist abuse of men. Helen Archer,  well into her thirties and replete with child obtained through artificial insemination from an unknown donor, is dating again in the manner of a 15 year-old. Nothing disastrous has happened yet but this being Helen it will. And needless to say, she and  the other main female characters will be saying “Men!”

On the everyday story of disabled folk front, the Downs child Bethany born to Mike and Vicky Tucker when Mike is in his sixties and she in her forties, is now greeted with cries of joy by every Archers’ character. This week the “normalisation of disability” in Ambridge took another step forward with the local WI putting on a talk given by a mother and her adult age Downs son. The event  was of course  greeted with universal praise.

Finally, the introduction of the Muslim character Iftikar Khan into the Archers core family  has been at least temporarily delayed. An attempted kiss and embrace between the chatelaine of lower Loxley Elizabeth  Pargetter and Khan resulted in a rebuff, gentle of course, from Elizabeth,  on the grounds that  she was “Not quite ready for a relationship”. But diversity lovers should not fear. It is only a matter of time before they are an item.  Indeed, the white, English  characters  are already preparing the ground . When gossip about a romance was developing between Khan and Elizabeth, a number of them talked about it without batting an eyelid at the prospect of a Muslim ending up as the squire of an English country estate with doubtless the patter of tiny feet of  a Mohammed or Fatima or both echoing in the ancient Lower Loxley halls.  Will Elizabeth have to convert to Islam is the big question.

Truly amazing what the BBC thinks goes on in an English farming village.

You have to understand religion and the religious mentality to understand history

Robert Henderson

YouGov have just undertaken a poll on behalf of the Oxford University Education Department to judge the attitude  of people in England to the teaching of  Religious Education (RE).  (http://www.ox.ac.uk/media/news_releases_for_journalists/121126.html). The support for such teaching was strong:

In the poll of a random sample of 1,832 adults in England, 64 per cent agreed that children need to learn about Christianity in order to understand English history; 57 per cent agreed it was needed to understand the English culture and way of life; and 44 per cent said they thought that more attention should be given to such teaching. Areas of Christianity that people regarded as particularly important for children to learn about in RE were the history of Christianity (58 per cent), major Christian events and festivals (56 per cent), and how Christianity distinguishes right from wrong (51 per cent).”(

This is  very welcome. In the Go-Between the novelist L P Hartley famously wrote  “The past is a foreign country”. Clichéd  as that now is it contains a serious truth.  When, for example,   an Englishman goes to America  he finds much that is familiar; the trappings of modernity in the cities and towns, the motorways, the cars and so on. It is not difficult for an Englishman to feel comfortable there. But there are also differences: the ways in which  English is spoken, the food , the conduct of the law and politics and much more.  Less obvious but more important are the differences in mentality between one culture and the next, even two such as England and the USA which have much culturally in common.    If an Englishman goes to France he still sees much which is  familiar because France has the trappings of modernity, but the differences between England and France are more pronounced  If an Englishman visits China the differences will be starker still and if he goes to a Third World country such as Rwanda the sense of being in an alien culture will be profound.

Studying the past is akin to visiting foreign countries.  Even when it is the history of the country in which a person has been born and raised, there are always the differences, many  subtle, some  glaring.  That is why having a good understanding  of the surface facts – dates, battles, institutions and so on – as retailed by  historians is not enough for a firm  grasp of the past, although the surface facts, especially the chronological details, are essential.   The differences in how those in the past viewed the world,  especially what was of prime importance to them compared with what we think is important,  must be understood.  For most of the English past nothing has been more important than religion as both a shaper of the individual mentality and the  creator of institutions and social norms.  That is why an understanding of Christianity is essential  for English children) because so much of English  history was shaped by Christianity and much of the general shape of English society today is ultimately the consequence of the actions of those driven by Christian beliefs.  (I write incidentally, not as a believer but an agnostic  – see  http://livinginamadhouse.wordpress.com/2010/09/19/what-is-the-rational-position-on-religion/).

Much of what we value in our society is the result of a sense of  Christian religious duty  to aid the unfortunate. The idea of  charity lies at the heart of  Christianity.  Academic education (and even literacy)  survived in the English mediaeval world  because of the Church and until the latter half of the nineteenth century English education was dominated by schools which were religiously inspired. Many of England’s  best known  schools (Eton, Winchester, Westminster, Charterhouse)  and her two premier universities Oxford and Cambridge have their origins in  Christian endowments, as do some of her most famous hospitals   (Barts, the Royal Free,  Guy’s and St Thomas’ ). Trade unions  and  the co-operative movement  – major  sources  of non-state corporate social support for the poor  well into the 1960s –  both had strong religious roots in Christian socialism.  Much of Britain’s most impressive architecture is contained within its  churches and cathedrals.   The English language is gilded with many phrases from the King James’ Bible: A broken heart, A fly in the ointment, A leopard cannot change its spots, A multitude of sins  (http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/bible-phrases-sayings.html).  In its many small fields and hedgerows , the  English countryside caries the marks of the enclosure movement  whose first wave was led by the monasteries before the Reformation.

More broadly the development of  parliamentary government (an English invention) can be ascribed in large part to the strains of Protestantism  (the English Nonconformist sects) which treated the relationship between the individual and God  as one which did not need to be mediated by priests but, rather, was something which came to fruition through self-constructed prayers and study by the lay individual of the Bible and the book Common Prayer in English.  This  individualism began in the 14th Century with the first complete translation of the Bible into English (the Wycliffe or Lollard Bible) and came to full flower with the Reformation.  Men and women could for the first time, if they were literate, read the Bible for themselves.  This religious individualism could and did translate itself  into political individualism where the individual was seen not  as a vassal but as  an active political player. This mixture of religious  and political activism  reached its height in the  period 1640-60, the time of Civil War, Commonwealth and Protectorate (see http://englandcalling.wordpress.com/the-beginnings-of-english-democratic-thought/).

The spirit of individualism also flowed into economic behaviour and played at least a significant part in the commercial  and then industrial development which led to the first and only bootstrapped  industrial revolution.  Many of the great(and lesser)  entrepreneurs of the industrial revolution  – Josiah Wedgewood and Abraham Darby are good examples –  were Nonconformists.  These were people who saw success in business, as evidence of  God’s favour or at least proof of the  living of a godly life, but   it may also have been a consequence of the fact , as we shall shortly see, that  Nonconformists  were excluded from public life  until the 19th century.

The religious mentality

But there is far more to  understanding Christianity than counting  the outcomes of  Christian belief.  Even more important is to get inside the heads of those living in an intensely religious world. It is immensely difficult for English men and women today, even if they are professing Christians,  to comprehend  what religion has meant in England  in the past. Imagine a world in which a belief, or at least a professed belief,  in Christianity  was not simply a question  of  personal choice but  a matter of life or death.  Nor was it a case of simply believing in a Christian God, it had to be the “right” variety  of Christian belief  That was England until  well into the 17th century  when the death penalty for   heresy,  blasphemy, atheism and suchlike offences remained until the  Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Act 1677 was passed removing the ultimate punishment.  But until well into the 19th century  Non-conformists, Catholics , Jews and unbelievers remained under considerable legal disadvantages  such as a bar to holding  many public offices – including being an MP – because  the Corporation Act of 1661 and the  Test Act of 1673 required office holders to at least pretend to be Anglicans. The Acts were not invariably rigorously enforced for Nonconformists,  but they were still a considerable bar to playing a part in public life.

Apart from the legal deterrents to not following the  “right” beliefs, there was immense social pressure to conform.   The philosopher David Hume, almost certainly an agnostic at best and atheist at worst,  remained coy about his exact beliefs until he lay on his deathbed  in the late 18th century because of the fear of being thought an unbeliever.  Remnants of that social pressure can  still be seen in the reluctance of leading present day politicians to publicly declare themselves unbelievers.

But the imposition of a prescribed religion by the state was not simply a matter of social control, although the hierarchical nature of the relationship of  the god in Christianity, Islam and Judaism  and believers  does serve that purpose, it mimicking the relationship between lord and vassal.   Large numbers of people, including those with power and influence, took their religion extremely seriously for  it was the very centre of their lives.   Part of that was the individual’s  fear of Hell and Purgatory opposed to the promised reward for the virtuous of  Heaven.  But there was also a social dimension because people believed that worshipping in the “right” manner was essential to the wellbeing of society, that to do otherwise would bring the wrath of God  in the form of war, pestilence and famine.  To cry heretic when that is sincerely believed is not a contemptible act in the eyes of believers but a matter of social responsibility. (It is entirely different from the politically correct today crying racist,  because the imposition of politically correct ideas arises not from a belief that their absence will result in punishment by an outside agency but from a wish to create the world in the image of the politically correct. )

There was also something which might be described as religious infatuation. Men and most commonly women had an intensely personal relationship with their imagined  God.   Those who took the veil and entered convents  were brides of Christ and some displayed behaviour which suggests a sublimated sexual infatuation with the idea of  Jesus.  Men subscribed to worship of the virgin Mary in similar fashion.  Saints were venerated and their places of burial the sites of pilgrimage.  Relics of  saints and best of all Christ – a thorn supposedly from Christ’s  crown of thorns or even better a splinter from the True Cross stood at the top of the relic pecking order – were treated with immense reverence and accorded what in other circumstances would be accounted occult powers, especially of healing and protection against disaster.

There was a baser side to religion. Human nature being what  it is, the clergy often seemed more intent on growing rich than tending their flocks or worshipping God.  Indulgencies to expunge the wages of sin and reduce time in Purgatory were sold cynically by Pardoners.  Pride was shown both by  priestly display and in the claims of some of the more exhibitionist ascetics to being the most unworthy of men. The Reformation of the 16th Century  was in large part  the child  of many centuries of dissatisfaction with the venal  and unconscientious nature of many of the clergy.  Nor was the great mass of the English population models of Christian restraint  and piety. William Langland’s 14th Century Piers Plowman draws a vivid picture of both the failures of the clergy and the often riotously disrespectful laity.

But these abuses were seen as  the shortcomings of men not of God.  Religious belief was often not merely sincere but intimidatingly sincere. The dire torments which the religious have willingly borne when they could have been avoided  simply by recanting (as was normally the case with the Inquisition and something prescribed in canon law)  or accepting that the emperor was a god  (as with Imperial Rome ) are astonishing.    There are few if any of the dimensions of torture which the religious have not suffered, death by fire, pressing with weights and  being slowly lowered into molten lead are just a few.  Nor were the exalted spared.  Bishops Hugh  Latimer and Nicholas Ridley  and the Archbishop of Canterbury Thomas Cranmer (collectively the Oxford Martyrs)  were  burnt at the stake in 1555 during the reign of  the Catholic Mary I.

Beneath Christianity lay the ancestral remnants of older religions and superstitions. Most English men and women  still lived in a world full of  the supernatural.  Satan and his manifestations and helpers were aboard in the world in the minds of  even many of the educated. As late as the 17th Century  witches were regularly accused and frequently  executed,  often by burning.  Eclipses of the sun could provoke widespread panic.

To the modern mind raised in a society which is both secular  in spirit and rational in intent  (because of scientific knowledge),  beliefs in the supernatural will often  seem absurd . But place yourself in a world without any scientific understanding and it does not seem ridiculous.  It is not difficult to see how belief in the supernatural would arise in a big-brained animal with a high degree of self-awareness.  It would be natural for hunter-gatherers  to think that the world was  controlled  by gods and spirits as they witnessed volcanic eruptions, floods, thunder and lightning  or saw anything inanimate which moved such as a river to be in some sense alive. What more natural in such circumstances to imagine the sun was dying as winter drew in and the days shortened and the gods needed to be placated by sacrifice to prevent the death?  What more natural if you believe in gods and spirits  to turn to the  shaman to control and placate the gods and spirits with potions and spells or to practice sympathetic magic  by enacting or drawing on cave walls an event such as a successful hunt for game?

Even when societies become considerably larger and more sophisticated than that of the hunter-gatherer tribe the same fears exist. Superstition exists strongly in the most advanced societies as evidenced by the many people who are psychologically dependent on a talisman such as a lucky object (which can be anything) or performing certain actions in a certain order – professional sportsmen are particularly prone to this type of self-comforting. Perhaps there is little difference between this and the belief in Christian relics. Obsessive compulsive disorders  could be seen as extreme examples of  the superstitious trait diverted to other overt purposes.  Human beings wish to be in control and even in a modern advanced state they often do not feel they are and seek comfort blankets where they can.

The broader picture

A knowledge and understanding of  Christianity is of course also a necessary  tool for interpreting European history.  Just as England’s history has been shaped by Christianity, so has Europe’s  and that of the  vast lands which have their origins in European colonialism  and exist today with a population predominantly  drawn from Europe and  cultures  which have their roots in those of Europe:  North America, much of central and Southern America , Australia and New Zealand.

More broadly still, the traits which are evident in Christians are a guide to the religious experience of other non-Christian lands, for the religious impulse if not the theology is the same.

Ideological capture

Tiger got to hunt, bird got to fly

Man got to sit and  wonder why, why, why?

Tiger got rest, bird got to land,

Man got to tell himself he understand

(Cat’s Cradle Kurt Vonnegut)

But the utility of understanding the sociology and psychology of religion goes far beyond  religion. It provides a guide to secular ideologies and their adherents.  By ideology I mean a set of ideas, religious or secular, to which an individual subscribes blindly regardless of the objective and testable truth of  the ideology or of any contradictions which it may contain.

The same qualities which create religious belief  can be placed in the service of  secular all-encompassing ideologies such as Marxism and  Fascism which offer the same psychological anchors and incentives as religions such as Christianity and Islam provide: the idea that there is something  greater than the individual; a universal guide to living a life;   the promise of the jam of a better life if not tomorrow at least sometime; the satisfaction of the tribal urge; the absolution from moral obligation to those who are outside the group and, perhaps above all, the sense of a journey  which lends meaning  to the individual life.

The totalitarian ideology which is political correctness is the best modern example in the West of  how the religious impulse has been shifted from formal religion to a secular belief.  The politically make objectively incorrect claims such as a heterogeneous society is superior and much desirable  to a homogeneous one (objectively incorrect because the heterogeneous society is invariably  more unstable and fractious than the heterogeneous one – let the reader provide an contrary example if they  wish to dispute this), that race is simply a social construct (the general physical differences in populations which we call races would not exist if humans did not treat racial difference as a potent barrier to interbreeding) or there is no  innate  difference between the capabilities and mentality of a man and a woman  (tell that to a woman giving birth), the apparent differences being simply a matter of social conditioning.   These assertions are every bit as absurd, because reality contradicts them, as the belief of Catholics that transubstantiation means that literally the blood of and body of Christ enter the wine and bread during  Holy Communion or the belief of  Muslims that the Koran was dictated to Mohammed by the Archangel Gabriel.

How do ideologies develop? The evolutionary scientist Richard Dawkins’ concept of the meme applies with especial force  to ideologies sacred or profane.   The meme is  the mental equivalent of a gene.  It is, like the gene, a replicator. Here is Dawkins defining it:

Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches.  Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperms or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation.  If a scientist hears, or reads about, a good idea, he passed it on to his colleagues and students.  He mentions it in his articles and his lectures.  If the idea catches on, it can be said to propagate itself, spreading from brain to brain.  As my colleague N.K. Humphrey neatly summed up an earlier draft of this chapter: `… memes should be regarded as living structures, not just metaphorically but technically.(3)  When you plant a fertile meme in my mind you literally parasitize my brain, turning it into a vehicle for the meme’s propagation in just the way that a virus may parasitize the genetic mechanism of a host cell.  And this isn’t just a way of talking — the meme for, say, “belief in life after death” is actually realized physically, millions of times over, as a structure in the nervous systems of individual men the world over.’  (http://www.rubinghscience.org/memetics/dawkinsmemes.html)

Memes are  arguably the most important evolutionary insight since Darwin’s formulation  of natural selection.  Dawkins has not received the praise he deserves ,  most probably because the concept does imply a great deal of determinism in human thought , something  which makes most human beings , if they think about the matter at all, decidedly uncomfortable.

Ideologies are a special class of meme because they are not a single discrete entity as many memes are.  They have the ability to not merely mutate, which could be said of any meme just as it could be said of any gene,  but the capacity to build endlessly complicating systems of thought, chains of memes link in a network of belief.  These systems of thought at their most extreme purport to not merely explain how to seek a given end but to provide a model of the entirety of reality.

Homo  Sapiens is very susceptible to the passing  of memes both because many are useful or enjoyable and because being a big-brained animal with language and a high degree of self-awareness  human beings are innately curious and questioning.  Those qualities also make humans acutely aware of possible dangers and opportunities which require reasoning and solutions.  But like genes memes can be beneficial, indifferent  or harmful in their effects.   Ideologies are never entirely benign because they require coercion to maintain their dominance for there will always bee dissenters from the ideology.  That is particularly true of secular ideologies, not least  because unlike religions they can be tested against reality.  Nonetheless,  there is a clear difference between ideologies which require people to behave in a way which acts  against the coherence and stability of their society and those which result in obnoxious consequences for those within the society deemed heretics  but do not strike at the natural unity that a homogeneous society displays.

An example of the former type of ideology  is political correctness,  which has at its centre the principle of  non-discrimination regardless of race, ethnicity,  gender or sexual inclination.  This principle leads to a policy of  large scale immigration of those who cannot or will not  assimilate, into very homogeneous societies such as England and the suppression of dissent  by the native population against the practice. This both neglects the wishes of the native population and invariably results  in a fractured (because immigrant ghettos always form)  and authoritarian society  as those responsible for the resulting multicultural/racial mess  desperately try to prevent the native population shouting treason and traitor and holding those responsible to account.

The latter type of ideology can have very different effects on a society  however damaging they may seem to be when witnessed at a particular point.   For example,  any theocracy will almost certainly have an innate tendency to enhance the natural tribal instincts of whatever society it holds in thrall.  It may damage individuals who are deemed heretics or unbelievers, but by its nature it will not allow vast numbers of  immigrants who do not share whatever is the faith to enter.  Not only that, by espousing a system of belief which is to be shared by all, those who do share the faith to the satisfaction of the theocrats will form a natural barrier against any attempt by those who are different even if they nominally share the faith because there will always be reasons to be found  for saying those not wanted for racial or ethnic reasons other than religion  are doctrinally unsound.  By retaining the integrity of the group, the ideology has, however damaging it may have been in other ways, has preserved the means for the society to survive and in time evolve to a less oppressive state.  The society made heterogeneous by creeds such as political correctness  is damaged fundamentally and may never recover.

How should religion be taught in schools?

I suggest this.  The English school curriculum is overflowing with subjects competing for space so it is pointless proposing a scheme of religious education which would take up much time.   An hour a week is probably what most pupils will get at present.   That might seem too little to encompass the curriculum I suggest,  but a great deal can be taught even in an hour a week over a period of twelve or thirteen years in school.  There is also a strong case for cancelling religious education as a separate subject and incorporating it into history teaching. That could extend the time available for religious teaching by one or two hours, although  sadly history teaching is badly neglected in English state schools at present.  However, there are serious moves afoot to increase its presence in schools  and develop a  decent English/British history curriculum. (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/9733464/History-is-not-all-Hitler-and-Henrys-say-MPs.html) .  The subject could also be worked into lessons dealing with politics to show the dangers of ideology.

The tenets of religion should be taught not as a fact or with the intention of either engendering religious belief  or of reinforcing an existing belief, but as propositions which can be examined  for their truth or falsity, as history  and, most importantly, as psychological and sociological  traits and events.

Obviously not all those things could be taught to all ages. The teaching of primary school children should concentrate on facts (I always give at least  two cheers for Mr Gradgrind) and Bible stories. As the child moves into secondary education they can begin to receive the intellectual, psychological and sociological ramifications of religion.

In England the emphasis should be overwhelmingly  on Christianity for the simple reasons that it is the religion which has been written into the English story  for over  fourteen centuries and  is the religion, in its various forms,  which has  written much of the  stories of the foreign lands  into whose historical clutch  England has longest been, namely, the countries and peoples of Europe.

Knowledge of other religions should be given briefly  to show the things they share both with Christianity and amongst themselves.   Islam  and Judaism should be given more prominence than the others because  the former is the one major no-Christian religion  to war directly with Europe and for a time to occupy European territory while the latter is a religion which has existed in Europe  for longer than Christianity.

The intent of the new religious curriculum is simple: it is not to make children into theologians,  but to give them a glimpse of the way people were in the religious past and how this affected their  lives, the wars they fought , how they thought and  the influence they have on English society today.