Category Archives: religion

Islam is simply incompatible with Western society

Robert Henderson

Seventeen people have  been murdered in the two terrorist attacks in Paris (between  7-9th January 2015). Ten were journalists, including some of France’s leading cartoonists,   working for the  French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. To them can be added two policemen, one policewomen and four  members of the general  public who happened to be unlucky enough to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.  The attacks were made on the Charlie Hebdo offices and  the  Jewish supermarket Hyper Cacher. The policewoman was shot in a separate incident.

The terrorist acts  were coordinated to produce maximum effect. That on  Charlie Hebdo was by the  brothers Said and Cherif Kouachi , who were of Algerian ancestry.  A third  brother Mourad Hamyd aged 18  was at school at the time of the Charlie Hebdo attack and has spoken to but not been detained by the police. The attack on a Jewish supermarket  was undertaken by a Mailian  Amedy Coulibaly.  He also killed a policewoman before his attack on the Jewish supermarket.  Coulibaly’s wife, Hayat Boumeddiene, who is of Algerian ancestry,  is thought to be another Muslim fanatic with homicidal tendencies. She is believed to have fled to Syria after  the shooting of the policewoman.

Those who died  at the Charlie Hebdo office were slaughtered  by men  shouting Allahu Akbar (God is great), “We have avenged the prophet!”  [for cartoons of making fun of Mohammed published by Charlie Hebdo) and just to make sure the message got across “Tell the media that this is al-Qaeda in Yemen” .   Cherif Koachi also said in a telephone  interview with a magazine  after the killings that the plot was financed by  al Q aeda The Jewish supermarket killer  introduced himself to frightened hostages  with the words ‘I am Amedy Coulibaly, Malian and Muslim. I belong to the Islamic State’.  All three killers  either expressed a wish for martyrdom or  behaved in a way in which was guaranteed to get  them killed.   All three were shot and killed by French security forces.

Unless  you are a particularly stupid and self-deluding  liberal  and have either persuaded yourself  that  this was a black op and the killers were agents of the wicked old West or have fallen back on that old liberal favourite  that the killers  are not true  Muslims  – congratulations to the Telegraph’s Tim Stanley for being so quick off the mark with that piece of shrieking inanity   –  you will think these are Muslim terrorists.  (The next time you encounter someone spinning the “not true Muslims” line ask them whether  the Crusaders of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were Christians).

Sadly there are many liberals who have not learnt the lesson dealt out by these atrocities. It is true that there has been almost complete condemnation of the killings by the liberal elites around the Western world, but one wonders how unqualified and sincere their regret and anger is.  Apart from the  liberal apologist  mantras  “not true Muslims”, “Just a tiny minority of Muslims” and “Islam is the religion of peace”   being  much in evidence, there has  been a disagreeable media eagerness to portray the killers as sophisticated military beasts. Here is a prime  example from the Telegraph:

“They wear army-style boots and have a military appearance and manner. One of the men wears a sand-coloured ammunition vest apparently stuffed with spare magazines. Some reports suggest that an attacker was also carrying a rocket-propelled grenade launcher.

“The men attacked the magazine’s headquarters with clinical precision, killing their victims and then shooting two police officers in the street outside.

“Amateur footage shows them using classic infantry tactics. They move along the street outside the office working as a pair: one advances while the other gives cover.

“Instead of spraying automatic gunfire, they fire two aimed shots at each target – a pattern known as “double-tap” firing – thereby conserving their ammunition.”

Shades of white liberals in the 1960s drooling over the Black Panthers in the USA  .

The truth is that the attackers did not behave like highly trained soldiers, and some of the reporting was simply wrong, for example, after the slaughter the killers,  as was widely reported , did not walk calmly back to the stolen  car  they were using but ran.  When they abandoned the car one of the killers left his identity card behind. After the murders at Charlie Hebdo the  two killers drove around  like headless chickens hijacking cars and holding up petrol stations to obtain food and water.  If they had really been cold, calculating beasts they would either have stayed where they were after the Charlie Hebdo killings and died in a firefight with the French police or arranged matters so that they had a hiding  place  to go to and  would  carried things like a little  food and water with them.  The widespread media  depiction of them as quasi-military figures glamourized and sanitised what they were.

The British political mainstream response

But it would be wrong to say nothing changed in Britain after the attacks. The Ukip leader Nigel Farage broke new ground for a mainstream British politician in modern Britain  by speaking of  a fifth column of people who hate us within Britain.

“There is a very strong argument that says that what happened in Paris is a result – and we’ve seen it in London too – is a result I’m afraid of now having a fifth column living within these countries.

“We’ve got people living in these countries, holding our passports, who hate us.

“Luckily their numbers are very, very small but it does make one question the whole really gross attempt at encouraged division within society that we have had in the past few decades in the name of multiculturalism.”

This was predictably  condemned by David Cameron, a  man who incredibly  still believes Turkey within the EU would be of great benefit to all concerned,  despite the anger and dismay in Britain about mass immigration generally making the prospect  of 70 million Turkish Muslims having a right to move freely within the EU certain to be  utterly dismaying to most native Britons. Interestingly, a would-be successor to Cameron as Tory leader, Liam Fox,  edged a long way towards reality in an article for the  Sunday Telegraph:

“All those who do not share their fundamentalist views are sworn enemies, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, Arab or non-Arab. It is the first lesson that we must understand – they hate us all because of who we are, our views, our values and our history. Western liberal apologists who tell us that the violence being directed at us is all of our own making not only fail to understand reality, but put us at increased risk.

“We must understand that there are fanatics who cannot be reconciled to our values and who will attempt to destroy us by any means possible. They are at war with us. They do not lack the intent to kill us, merely the means to do so, and our first response must be to deny them that capability. Sometimes that will require lethal force.”

The fact that Farage also condemned multiculturalism in no uncertain terms  provoked an automated politically correct response from the leader of the Liberal Democrats Nick Clegg:

“The Deputy Prime Minister hit out after Mr Farage suggested the attack on the offices of a satirical magazine should lead to questions about the UK’s “gross policy of multiculturalism”.

“I am dismayed that Nigel Farage immediately thinks, on the back of the bloody murders that we saw on the streets of Paris yesterday, his first reflex is to make political points,” Mr Clegg said during his weekly phone-in on LBC radio.

“If this does come down, as it appears to be the case, to two individuals who perverted the cause of Islam to their own bloody ends, let’s remember that the greatest antidote to the perversion of that great world religion are law-abiding British Muslims themselves.

“And to immediately … imply that many, many British Muslims who I know feel fervently British but also are very proud of their Muslim faith are somehow part of the problem rather than part of the solution is firmly grabbing the wrong end of the stick.”

Such  condemnations are of little account because Farage has spoken an obvious truth and the general public will understand that.  The promotion of multiculturalism has been generally pernicious because it wilfully creates serious divisions within a society,  but is unreservedly toxic in the case of Islam because Muslims,  violent and non-violent, believe in the supremacy of their religion.

The change of language by public figures particularly politicians is of the first importance because the general  public need a lead to be given where a matter is contentious. In these politically correct times it is particularly necessary  because the native population of Britain have been thoroughly intimidated by the totalitarian application of political correctness which has resulted in people saying non-pc things  losing their jobs, being arrested and,  in a growing number of cases , being brought before a criminal court to face charges.

Once things  forbidden by political correctness are  said by public figures change could be very fast. More and more people will embrace the forbidden words and ideas and, like a dam bursting, the  flood  of non-pc  voices will  overwhelm the politically correct restraints on speech and writing.

A tiny proportion of  Muslims

The  claim is routinely made by the  politically correct Western elites and “moderate” Muslims  that those committing terrorist atrocities are a tiny proportion of Muslims.  That is pedantically true but unimportant,  because it is to misunderstand the dynamic of terrorism which rests on a pyramid of commitment and support for the cause. At the top are  the leaders. Below them are those willing to carry out terrorist acts.  Supporting them will be those who make the bombs, acquire guns and so on. Below them will come those who are willing to raise funds through criminal behaviour such as extortion and drug dealing and administer  punishment – anything from death to beatings –  to those within the ambit of the group who are deemed to have failed to do what they were told or worse betrayed  the group.  Next will come those willing to provide safe houses for people and weaponry.  Then there are  those willing to provide information and come out on the streets to demonstrate at the drop of a hat.  At the bottom of conscious supporters will come the  “I disagree with  their methods but…”  people.   They say they support the ends of the terrorists but do not support terrorist  acts. This presses the terrorist demands forward because the public will remember their support for the ends and forget the means because it is the ends which engage the emotions . Those who are familiar with the Provisional IRA during the troubles in Northern Ireland will recognise this  character list  with ease. Moreover, even those from a community from which  terrorists  hail who refuse to offer conscious support  will   aid the terrorists’  cause by providing in Mao’s words “the ocean in which terrorists swim”.

There are differences in the detail of how terrorist organisations act, for example,  PIRA operated in a quasi-military structure  with a central command while Muslim terrorism is increasingly subcontracted  to individuals who act on their own. But however a terrorist movement is organised  the  general sociological structure of support described above is the same  whenever there is a terrorist group which is ostensibly promoting the interests of a sizeable minority and that minority has, justified or not, a sense of victimhood which can be nourished by the terrorists . Where the terrorists can offer a cause which promises not merely  the gaining of advantages by the group but of  the completion of some greater plan its potency is greatly enhanced.  Marxism had the communist Utopia and the sense of working towards final end of history; the great religions offer, through the attainment of some beatific afterlife, the favour of God’s will for their society and the completion of God’s plan.  Islam has those qualities in spades.

All this means that  though the active terrorists may be few , the effectiveness of the terrorist machine relies on large numbers who will offer some degree of support.   Consequently, the fact that the number of Muslims committing terrorist acts may be a tiny proportion of the total Muslim population is irrelevant. What matters is the pyramid of support which at its broadest will  include all Muslims because it is the total population which provides “the ocean in which the terrorist  may swim”.

There is also good evidence that large minority of Muslims in Britain support the methods of  Islamic terrorists, for example an NOP Poll in 2006 found that around a quarter of  British Muslims  said the  7/7 bombings in London in July 2005 were justified because of Britain’s involvement in the “War on Terror”.  There is also plenty of British Muslim support for the imposition of Sharia Law on Britain and some  Muslim children are confused as to whether it is Sharia Law or British Law  which is the law of the land. There are also growing numbers of Sharia Courts in Britain which allow disputes between Muslims to be decided outside of the British legal system.

Importantly,   it is not a case of just  the poor and the ignorant only holding  such views. Young educated Muslims are  if anything more enthusiastic than the average British Muslim to have Sharia Law with 40%  in favour and no less than 32% favouring killing  for Islam if the religion is deemed to have been slighted in some way. All of this points to a considerable reservoir of support for the ends of Muslim terrorists if not always the means.  Many Muslims in the West  would not be prepared to engage in violent acts themselves ,  but they would quite happily accept privileges for their religion and themselves won by the sword.

How should the West react to Muslim terrorism?

How should the West react?  In principle it should be simple. There is no need for gratuitous abuse, no need for laboured reasons why Islam is this or that. All that needs to be recognised  is that Islam is incompatible with liberal democracy because in its moral choices it is a belief system  which runs directly counter to liberal democracy and has as  its end game the subjugation  of the entire world.

What effective  action can Western governments do to prevent the gradual  erosion of  the values upon which their societies are built? ? There are three general  possibilities. These are:

  1. Logically, the ideal for any Western government committed to their country’s national interest would  be to expel all Muslims from their territory as a matter of policy with no legal process allowed.   That is because  (1) there is no way of knowing who will become a terrorist;  (2) a large population of Muslims provides the “ocean in which the terrorist swims “ and (3)  any action disadvantaging Muslims short of expulsion will breed terrorists.
  2. A less comprehensive programme would be to block all further Muslim immigration, ban all Muslim religious schools,  cease funding any Muslim organisations, deport any Muslim without British citizenship, remove the British citizenship of any Muslim with dual nationality and deport them back to the country  for which they hold citizenship.  The question of legal aid would not arise because  their would be no appeal allowed as the policy deals in absolutes: you are a Muslim either without British citizenship or with dual nationality and you qualify for deportation . The difficulty with that set of policies is it would  allow a large population to remain within the West and would create resentment amongst that population which could lead to terrorism.
  3. The least dynamic government action would be to implement programme 2 but allow any Muslim with British citizenship or long term residency to appeal expulsion through the courts. That would have the disadvantages of programme 2 plus the added opportunity for endless delay as appeals are heard and re-heard. Such a system would also require legal aid to be given if the judicial process was to be sound.

Will anything like this happen? Most improbable at least in the short term.  The West is ruled by elites who worship at the altar of  political correctness.  Theirs in a fantasy world in which human beings are interchangeable and institutions such as the nation state  are seen as  outmoded relics as homo sapiens marches steadily towards the sunlit uplands of a world moulded and controlled  by  the rigid totalitarian dicta of  political correctness .

For such people the mindset of anyone willing to die for an idea is simply alien to them.  Even more remote to these elites  is the belief that there is an afterlife which is much to be preferred to life on Earth. Most damaging of all they cannot conceive of people who have no interest in compromise and consequently will be remorseless in their pursuit of their goal. The liberal  mistakenly believes that simply by contact with the West will  the values the liberal espouses be transferred to the rest of the world. This incredibly arrogant fantasy can be seen at its most potent in their attitude to  China, which is  quietly but efficiently creating a world empire by buying influence, and in the Middle East and North Africa where the attempt to transfer liberal  values by a mixture of force and material aid has been a shrieking failure which mocks the liberal every second of every day.

Because of such ideas Western elites are only too likely to keep fudging the issue and conceding, not necessarily right away, more and more privileges to Muslins within their societies. They will also probably greatly increase funding for “moderate” Muslims to enter Schools and Mosques to teach Western values. This will drive many young Muslims towards extremism not away from it because however the teaching of British or Western values is conducted it will inevitably be seen as a criticism of Islam.  Older Muslims will also be angered at such  teaching of their children.  Anything the liberal is likely  to do will simply be throwing  petrol on the fire.

What is required is the replacement of the present elites either by removing them from power or by them changing their tune utterly.  The first is improbable in Britain because of the structure of the voting system  which hugely protects the status quo and a complicit mainstream media which shares the devotion to political correctness and manipulates access to favour parties and politicians which play the politically correct game.

But the changing of political tune is a real possibility because liberals are starting to get truly frightened as they realise things could get seriously out of control if Muslim terrorism continues to occur. There is also the fact that white liberals  recognise in some part of their minds that what they ostensibly espouse – the joy of diversity – is bogus.  This can be seen by how they so often arrange  their own lives  to ensure that they live in very  white and in England very English circumstances. The  massive white flight away from places such as  inner London and Birmingham bears stark witness to this.  Being capable of the greatest self-delusion they explain their hypocrisy by telling themselves that this is only because the great project of producing a country, nay a world, fit for the politically correct to love in, has tragically not been fully realised yet because  the outmoded non-pc  ideas and emotions still exists  as people have not yet been educated to see the error of their primitive ways such as believing in the nation state and a homogenous society. But in their heart of hearts they know they would dread to live in the conditions to which they have sanguinely consigned the white working class.

Liberals  may also have the beginnings of a terror that their permitting of mass immigration, the promotion of multiculturalism and the suppression of dissent from their own native populations will soon come to be called by its true name, treason. All these fears will act as a motor to drive the liberal elites to become more and more realistic about what  needs to be done.

The question every non-Muslim  in the West needs to answer is this, do you really believe that if Muslims become the majority in a Western country they will not do what Islam has done everywhere else in the world where they are  in the majority and at best place Islam within a greatly privileged position within the state or at worst create a Muslim theocracy?  Even Turkey, the liberals’ favourite example of a Muslim majority secular democracy, is rapidly moving towards a position when it cannot meaningfully be called a democracy or secular as Islamic parties gain more and more leverage and the Prime Minister Erdogan becomes ever more autocratic.

If a person’s answer to the question I posed is no, then they need to answer another question, do I want to live in such a society? If  their answer is no then they must  be willing to fight for their way of life or the “religion of peace” will change their society beyond recognition.

When I hear someone describing Islam as the “religion of peace”  I am irresistibly reminded of the aliens in the film Independence Day emerging from their spaceship yelling “We come in peace” before blasting every human in sight.  The white liberals who peddle into the “religion of peace” propaganda should be constantly called upon to explain why it is that a “religion of peace” can be so unfailingly successful in attracting people who say they subscribe to it yet are unremittingly cruel and violent.

What is treason today?

A vital part of the liberal internationalist plot to destroy Britain as an independent nation is the destruction of the concept of treason. They do this the attempt through a tidal wave of propaganda about the joys of diversity, the incessant reciting of mantras such as that “we live in a globalised world” , the signing of treaties which embroil Britain in supra-national authority and the repeal of laws relating to treason. (see http://www.hmg.gov.uk/epetition-responses/petition-view.aspx?epref=TreasonAmend as an example of the present government’s mentality).

A concept of treason is fundamental to every society because it sets the bounds of loyalty. Allow that there is no difference between a native of a state and a foreigner, as the liberal internationalist does in practice, and the coherence of a society is destroyed which puts its very existence under threat.

This is particularly pertinent now because of the emergence of large numbers of British born Muslims showing unambiguously their rejection of British society through violence and threatened violence.

The article below examines what constitutes treason today.  It was published in Right Now! magazine in 2001.
What is treason today?

Robert Henderson

Treason is a famously slippery word, not least for the reason enshrined in the oft-quoted but, because it contains a savage truth, eternally potent rhyme:
Treason never prospers,
What’s the reason?
For if it does
None dare call it treason.

Yet elusive as it is, treason clearly has an objective reality, a reality, moreover, whose essence is changeless. That quality is betrayal which goes beyond the personal. If a friend betrays you to another friend that is not treason. If a fellow countryman betrays you to an occupying power that is treason.

As a legal concept, treason has been redrawn during the past millennium. In a dynastic context, where the king is king in executive fact as well as name, treason is the betrayal of the sovereign by a person who owes him allegiance. That betrayal may be through disloyalty or an attempt to harm the person of the monarch (and generally his family). By extension, the same applies to those to whom the monarch’s executive power is delegated. Kill the King’s man and you attack the King.

But treason in dynastic circumstances was not a straightforward matter of simply plotting against the king or attempting harm to the king’s person or doing the same to his representatives. A great noble or courtier close to the king might well lose his head through being deemed to have given “evil counsel” to the monarch, even though that counsel had been accepted and acted upon by the king. The “evil counsellor” would be blamed (and probably executed) to ensure that the monarch was not held to account.
The idea of “evil counsel” had an important effect in English constitutional development and a consequent broadening of the idea of treason. Evil counsellors were generally identified not by the king but by others, most notably Parliament. Thus the practical application of the idea of the evil counsellor both reinforced the idea that the monarch was not a completely independent agent and created the idea that any man involved in politics owed not merely his formal loyalty to the king (and later the people), but also should take care to act and speak in a way which would not be to the disadvantage of the king and his subjects.

The notion of treason evolved in Europe because monarchs have rarely if ever been able to act indiscriminately in their own interests. Indeed, European monarchs have been remarkably unsuccessful in creating efficient and lasting despotisms. Because of that, their subjects never truly succumbed to politically debilitating ideas such as the divine right of kings. Rather they expected of a king duty as well self-promotion and satisfaction. The concept of the unjust prince was well developed by 1100 and culminated in the doctrine of tyranicide developed by John of Salisbury in the 12th Century. Here is Manegold of Lautenbach writing in the 11th Century:

No man can make himself emperor or king; a people sets a man over it to the end that he may rule justly, giving to every man his own, aiding good men and coercing bad, in short, that he may give justice to all men. If then he violates the agreement according to which he was chosen, disturbing and confounding the very things which be was meant to put in order, reason dictates that he absolves the people from their obedience, especially when he has himself first broken the faith which bound him and the people together.*

* Quoted by A.J. and R.W. Carlyle in A history of Medieval Political Theory in the West , Vol. III, p. 164, n. 1.

For Manegold a people’s allegiance to its ruler is a promise support him in his lawful undertakings and is consequently void in the case of a tyrant. In a sense, a tyrant committed treason by dishonouring the office of monarch and its implied and inherent obligations.

Restraints on the monarch were given formal status by their coronation oaths. In England, Magna Carta (1215) moved matters on to another stage where a monarch was forced to agree to direct constraints on his power. The example of Magna Carta in turn led to the development of the English Parliament, which moved from a petitioning and tax granting body in the 14th century to the point where it practically, if not in theory, usurped the power of the king.

As the power of monarchs waned, the emphasis of who was betrayed gradually moved to the idea that the entire population of a country was an entity in itself and betrayal of that entity amounted to treason. The shift from monarch to people was completed with the advent of the formally democratic state, where, in theory at least, the general population became the sovereign.

Of what does treason consist in the formally democratic nation state? Generally it must be the conscious decision to act in a way which will weaken the integrity of the nation state. Betrayal in the old manner of spying or acting for an enemy in war is still part of that. But the primary treason in the modern formally democratic state is more insidious. It is the abrogation of the sovereignty of the nation state by immersement in larger political entities and through the signing of treaties which restrict the opportunity for national self-determination.

This raises an interesting question, namely can an elected politician commit treason if the treasonable activity is part of an election manifesto or it is put to a referendum? The textbook answer would be that ultimate sovereignty in a formal democracy lies practically and morally, if not always legally, with the electorate. An electorate which elects a party or individual on a manifesto or votes yes in a referendum is considered to be tacitly granting the policy legitimacy. However, there are strong objections to this interpretation.

The first is that the treasonable activity may be misrepresented by the party or politician. A classic example of this is Britain’s entry into what is now the European Union (EU). The British electorate were undeniably deliberately misled by the 1970 Tory manifesto into believing that they were merely joining a free trade area.

They were deliberately misled again during the 1975 referendum on Britain’s continued membership. They have been deliberately misled consistently in the 35 years since the referendum, being told by every government that British sovereignty is not being lost, when massive amounts have been ceded. That is treason by any meaningful definition that has ever been used in the past.

But what if all the sovereignty which had been ceded to the EU had been done after it was presently honestly to the electorate? Suppose every change had been the subject of a referendum. Suppose those referendums had been conducted with absolutely fairness.What then? Here the old idea of “evil counsellors” has utility. In the modern formal democracy, politicians play the role of counsellors. Where their counsel is bad and the results of it disadvantages the people to which they owe their good sense and loyalty, then that might be said to be treasonable. Our representatives owe us their best judgement and courage. If they act in a way which is compromised by considerations other than their honest judgement and that action has results which are treasonable, they are guilty of treason. Not only that, but the representative must be honest about the foreseeable consequences of what they propose. In the representative’s special position, treason may be committed though acts of omission as well as commission, through not pointing out consequences.

What are the great particular treasons of our time? They can be defined in terms of what causes damage to the viability of the nation state. In the case of Britain, the most dramatic formal act of damaging the nation state has been our membership of the EU. But that is only one of a number of serious attacks on the British state and people. The permitting of mass immigration is a profound form of treason, for mass immigration is a form of conquest. North America is now dominated by the white man because of a slow accretion of settlement not through sudden and violent conquest. To that treason is linked its sister act, the attempted cultural cleansing of the native population of Britain in general and the English in particular, through the wilful denigration of the native population of this country, the deliberate denial to them of their history in our schools and the suppression of dissent through the power of the state, willingly assisted by the mass media.

To those may be added these others which are patently against our interests. Entering into treaties which remove freedom of action from the country, for example those governing membership of the World Trade Organisation. The failure to maintain the country’s military capacity and the use of what military we have in foreign adventures in which Britain has no natural interest. The deliberate refusal to ensure that the country’s economic capacity can supply all essential items in time of emergency, in particular the securing of the food supplies. The spending of taxpayers’ money on foreign peoples. All these treasons, and those of the preceding paragraphs, apply to a lesser or greater degree throughout the First World.

Our own time has brought a new problem of definition to treason. The elite ideology of the moment is Liberal Internationalism. This might seem to be a direct challenge to the very idea of treason, for where neither the primacy of the nation nor the authority of a sovereign is recognised, against whom is treason committed? The answer is that for the Liberal Internationalist, treason is any dissent from his ideology. Treason has put on totalitarian clothes.

Unfortunately, the Liberal Internationalist propaganda has been so successful that treason has an old fashioned ring to the modern Briton. It is mocked along with the very idea of patriotism. So long have the British been at peace, so safe does everyday life seem, so ruthlessly have the liberal elite and their educational and media nomenclatura promoted the idea that the time of the nation state is passed, that even naturally patriotic Britons find the idea of treason an uncomfortable one.

That is a mortally dangerous because a belief that treason may be committed is vitally important if we wish to maintain our independence. It is so because the nation state requires a concept of treason as a foundation of its integrity. We desperately need to understand the nature of treason and act upon it for our own protection.

Remember, remember the fifth of November – it speaks to us today

Robert Henderson

Anyone taking their cue from the mainstream British media would imagine that Guy Fawke’s night is merely an archaic piece of religious bigotry. The papers and airwaves are alive with mediafolk and politicos tut-tutting over  the “anti-Catholic festival”,   with the more advanced liberal  bigots amongst them musing whether it should be banned as it
“incites hate”, while the less straightforward propagandise  for its abolition under the shelter of “health and safety”  with a recitation of the tremendous risks involved with bonfires and fireworks.

The truth, as ever with liberal bigots, is  the exact opposite of  what they claim. To equate   anti-Catholic feeling in 1605 (and for many years afterwards) with simple, wilful hatred is to display a howling ignorance of both history and of societies which are dominated by
religious belief. By  1605 England had endured 70 years of incessant Catholic threat since
the breach with Rome.*  Under Mary Tudor she had had a very dirty  taste of  what a Catholic Restoration would mean, with burnings and general persecution.  Before English eyes were the constant  sufferings of Protestants on the  Continent.   The re-conversion of England to Catholicism would mean  at best the intolerance of the Inquisition   and at worst   a Catholic foreigner  such as Mary’s husband Philip II of Spain sitting  on the English throne.  The great massacre of French  Protestants on  St Bartholomew’s Day in 1572  was dreadful warning of  what  fate might await  Protestants  under a Catholic monarch.

Throughout the reign of Elizabeth, the fate of  Protestantism  hung by precious  few threads, the sturdiest of which was England. On the continent only Sweden and the nascent power of the Dutch Republic stood between  the power of Spain, the great  agent of the counter-Reformation. Most  of  Europe  remained Catholic. The two greatest continental kingdoms,  Spain and  France were  Catholic and the (Catholic) Holy Roman Empire under the Hapsburgs was still a considerable  force.   Had England fallen to Rome  the Counter-Reformation would in all probability have triumphed.  Had the Dutch Republic failed  England would have been utterly isolated as a Protestant kingdom.

An  analogy with the position that England found itself under between the 1530s and 1605 would be that of Britain  in WW2 before America joined the war. Yet the Elizabethan situation was more perilous by far. The WW2 situation lasted for less than 30 months; that of England in 1605 had lasted 70 years and would last the Lord knew how much longer. Worse, there was no great overseas help to be had because there was no  Elizabethan equivalent of the USA or the Empire and the population of England was tiny  (3-4 million at best)  compared to the powers which opposed her.

During the 45  years following Elizabeth’s accession (1558)  Spain had three times tried and failed to invade England (1588, 1596, 1597). As recently  as   1601 Spain invaded Ireland and joined with Irish forces, but was defeated at the battle of Kinsale in Co. Cork.

To these external threats may be added the incessant Catholic plots against Elizabeth’s life throughout her reign,  with the shadow of Mary Queen of Scots  covering  most of them until her long overdue execution in 1586.

The mentality of  those  English Catholics who were prepared to act against the Crown was treasonable in the extreme. They’re cast of mind is exemplified by Reginald Pole, whom Mary Tudor rewarded with the Archbishopric of Canterbury and the Pope rewarded with a  cardinal’s red hat. Pole fled England after falling out with Henry VIII. He then wrote
a pamphlet imploring all Catholic powers of the day from the emperor Charles V to Frances I of France to invade England  and for all Englishmen to support the invaders.

For men such as Pole religion was all.  To make England Catholic was their only end. There was no arguing with them. Like the fanatic Muslim today everything else subordinate to their religion.  As Catholics,  their loyalty was to the Pope not to their king or country. The Catholic traitors of Elizabeth’s reign  would have willingly allowed a creature  such as the Duke of Alva to land and devastate England as he had devastated the Low Countries. Nothing was too terrible if it meant England  was to became Catholic once more. Truly, England in 1605 had no reason to  doubt that   she was under threat from  within and without her shores.

The modern  British mind has difficulty with understanding that religion was a very different beast to what it is today.  It does not understand that religion was not a quiet, private activity then but rather something which coloured the whole of life. Unbelief if it existed kept its head well buried. Intelligent, educated men were often ecstatic in their devotion and the poor if deficient in theology mixed their  Christianity with a healthy dose of pagan superstition, vide the  witch mania of the time.

Because religion was taken seriously, not only the fate of the individual soul but the fortunes of a country seemed to rest on the performance and nature of the religion of the country. Hence, to a Protestant the maintenance of England as a Protestant nation  was as
vital as its  re-conversion  to Catholicism was to a Catholic. This belief,  coupled with the actual behaviour of Counter-Reformation Catholic countries towards Protestants , was enough to persuade any English Protestant that  nothing worse than a Catholic England could be envisioned.

Religion was then a political question, the most important political question of the day and  Catholics of necessity were traitors because they had to give their loyalty to the Pope.  That was the long and short of it for Protestant England.

The response to the gunpowder plot was, in  the context of the day, extraordinarily mild.  The plotters had encompassed a plan the like of which had never been attempted before and which arguably has never been made reality anywhere ever. They designed to kill the entire English ruling elite, including the King,  in one fell swoop. A  more clinical and diabolically simple means of  revolution cannot be imagined. No  wonder the English elite  were terrified and the people easily roused to rage. There was some tightening of the laws and their enforcement against Catholics, but  there was no English St Bartholomew’s Day
against them.

The creation of a day of commemoration by Parliament on the 5th  of  November was a brilliant political act which kept the danger of further  Catholic plots and invasions before the people. Its popularity and longevity as a truly anti-Catholic festival  shows that Parliament was  utterly  in tune with the people.

The festival has renewed relevance today with the re-importation of fanatic religion in the form of Islam whose adherents acknowledge no country  and who, like the Catholic church of old, seek nothing less than the encompassing of the world within their faith. Plus ca change…

Today Britain is subject to a foreign power (the EU) to whom she pays an annual tribute (the difference between what is paid to Brussels and what we get back) and from whom she suffers constant interference with her internal affairs (virtually everything). In addition, Britain  has to bear institutions on her territory which are controlled by the foreign power (foreign inspectors of various sorts)  and the foreign power is attempting to make allegiance to the foreign power superior to Britons allegiance to Britain. (EU citizenship, the EU  Constitution).
*England’s  position before  Henry VIII’s  breach with Rome has startling similarities with  Britain’s position  today. Catholic England was a country subject to a foreign power (the Papacy) to whom she paid an annual tribute (Peter’s Pence) and from whom she  suffered constant interference with her internal affairs (clerical appointments). In addition, Catholic England had to bear institutions on her soil which were directly controlled by the foreign power (religious houses  founded under the direct authority of the Papacy) and every English man and woman owed their first allegiance to the Pope as Christ’s vicar on
Earth.

The Levellers: the first English radicals

Radical has a special meaning in English political history. It describes those whose instincts were democratic although they did not espouse the idea of a full male adult  suffrage let alone a suffrage which included women until very late in their existence. But what they all had was a desire to see political power taken from the few and given to many more.  Their means of doing this was not to overthrow Parliament but to make it responsive to the interests and needs of the general population, something which was to be achieved by devices such as broadening the franchise, ending rotten boroughs, annual parliaments. As for the monarchy, this might be allowed or not, but if it was to continue the powers of the crown had be emasculated.  With few exception such as Gerrard Winstanley and his Diggers,  they were not  socialists or egalitarian in a general sense.  The sort of people who became radicals were typically men with some material independence and education such as tradesmen and  those educated at non-conformist colleges. Constitutional reform – in which they had a naive trust as a panacea for all the ills they wished to mend –  was what they sought, not social revolution. 

The English radical emerged in the struggle between Charles I and Parliament. The  group  which gave the strongest voice  and  effect  to the new radical  was the Levellers. They  were  a  disparate  and ever  shifting  crew,  drawing  their support primarily from the ranks of the  Parliamentary  armed forces (especially after the New Model Army was  formed  in 1645), small  tradesmen,  journeymen and apprentices. However, they also included those from higher social classes,  their most famous leader, John Lilburne,  being the child  of minor gentry.

What the Levellers were most certainly not, were the thorough going democrats and proto-socialists portrayed by the likes of Tony Benn and Bill Bragg.  Rather they were men who would have fitted much more comfortably into the ideological sleeve of Margaret Thatcher than that of social democracy.

Their opponents attempted to portray the Levellers  as social revolutionaries  who  would take the property  of  the  rich,  most  particularly  their land, and give it  to  the  poor.   Hence the epithet of Leveller which  originated as a term  of  abuse. But the Levellers consistently  denied that they had  any such programme and were staunch defenders of the right to  property. They  might  best  be  characterised  as  radical  democrats with a very strong libertarian streak.  Indeed,  so  far  were they  from being proto-communists that they had an almost sacramental belief in the  individual’s right  to personal property. 

Intellectually, they  started  from  the  view  that  all Englishmen  had a birthright  which  entitled them to have  a  say  in who should govern them,  although  at  times they  accepted  that  the  birthright  might  be  breached  through  dependence on a  master  or  by  receiving alms. More  importantly,  their  ideology  contained  the germ  of  the idea  of a social contract between the people and  those  who held power,  an idea which was to come to dominate  English  political  thinking  for the next century or so  through  the  philosophy of Thomas  Hobbes and John Locke.  

The  Levellers were,  with one or two  exceptions  such  as Richard  Overton,  who was a deist at best and an atheist  at worst, or John Wildman,  who was a libertine  and  chancer,  religious.  But their belief had a strong vein of rationalism in  it. They  saw God not as  the often  cantankerous  and domineering supernatural being  of traditional  Christianity, but as  a  rational intelligence who entered every man  and  allowed  him to see what was naturally just  and  reasonable.  For  the Levellers,  it seemed a natural right –  a  rational  right –  for a man to have a say in who should hold power and  what they should do with the power.

The  Levellers  were happy to use  historical props  such  as  Magna  Carta  and the legend  of Norman  oppression  when  it  suited them, but their  rationality led them to  question how  men were governed  from first principles. One of the Leveller  leaders  Richard  Overton  actually called  Magna  Carta  a  ”beggarly thing” and went on to comment:

 Ye [Parliament]  were chosen to work our deliverance, and to estate us  in natural and just liberty,  agreeable  to  reason  and common equity, for whatever  our  forefathers  were, we are the men of the present age, and ought to  be  absolutely  free  from all  kinds  of  exorbitancies,  molestations  or arbitrary power. (A Remonstrance. Tracts  on  Liberty in the Puritan Revolution)

More balanced was his fellow Leveller William Walwyn:

Magna  Carta (you must observe)  is but a part  of  the people’s  rights  and liberties,  being no more but  what with  much striving and fighting,  was wrested from  the  paws of those kings ,  who by force had  conquered  the nation, changed the laws and by strong hand held them in  bondage.  (England’s Lamentable Slaverie,  Tracts  on  Liberty in the Puritan Revolution.)

To call the Levellers  a political party in the modern  sense  would  be misleading.  Yet they were the closest thing to  it  both  then  and, arguably,  for  several  centuries.  Their tactics and  organisation were  modern  –  the use of  pamphletering  and  newspapers, the ability  to get  large  number of supporters onto the streets (especially in  London)  at  the drop of a hat,  the creation of  local  associations.  Much of  this  was  the  work of  Lilburne, a  man of  preternatural  obstinacy,  courage  and general  unreasonableness. It  says much for the  restraint  of  the  English  elite of the day and  respect for the law that he  was not killed out of hand. It is difficult to imagine such  behaviour being  tolerated  anywhere  in  Europe in the  seventeenth century.

Lilburne by every account of  him was a most difficult man – it was said that his nature was so  combative that he would  seek  a  quarrel with himself  if  he were  alone  –  ‘Jack  would fight with John’.  Yet this man, who  came  from  a  very  modest  gentry background, remained alive  despite challenging the authority of first the king and  then   during and after the civil war, Parliament,  Cromwell and the   Commonwealth.  He  thus carried on  this  mortally  dangerous   behaviour for almost a generation.  To the end of his life in   1657, he was thought dangerous enough to imprison.

Lilburne  first came to notice for  seditious speeches  and writings in the 1630s. For that he was whipped from the Fleet  to  the Palace Yard where he was stood in the stocks.  Whilst  in the stocks,  he removed copies of the pamphlets which  had  caused  his  punishment  and threw them to  the  crowd.  That  little  episode  will  give a good  idea  of  the  Lilburne’s  general  mentality.  He was an extreme example one  of  those  necessary  unreasonable men without whom nothing  great  gets   done. 

From the time of his flogging onwards,  Lilburne’s career was one of studied defiance of authority. He was one of the  most  potent  pamphleteers England has ever seen.  For more than  a decade, he produced a flood of writings guaranteed to inflame  virtually anyone in public authority in the land. He  faced  down  judges  in  the most powerful courts in  the  land.  He  controlled  the  London  mob  consummately.  He  treated  the  greatest men in the land as equals. In any other place on the  planet at that time,  he would have been dead meat before his  career as an agitator began.  But not in England. He might be   flogged.  He  might  be  put  in  the  stocks.  He  might  be   imprisoned.  He might be tried twice for his life.  But  what   17th  century  England would not do was  unreservedly  murder him.

The Levellers  developed  an increasingly sophisticated political programme in a series of documents known  as  The  Agreements of the People.  These Agreements dealt extensively  with political representation and structure. They were also  very  successful in creating a  sense of  historic  grievance  and  an enemy.  They did this by portraying 1640s England  as   having declined from a golden age of freedom to an  oppressed  land and  people under the heel of the  Normans  and  their  French successors.

The Levellers  time was brief. They were a serious  political force for,  at most,  the years 1646 to 1649  and  that  is  probably  being a mite too generous.  They failed utterly  in  the  end,  not least because they were unable to carry  the  army,  especially the junior officers,  with them. But they  were  important  both  for  giving voice  to  the  ideas  and  creating  many of the practices on which modern  politics  is  founded.

England and the rejection of violence

Why was England so different from other countries in its political, social and economic  development?  How was it that only in England did parliamentary government evolve and the one and only bootstrapped industrial revolution arise?  Perhaps much of the  answer  lies  in the fact that the English, in comparison with any other large nation, have long been wonderfully  adept  in dealing  with the central  problem  of human  life –  how  to live together  peaceably.  A  Canadian  academic, Elliott Leyton,  has  made  a study of English  murder through  the centuries in his book Men of Blood. Leyton finds that the rate of English  (as  opposed  to  British murder) is phenomenally  low  for a country of her size  and industrial development,  both now  and for centuries past.  This strikes Elliott  as  so singular that he said  in  a recent interview “The English  have  an antipathy to murder  which borders  on eccentricity; it is one  of the great  cultural oddities of the modern age.” (Sunday Telegraph  4 12 1994).

 This  restraint  extends to warfare and social disorder. That is not to say England has been  without violence,  but rather that  at any point in her history the level of  violence  was  substantially lower than in any other comparable society. For example,  the  English Civil War  in the  17th  Century  was, apart from the odd inhumane blemish,  startlingly free of the gross  violence common on the continent of  the  time  during the 30 Years War,  where the sacking and pillage of towns and cities  was  the norm. A particularly notable thing,  for civil wars are notorious for their brutality. 

The  way  that  England  responded  to the  Reformation  is instructive. She  did not suffer the savage  wars of religion which  traumatised  the  continent  and  brought  human calamities  such as the  St Bartholomew Day’s  Massacre  in  France  in 1572,  when thousands of French  protestants  were   massacred at the instigation of the French king. 

It  was not that the English did not care deeply about  their  religion,  rather that they have been, when left to their own  devices,  generally loth to fight their  fellow  countrymen  over  anything.  English  civil  wars  have  always  been essentially  political affairs  in which the ordinary  person has little say, for the struggles  were either dynastic or  a clash  between Parliamentary  ambition and  the  monarch.  Even the  persecution of  the  Lollards  in  the late fourteenth  and fifteenth centuries and the persecution  of Protestants  under Mary I had a highly political aspect.  The former  was a vastly disturbing challenge to the  established social  order  with men being told,  in so many  words,  that   they could find their own way to salvation and the latter  an  attempt  to  re-establish not merely  the Catholic  order  in  England,  which had been overturned since the time  of  Henry  VIII’s  breach  with Rome,  but also what amounted to  a  new  royal dynasty with Mary’s marriage to Philip of Spain.

Even the prohibitions on Catholics and non-Conformists  after the  Reformation had a fundamental political basis  to  them, namely, they were predicated on the question of whether  such people be trusted to give their first loyalty to the crown.

The treatment of foreigners

Compared with  other  peoples,  the  English  have been noticeably restrained  in their treatment of other  peoples residing  within their country.  A few massacres of  Jews  occurred before their expulsion from England in 1290,  but from that  time  there has not  been  great slaughter of a minority living within  England. Since  1290  there  have been occasional outbreaks of anti-foreigner violence. During the Peasants’  Revolt  London-based Flemings  were  murdered.  In later times an anti-Spanish “No Popery”  mob was  frequently  got up in London and he influx of Jews and Huguenots in  the 17th and 18th centuries caused riots,  one so serious in 1753 that  it  caused the repeal of a law naturalising  Jews  and Huguenots.  But  these riots did not result in great  numbers of dead, let alone in systematic genocidal  persecutions of any  particular group.  Most notably,  the English  fonts  of authority,  whether  the crown, church  or  parliament,  have   not incited let alone ordered the persecution of a particular  racial or ethnic group since the expulsion of the Jews.  They  have persecuted Christian groups, but that was a matter  of  religion  not  ethnicity, the  Christians  persecuted  being  English  in the main. The only discrimination  the  English  elite  have formally sanctioned against an ethnic group for  more than half a millennium was the inclusion of Jews within  the  general  prohibitions passed in the half century  or  so after  the Restoration in 1660 which banned  those  who  were  not members  of the Church of England from holding  a  crown  appointment such as an MP or election to public offices  such  as that of MP.

This comparative  lack of  violence  can plausibly be seen as the ground for England’s maintenance and unique development of a Parliament and  the development of the rule of law a  consequence  of England’s political  arrangements. From that sprung the gradual erosion of monarchical authority. Put those three developments together and there is arguably the ground upon which first a great commercial edeifice was built followed by industrialisation.  

But even if that is the immediate cause of English development it does not explain why  the English become  exceptionally peaceable within their own territory.  One could argue that being an island helped, not least because England has not been subject to a forced foreign conquest  from the continent  for the better part of a millennium. However,  England has suffered a good deal of inter-nation warfare within the British Isles, especially with Scotland. She has also fought many a campaign around the world, both as England and later under the banner of Great Britain. It is not that the English are or have been naturally timid.  

Perhaps the fundamental answer to English peaceableness  lies in the fact  that the English enjoyed a level  of  racial and cultural  homogeneity  from very early on.  Long  before  the English kingdom existed Bede wrote of the English as a single people.  The  English have never killed one another  in  any great  quantity  simply  because one part of  the population  thought  another  part was in some way not English.  That is the best possible starting point  for  the establishment of a coherent community. 

The  favoured  liberal  view of England is  that  it  is  the mongrel nation par excellence.  In fact,  this is the  exact opposite of the truth.  The general facts of immigration into England are these. The English and England were of  course created  by  the  immigration of Germanic  peoples.  The British  monk, Gildas,  writing  in  the  sixth  century, attributed  the  bulk  of  the  Saxon  settlement  to the practice  of  British leaders employing  Saxons  to protect   the Britons from Barbarian attacks after Rome withdrew around   410  A.D.  The English monk Bede (who was born in  A.D.  673)   attributed  the origins of the English to the Angles,  Saxons   and  Jutes who came to England in the century  following  the   withdrawal  of  the  Romans at the  request of  British  war leaders.

Archaeological  evidence suggests that  substantial  Germanic settlement in England had a longer history and  dated  from  the  Roman  centuries, perhaps from as early  as  the  third  century.  What is certain is that in her formative  centuries  following  the  exit  of  Rome, the  various invaders  and  settlers  were drawn from peoples with much in  common.

They  were  the  same  physical type, there  was  a  considerable similarity of general culture, their languages  flowed from a common linguistic well. When the Norsemen came they too brought a Teutonic  mentality and origin. Even the Normans were Vikings at one remove who, if  frenchified,  were not  physically  different  from  the English  nor  one imagines utterly without  vestiges  of  the  Norse mentality.  Moreover, the number of Normans who settled  in England immediately after the Conquest was small, perhaps as few as 5000.

After  the Conquest,  the only significant  immigration  into England for many centuries were the Jews.  They were expelled  from England in 1290. There was then no really large  scale  and  sudden immigration from outside the British Isles  until  the flight of the Huguenots after the revocation of the Edict  of Nantes (which granted limited toleration to the  Huguenots within France) in 1684 by Louis X1V.

There was other immigration in the period 1066-1650, but it was  small and highly selective. Craftsmen of  talent  were  encouraged particularly in the Tudor period. Italian families  with  trading and banking expertise (such as it was in  those days) appeared  after the expulsion of  the  Jews.  Foreign  merchants  were  permitted,  but for much of  the  period  on sufferance  and  subject  to  restrictions  such  as forced  residence within specially designated  foreign quarters. 

The  upshot of all this is that for six centuries  after the Conquest  England was an unusually homogeneous country,  both racially  and culturally. This is reflected in the  absence since  the  Norman Conquest of  any serious regional separatist  movement within the  heart of English  territory. There  has been meaningful resistance  at  the periphery  – Cornwall,  the Welsh marches and the  far north,  but  even that  has  been  effectively dead since the sixteenth century. Englishmen have fought but not to create separate nations.

The unusual restraint of the English  is also shown in their dealings with foreigners  abroad. England did not routinely go in for sack and pillage as was common on the continent and occasional massacres  often occurred in special circumstances,  for example,  Cromwell’s in Ireland happened in   aftermath of a  massacre of Protestants in Ulster in 1641 and the fear that Ireland would be used as a springboard for a Royalist invasion of England.

Nowhere was the restraint seen more emphatically than in the Empire. If  a people were forced to become part of an empire, the British Empire was indubitably the one to join. There were of course outrages committed in the Empire’s name,  but there was no general policy of  cruelty and, for the final century of the Empire’s existence, official British policy towards the colonies was that the interests of the natives should come first.  

If  the  theory that a homogeneous population long occupying a territory without suffering foreign conquest results in greater social restraint  is correct,  this may have  a profound implication.  Assuming that personality is substantially innate, natural selection will act upon the type of personality which is best suited to the environment. It could be that the native English are, on average,  genetically better suited to live in a society in which politics are decided by peaceful transfer of power and business and personal disputes are mediated through the law.   On top of any genetic propensity is added the culture of restraint which has developed from the genetic propensity over the centuries.

Should it be true that the English have a unique genetic national shape and  a culture which uniquely plays to that genetic national shape, then mass immigration will weaken both by introducing both different genetic types an competing cultures.

The roots of English democracy

The beginnings of English democratic thought

 Contents

INTRODUCTION

THE FRANCHISE BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR

THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

PHILOSOPHICAL AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

SERVANTS AND ALMSTAKERS

CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTRODUCTION

The Civil War changed English politics utterly. It brought the end of claims by the English crown to Divine Right and absolute monarchy. It promoted the political interests of the aristocracy and gentry as a class. It forced those on the Parliamentary side to effectively exercise power on their own responsibility. It created a political class which saw politics as something they could control rather than merely be part of as a adjunct to the crown. It began the constitutional process which resulted in cabinet government. It laid the foundations for the formation of political parties. In short, it sowed seeds of modern representative government.

But something else occurred which was to be even more momentous in the long run. It was during the 1640s that the belief that men should only be ruled by those they had themselves elected first became a serious political idea, not merely in England but anywhere. Amazing as it may seem now, the idea that every man (but not woman) should have an active voice in choosing those who would represent and govern them was a novel concept in the middle of the 17th  century. A form of male-only democracy existed in the ancient world, but it was never inclusive because the citizens were always greatly outnumbered by the unfree and other non-citizens.

Why was the idea of every man being an elector so revolutionary? The enfranchisement of a wide electorate is perhaps the most fundamental political change a society can undergo. It forces the elite to take note of the masses in a way that no other system does. Even the humblest man must be considered as a man in his own right, a person with a vote and needs and wishes. Those needs and wishes may be heeded and met to varying degrees, but what the majority needs and wants cannot be ignored completely when each man has a vote.

The democratic spirit was surprisingly widespread in the 1640s. By this I do not mean that men were commonly calling for full manhood suffrage, much less the emancipation of women. Rather there was a sense that the social order had been rearranged by the war, that men were on some new ground of equality and had a right to a public voice. In particular, there was a feeling that those who had fought for Parliament had won the right to enfranchisement. There was also a more widespread feeling which penetrated all social classes that the existing franchises (which varied greatly) were frequently too narrow and that the towns, particularly those most recently grown to a decent size, were grossly under-represented.

The group which gave representation to democratic feelings most successfully was the Levellers. They were a disparate and ever shifting crew, drawing their support primarily from the ranks of the Parliamentary armed forces (especially after the New Model Army was formed), small tradesmen, journeymen and apprentices. However, they also included  those from higher social classes, their most famous leader, John Lilburne, being the child of minor gentry.

To call them a political party in the modern sense would be misleading. Yet they were the closest thing to it both then and arguably for several centuries. Their tactics and organisation were modern – the use of pamphletering and newspapers, the ability to get large number of supporters onto the streets (especially in London) at the drop of a hat, the creation of local associations. They also developed an increasingly sophisticated political programme in a series of documents known as The Agreements of the People. These Agreements dealt extensively with political representation and structure. The levellers were also very successful in creating an enemy and sense of grievance. They did this by portraying 1640s England as having declined from a golden age of freedom under the heel of the Normans and their French successors.

Led for the most part by a man of preternatural obstinacy, courage and unreasonableness, John Lilburne (“freeborn Jack”), the Levellers frightened the Parliamentary leaders sufficiently to force various negotiations and discussions. These culminated in the Putney Debates in 1647 when Parliamentary and Army leaders including, Cromwell and his son-in-law Henry Ireton, met with a variety of people on what might broadly be called the democratic side.  Unfortunately Lilburne was not able to attend. Nonetheless,the Leveller position was strongly represented. Most importantly, much of the debate was taken down in shorthand. It is a most intriguing document. The sheer range of political ideas it displays is impressive. It shows clearly that in the 1640s there was a very high degree of sophistication amongst the politically interested class. The ideas run from the monarchical to the unreservedly democratic. This document together with the Leveller pamphlets provide ample evidence of Leveller thinking.

How far did the Levellers reach in their search for political inclusion? Did they go the whole hog and seek a full manhood franchise or were they much more cautious? That is the question which I shall now examine with the aid of Prof C.B. Macpherson.

Macpherson contends in his ‘Theory of Possessive Individualism’ that the Levellers were  never advocates of universal manhood suffrage, but, rather, sought a  restricted franchise which excluded servants (to be equated with wage-earners) and almstakers (or beggars).

He is extremely emphatic in his conclusions. As we shall see, there are substantial reasons for doubting his certainty, both on the question of universal manhood suffrage and on the extent to which a more restricted suffrage was accepted by the Levellers.

To answer the question I shall begin by describing the  attitude  taken towards the franchise before the  Levellers.

I will then cover, in much the same order as  Macpherson, the documentary evidence he puts before us.

Having done this, I shall examine the philosophy he attributes to the Levellers in order to explain their  motivations and to bring forth  any  further evidence and observations.  

Lastly, I will deal with the definition of servants and almstakers,  plus the  nature of Macpherson’s statistics.

 Chapter 1

 THE FRANCHISE BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR

Discontent with electoral qualifications, provisions and practices was not an infant of the Civil War and  its aftermath, although it was greatly increased by those events,  Rather it was the end of a trail which began in Elizabeth’s reign and reached  its highest pitch, prior to the 1640s, during the years 1621 to 1623.

The discontent was provoked primarily by the situation in the boroughs rather than the counties, Since 1430, the county electorate had been restricted to the forty shilling freeholder, which qualification had become almost sacrosanct by the end of the sixteenth century –  only one proposal outside the ‘Great Rebellion’ (1621) was made to raise or lower it.  Tudor inflation had  greatly lowered the barrier it represented (40 shillings in 1600 was worth perhaps 15 shillings at 1430 values) and it is reasonable  to suppose this considerably increased the rural electorate. Also, there is evidence to suggest that the qualification was not always enforced1 and some county electorates may have had a very broad manhood franchise indeed prior to 1640.

Borough franchises were anything but uniform. In some the whole ‘commonalty’  (all householders) or  even all ‘potwallers’ (men with their own  hearths) voted. In others the vote was restricted to all taxpayers (‘scot and lot’), freemen of the town, or those in possession of burgage property. In extreme cases the vote might be restricted to the ruling corporation. Such discrepancies of representation were aggravated by a distribution of borough seats which took insufficient  account of the demographic changes of the past two centuries, during which time England’s population increased very substantially, perhaps by as much as a third. All this meant that there was fertile soil for agitation for more equal borough representation, both in terms of the breadth of the franchise and in the number of seats.

Tudor monarchs, not unnaturally, did not favour larger electorates2. The existence of ‘rotten boroughs’ was a source of patronage and, if the monarch could control the oligarchies who returned the MP, a means of reducing opposition to the Crown. As there was a significant number of such boroughs, this was no small advantage to the monarch.

The attitude of Parliament to the franchise was mixed. The Lords had a similar interest to the Crown in distrusting broad franchises. The peers often effectively controlled seats in the Commons. They also had a natural inclination to deny the ‘commonality’ any voice in the affairs of the kingdom. Conversely, it was obviously in the Commons’ interest to increase electorates, where such increases reduced the Monarch’s’ and the Lord’s opportunities for patronage.

There is particular evidence that the Puritans favoured larger electorates, at least in so far as it suited their own purposes. At Warwick in 1586 Job Throckmorton was  elected after he threatened to invoke the right of the ‘commonality to vote. In 1587 John Field remarked to  colleague ‘seeing we cannot compass these things by suit or dispute, it is the multitude and people that must  bring the discipline to pass which we desire.’3 As Puritans displaced many court nominees and the creatures of aristocrats, this is significant in view of  the attitude of the Commons towards electoral qualifications  between 1621 and 1628.

By 1621, the Commons had gained the right to decide disputed elections and to revive lapsed borough seats and  even make new creations, The tendency until 1628 was to  ecide in favour of wider franchise and to allow  all the ‘commonality’ to vote. At Bletchingly (1624) and Lewes (1628) ‘all the inhabitants ,’ were to be  electors’, and at Cirencester (1624) all ‘resients:’.  n the case of Pontefract in 1624 a general principle was formulated:

‘There being no certain custom nor prescription, who should be the electors and who not, we  must have recourse to common right which, to this purpose was held to be, that more than the  freeholders only ought to  have  voices  in the election, namely all men,  inhabitants,  householders resient within the borough.’4

Further, in the case of Boston (1628) it was asserted that the election of burgesses belonged by common right to the   commoners and only prescription or ‘a constant usage  beyond all memory’ could rob them of this.5

It is true that when the Commons revived or created borough  seats, they concentrated, as the Tudors had done, on small towns to promote their own advantage. But,  even so,  they granted ‘scot and lot’ franchises in every case (except Weobley) which meant  that even small towns such as Great Marlow or Hilbourne Port had electorate of around 200.

Bills  were  introduced to  regulate  elections and standardise, the franchise in 1621, 1623, 1625, 1628  and 1640, The 1621 Bill is of particular interest because it proposed that the 40/- freeholder qualification be increased to œ4 and to admit œ10 copyholders by  inheritance. The borough proposals add no more than the various decisions on individual cases (in fact even less), for electors were to be freemen except where they numbered less than twenty-four, in which case all  inhabitants  not in receipt of alms were to be included,

In 1640 the franchise was raised again by Sir Simonds D’Ewes. It was he who first uttered the idea later made famous by Thomas Rainsborough ‘that the poorest man in England ought to have a voice, that it was the birthright of the subjects of England and all had voices in the election of Knights etc. previously.’6

In 1641 a bill had reached second reading but was then lost. D’Ewes favoured its contents except that he ‘desired that whereas it was provided in the bill that none that took alms should have voices in elections, which I well allowed, we would  likewise provide that no more monopolizing elections might be in cities and boroughs, that all men resients might have voices.’7

It is also noteworthy, both for its own sake and the part it played in Leveller literature, that many believed that the Statute of 1430 had disenfranchised  people. William May, in 1621, said ‘Anciently, all thecommonality had voice, but because such a multitude made the election tumultuous, it was after reduced to freeholders’.  William Prynne put it even more plainly, ‘Before this  Petition and Act every inhabitant and commoner in each county had voice in the election of Knights, whether he were a freeholder or not, or had a freehold only of one penny, six pence or twelve pence by the year as they now claim of late in most cities and boroughs where popular elections are admitted’8. It is a sobering thought that if the Statute of 1430 did disenfranchise large numbers of county electors, the county franchise may have been wider in medieval England than it was to be again before the end of the nineteenth century and conceivably wider than the Franchise before the 1918 Representation of the People Act.

What  of the position of servants,  wage-earners and almstakers in all this? Resident household servants were generally considered beyond the pale, although  ‘servants’ were said to have voted in the Worcestershire county election of 1604. Wage-earners certainly did so, for those in the ‘potwaller’ and ‘scot and lot’ constituencies were granted the right to vote. Almstakers were excluded in the 1621 and 1640 bills, yet at Great Marlow in 1604 77 of the 245 voters were said to be almstakers, nine of  them inmates of the almshouse. In 1640 the right of the Bember inmates to vote was said to have been sustained  and in 1662 the St. Albans almsmen were said to have ‘had voices time out of mind’.

It is clear from all this, that the Levellers did not enter untilled ground when they broached the question of the franchise. There are also, for our purposes, three points of particular interest. First, the Commons,  or at least an influential  part of it,  was not unduly disturbed by the prospect of an enlarged electorate. Second, people whom Macpherson claims the Levellers would have excluded – servants and almstakers – were ncluded in the franchise long before the Civil War. Third, that there existed even gentlemen (such as Sir Simonds D’Ewes) who had an active and unambiguous democratic spirit. The latter point is particularly pertinent because the chief Leveller, John Lilburne, was also of gentle-birth, a fact he never ceased to emphasise. Democratic ideas were not thus foreign bodies suddenly introduced by the Levellers.

 Notes

 I. K. Thomas. The Levellers and the Franchise answer p.62

 2. J.H, Plunb. The Growth of the electorate 1600-1715

 3. Ibid

 4. Ibid

 5 K. Thomas, The Levellers and the Franchise p.62

 6. Ibid p.63

 7. Ibid p.64

 8 Ibid p.64

Chapter 2

THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

The roots of Macpherson’s conclusions lie in the Putney Debates. Prior to Putney, the franchise received relatively little attention in Leveller writings, Those statements which do exist do not explicitly exclude servants and almstakers, and have the appearance of demands for universal  manhood suffrage.  Post  Putney  statements on the other hand consistently advocate, for whatever reason, the exclusion of servants and almstakers. The evidence  of  the Putney  debates provides  Macpherson  with his main means of resolving, at least to his mind, this apparent inconsistency.

The question of the franchise occupied most of the second day’s debate at Putney. The first article of the (First) Agreement demanded ‘That the People of England,.,. ought to be more indifferently proportioned according to the number of inhabitants.’ This provoked Cromwell’s son-in-law, Henry Ireton to say:

‘The exception that lies in it is this. It is said, they are to be distributed according to the number of  inhabitants, ‘The People of England’ etc. And this  doth make me think that the meaning is that every man that is an inhabitant is to be equally considered, and to have an equal voice in the election of those representors, the persons that are for the general representative…’2

Thus Ireton, whatever his motives, charges the Levellers atthe earliest possible opportunity, with seeking universal suffrage. Petty is the first Leveller to answer: ‘We judge that all inhabitants that have not lost their birthright should have an equal voice in elections’,3

Macpherson thinks it significant that Petty does not state in plain words whether he is for or against universal suffrage. Yet why should he have felt obliged to do so? Ireton has asked a plain question and Petty’s reply, no matter what construction is put upon the phrase ‘all inhabitants that have not lost their birthright’, is an adequate and reasonable answer. Surely more significant is the fact that those with Leveller sympathies did not recoil from the suggestion with horror. However, there is a note of ambiguity in Petty’s answer and it is possible, as A.L.Morton suggests4, that Rainsborough’s famous speech which follows immediately (the poorest he that is in England etc.)5 was intended to clarify the situation.

But by far the most significant passage for Macpherson occurs when the debate has turned to considering the particulars rather than the general issue of the franchise, Cromwell in what appears to be a state of some impatience suddenly says:

‘If we should go about to alter these things, I do not think we are bound to fight  for every  particular  proposition. Servants while servants, are not included. Then you agree that  he that receive alms is to be excluded?’

The first to reply is Lt. Col. Thomas Reade, who, although more progressive in spirit than Cromwell, was no Leveller:

 ’I  suppose it’s concluded by all,  that  the  choosing of representatives is a privilege: now I see no reason why any man that is a native ought to be excluded that privilege, unless  from  voluntary  servitude.’ ‘

 Then follow the critical words of Petty:

 ’I  conceive  the reason why we would exclude  apprentices or servants, or those who take alms,  because they depend upon the will of other  men and should be afraid to displease (them). For servants and apprentices, they are included in their master, and so for those  that receive alms from door to door’6

This passage is remarkable for a number of reasons. First, Cromwell assumes general agreement  that servants were to be excluded, although, up to this point in the debate, there appears little, if any, justification for doing so. This may indeed support  Macpherson’s contention that all parties, including, the Levellers were strong for exclusion. But there  are  alternative explanations. Cromwell’s impatience may have got the better of him  and he could have made such a statement in order to  browbeat any opposition. It is after all a common debating trick, and we have ample evidence from Putney and elsewhere that Cromwell was prone to behaving in a domineering and high-handed manner.

Second, what of Petty’s reply? In the first place it may merely be as J.C. Davis7 suggests, a statement of what Petty considered the grounds on which Cromwell would advocate exclusion, rather than an endorsement of them. Alternatively, if we accept that Petty was in agreement with Cromwell, which might be suggested by the alacrity of his reply, other considerations  rise. Macpherson considers Petty to have been the main Leveller spokesman at Putney and by implication, fully representative of Leveller opinion.

This is a dangerous road to travel. Petty, apart from his appearance  at Putney  and on a number of Leveller-Independent committees, was a somewhat obscure figure in the Leveller camp, Perhaps significantly, he was involved in the drafting of the compromise Second Agreement and in later years became a member of Harrington’s aristocratic-republican Rota Club.8 None of this of course does more than suggest that Petty may have been less than representative of Leveller thought, particularly that of Overton and Lilburne.

Petty may have been an opportunist willing to support a movement whose aims and ideals he did not necessarily consider sacrosanct but merely convenient. Or he may have turned his coat  when the movement  failed.  Whatever the truth of the matter, we may join with A.L. Morton in wishing that if Lilburne had been at Putney and in thinking that the position might well be clearer if he had been able to do so.

Then there is the position of Rainsborough at Putney, where he unambiguously embraced adult manhood suffrage. It is true that Rainsborough had, as far as is known, no direct connection with the Levellers prior to Putney, but his sympathies were clearly with the Levellers and he enjoyed a considerable reputation in the Party after Putney, His contribution to the franchise debate was by far the most forceful  on the Leveller side (in the sense that Rainsborough agreed with the Leveller arguments rather than those of Cromwell et al) and greatly outweighed that of Petty. If Rainsborough’s ideas were so acceptable to Levellers after Putney, why not before and during Putney?

Macpherson uses Petty’s reply to Cromwell as a springboard to launch his theory. He  admits that  further sustaining evidence to support his proposition is necessary. The says quite correctly, that Levellers did believe that the right to elect could be forfeited by (freeborn) men. Up until Putney, delinquency was commonly cited as being sufficient reason, However, it must be remembered that the Levellers were in favour of reconciliation with the royalists (delinquents). The fact that they proposed to exclude them for a relatively short period of time from the franchise, (provided their behaviour was satisfactory)is scarcely surprising, for the situation was exceptional. It is reasonable to see such exclusion as simply an extraordinary measure to settle the country after a civil war. One would be very rash to assume that this attitude was indicative of Leveller opinion in general on the loss of birthright.

Macpherson  continues by quoting the  franchise  clause (section ll) of the Petition of January 1648:

‘Whereas  it hath been the ancient liberty of this  nation, that all the  freeborn  people have freely elected their representers  in Parliament,  and their sheriffs and Justices of the Peace, etc. and they were abridged of that their native liberty by a statute of the 8.H.6,7. That, therefore, the birthright of all English  men be forthwith restored to all which are not,  or shall not be legally disenfranchised for some  criminal  cause,  or are under 21 years of age, or servants or beggars .’9

Of this Macpherson says there could scarcely be a clearer indication that the Levellers assumed that those who became servants or beggars thereby forfeited their birthright to a voice in elections (p.124). We may well agree that at this time the Levellers were willing to do so, but as the whole point of Macpherson’s task is to establish a consistency in Leveller thinking, we are really no further down the path of enlightenment. If the Levellers from Putney onward did compromise at various points, it does not prove that they wished for anything other than a full manhood suffrage. More probably, such compromises are simply reluctant adjustments to the political realities of the time.

The  seems to be on firmer ground when he turns to a letter sent from several Agitators of the Army to their respective Regiments (llth November, 1647) concerning the franchise debate at Putney. This tells us that ‘it was concluded by vote in the affirmative:  viz, that all soldiers and others, if they be not servants or beggars, ought to have voices in electing those which shall represent them in Parliament, although they have not forty shillings per annum in freehold land And there were but three voices against this your native freedon’lO.

It does at first glance seem strange that the exclusion of servants and beggars should be linked with the phrase ‘this your native freedom’. However, it must be remembered that the Agitators’ prime concern was for  the soldiers  they represented. If it is accepted that the leading  Independents were willing to include all  soldiers, regardless of their status, in the franchise, it  then  becomes possible that the phrase ‘this your native freedom’ applied to the soldiers rather than the whole  population.

‘The Grand Designe’ of John Harris (the agitators’ pointer) which appeared in December, 1647, and the Third  Agreement of May, 1649, present similar problems. In the former, Harris explained that the intent of the First Article (which provoked the franchise debate at Putney) was that the electors should be:

  ’all  men that are not servants or  beggars, it being pure  equity, that as all  persons are bound to yield obedience to the decrees of the  Representative or Parliament, so they should have a  voice in  the  electing their Representatives or Members of Parliament’ 11,

While the franchise clause of the latter stated that the electors would be:

‘(according to natural right) all men of the age of one and twenty years and upwards (not being servants or receiving alms, or having served the late King in arms or voluntary contributions) l2.

The equating of ‘all persons’, and ‘all men that are not servants or beggars’ in the former and ‘the according to naturall right’ in the latter seem to lend weight to Macpherson’s argument. Yet in both the authors were using well tried phrases and need not have considered the full implications of them. Also, in the latter case, as A.L. Morton says, the statement of general principle occurred before any of the exceptions were detailed.

Having come this far, Macpherson feels he is in a position to interpret, as he puts it, the apparent claims of the Levellers for an ‘unqualified manhood franchise’ and their opponent’s attribution of this to them at Putney, and  the lack  of  any explicit exclusion of servants prior  to Putney.  Thus, when the Levellers used phrases such as ‘every inhabitant’, ‘every person in England’ or ‘the poorest man in England’, Macpherson believes that we must assume that they really meant ‘all freeborn men who have not lost their birthright’, a loss of birthright toinclude servants and beggars. This is a great deal to read into the evidence.

Ireton and Cromwell, on the other hand, were so concerned to defend the existing franchise qualifications, Macpherson says, that for the purpose of debate they were indifferent to whether the Levellers sought an unqualified franchise  or merely a broader but still restricted one. When Ireton referred to ‘all persons’, ‘any man that hath a breath and being’ , ‘all inhabitants’, or Cromwell ‘men that have no interest but the interest  of breathing’13,  this  thinks  Macpherson was hyperbole by Cromwell and Ireton to sharpen the issue, Yet if it were hyperbole, why was it not resisted more vigorously and unambiguously by Petty et al?

Macpherson fastens on to the fact that, as he puts it, “even after Cromwell had explicitly recognized that the Levellers’ proposal excludedservants and almstakers, he still spoke of it as tending to anarchy because it would give a vote to ‘all those who are in the Kingdom’”14. Now, as we have seen, it is by no means certain that Cromwell’s statement was accepted by the Levellers (p above). The fact that he continued to impute to the Levellers this position may reasonably be taken as an indication that the Levellers had not accepted it, that it was an agreed position and Cromwell words thus exaggeration. The same reasoning may be applied to the fact that the Levellers did not bother to refute these ‘apparent’ imputations of manhood suffrage. Indeed, it would seem more significant that they did not do so.

The reason why they refrained from answering such claims directly, says Macpherson, was because it would not have helped their case to have done so, being more concerned to refute the charge that their proposals would destroy property. This is conceivable yet unlikely, unless we accept that the Levellers were only concerned with a limited franchise along  Macpherson’s lines. Moreover, one cannot divide the questions of the franchise and the feared destruction of property, for one stems from the other.

Neither do I find the fact that only Colonel Rich mentioned the Levellers’ ‘supposed ‘ intention to include servants necessarily indicative of a general consensus of opinion. It is surely significant that he mentioned it at all in the light of Macpherson’s position. Nor do I think he was contradicted by Rainsborough as Macpherson believes. Rich said:

 ’If the master and servant shall be  equal electors, then clearly those that have no interest in the Kingdom will make  it their interest to choose those that have no interest. It may happen, that the majority may by law,  not in confusion, destroy property;  there may be a law enacted,  that there shall be an equality of goods and estate’

He then proceeds to point out the danger that the poor night, as in Rome, set up a dictator15. Rainsborough replies:

‘I think it is a fine gilded pill. But there is much danger,  and it may seen to some that there is some kind of remedy [possible]. I think we  are better as we are [if it can be really proved] that the poor should choose many [and] still the people be in the some case, be over voted still,  But of this and much else, I am unsatisfied… and the[first] thing that I am unsatisfied in is how it comes about that  there is such propriety in some freeborn Englishmen and not [in] others.’16

Now this is, to say the least, a messy passage, but its meaning, if we accept Woodhouse’s additions, is surely plain enough. Rainsborough is rejecting  Rich’s suggestion and when he speaks of ‘being better as we are’ he is merely saying that if he was certain this would be the result of an unqualified franchise, he would reject it, but that, in fact, he does not believe this would be the result. He sees it in other words as a red herring. Indeed, if we were to accept that he did not take this position, we are forced to conclude that Rainsborough was in favour of no change at all, which would be a howling nonsense in view of his explicitly democratic ideas.

There is another passage from Putney which suggests that servants were not automatically excluded by all present. Captain Rolfe appeals for greater moderation, saying, ‘I shall desire that a medium or some thoughts of composure, [may be had] in relation to servants or to foreigners, or such others shall be agreed upon.’ Captain Clarke , who possessed Leveller sympathies, replied first, stating that he too ‘shall desire [that] before the question be stated it may be moderated as for foreigners’17. It is noteworthy that  Clarke,  although  agreeing  that foreigners should  be excluded, does not mention servants and that Rolfe believes too much heat is being generated by the subject, scarcely an indication that all concerned agreed that servants were beyond the pale.

The pre-Putney documents receive similar treatment from Macpherson. The case of ‘the Army truely stated’(15th October, 1647), which ha originally accepted as a demand for full manhood suffrage18, asked that:

‘all  the freeborn at the age of  twenty-one years and upwards,  be the electors,  excepting those that have or shall deprive themselves of that their freedom either for some  years or wholly by delinquency.19

This the  sees as excluding servants  and almstakers. This seems a most peculiar conclusion. Why on earth should servants or almstakers be described as delinquent? Delinquency in the seventeenth century meant much what it does today, namely antisocial acts(particularly criminal ones). Being a servant or almstaker could not denote delinquency, for the former was in useful employment and the latter more often than not had to prove that they were of good character before being in receipt of alms (This particularly applied to those in almshouse). Moreover, the common objection to granting the vote to servants and almstakers was one of dependency. Yet it is not mentioned here.

It is just possible that the temporary exclusion referred to apprentices. This  Macpherson rejects as most of such would be under 21, but K. Thomas is favourable to the idea on the grounds that the legal age for the end of apprenticeship was 24. Again, the question arises: why should apprentices be described generally as delinquents?

For my own part, I think it probable that the exclusion of delinquents referred solely to royalists, or just possibly to civilian delinquents, that is, common-criminals. The term delinquent has a special and technical meaning in the context of the civil war, namely a royalist who was considered to be both recalcitrant and to have been a serious and persistent supporter of the King (the practical application of this definition was inconsistent, but that was the theory).

It is true that permanent exclusion seems to run contrary to the Leveller desire for reconciliation with royalists, but it is not necessarily certain  that the authors of ‘The Case’ shared such sentiments. They may for instance  have believed that certain royalists were so responsible for the troubles of the war, that no leniency could be extended. Such an argument could also be advanced in the case of common criminals.

Of the other documents, Lilburne’s ’England’s Birth-right Justified’ (October 1645), ‘London’s Liberty In Chains Discovered’ (October 1646), ‘The Charters of London’; or,  ‘The  Second Part  of  London’s  Chains  discovered’ (December,  1646), and ‘Rash Oaths Unwarrantable’ (May, 1647)20, all fall foul of Macpherson because  they contain such terms as ‘freeborn’, and ‘freemen ‘, in connection with the franchise. This is another case when we must beware of reading too much into regular Leveller phraseology, which would be more suitably viewed as rhetoric, an affirmation in this case that all men were born possessed of the same birthright, and should enjoy the same, There are many instances where such phrases were used in connection with other matters, such a religion or civil liberties, which Macpherson  claims  the Levellers believed were inalienable, and he presumably would not wish to argue that the use of ‘freeborn’ in these contexts did not mean all men, (and indeed women).

 ’London’s Liberty in Chains’ is of particular  interest to ship Macpherson because it bases  its  claim for a broader franchise on the fact that the statute of 1430 (8′H’6’7) had disenfranchised many who  had previously had the vote.  This, says Macpherson, cannot be a claim for manhood suffrage for it is merely a claim to remove the forty shilling qualification which does not necessarily mean servants and almstakers would be included. This is correct, but neither does it mean that it was only a plea for tenant farmers and non-corporate traders and craftsmen, if we bear in mind the evidence of the previous chapter, particularly Poynnes’ words (see above ).

The other two documents that Macpherson examines are ‘The Remonstrance of Many Thousand Citizens, and Other Freeborn People of England’ (July, 1646), and ‘Jonah’s Cry out of the Whale’s Belly’ (July 1647). The former requests that every year in November elections should take place and that ‘all men that have a right to be there, not to fail upon a great penalty, but no summons to be  expected’21. This Macpherson this significant for it states that voting would be by ‘all men that have a right’, not simply all men. Yet, in view of the circumstances of 1646 when the position of  royalists had to be considered, should we expect that no exclusions would be thought reasonable then? The answer is surely no.

The latter document is concerned with the right of soldiers to vote. It states that ‘according to the principles of safety, flowing from Nature, Reason and Justice…  every individual private soldier, whether Horse or Foot, aut freely to have their vote, to chuse the transactors of their affairs.’ This does not necessarily imply that the soldiers desired the same for civilians. However, we know that documents which either originated from or involved the Army, expressed concern for the population as a whole.

The documentary evidence is, to put it politely, less than conclusive. In the absence of even one unassailable statement, Macpherson is forced to rely on building up his argument  by interpretation.  The disadvantage of this is that in so many instances an equally plausible interpretation can be made to prove the contrary. This is not, however, to suggest that  Macpherson has been proven completely mistaken, for we must not fall into the trap, which he himself falls into, of insisting on consistency to the extent where  every statement must be interpreted  in a certain fashion.

 Notes

 1 D. H ‘Wolfe, Leveller .Manifestoes .226

 2 A,S.P Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty , p.52

 3 Ibid, p.55

 4. A,L. Morton, Leveller Democracy p.205.

 5 A,S.P. Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty p.53

 6. Ibid, pp. 82-3

 7. J. Davis, The Levellers and Democracy ,

 8. K. Thomas, The Levellers and the Franchise p.67,

 9 D.H. Wolfe, Leveller Manifestoes P,269.

 10. ASP Woodhouse, p.452.

 11. C .B, Macpherson, p125

 12. D.H. Wolfe, p.403

 13. A.S.P. Woodhouse, pp, 57, 70, 63, 77.

 14. C.B. Macpherson, p.126.

 15. A,S.P. Woodhouse, pp.63, 64.

 16. Ibid, p,64.

 17.A.S.P. Woodhouse, p,30.

 18.K.Thomas, p. 212

 19. D.H. Wolfe, p.212.

 20. England Birthright Justified’ is printed in Haller  ’Tracts on Liberty in  the  Puritan Revolution’, ‘London in Chains’, ‘The Second Part of London  Chains  discovered’ and  ’Rash  Oaths  Unwarrantable’, are not readily available. See Macpherson  pp. 131-135.

 21. ‘The Remonstrance’ is printed in H.H. Wolfe , p.129, but ‘Jonah’s Cry’ is not readily available. See Macpherson,  p.135,

 Chapter 3

PHILOSOPHICAL AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

The philosophy which Macpherson  attributes to the Levellers to explain why they proposed  to exclude servant and almstakers derived from the view of a man’s capacities (i.e.  his own labour) as a commodity which  could be sold, This Macpherson believes was the dominant ideology in 17th Century England. Thus, although the Levellers believed that all Englishmen were born with the same  birthright, certain parts of this birthright could be forfeited. Religious, civil and even  possibly economic rights could not be alienated justly, and as such should be protected constitutionally.  The  right  to elect, however, could be forfeited by entering into a condition of dependence, either by taking wages or alms. In such  cases, a just dependence resulted and the  subservient individual’s voice was deemed to be included in that of his master or benefactor, as far as a voice in elections was concerned, jut as that of a wife was deemed to be included in that of her husband.

That this could be  considered just  is further explained by what Macpherson deems to be the general contemporary opinion of what the functions of government should be. The primary function of 17th Century government, Macpherson informs us, was ‘to make and enforce the rules within which men could make the most of their own energies and cpacities’ and the secondary function, derived from the first, was ‘the protection of property in goods and estate’ (p.144). Servants and almstakers had lost the ‘property in their own had labour’ and, therefore, had presumably no land or capital, and as such could have no interest in either function of government,

At first glance this line of argument is both plausible and attractive. We are dealing with an openly acquisitive society which judged a man in large part on the basis of his material estate, and which was still pronouncedly hierarchical. Add in Man’s natural tribal inclinations, and it would not have been  unreasonable for the Levellers in such a situation to be  concerned with advancing those with whom they had most sympathy, the small men, while neglecting the needs of other  groups. Also, the exposition is alluring because it  purports to provide us with a means of assessing all Leveller aims and of removing inconsistencies using a system which is logical and neat. Yet, like all intellectual schemes which purport to show Man as a consistent political animal, the cracks soon begin to appear when compared to the reality.

First let us examine parts of Overton’s ‘An Arrow against all Tyrants’ (19th October, 1646) and his ‘Appeale’ (July, 1547):

‘No man hath power over my rights and liberties, and I over no man’s….for by naturall birth all men are equally and alike borne to like propriety, liberty and freedom,  and as we are  delivered of  God by the hand of nature  into this world, everyone  with a naturall, innate freedom and propriety….even so are we to live, every one equally and alike to enjoy his birthright and privilege…. [no more of which may be alienated]  than is conducive to a better being, more  safety and freedome….[for] every man by nature being a King, Priest and Prophet in his own naturall circuit and compasse, whereof no second may partake,  but  by deputation,  commission and  free  consent from  him,  whose  naturall right and freedome it is.’1

In the ‘Appeale’ 0verton adds to this splendid statement of individual liberty, the duty of all men to protect themselves ‘from all things hurtful, destructive and obnoctious thereto to the utmost of [their] power’. It is difficult to accept that any man who could express such sentiments would willingly have allowed that large numbers of men be excluded from the franchise simply because of their position in life.

However, what concerns Macpherson is ‘the proprietorial quality of the Leveller individualism’. The essence of  Man to the Levellers was freedom which meant the proprietorship of one’s own person and capacities (P.142).

From this Macpherson deduces that certain rights were considered inalienable while the right to elect was not. Thus, ‘property in one’s own mental and spiritual  person required freedom of  speech, publication and religion’ (P.142). These rights, apart from their justification by natural law, were demanded for  all because in Lilburne’s words ‘what is done to any one, may be done to every one’3. Similarly, economic rights must be demanded for everyone or monopolists would return, arbitrary taxation and regulation, introduced, even though only those had retained the disposal of their own labour could benefit from them directly,

It is a pity that Macpherson does not extend this line of reasoning to the right to elect. For surely in this  case  as  well, provision against arbitrary disenfranchisement would be necessary and what better method, on Lilburne’s reasoning, than to extend it to all. To this, of course, Macpherson will reply that the functions of government did not concern ‘those who had lost their birthright’, Yet, neither apparently did economic rights  and there would be as much reason to claim the right to elect for all on expedient grounds as there was in the case of economic rights. Further, if we examine the extent to which the Third Agreement especially shackled Parliament, what possible harm, by way of anarchy, levelling of estates etc. could come of it,

The likely answer as to why the Levellers did exclude servants and almstakers after Putney is expediency, either for the reason Petty gave, that dependant men would be afraid to displease their masters, or because they were made aware of political realities.  Macpherson doubts whether the Levellers would have excluded nearly two-thirds of the adult male population on the grounds of expediency, because he believes that they were such committed idealists they could not have brought themselves to such a business.

This is a rather surprising conclusion for, as J.C. Davis4 points out, the Levellers did compromise on the tithes, an issue of principle if ever there was one for them. The March Petition of 1647 and the July Appeale demanded abolition of tithes without provision for compensation. It was not mentioned in the first Agreement5, and deliberately left out from the January Petition of 1643 so as not to ‘disengage any considerable party, and so continue our distractions’. It returned in the Humble Petition (September , 1648) and the Second Agreement, but now with provisions for satisfying all impropriations.

Also, we must remember that the Levellers compromised on the franchise,  even by Macpherson’s account,  in the Second  Agreement. Of course,  Macpherson would be quick to point out the difference between the ratepayer franchise  (adopted in the Agreement) of 375,300,  and the non-servant franchise he says the Levellers wanted (416,700), was so small to be scarcely worth mentioning,  In that case, why  should the matter have raised so much consternation  at Putney.  Macpherson  says the dispute at Putney arose because Ireton and Cromwell wanted nothing more than the freeholder franchise. Yet Cromwell at Putney admitted he was willing to allow that ‘perhaps  there are a very considerable part of copyholders, by inheritance, that ought to have a voice’6.

There is further evidence that the Levellers compromised. When all seemed lost after Burford, ‘The Remonstrance of Many Thousands of the Free-people of England’ offered  amongst other things votes to ‘all that come unto us’. The  tone of the ‘Remonstrance’ is savage, reflecting the bitter anger felt by the author at the betrayal of the people’s iberties.  That it offered votes to ‘all that come unto us’ may merely be, in part at least, a reflection of this bitterness and also of the fact that it was a call to armed rebellion, Yet it is surely significant that such a statement should be made so soon after the ‘Third Agreement’ which although a partial compromise designed to appeal to moderate opinion, is none the less often viewed as the final position  of  the  Levellers. It is also interesting to note that it demanded ‘that  every free-commoner shall be put into a way and enabled with means for his natural subsistence’7, surely in this context meaning all commoners and thus giving added strength to the belief that the use of the word ‘free’ was merely a rhetorical device.

 A further pamphlet which was Leveller in tone was ‘A Charge of High Treason exhibited  against Oliver Cromwell’ (1653), which summoned all the people of England to the polls ‘as well  masters, sons of servants’ which, if nothing else, reflects a radicalism that, whatever the truth of Macpherson’s  case, reminds us that we have every cause to assume that the seeds of manhood suffrage were always there.

 Notes

 1. C.B. Macpherson, pp. 140-1

 2. Ibid, p.141.

 3. Haller and Davies, The Leveller Tracts, p.455.

 4 J.C. Davis , The Levellers and Democracy .

 5 The  Agreement was  concerned with short-term

 measures which may well explain the exclusion.

 6. A.S.P. Woodhouse, P.7.

 7. Levellers and the Puritan Revolution, p.575

 Chapter 4

 SERVANTS AND ALMSTAKERS

Macpherson  has calculated  (using Gregory King’s estimate of 1688) that universal manhood suffrage in 1648 would have enfranchised 1,170,400 men. The exclusion  of  servants and almstakers (by Prof Macpherson’s definition, and accepting that all soldiers regardless of status were to be enfranchised) would have reduced this figure to 416,700. Thus, the Levellers on this reckoning  were  committed  to excluding nearly two-thirds of the adult male  population from the franchise. That I would suggest is a palpable nonsense.

Various criticisms may be made concerning the manner in which Macpherson has  treated  King’s figures.  These ‘statistics’ were at best informed guesses, and  King himself considerably varied his estimates of the size of social classes.1 In addition, Macpherson takes no account of a probably significant rise in wage-earners between 1648 and 1688, It may  even be, as A.L. Morton suggests,2 that King’s figures are misleading for  1693, because they do not differentiate adequately between the many graduations of employment to be found between a simple wage-earner and independent producer or artisan.

However, such criticisms do not go to the heart of the matter. The crux of the problem lies in the meaning given to the terms servant and almstaker (or beggar)by the Levellers within the context of  the franchise. To  read Macpherson is to gain the impression that servant in  common  contemporary  usage was given the usual meaning which he ascribes to it, i.e. wage-earner.

Yet it would appear that contemporaries used the term variously to accommodate the semantic confusion arising from an attempt to apply a social vocabulary inherited from a feudal and patriarchal past to the needs  of a society in which the relationship of master and servant was steadily yielding to that of employer and wage-earner.3

In fact, as K. Thomas points out, none of the three contemporary economic writers to whom Macpherson refers, Andrew Yarranton, John Carey and Thomas Firrin (p.282), equated ‘servants’ with day-labourers, the latter actually distinguishing between single persons who earned money by pinning with ‘servants’, that is, apprentices or domestics .

The Statute of Artificers also distinguished between ‘servants ‘ who contracted for a year or similar period and ‘artificers and  labourers being hired for wages by the day or week’. Richard Mayo, the author of ‘Present for Servants’ (1693),  considered the normal usage concerned those who ‘….have voluntarily submitted  themselves, by  contract, for a certain time to the disposal of others, according to the word of God, and the laws of the realm’ 4.

Now let us refer back to the statement of Petty during the Putney debates. (p. ). His reason for exclusion was ‘because they depend upon the will of other men and should be afraid to displease then’. In the light of this, there was obviously a  considerable difference between a man contracted to serve a year or so, who could only break his contract by mutual agreement with his employer or by order of a J.P on application by master or servant alone, and a wage-earner who was employed more or less casually, who, in theory at least, could change  employer  frequently  and also could be dismissed at   will. (It might appear that the contracted servant was in  a vastly more secure position, but it must  be remembered  that unilateral application would be infinitely more likely to be granted to an employer than a  servant).

There is further evidence that the Levellers were, at worst, concerned with excluding only those who were really bound to one man. The franchise clause of the  Second Agreement states that electors ‘shall be Natives, or Denizen of England, not persons receiving Alms .,. not servants to,  and receiving wages from any particular person’5 . It is even possible that this ‘wage from any particular person’  represents a compromise on the part of the Levellers. Only in the Second Agreement  do  we  find  wage-earners specifically excluded from the franchise. As this document was the result of bargaining between the Levellers and their opponents, the exclusion of those who received ‘wages from a particular person’ may not have been proposed by the Levellers. It may rather represent a reduction of a more extreme position by their opponents, i.e. that all wage-earners were to be excluded. In itself the distinction made between ‘servants’ and ‘wage-earners’ is evidence that the two were thought of as separate groups.

At best, it would  seen that Macpherson’s definition is too broad, and that the Levellers were thinking in terns of personal servants, employees living in the master’s house and apprentices. If this was so, then the disenfranchisement of the groups would have been, for the most part, temporary. Apprentices would become journeymen and eventually masters (or  at least the Levellers wished to create a situation where this could happen). Of the two other groups, there is evidence that many were below voting age,  and their period of employment relatively short. At Ealing in 1599, 60 per cent of the population aged 15 – 19) were servants. At Claworth in 1676, there were 67 servants of whom only one remained by 1638, and at Cogenhoe again only one out of total of 31 in 1618 was still employed in 1628.6 The most likely explanation for this apparent mobility of labour is that when a man married he set up his own household.

If we then consider evidence suggesting that to be head of household was the mark of a man capable of voting, the significance of this is obvious. Thomas Cartwright  wrote ‘All men understand that where the election is most freest and most general, yet only they have to do which  are head of families’, and, John Eliot in his ‘Christian Commonwealth’ (1659) ‘servants, or sons living with their parents are in the condition of servants…. may not explicitly , politically, personally, choose public  rulers…. But, if they marry or live in the state of allowed public freedmen, then are they capable of the choice of their public rulers’7. If we can accept such views as representative, then the disenfranchisement of  servants in our restricted sense becomes, for at least a great part of then, a temporary affair.

The  Leveller  position on almstakers  is, rather easier to resolve. Until the Second Agreement, only  beggars were mentioned. The Putney resolution, ‘The Grande Designe’ (John Harris) and the ‘Petition of January’ 1648, used the terms ‘beggars’ rather than ‘almstakers’. This in itself might not be significant, for it is conceivable that ‘beggar’ was a term which included persons who begged casually, probably in an  itinerant fashion, and men who were forced to seek parish relief temporarily or permanently.  However, there are indications that this was not so. William Petty alone of the Levellers at Putney spoke of ‘those that  receive alms’. That he used this phrase may be accounted for by the fact that Cromwell had just  posed a question in a fashion which prompted such an answer. In any event, Petty qualified his statement by explaining that he meant ‘those that receive alms from door to door’, surely not a reference to those who received official parish relief.

Cromwell himself, according to John Say’s parliamentary diary, informed the Commons on 23rd November 1647, that the agitators ‘would exclude children and servants, Yet such as received alms they insisted on as persons competent for electors’. It could be argued that Cromwell was slandering them in the hope of discrediting the Levellers, yet in that case why not go further and say they would include servants as well?

We know also of the concern the Levellers showed for those impoverished by the war. It would seem  most unlikely that they would willingly have excluded such persons simply because they were forced to take alms.  Nor do they appear to have regarded almstakers in general as irresponsible. One of the demands of the January Petition of 1643 was that ‘the poor be enabled to choose their trustees’.

The inclusion of ‘almstakers’ alone, even if we are mistaken about ‘servants’, would have increased the electorate considerably. According to Macpherson, in 1643 there were 309,700 ‘almstakers’ and only 9,000 ‘beggars,’9 If we are correct in our interpretation of the term ‘servant’ then a position approaching universal manhood suffrage is in view. (Statistics for ‘servants’ as we understand the term present problems, but Peter Laslett 10 has estimated that 10-15 per cent would fall into this category,  many of whom would be only temporarily disenfranchised or under age,)

There is one further point to consider, namely the Levellers’ own conception of their society and what they wished it to be. Although supporters of property, their main concern was to protect the rights of the small man. For this protection they looked, as was the habit of mind then,  much to the past for answers and justifications and had constantly in their minds some  ideal of a Golden Age, If the master-servant relationship was giving way to that of employer-wage-earner, this was not obvious to them. The type of society which they desired was that of the  small independent man, and they believed that the  safeguards  they sought against monopoly and other  unwarranted interference with the individual  would  produce such a society, and thus the electorate, even if exclusions were made in their own time, would increase over the years. Whether this was  impracticable  or not, is neither here nor there in assessing their intentions,

 Notes

 1. K. Thomas, p. 71.

 2 A.L, ‘Morton , p.213.

 3. K. Thomas , p.72.

 4 Ibid, 3 ,71.

 5. D.H. Wolfe, p.403

 6 A.L. Morton, p,214.

 7 P. 72-73.

 8. D.H. Wolfe, p,82 ,

 9. Beware of making the same mistake as Thomas does

 by taking 1613 figures for 1543.

 l0. P. Laslett, The World We Have Lost.

CONCLUSION

There would appear to be three possible explanations of the Levellers’ attitude to the franchise. Firstly, that Macpherson is correct, namely that the Levellers were always in favour of a restricted franchise,  excluding servants and beggars. Secondly, that they  were from the first in favour of a full manhood franchise, but were forced to compromise when faced with political realities.  Thirdly, that the Levellers were not originally overly concerned with the franchise, or at least their ideas were not clear-cut, but came, through the trials of 1647-9, to a desire for full manhood suffrage but were then thwarted by political realities.

I suspect that the last comes closest to the truth. It is difficult to imagine most of those who followed the Levellers being content with anything less than full enfranchisement for themselves or for others like them. That being so the broad membership of the Leveller cause leads to the logical conclusion that a very wide franchise indeed must have been desired if not attained.  

Macpherson claims too much for his evidence. Firstly, the consistency which he attributes to the Levellers may, I think, be safely discounted. That some men of Levelling colour did think as Macpherson believes is most probably true, indeed almost certainly so, for it would be a strange party or group which did not contain differences of opinion on such a contentious issue.

Secondly, his broad definition of servants is dubious to say the least, particularly when we bear in mind the apparent  readiness of the Commons before 1640 to grant wider franchises than he claims for the Levellers, and the fact that on his definition many who voted previously would have  been excluded.

The position of the almstakers  is, I think, even  more clear cut, remembering that Petty spoke of ‘those that receive alms from door to door’, the use of  ’beggars’ until the Second Agreement , and the entry in John Bay’s diary (a piece of  evidence, incidentally , not available to Macpherson ).

Thirdly, the philosophy which he attributes to the Levellers has logical flaws when examined closely, and the system he constructs makes one wonder, with Peter  Laslett, whether Macpherson has not developed his theory before examining  his   evidence  and consequently  falls, albeit  unconsciously, into the mistake of attempting to sustain his theory by arguing a priori that all must thus be so. 

After the Restoration, democratic ideas did not gain serious political currency in England for more than a century. However, they found ready supporters abroad, most dramatically in the person of Thomas Paine, who although English made his name in the American Revolution. The received academic opinion on the Revolution is that it was the offspring of John Locke. In fact, it had at least as much in common with the ideas of the Levellers. The  Constitution is a balance between Locke and Paine, granting a large degree of popular involvement in politics , whilst tempering it with restrictions such as electoral colleges.

Why did the idea of democracy based on the active consent of all men arise in England rather than elsewhere? There were good reasons why it did. In the early modern period, England was an oddity amongst European states. Representative assemblies were commonplace in the mediaeval world. By 1600 all but a few had fallen to the growing power of rulers and either ceased to exist or had been emasculated to the point of insignificance. In England alone Parliament had increased  its power and status in the 16th century. Not only that, but elections were held to appoint MPs. The membership of most European assemblies was, like the House of Lords, dependent on social position.

There was also a long tradition of liberty in England. In the minds of the Levellers these went back to long before Magna Carta. They also, as mentioned in the introduction, saw this tradition as having been stifled by the Normans and their continental successors. These were and are powerful engines for action.

England was also odd in other ways. Serfdom had withered away early. Enclosure had driven men off the land and into the towns. The dissolution of the monasteries had both removed the incubus of Rome and redistributed land and property, much of which ended up in the hands of “new men”. The population had risen dramatically since 1500 and high inflation (by pre-modern standards) had caused considerable social dislocation. At the same time, the wealth of the country had grown and the foundations laid for the commercial revolution which was to lay the foundation for the industrial revolution. Stuart society was a world on the physical, economic and intellectual move and waiting to move faster if the right engine appeared. The Civil War was the right transporter.

 Notes

 1. Market Society and Political Theory

  Bibliography

 C. B. Macpherson The theory of possessive individualism

 Primary Sources

 D.H. Wolfe, Leveller Manifestoes of the Puritan

 Revolution.

 A,S.P. Woodhouse, Puritanism and Liberty.

 W. Hall, Tracts on Liberty in the Puritan evolution, Vol. III.

 Secondary Sources

  C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism

 K. Thomas, The Levellers and the Franchise (Chapter in the Interregnum The Quest for Settlement, Ed. G.E. Aylmer).

A.L. Morton, Leveller Democracy (In he world of the Rantors).

J.C. Davis, The Levellers ad Democracy : P. & P.X1 1968.

R. Howell and D. Brewster Reconsidering the Levellers, P. & P, 1970.

J.H. Plumb, The Growth of the electorate 1600-1715, P. & P. 1969

V.F. Snow, Parliamentary Reapportionment Proposals in The Puritan Revolution, E.H.R. 1959.

G.F. Aylmer, Gentlemen Levellers, P, & P. 1970.

P. Laslett, The World We Have Lost.

P. Laslett, Market Society and Political Theory, H.J. VII (1964).

J. Frank – The Levellers.

N.H, Brailsford – The Levellers and the English Revolution.

M.A. Gibb – John Lilburne The Leveller.

English education: the roots of its politicisation

When I left school in the mid-sixties the Empire was effectively finished – the final nail in the coffin of imperial feeling was banged in by our entry into the EU in 1972,  which alienated the  white dominions – and a new spirit of anti-Establishment feeling was beginning to erode school discipline. But progressive ideals had not yet taken hold the  educational establishment and the comprehensive disaster was only in its infancy. The school leaving exams, the O and A Levels, were a real test of competence in both their subjects and of  the literacy and numeracy of candidates. To take but one example of the difference between then and now: even O Level science exams had, for 16-year-olds, demanding practicals as well as written papers. 

By the mid seventies the grammar schools had been reduced to a rump of a few hundred. Ironically, most of those which had converted to  comprehensive schools or which had chosen to become private schools to preserve their status,  had been forced to change by a supposedly conservative government, that of Ted Heath, whose education minister was  Margaret  Thatcher.  The  failure  of  Heath  to  stop comprehensivisation  was a harbinger of what was to happen under the future Conservative governments of Thatcher and Major.

Comprehensivisation

The comprehensive ideal  is not innately wrong.  Children of very widely differing abilities can be successfully taught  together. Traditionally, the greatest public schools  in England have been  comprehensives of a sort.  They took boys who varied from the exceptionally bright to the stonewall stupid and managed largely  to successfully educate both groups and all those in between.  The very bright won scholarships to Oxbridge, while the stonewall stupid  at least left school functionally literate.

But these schools were hopeless models for a  state comprehensive system. They drew almost all of their pupils from the middle and upper classes  and the resources available to the schools from fees and endowments vastly outstripped any that could ever be available to state funded schools. The social class of the pupils meant that the pupils had expectations of being in the higher reaches of society when they entered adult life and parents who actively wanted and expected their children to be educated. To these advantages were added  greatly  superior financial resources which permitted the recruitment of first rate staff, small classes and personal tuition.

A general comprehensive system lacks the advantages of a great public school.  Most of the schools will be dominated by the children of the working class simply because they are by far the most numerous.  That would be true even if all private schools were abolished and “bussing” of middle and upper class children was enforced to ensure that schools were socially mixed.

Inevitably the adult expectations of working class children tend to be lower than those of the middle and upper classes. Their parents are generally less supportive of the idea of education. A significant minority are actively hostile to their children becoming better educated than they are because it divorces the children from their workingclass roots.  Few will be able to provide active academic  assistance to their children.  Those facts alone make mixed ability teaching difficult. Add in the much smaller financial resources available to state schools – which expresses itself in larger classes, a narrower curriculum and, on average,  less able and  less  well motivated staff  – and you have a recipe for low educational attainment. In such schools the bright and academically interested  pupils often become isolated, under-challenged intellectually  and frequently bullied, while the duller,  non-academic majority  are allowed to plough an educational furrow,  which stretches from  academic inadequacy to an outright failure of education. 

In practice comprehensivisation was much worse than that.  Bussing was not enforced.  The better off continued to send their children to fee-paying  schools – today approximately 7 per cent  of  our schoolchildren are privately educated, a higher proportion than in the 1960s when many middleclass parents were happy to send their children to state grammar schools. (It is a grand irony that comprehensivisation rescued the public schools,  many of which were  struggling to maintain numbers by 1965).

Social segregation by the use of fee-paying schools was amplified both by the natural segregation of social classes into geographical areas – in the absence of enforced “bussing” a middle class suburb will have a local school which is largely filled with middleclass children – and by the widespread practice of middle class parents moving to areas where good state schools were available. The consequence has been a state school system which is heavily segregated by class, with the schools dominated by the working class tending to be the lowest achieving.

The subversion of the social mixing part of the comprehensive ideal was further  complicated by mass immigration. This introduced not only racial and ethnic conflict into schools, a toxic enough disruptive element in itself, but also created grave practical problems  because so many of the immigrant children did not have a competence in English.  The  official promotion of multiculturalism and  its concomitant  idea  that any member of an  ethnic  minority  is  automatically a victim of white society  complicated the position further, not least in the area of discipline. Ethnic minorities soon realised  that in the context of an  official  sponsorship  of “victimhood”  they could get away with more and more. Native English  children seeing this, naturally enough, also became more inclined to  misbehave. 

Because immigrants settled almost entirely in large towns and cities, these problems were and are confined almost exclusively to schools where the white pupils were workingclass, who found  their already inferior opportunities for education further reduced. Worse,  immigration was the final lever which allowed progressive education to not only gain absolute ascendency in the English state  educational system, but to transform the progressive ideal into an overt political ideology, the ideology we know today as political correctness.

English education in saner times

I was born in 1947. Never, perhaps, has England (and Britain) been more of a coherent community.  The dramatic recent experience of the Second World War  filled the minds of everyone  and that  shared experience  bound together even more tightly  a very racially and culturally homogenous country.  It was rare to see a black or brown face even in London, and any suggestion that someone from a racial or cultural minority should do anything but  their best to assimilate into English culture would have been generally thought to touch the confines of lunacy. It was a very English, very British world. 

It was a time when Britain made most of the manufactured goods that it consumed, including its own cars, aircraft, ships, and it would have been thought extraordinary for a British Government to fail to protect British industry.  Great industrial names such as Austin (cars) and  Fry’s (chocolate) were not only English-owned and English made but leaders in the English market.  The shops which people used were generally owned by the English and more often than not family enterprises.  Every day an inhabitant of England  was reminded that  they were members of an advanced technological society which could make or grow what it wanted and that most of what they consumed was made in England (or at least Britain) or came from the Empire. 

The idea of Empire was still important – just. The fifties were the very last moment when an English boy could grow up with an  imperial consciousness as part of everyday life. There was no assumption that the Empire would collapse. India might have gone in 1947, but the assumption amongst both the general population and the political elite was that Britain would have to bear “the white man’s burden”  for many  a long year yet.  That will seem extraordinary to the point of fantasy now, but  it is true. In the forties and fifties  the Foreign and Colonial Office continued to  recruit and train young men for careers  as imperial servants such as District Officers and white  emigration from Britain to places such as Kenya and Rhodesia was officially encouraged. 

Against this background English schools taught as a matter of course a curriculum that extolled English and British values, history and culture.  History for the English child was British and imperial history first with  European history a poor second. Geography was concerned primarily with the physical and demographic demography of Britain.  English literature concentrated on the classic English texts from Chaucer through to Trollope.

But it was not simply English history and culture which was imparted. Whole class teaching was the norm with the teacher firmly in charge. Children were expected to acquire the factual knowledge of a subject as well as its process. Because discipline was not generally a problem, schools were primarily institutions to teach people rather than being the child-minding depots we all too often see today.  There is a good case for saying that the general standard of English education was never higher than in the quarter century between 1945 and 1970. This was not only because of the good overall educational standard, but because  all pupils, unlike the pre-war system, now got a secondary education as of right.

That is not to say everything in the post-war educational garden was lovely.  Before comprehensive education began under the first  Wilson Government,  English state education was divided between grammar schools, secondary moderns and a small number of technical schools – the last were intended as training grounds for artisans, to use an old fashioned word.  The consequence was to lower, irrevocably in most instances,  the social horizons and aspirations of those who did not  pass the 11-plus and go to grammar schools, because it was very difficult to move to a grammar school after the age of 11.  It also created a sense of inferiority and resentment amongst many 11-plus failures.

Despite these shortcomings,  the system was unreservedly to be preferred to what we have today. The grammar schools not only produced a  genuinely educated class, but provided  an escape  route  to something better for clever children from even the poorest backgrounds.  That opportunity grew with the significant expansion of university and polytechnic places in the fifties and sixties. In 1950 approximately  2 per cent of English school-leavers went on to higher education: by 1970, following the implementation of the Robbins Report (1963), the figure was approximately  7 per cent (and this was the age of the post-war baby-boomer generation, so there were more pupils in the age group in 1970 than 1950).  Most tellingly, in the 1960s, before the destruction of the grammar schools,  workingclass children in higher education  formed a greater proportion of the whole student body than it does now – there are more workingclass students now, but that is simply a consequence of the vast increase in those in higher education to more than 40 per cent.

Quantifying English intellectual accomplishment

In  his  book  “Human  Accomplishment”   the  American  Charles  Murray calculates  the  contribution  to  civilisation  made  by   individuals throughout  history  up until 1950.  To give his calculations  as  much objectivity  as possible he measures  the amount of attention given  to an  individual   by  specialists in their  field in   sources  such  as  biographical  dictionaries – put crudely, the greater the frequency  of mention and the larger the space devoted to an individual,  the  higher they score.

Murray  quantifies   achievements  under  the  headings  of   astronomy (Galileo  and  Kepler  tied  for  first  place),  biology  (Darwin  and Aristotle),  chemistry (Lavoisier),  earth sciences  (Lyell),   physics (Newton  and  Einstein),   mathematics  (Euler),   medicine   (Pasteur, Hippocrates  and  Koch),   technology  (Edison  and  Watt),    combined scientific (Newton), Chinese philosophy (Confucious), Indian philosophy (Sankara), Western  philosophy (Aristotle), Western music (Beethoven and Mozart),  Chinese painting  (Gu  Kaizhi  and  Zhao  Mengfu),  Japanese painting  (Sesshu,  Sotatsu and  Korin),   Western  art  (Michelangelo), Arabic  literature,  (al-Mutanabbi) Chinese literature (Du Fu),  Indian literature  (Kalidasa),   Japanese  literature  (Basho  and  Chikamatsu Monzaemon), Western literature (Shakespeare).  

Objections have been made to Murray’s methodology such as the fact that many  of the great achievements of the past,  especially in  the  arts, have  been anonymous,  which give it a bias towards the modern  period, and fears that it has a built-in Western bias –  the  representation of  non-Western  figures in the science  and technology  categories  is minimal.   Nothing can be done about anonymity – it is  worth  pointing out  that the majority of those heading the categories lived  at  least several  centuries  ago  – but  Murray  substantially   guards  against pro-Western  bias with the breadth and number of his sources and it  is simply  a fact that science and advanced technology arose only  in  the  past few centuries and that both are essentially Western  achievements. It  is  also noteworthy that Murray’s  method only places  one  of  his fellow   countrymen  at  number  one  in  any  category    (Edison   in technology).  If  any bias exists it is unlikely to  be  conscious.  At worst,  Murray’s  findings  can be seem as a fair  rating   of  Western achievement.

The list of those heading the various categories (see second  paragraph above)   suggests  that  Murray’s method is pretty  sound  despite  any possible methodological  shortcomings,  because those who come top  are all men of extreme achievement.  There might be arguments over  whether Aristotle should take precedence over Plato or Kant,   but no one could honestly argue that  Aristotle was an obviously unworthy winner of first place in the philosophy category.

Of the 13 categories which  can include Westerners (they are  obviously  excluded  from  non-European  literature  and  art),   Englishmen are indisputed firsts or share  first place with one other in four: biology Darwin with  Aristotle;   Physics  Newton  with  Einstein;   combined scientific  Newton alone;  Western literature Shakespeare  alone.   No other  nation  has  more  than two representatives  at  the  top  of  a category.  The thirteen Western  ncluding categories have a total of 18 people in  sole or joint first place.  England  has nearly a quarter of those  in first place and more than a quarter of the 15 who  are  drawn from the modern period, say 1500 AD onwards.   

Apart  from those coming first,   the English show strongly in most  of the  Western qualifying categories (especially in physics – 9 out of the top 20, technology – 8 out of the top twenty – and Western literature). The  major  exceptions  are   Western art  and   music,  where  English representation  is mediocre.   I think most people who think about  the matter  at  all  would feel those  quantified cultural  strengths  and  weaknesses represent the reality of English history and society.     

The fact that England shows so strongly in Murray’s exercise  gives the lie  to  the common representation of the  English  as  unintellectual. Moreover,  there is much more to human intellectual accomplishment than the fields covered by Murray,  most notably the writing of  history and the social sciences,  areas in which England has  been at the forefront throughout the modern period: think Gibbon,  Macaulay,  Herbert Spencer and Keynes.

England – the saviour of the Reformation

The Reformation is one of those very rare events which may legitimately be described as seminal. Whether it was, as has often been claimed, the engine which drove the commercial and industrial revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is debatable, even dubious. It may or may not have been responsible for the spirit of intellectual enquiry which began in the sixteenth century – I favour the spread of knowledge through the invention of printing. What is not in doubt is the fillip it gave to the development of Europe’s kingdoms and principalities becoming political islands unto themselves. After Luther and Calvin the ideal of a European unity called Christendom was done. The Protestant parts of Europe were faced with the forces of the Counter-Reformation. Princes and peoples were forced to decide where they stood. The map of modern Europe began to take shape.

Read a general history of the Reformation and England will probably play a small role. This is a mistake for one very potent reason: England was the most important kingdom to go Protestant. Had she not embraced the Protestant cause, it is dubious whether the Reformation would have succeeded. Spain and France, the two most powerful continental kingdoms stayed loyal to the Catholic Church and wielded the Counter Reformation’s sword with enthusiasm and energy. The Emperor remained Catholic. Apart from England, the Protestant cause was alive only in the Netherlands, where it was ominously threatened by the Spanish, sundry German states all of which were too small to be of account on their own and in Scandinavia, peopled by few and on the periphery of Europe.

England preserved the Protestant Reformation firstly by simply being an important European power which was  Protestant. While England was Protestant, the Catholic world knew that Protestantism was seriously alive. This knowledge also gave heart to continental Protestants. England’s second contribution was practical: in the vitally important years of the sixteenth century she gave aid in men and money to the fledgling Protestant States of the continent, particularly to the Netherlands, an irony which will not be lost on those with a knowledge of English/Dutch relations in the next century. Her third and last contribution was the American colonies. Protestantism was given a refuge across the sea. No longer could popes and Catholic monarchs dream of expunging  the heresy by simply cleansing Europe.

Why did England turn so easily to Protestantism? The answer is threefold: John Wyclif, anti-clericism and a long history of Royal resistance to papal authority.

Wyclif and his followers actually embraced the theological and practical foundations of the Reformation in the second half of the fourteenth century, one hundred and fifty odd years before Luther pinned his theses on the door of the  castle church of Wittenberg. Wyclif questioned the reality of  transubstantiation (the Catholic belief that the bread and  wine at Communion turn literally into the body and blood of Christ), he attacked the authority of the pope, he railed against the abuses of simony and indulgences. He advocated a  bible in English and either he or his followers, the Lollards, produced a complete translation before the end of  the fourteenth century. Lollardy was officially suppressed early in the next century, but their ideas lingered, both here and abroad.

Wyclif’s ideas had very wide appeal. This owed more to a deep-rooted English anti-clericism, than any theological  niceties. (The English have never been a deeply religious race). Add in the long history of English kings resisting  Papal meddling in the affairs of England and the mistrust of foreigners natural to the average Englishman, stir the  mixture and one can readily see that when the Reformation came England was culturally predisposed to accept it.